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ABSTRACT 
Across continents, countries share borders with one another and so, have settlements called border 
communities. Nigeria is not an exception as she shares borders with neighboring states like Benin 
Republic in the South-West, Niger in the North, Chad and Cameroun in the North-East. For over 
5 years, Nigeria has witnessed serious security challenge most especially, in the North-Eastern 
region, through the activities of Boko Haram, who infiltrated through porous borders putting the 
communities on constant threats and invasion. Extant literature reveals that these communities are 
being marginalized, with little or no attention from government in terms of basic infrastructure 
needed for daily survival. So far, research has focused on the coping strategy of Internally 
Displaced Persons and refugees in camps and host communities, to the total neglect of the border 
communities. It is therefore in this light that this study focuses on the coping strategies evolved by 
the border communities which ensures their continued survival against cross-border insurgency. 
This study was underpinned by three theories such as state fragility theory, functional prerequisite, 
human needs theory while a theoretical model that speaks to the coping strategies of border 
communities in North-Eastern Nigeria will be constructed from the study. For this study, 
qualitative research model was adopted using a phenomenological case study approach in 
exploring the coping strategy of border communities to ensure their survival and continuing 
existence, against cross-border insurgency. The target population consisted of all inhabitants of 
border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Purposive sampling method was employed 
utilizing the typical case in the selection of participants. In-depth Interview (IDI) and Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) was employed in collection of data while the interviews conducted were 
interpreted, transcribed, and content-analyzed. Data from both primary and secondary sources 
were descriptively analysed systematically and objectively, making valid textual inferences from 
them by identifying specific characteristics as it relates to cross-border insurgency and the coping 
strategies of border communities which are the crux of the study. Findings revealed that truly the 
border communities suffer Boko Haram attacks which has not only created a state of insecurity 
within the communities but has also created humanitarian crisis. Pathetic to note that this situation 
has received limited or no response hence, the evolvement of coping strategies by the communities 
for continued survival. These coping strategies involve reconciliation and unity, vigilance and 
Prayerfulness, formation of Vigilante Groups, and Bargain. Though, these strategies have been 
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effective for survival, they have proven not to be totally capable of preventing further attacks in 
the communities. It is therefore necessary for the government through its agencies most especially, 
the North-East Development Commission and the Border Community Development Agency to 
synergize and improve on these strategies so that these communities can continue to experience 
the peace and tranquility that have eroded them for too long.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 
1.0 Background to the study 
Through the ages, Africans have migrated across what has been termed international boundaries 
as pastoralists, traders, muggers, refugees etc. According to Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 
(2013). The scramble for Africa by the colonialists which eventually led to the partitioning of 
Africa following the Berlin Conference of 1885/1887 brought about the phenomenon of artificial 
borders on the continent, which in turn resulted in the curtailment of free movement of people, 
goods and services across the traditional, lax borders. Ikome (2012) assert that the porosity of 
Nigeria’s borders owes as much to the way the colonialists carved up the African continent as to 
the nature of their management by post-colonial states.  To this end, the intention of the colonialists 
which was sacrosanct to them in the partitioning of Africa was not to create a boundary per se, but 
to create a sphere of influence driven by political and economic motives.  
These boundaries defined in terms of latitudes, longitudes, geometric circles and straight lines-
split several ethnic and cultural communities, a situation which majorly has made it difficult for 
most African states to effectively administer their borders cutting across cultural and ethnic groups. 
A perfect example is the Yekewa and Yardaje communities which, by virtue of the borderlines 
that cut across them, are separated into different states namely Niger and Nigeria respectively1. 
While porosity of African borders may aptly be blamed on colonialism, African leaders have also 
contributed no less to it by border mismanagement, thus opening them up to various, foreign, 
hostile incursions. As Okumu, (2010: 22) notes, “the high level of insecurity on African borders 
is largely due to the way they are administered and managed, and less to do with how colonialists 
drew them”. What has been generally said of insecurity is particularly true of cross-border 
insurgency especially in form of armed conflict. 
 
1 According to Miles, (1993), Yardaje and Yekewa are two neighboring Muslim Hausa villages of almost equal size, 
administrative status, and economic importance. Thirteen kilometres apart, they are located within the indigenous 
region of Daura, attributed as the birthplace of the Hausa people. By virtue of the demarcation of international 
boundary, the two communities found themselves on opposite sides. Yardaje to Nigeria and Yekewa to Niger. 
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Armed conflict, prior to and during the Cold War era, was perceived as inter-bellum between 
sovereign states (Laqueur, 2004). Since the Cold War ended, the experience of armed conflict has 
transformed into the emergence of non-state actors against their very nation-state (Laqueur, 2004). 
According to Abott, et al (2006), insurgency, which has been termed the commonest form of armed 
conflict, has arguably continued to pose as the greatest peril to global peace and security in the 21st 
century. Some years back, insurgency was experienced in a few, isolated places, such as the 
Basque country in Northern Spain, the Northern Ireland, and some locale in the Middle East 
(Barga, 2012). This phenomenon is now clearly evident across the globe with the uprising of 
insurgent or terrorist groups such as the Kashmiri groups in India, Karen and Shan groups in 
Thailand, Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front in Syria (ISIS), Hezbollah 
in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and the Taliban in Pakistan.  
In India, Lal (2012) averred that “the radical Islamic groups domiciled in Indian Kashmir, 
insurgent groups in the northeastern provinces, and groups launching attacks on major cities 
generally have ties to Pakistani extremist groups” (Lal, 2012: 129) such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (Lal, 2004). They also have a strong link with global Islamic extremist 
movement such as Al-Qaeda. Initially, the Kashmiri groups primarily focused their attention and 
activities on the Kashmir region but later spread their tentacles to India’s urban areas. The attacks 
carried out on India’s Parliament in 2001, the UN Consulate in Calcutta in 2002, and series of 
attacks in Mumbai in 2008 attest to the preceding. Again, the radical Maoist insurgents otherwise 
called the Naxalites posed a serious threat on many central Indian states such as Andhra Pradesh, 
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa.  
This insurgent group basically erupted to overthrow the national government and attack the crème 
de la crème who hold ownership of lands. They also violently resist the incursion of foreign 
companies who have come into India for business purposes and force those that were already in 
India. They violently attack such formations and disrupt their operations, mostly mining operations 
(Lal, 2012). This focus earned the Naxalite insurgent groups the sympathy of the tribal locations 
mainly composed of the minorities who feel neglected in the scheme of things and in the 
developmental plan of India, and therefore garnered membership from these areas. With a strong 
membership base, the Naxalites were able to carry out several deadly attacks on police formations 
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in the earlier mentioned areas. These occurrences made the state governments embark on 
counterinsurgency (COIN) moves against the insurgents. The government of Orissa commissioned 
two thousand one hundred special police officers and four battalions of the Indian reserve Police 
for this purpose. In 2008, several clashes between the government forces and the Naxalites led to 
the death of seventy-four police officers and twenty-two civilians (Joshi, 2009). In all, about one 
thousand lives (both security operatives and civilians) were lost in different attacks launched by 
the Naxalites in the areas. Though, some Naxalites were also killed, figures were not given. Several 
appeals were made to the Indian government to end the armed response and tackle the issue as a 
socio-political concern, but the government declined and still treated the issue as breakdown of 
law and order which needed be addressed by the police (Kripalani, 2008). In fact, government 
policies further supported armed response through police mobilization rather than recommending 
swift moves toward economic development of the areas concerned.  
In addition, in the North-Eastern region of India, different insurgent groups operate in states that 
are marginalized and poorly governed and developed such as Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, 
Nagaland, and Tripura. Insurgent groups in these states fight the central government on issues that 
concern the development of the region which it has failed to address. At some point the border 
communities in these states became tensed up as there was an influx of immigrants from 
Bangladesh. Their presence threatened the existing culture and poor economic status of the 
communities. Regardless, the lack of clear government structures in these communities gave the 
insurgents a wide space to occupy. They therefore went ahead to forcefully collect taxes, ruling 
over these communities with lethal force. These insurgent groups went further to establish enclaves 
across borders into neighbouring countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar thus, making a 
domestic issue become transnational (Lal, 2012). 
According to Salehyan (2010), Insurgent groups seek havens in neighboring countries where they 
settle for the training of their combatants, stockpile the needed resources, and enjoy a level of 
safety. Once these groups have fully stabilized themselves on external soil, they cease to be a 
solely domestic affair but draw attention from regional governments. Examples include the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) which constitutes a major threat to the 
Colombian government and has retained bases all over the North Andean region (Marcella, 2008) 
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and the Sudanese insurgent groups who succeeded in acquiring a base in neighbouring Chad solely 
for training of combatants (Jagadish, 2009).  The Afghan forces have equally experienced 
consequential difficulties in tackling the Taliban solely because insurgents are found all around 
the border with Pakistan (Jagadish, 2009). In the same vein, some countries have maintained 
significant relations with neighbouring countries to contain and end such insurgency. India, for 
example, has positively engaged its neighbors to tackle such menace in its northeastern states. 
While constant attacks remain a continuum, India continues to partner with its neigbours like 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar (Burma) to combat such insurgent groups so as to curtain their 
growth and subsequent distribution (Salehyan, 2010). 
In Thailand, ethnic insurgent groups such as the Karen and Shan groups have carried out activities 
across the border into Myanmar which have at various times severed the relationship between the 
two countries. On a number of occasions when some separatists and Karen National Union strike, 
forcing the Myanmar military to react by attacking their bases on the side of Thai, the government 
of Thai responded with a counter force on the ground of defending her territorial sovereignty, 
thereby impeding the Myanmar forces from infiltrating the Thai border to combat the insurgents 
(Salehyan, 2010). Furthermore, in February 1992, Thai military through its air force fired shots at 
Burmese soldiers who crossed its border to attack a Karen base as a warning for them to desist 
from crossing its border again on such mission (Poole, 1992).  These clashes continued to occur 
until February 2001 when around 200 Myanmar soldiers advanced into Thailand purposely to 
attack ethnic Shan insurgents. A clash ensued between the Thai forces and the Myanmar forces 
close to the town of Mae Sai leading to the death of not less than 20 soldiers and civilians mostly, 
dwellers of communities that straddle the border of Thai (East, 2001).  
In June 2002, series of fierce clashes ensued after Myanmar forces attacked a Shan insurgents’ 
base in Thai, “prompting an exchange of artillery fire” (The Nation [Thailand] (2002). The Thai 
military was on high alert and issued a statement that: “Artillery shells have landed on Thai 
territory, endangering the lives of villagers.  . . . as long as the Burmese government continues to 
suppress the ethnic minority groups and refuses to embrace democracy, the fighting will continue, 
and Burma will continue to mistrust Thailand.” (The Nation [Thailand] 2002).  
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Similarly, in 2006 Israel launched series of fierce attacks on Lebanese terrain. This was targeted 
at the Hezbollah fighters who had apprehended Israeli soldiers and continued to fire rockets across 
the border into Israeli soil. This move did not only severe the relationship between Israel and 
Lebanon but appreciably threatened to further weaken regional relations, particularly as Syria 
declared its staunch support for Hezbollah (Salehyan, 2010). 
This menace has been replicated in Africa such that the continent is increasingly becoming a 
breeding ground for various insurgent and terrorist groups owing to the weak structure of many 
African states who are unable to apply force within their territory and effectively police their 
borders (Herbst, 2000). The Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, the Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia, the National Movement of Azawad (MNLA) in Northern Mali, the Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, the M23 Rebels in Democratic Republic of Congo, Boko Haram 
in Nigeria and a host of others are examples of infiltrating insurgent or terrorist groups existing on 
the continent. Notably, the most damaging effects of these insurgencies around the globe have 
been the high rate of humanitarian crisis in form of internal displacement, refugee influx, food 
insecurity, epidemic, and gender and sexual based hostility (Hughes, 2012). Cross-border 
insurgency equally has the potential of breeding tension within a region which may eventually lead 
to war. An example is the case of Rwanda who, so many times went across the border into Congo 
DRC to fight the Hutu insurgents in their hideouts and to punish members of such communities 
for harbouring such groups (Lal, 2012).  
In Africa, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) which operated for more than twenty years 
unleashed terror in diverse communities across four African countries. Their attacks were targeted 
at brutalizing, torturing, mutilation, killing and conscription of children as child soldiers.  Statistics 
show that this group which has its origin in northern Uganda abducted over 20,000 children and 
was responsible for the displacement of over 1.9 million people who lived in different communities 
that straddle the border (Human Right Watch, 2012). The fierce resistance the LRA met by the 
Ugandan military forced it to migrate across the Ugandan border into the border region between 
the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the South Sudan. 
This led to the massive displacement of more than 2.5 million people and the abduction of children 
whose figure ranges from 60,000 to 100,000 across the four countries (United Nations Security 
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Council, 2013; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2013). Statistics also reveal a varying 
number of civilians killed by the LRA combatants. While Ahere & Maina (2013) and HRW (2012) 
admitted that tens of thousands were killed, United Nations Security Council (2013) averred that 
over 100,000 people were killed by the insurgent group. Of course, this phenomenon instigated a 
regional military response which enfeebled the group as its membership reduced drastically to a 
total of 150 Ugandan males excluding the wavering number of abducted children (Ronan, 2015). 
The continuous attacks communities suffered from, coupled with a weak security and protection 
measures put in place by the governments involved, made these communities evolve some coping 
strategies to guarantee their safety within their communities. 
So many factors came into play in the different strategies employed across communities. Such 
factors included personal perception, topography and environmental conditions. Some felt though 
they wanted to flee, they had nowhere to run to (Li, 2005). Some others had a strong conviction 
that their homes belonged to them and that no one had the right to displace them, hence their 
responsibility to defend their heritage. While some took to hiding in the bushes and mountains 
until they deemed it safe to return into the communities, many others remained there at night and 
returned in the day to get some food for the elderly and children who perpetually remained in 
hiding. Many also fled to safer, neighbouring communities and camps whenever the LRA attacked 
their communities (Sohn, 2005).  
Cline (2013) noted that a community leader in Uganda averred that children who witnessed this 
phenomenon who are now adults see no reason to build houses for themselves because they lived 
their childhood in the bush where there existed no home setting. In Uganda, the situation also saw 
the massive exodus of numerous children (between 30,000 and 40,000) as well as many adults 
from different communities into IDP camps and urban settlements (Amnesty International, 2005; 
Li, 2005; Sohn, 2005; Cline, 2013). Other strategies involved submission and cooperation with the 
LRA whenever they came into these communities; restricting movements and where necessary; 
movement in groups escorted by local security men were encouraged; prayers and rituals offered 
for peace and an end to the insurgency; early warning system which involved developing a 
communication system to alert the security personnel of an intended attack or presence of the LRA 
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combatants; creation of Local Defense Units (LDUs). These measures were employed by the 
affected communities in the four countries mentioned above.   
To further elaborate the analysis on cross-border insurgency in Africa, various dimensions of 
insurgency are identifiable in Nigeria. Some examples include the Movement for the Actualization 
of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Niger-Delta insurgency part of which is the 
Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), the Ahl al sunnali al alDa’wawa al-
Jihad, popularly called Boko Haram and, most recently, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) 
(Ukpong, 2016). However, the major difference between them is situated in nature and space rather 
than issues and strategies. While the MASSOB, MEND and the like are resource-based conflicts 
and fully domesticated precisely within the South East and Niger Delta region of the country, Boko 
Haram is rather religious based, and portends a transnational dimension.  
According to Akanji, (2013), Boko Haram, an Islamic sect that posits that northern politics has 
been hijacked by a group of dishonest, corrupt and pseudo-Muslims, seemingly existed before the 
21st century but was relatively unknown as a violent or terrorist group. The group seeks to wage 
war against not only these Muslims but also the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 
general, with a view to creating and entrenching in the entire country a pure Islamic State governed 
by Sharia Law. Over time, the sect has fully developed into a terrorist group considering its modus 
operandi and its alliance with other renowned terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the 
Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Onuoha, (2011) pointed out that the collaboration between 
Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was established by the spokesmen of 
both sects. This collaboration was meant to train Boko Haram members and supply them with 
weapons to protect Muslims and stop the progress of a minority of Crusaders in Nigeria. The 
training was worthwhile for them as it became evident in their activities thereafter that they had 
become skillful in the making and use of bomb and engagement of suicide bombers, whereas until 
participating in the training camps, Boko Haram did not engage in such practices (Epperson, 2012).  
According to Meehan, (2011) Boko Haram became sophisticated in their activities by utilizing 
internet fora for advocacy and recruitment as well as a source of information sharing. Towing the 
path of Al Shabaab, Boko Haram used the fora to “increase the group’s legitimacy among the 
jihadi community”. These media have also been effectively utilized by the group in propagating 
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their ideology and activities to the global community, such lethal activities which have been 
detrimental to African border communities continually putting them at risk of losing their lives 
and properties. Inadequate border security also increases this risk, leaving the communities to 
personally devise strategies to cope with the situation. This study is therefore geared towards 
investigating and identifying the coping strategies evolved by these communities to ensure their 
survival in the face of the looming threat that daily confront them. 
1.1 Statement of the problem 
Literature is replete with sufficient works on the theme of border life in the context of inequality 
and marginalization. It is widely held by many a scholar that border communities face neglect 
politically, socially and economically when compared to the hinterland (cities and towns) of their 
nation-state. According to Meinhof (2003), in some of the European rural or small-towns in the 
border regions, people who are considered marginal (such as Sinti, Roma) expatriates from other 
nations, the politically suspicious and the disabled settle there. Wastl-Walter, et al (2003) averred 
that border areas are peripheral regions par excellence and in several respects. They also see them 
as areas that are at the margins of the nation-states. Because of their distance from the core areas, 
border areas are geographically isolated and marginalized and as such people living there are often 
also marginalized politically, socially and economically. Wastl-Walter, et’al (2003) focused on the 
consequences of marginalization on border communities and the strategies inhabitants of these 
border areas adopt in coping with all of these marginalities. Holly et’al (2003) also investigated 
in-depth on the phenomenon of social and economic inequality in border communities on both 
sides of the border and how they cope with such phenomenon. 
It is an undeniable fact that border communities in Nigeria face a lot of security threats and 
challenge through cross-border criminalities. While the current researcher was on a preliminary 
field trip to borders in Iseyin/ Saki, Idi-Iroko and Imeko/ Ilara, all in the Southwest region of 
Nigeria, it was discovered that security threats are a peculiar reality to all of them. In fact, it was 
briefly mentioned by one of the “Baales”2 in the course of an interview that there was no week that 
the community would not face attacks from external, terrorist aggressors. This confirms that 
 
2 A Baale is a traditional ruler of a small community in the Yoruba land. And of course, border communities in the 
Southwest are small communities headed by a baale. 
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security threat is a challenge that consistently threatens the survival of people living in the border 
communities. 
In North-Eastern Nigeria, as a result of Boko Haram’s nefarious activities, Salkida, (2012) notes 
that life in several communities of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, such as Kawuri, Gwoza, 
Gamboru-Ngala, Baga, Shuwa, Konduga, Bama, Ajigin, Giwa, Chibok, have been 
characteristically horrible, brutish and, to say the least, short-lived. The region has stopped to 
observe civil order, resulting in the appalling humanitarian situation manifesting in human right 
abuses, human casualties, internal and external displacements, loss of means of livelihood, lack of 
medical facilities and absence of other basic amenities. Since 2012, the humanitarian situation in 
North-Eastern Nigeria has further degenerated as various humanitarian agencies have limited 
access to rural areas where the displaced persons are relocated to. The alarming refugee influx into 
Nigeria and the spill-over of Boko Haram violence off the Nigerian borders into neighbouring 
countries such as Chad, Cameroun and Niger over time have resulted in grave regional security 
consequences. This is despite the formation of a Joint Border Patrol Command established by the 
Nigerian government which is composed of the military, Immigration, Customs, Civil Defence 
and the Police, to deal with the increasing security issues emanating from the insurgency (This 
day, April 16th, 2014). Boko Haram has exposed the porous nature of the borders of African 
countries where it has resulted in increased insecurity and violence in certain border communities 
of these countries notably Niger, Chad and Cameroun. 
HNO (2014), in reviewing the humanitarian needs of affected areas, provides a demographic 
profile of North-Eastern Nigeria for 2014. As at the end of 2014, 24.5 million people were living 
in the six states of North-Eastern Nigeria out of which 15.5 million people lived in the affected 
areas which. Of this number, 0.98 million people were displaced (Eweka and Olusegun, 2016). 
This simply implies that 14.52 million people remained in the affected areas. The report went 
further to provide an extensive survey to depict the challenges these displaced persons faced in the 
various Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) and refugee camps and how they were able to cope 
in the face of those confronting challenges. Looking critically at the population figures above, it is 
evident that out of the 15.5 million people living in the affected areas, only 0.9 million of the 
population were displaced while, 14.52 million remain in those communities in the face of the 
daily looming security threats. HNO (2015) equally executed an extensive need assessment of the 
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affected population with regard to the IDPs and refugees in their host communities and camps 
without involving inhabitants of border communities who are the first victims of the dastardly 
terrorist acts. This confirms what Wastl-Walter, et’al, (2003) asserted about marginality of border 
communities due to their geographically isolated nature. 
From the foregoing, studies have shown that inhabitants along border communities have always 
been at the receiving end of insurgent activities as they are the first victims of this inimical 
phenomenon and disturbingly, do not receive adequate government intervention and attention from 
international humanitarian organizations. In spite of this, they still continue to survive in the face 
of daily threats. This is to suggest that these communities may have devised coping strategies to 
guarantee their survival. 
Relatedly, though a few studies border on the security threats and challenges that daily confront 
border communities within the African purview, no scholarly attention has been paid to how border 
communities have been able to manage such threats and challenges with impoverished assistance 
from their governments. This is the lacuna that this study intends to fill. It, therefore, becomes 
necessary to investigate the coping strategies developed by border communities in dealing with 
cross-border insurgency regarding safety (traditional security) and livelihood (human security). 
1.2 Research questions of the study 
Research questions are essential because they define the objective of an academic study. Obasi 
(1999) averred that research question is the most worrying issue of fact that needs to be properly 
examined and understood. Therefore, the current researcher has raised the following questions to 
guide this study: 
1. What are the patterns of cross-border insurgency in the selected border communities in 
North-Eastern Nigeria? 
2. What are the impacts of cross-border insurgency on these border communities? 
3. How has the government (federal, state and local) and international humanitarian 
organizations responded to cross-border insurgency in the border communities? 
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4. What are the coping strategies employed by the selected border communities in tackling 
cross-border insurgency?  
5. How has the adopted coping strategies impacted on the continued existence of the border 
communities? 
1.3 Aims and objectives of the study 
The study has broad and specific objectives. The general objective is to investigate the coping 
strategies of border communities vis-à-vis cross-border insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria, 
while the specific objectives are to: 
1. Highlight the patterns of cross-border insurgency existing in the selected border communities 
in the North-Eastern Nigeria. 
2. Examine the impacts of cross-border insurgency on the selected border communities. 
3. Investigate the measures taken by the government (federal, state and local) and international 
humanitarian organizations to tackle cross-border insurgency in the selected border 
communities. 
4. Examine the coping strategies employed by the selected border communities in tackling cross-
border insurgency 
5. Examine the impacts of the adopted coping strategies on the continued existence of the border 
communities.  
1.4 Scope of the study 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a nation-state geographically located on the Gulf of Guinea in 
Western Africa with a total area of 923,768 square kms out of which about 13,000 square kms are 
covered with water bodies (Nigeria Fact Sheets, 2001). The country lies between Benin Republic 
in the West and Cameroon in the East (Douglas, 2004). The lower route of the Niger River runs 
south into the Gulf of Guinea through the eastern region of the country. Southern valleys are 
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formed by swamps forests and mangrove, on the South coast. These valleys are plains in the North 
and mountainous in the South East. There are forests made up of hard wood in the inland territory. 
There are 36 states in the country with Federal Capital Territory (FCT) as the capital city located 
in Abuja. It is grouped into six geopolitical zones such as North-West, North-Central, North-East, 
South-West, South-East and South-South. These groupings were done based on states with 
homogeneous ethnic groups, cultures and common history. North-West zone which is the most 
populated has seven states with a population figure of 35,786,944; the South-West zone has six 
states with a population of 27,266,257; the South-South zone equally has six states with a 
population of 21,014,655; the North-Central zone has seven states together with the Federal 
Capital Territory of Abuja (1,405,201) with a population of 20,266,257; the North-East zone has 
six states with a population of 18,971,965 and finally the South -East zone has five states with a 
population of 16,381,729. 
This study was carried out on the North-East (NE) Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria3 which covers 
close to one-third (280,419km2) of Nigeria’s land area (909,890km2). It consists of 6 states: 
Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Yobe and Taraba. According to the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), these States have 13.5% (i.e. 23,558,674) of Nigeria’s population which is put at 
173,905,439.4 
Additionally, the Zone shares international borders with three countries namely the Republic of 
Cameroon to the East, Niger Republic to the North and Republic of Chad to the North-East. It is a 
Zone that has been identified to be a major contributor to national net food production. Despite 
this, the region has the worst socio-economic condition in the Country. Its average total poverty 
level is estimated at sixty-nine percent (69.0%) which is above the national average of sixty-point 
nine percent (60.9%). This depicts the Zone as the region with the highest rate of poverty in Nigeria 
(NBS, 2010). This study focused on three states namely Yobe, Adamawa and Borno being the 
 
3 Geopolitical zone of Nigeria refers to any one of the six zones the Nigerian states are sub-divided into. Pertinent to 
this study is the North-East geopolitical zone which consists of six states of the Nigerian federation.  
4 2012 National Baseline Youth Survey, NBS 
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states that share boundary with neighboring states such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon and as such 
have many border communities situated within them which constitute the locale for the study.   
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Figure 1.1 Map of Nigeria Showing the Six Geopolitical Zones 
 
Source:https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pius_Ekong/publication/51795009/figure/fig1/AS:2
77168446820360@1443093516012/Fig-1-Map-of-Nigeria-showing-the-six-6-geopolitical-
zones-For-interpretation-of-the.png  
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
1.5 Research methodology and methods 
This section presents the research methods used in gathering and analyzing data for the study. This 
explicitly spells out what, where, when and how the research was executed. These include the 
scope of the study, research design and data collection technique, sample size, sampling technique 
and ethical consideration.  
For this study, qualitative research model was adopted using a phenomenological case study 
approach. According to Padilla-Diaz (2015), Edmund Husserl defines phenomenology as an 
experimental method which rely on the conscience of phenomena where the pure essences of the 
contents of consciousness stood out. Husserl is regarded as “the fountainhead of phenomenology 
in the twentieth century even though the origin of phenomenology can be traced back to Kant and 
Hegel (Vandenberg, 1997:4). Phenomenology takes the instinctive experience of phenomena as 
its starting point and tries to extract from it the essential features of experiences and the essence of 
what we experience (Padilla-Diaz, 2015). Husserl's view was premised on the work of Franz 
Brentano his teacher who provided a basis for phenomenology (Holloway, 1997) and was further 
developed by philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, MaxScheler, Edith Stein, Dietrich von 
Hildebrand and Emmanuel Levinas. The term ‘phenomenology’ was used occasionally by various 
scholars in the history of philosophy before Husserl tied it more specifically to his particular 
method.  
Phenomenology counters the idea that natural science alone determines what is real and what is 
not, and that all concepts that we wish to take seriously must be reducible to concepts of the exact 
sciences (Overgaard and Zahavi n.d.). Phenomenology avers that the exact sciences do not 
describe a world that is different from the ordinary world. Instead, they simply utilize new methods 
to describe and explain the world we already know and thereby allow us to obtain more exact 
knowledge about it. The scientific ambition of describing reality objectively, that is, from a third-
person point of view, is a thoroughly legitimate one. Yet, one should not forget that any objectivity, 
any explanation, understanding and theoretical construct, presupposes a first- person perspective 
as its permanent ground and precondition (ibid.). To that extent, the belief that science can provide 
an absolute description of reality, a description devoid of any conceptual or experiential 
perspective, is an illusion. Science is deeply rooted in the life-world. It draws upon insights from 
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the pre-scientific sphere and it is conducted by embodied subjects. For the phenomenologist, 
science is not simply a collection of systematically related, well established propositions. Rather, 
science is something that people do; it is a particular markedly theoretical way of relating to the 
world (ibid.).  
Schutz emphasizes that social scientists and natural scientists are motivated by other, more 
theoretical interests than the everyday person is guided by. The everyday person is an agent rather 
than a theoretical observer who has practical interests and is normally guided by common-sense 
knowledge and understanding. The social scientist, by contrast, is not an agent in the social 
relations she studies. A scientific researcher, regardless of whether she studies social hierarchies 
in Scottish factories or electrons and amino acids, is an observer, not a participant. Schutz thus 
insists that the social scientist must maintain a distance to the phenomena she studies. However, 
the social sciences examine human beings in manifold social relations, and human agents have 
interests, motives, self-interpretation and an understanding of the world they live in all of which 
must be taken into account if we want to understand social reality in its full concretion (Schutz 
1962; Gurwitsch 1974).  
Therefore, a phenomenological approach is utilized to understand the issue from the everyday 
knowledge and perceptions of specific respondent subgroups (Lindgren and Kehoe, 1981 cited in 
Vaughn, Schumm, Jallard, Slusher, and Saumell, 1986). It is not primarily concerned with 
exploring the causes of events but attempts to describe how things are experienced by the people 
involved directly (Denscombe, 2004). Husserl (1970) averred that pure phenomenological 
research seeks principally to describe rather than explain, and to start from a standpoint free from 
hypotheses or preconceptions. 
Qualitative research is an exceptional and effective way of gathering culturally specific 
information about the opinions, values, behaviours, and social context of a particular population. 
This method equally aims to provide “an in-depth understanding of the world as seen through the 
eyes of the people being studied” (Wilmot 2011). Merriam, (2009) noted that qualitative research 
is interested in grasping the meaning people have constructed, in other words, how people make 
sense of the world and the experience they have in the world. Furthermore, Silverman, (1985) 
conceives it as an approach to research that assists the exploration of a phenomenon within its 
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context, utilizing an array of data sources. It involves a continuing interplay between data 
collection and theory.  
It is also useful in identifying intangible factors, such as social norms, gender, socio-economic 
status, ethnicity, roles, and religion. In the view of Creswell, (2009) qualitative research method 
allows for exploring and understanding the meaning an individual or group/s ascribe to a problem. 
The role a researcher plays entails, evolving questions and procedures, collecting data in the 
participants setting, analyzing data by inductively building from particulars to general themes, and 
making interpretations of the meaning of the data. This is why Mason (2002), asserts that the 
qualitative research methodology celebrates richness, depth, nuance, context, multidimensionality 
and complexity. What therefore distinguishes qualitative research method from other research 
methods is the opportunity it offers to do an objective and in-depth study and analysis by obtaining 
first-hand information from respondents. As opined by Fawole et’al, (2006), the potency of 
qualitative research lies in identifying strengths and weaknesses of a phenomenon. 
Owing from the above, this study chose a qualitative research model using a phenomenological 
case study approach. This is primarily because the study is targeted at gaining in-depth 
understanding of the lived experiences of inhabitants of selected border communities in the North-
Eastern Nigeria as regarding cross-border insurgency which is the activities of the Boko Haram 
within their various communities. Utilizing a qualitative approach facilitated the generation of a 
holistic understanding of the experiences of the study population regarding the Boko Haram 
attacks, and how they have been able to continually live in those community in other words the 
coping strategies employed by the study population which has made continual existence possible 
in those communities. Through this same approach, the study was able to discover rich information 
about the dynamics in the activities of the Boko Haram and the responses of the communities to 
such within the border communities of the North-Eastern Nigeria.  
1.5.1 Population of the study and sampling procedure 
The target population of this study included all inhabitants of border communities in the North-
Eastern Nigeria.  
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Purposive sampling method was employed utilizing the typical case in the selection process of 
participants as the study is strictly qualitative using a case study design (Punch, 2005). This depicts 
that the population is selected based solely on the knowledge and experience they have acquired 
which is useful for the study. This method is equally used for an intensive study of community 
situations. The researcher selected three states from Nigeria’s North-Eastern Region namely 
Borno, Adamawa and Yobe because these are the major states that experience cross-border 
insurgency in Nigeria. According to ACAP (2018) these states share boundaries with neighbouring 
countries such as Cameroun, Chad and Niger where Boko Haram carries out its nefarious 
activities.  
The sample size of this study consisted of 276 participants who were interviewed. These 
respondents are inhabitants of the selected border communities in Nigeria’s North-Eastern Region. 
46 participants were selected from two modestly populated border communities located in each 
state. The communities included Gamboru-Ngala and Baga communities in Borno State, Michika 
and Mubi communities in Adamawa State as well as, Yusufari and Kanamma communities in 
Yobe State. The service of a guide and interpreter where necessary was employed to facilitate 
access to these communities5.  
1.5.2 Methods of data collection 
Given the nature of this research work, the data used for analysis were obtained largely from both 
primary and secondary sources as highlighted below. 
Primary Sources: According to Alagoa (1985) and Afigbo (1990), primary sources are seen as 
reliable because the data generated present direct information from the participants or key 
witnesses thus limiting the possibility of distortion or exaggeration. This assertion is in line with 
phenomenology which is the research approach for the study. For the purpose of this study 
therefore, In-depth Interview (IDI) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) were used. This technique 
is invaluable in conducting “systematic social inquiry, generating empirical data about (the) social 
world by asking people to talk about their lives” (Holstein & Gubrium 1995). As opined by Jegede 
(2006) and Ulin (2002) this is to establish greater precision as detailed information emerges. As 
 
5 A guide and interpreter was needed to facilitate access to the communities because the communities have different 
languages thus, making language a barrier. 
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an instrument for primary data collection, a structured as well as open–ended interview guide was 
utilized which allowed participants to express themselves to the fullest without restrictions and 
which helped the researcher to elicit useful and needed information to the fullest from them. Upon 
arrival in the communities, with the assistance of a guide, the researcher sought audience with the 
traditional ruler to formally request his permission to carry out the interviews.  
In each of the six (6) communities, six (6) In-depth Interviews were carried out with key 
stakeholders who included the traditional ruler, the men leader, the women leader, the youth leader, 
and two Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) identified in each community. Four (4) Focus Group 
Discussions were conducted with men, women, youths, and the vigilante group in each 
community. From previous studies conducted, it has been observed that community leaders in 
border communities emerge based on a number of factors most important of which is vastness in 
the peoples’ history and culture. As a result of this, they are found capable of giving accurate 
information needed. In communities in Adamawa and Borno states, the FGDs consisted of 10 
participants giving everybody an opportunity to share his or her experience. In Yobe state it was 
quite different. The number of participants varied between 6 and 8. The researcher noted that a 
point of saturation6 was reached as these interviews were successfully conducted in Adamawa and 
Borno states while in Yobe state it was observed that respondents withheld some information 
especially regarding coping strategies. With the permission of the respondents, a recorder was used 
during the interview process. 
Secondary Sources: These included documents, books, journal articles, newspaper articles, from 
the internet, the library. As a result of the fundamental role these sources of data play in 
complementing the quality of the primary data gathered, they assisted, in course of analysis, in 
throwing more light on and validating the content of the primary data gathered. 
1.5.3 Method of data analysis  
The research employed thematic content analysis to analyze the collected data. The interviews 
conducted were interpreted, transcribed and content-analyzed. Holsti (I969) defines content 
 
6 A point of saturation is a point where in the process of conducting interviews no new information other than the previous ones is 
being generated from the respondents.  
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analysis as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying 
specified characteristics of messages”. It involves the “examining of the presence of words or 
phrases in a text in order to identify the specified characteristics of messages and to make meaning 
of them”. Patton (2002) defines content analysis as “any qualitative data reduction and sense-
making effort that takes a volume of qualitative materials and attempts to identify core 
consistencies and meanings”. With the use of this technique, the researcher descriptively analyzed 
data from both primary and secondary sources systematically and objectively, making valid textual 
inferences from them by identifying specific characteristics as it relates to cross-border insurgency 
and the coping strategies of border communities which are the crux of the study.  
The findings from the border communities were comparatively analyzed where necessary to bring 
out the emerging patterns in the coping strategies as a result of varying factors that exist in the 
communities. 
1.5.4 Credibility and Trustworthiness of the study 
Credibility and trustworthiness are an integral part of research. It is concerned with dealing with 
biases and assumptions that come from the researcher’s life experiences or interactions with 
research respondents, which are often emotion-laden and may therefore negatively reflect in the 
outcome of the research. In guarding against subjectivity, member checking technique is best used 
in determining the accuracy of the qualitative findings. This involves taking the final report and 
specific descriptions or themes back to participants in the various communities for them to 
determine if the outcome truly reflects their perception of the studied phenomenon. While this 
would have been the best option for the current researcher to explore, it would seem impossible 
because of proximity and time constraints, and because the researcher does not share affinity with 
the study communities in terms of culture, situation and geography. 
To correct this anomaly therefore, the study will be subjected to review by an external auditor who 
does a relatively more thorough job than a peer debriefer. The external auditor who is usually not 
familiar with the researcher or the project will review the entire project to provide an objective 
assessment throughout the process of research or at the conclusion of the study. As put by (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985) the external auditor’s role is like that of a fiscal auditor, and specific questions exist 
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that auditors might ask.  Having this in mind, therefore, the researcher adhered to Yin’s (2009) 
suggestion that researchers need to document the procedures of their case studies and document as 
many of the steps of the procedures as possible. He also recommended setting up a detailed case 
study protocol and database, so that others can follow the procedures. Gibbs (2007) suggested a 
few qualitative reliability procedures amongst which are checking transcripts to make sure that 
they do not contain noticeable mistakes made during transcription and making sure that there is no 
drift in the definition of codes, or a shift in the meaning of the codes during the process of coding. 
This can be accomplished by constantly comparing data with the codes and by writing memos 
about the codes and their definitions. 
These strategies for curbing subjectivity was employed to assist the researcher in achieving the 
goal of fairness and equity which is representing participants’ viewpoints by avoiding lopsided 
interpretations that represent the biases of the researcher or only a few participants. 
1.6 Conceptual clarifications 
Any meaningful conceptualization must begin from a context-based approach which cannot be 
independent of each other (Osaghae, 2009). It is therefore necessary to clarify the following 
concepts in this discourse to enable an in-depth understanding of the relationship between them. 
1.6.1 The Concept of Border 
The concept of border is constantly changing. Border has been conceptualized by different 
scholars, international, regional and sub-regional organizations who have defied uniformity of 
parlance. Presently, the prevalent definition has been geographical, independent of all that the 
concept of border encloses; it would appear that in recent past, there has been a widening of the 
concept that extend beyond the traditionally accepted meaning of the border (Johnson et al., 2011; 
Wastl-Walter, 2011; Wilson & Donnan, 2012). Thus, borders give room for new meanings every 
day, as much as it allows for proliferation of types: diffuse or firm borders, juridical-political 
borders, territorial or identitary borders, cultural borders, symbolic borders, etc. Garcia (2006) 
cited by Jimenez, Orenes and Puente (2010) identifies eight dimensions of borders: the historical 
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dimension, the spatial-cultural dimension, the dimension of ideas, the normative dimension, the 
economic, material, human dimension and the agential dimension.7  
To understand the concept of border in the present day, Jimenez, Orenes and Puente (2012) further 
examine its concrete manifestations by grouping the above enumerated dimensions into two 
fundamental distinct planes namely geographical borders, connected with states, and symbolic 
borders. Geographical borders identified with states refer to geography, economics, politics, and 
the administrative realms, while the symbolic demands significant effort to demarcate given that 
it does not address a concrete or defined reality. From the foregoing, border can be comprehended 
as a space demarcated by symbolic limits linked with social representations, whether they coexist 
with physical and official barriers or not. It has also been noted that border could be seen as a 
limitation that is mental or imaginary, constrained by variables such as space, identity, time, 
desires, actions, etc. Border, therefore, becomes a locale in which “we” and the “other” are 
conceptualized, and which is in some circumstances identified by its permeability, in variance to 
the stringency of the identity. This is the most related to geographical borders. However, it was 
suggested that borders are highly complex, social spaces that need interactive and dialogic 
assumptions to be comprehended in their full extension (Jimenez, Orenes and Puente, 2012).  
Grimson (2005) points out that while geographical borders which refer to geography, economics, 
politics, and the administrative realm identified with states, separate different realities, they 
simultaneously produce trans-border spaces. Such spaces produce power contest implicating 
 
7 The historical dimension (which is determined based on a request by the states themselves and governed by the 
framework of international or transnational processes, which oversees cross-border actions and dynamics), the spatial-
cultural dimension (this suggests the border to be the jurisdiction where a state can exercise its sovereignty or power), 
the dimension of ideas (this concerns what the people imagine the border to be. It is here that barriers of a symbolic, 
religious, or ethical nature appear), the normative dimension (this describe how a border is politically constructed thus 
bringing up the disparity between political borders and borderlands), the economic, material, human dimension (with 
the economic component, the exchange of resources and goods, migratory flux, and contraband) and the agential 
dimension (this concerns analyzing the activities, emotions, interactions and expectations of agent (s) situated within 
these spaces).  
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diverse territories and identities; they are equally differentiated spaces, which produce or provoke 
conflicts, and which serve as a locale for trans-cultural dynamics. 
Weber (2012) describes a border as a line that symbolizes a boundary. Borders are seen as 
boundaries between states, while boundaries are markers in existing states. As borders distinguish 
a state’s territory, it also expresses belonging, identities, and political affiliation. Weber goes on 
to say that borders, boundaries, and borderlands make up numerous potentials as well as obstacles. 
As borders remain important in demarcating the physical boundaries of state territories, it remains 
important in daily practice to the people living within such spaces. She further opines that 
smuggling of small arms, human trafficking, and provision of refuge for armed opposition groups 
are all activities which can be carried out by borderland communities. This constitutes a risk to the 
security of the state.  
O’Dowd (2002: 24) notes that borders are “places of economic and political opportunity for 
nations and states as well as for a host of other interest groups and agencies, legal and illegal”. He 
says for some countries, borders have been transformed from barriers, and acquired a new 
‘bridging’ function. Also, in response to 9/11 attack on the United States of America, the definition 
of borders changed for all countries exporting to the United State of America (USA). In response 
to the attack, the USA came up with the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade 
Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) policies, both of which consider the starting point for 
borders in the country of export. In other words, as the borders were ‘pushed out’ (Bowman 2006) 
and thus did not coincide with the geographical borders, they obtained a new meaning from trade 
and security perspectives. 
According to Simmel (1992), border is not a spatial fact with a sociological impact, but a 
sociological fact that shapes spatiality. In this sense, a border is not defined by the geographical 
space but by the impact of people. Barka (2012: 5) noted that a border post can be defined as the 
“location where one country’s authority over goods and persons ends and another country’s 
authority begin.” It is the location where a multitude of government agencies (i.e Revenue 
Authority - Customs; Immigration; Security-Police; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Health; 
Bureau of Standards, etc.) are involved in the various document and goods controls, the calculation 
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and collection of duties and taxes, as well as immigration. This definition clearly describes how a 
border is demarcated; it also enlists the stakeholders in the activities carried out at the border. 
A border provides a practical opportunity to assist a state to maintain its internal security against 
external threats and aggression against its territory and people. A border is subsequently, a 
separation between states but also a process of control on behalf of their national security. 
Nonetheless, demands made by the current global economic system require a certain degree of 
border openness. Hence, borders should not just be exclusive (refusing entry to undesirable 
products and people); they should also be inclusive (facilitating the movement of individuals and 
goods).  It is, therefore, important that states find a balance between the need for mobility and 
control between “doors and walls”. A completely closed border is not in fact the solution to border 
insecurities and other transnational challenges. On the contrary, it would be in danger of creating 
an environment that is propitious to illicit activities.  The balance between “doors and walls” 
should therefore be respected, to facilitate development of legal, economic activities in and beyond 
the border region and subsequently help reduce the conditions that generate illegal activities. 
The function of a border in the definition of the state should not be underestimated. In certain 
regions of the world, borders are still subject to dispute or are in the process of being stabilized. A 
lack of clear delimitation and demarcation between two states is a potential source of tension, 
which can affect other countries in the region.  In May 2009, for example, only 25% of land borders 
in Africa had sufficient demarcation lines (GTZ and GABP, 2009). According to the declaration 
of the African Union Border Programme and its implementation modalities as adopted by the 
Conference of African Ministers in charge of border issues held in Addis Ababa, the African Union 
is aware of the importance of having stable borders for peace, security and cooperation in the 
continent and in June 2007 it launched the Border Programme, in an effort to define and demarcate 
the borders of its member states by 2012. 
Eselebor (2008) has noted that a border is a line or thin strip delimiting the territories of sovereign 
states with equal jurisdiction as can be observed at the Nigeria border with Benin Republic at 
Seme. Eselebor further notes that an understanding and interpretation of what border is and means 
vary with different strategic interests that could be social, economic, political or environmental; 
and that our border, therefore, performs the dual function of a line that links and separates. Talking 
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about international borders, the 29th Report of the European Union on the proposal for a European 
body guard, (2003:9) asserted that: 
borders are natural points at which to make checks on entry to a country, not only 
on people but on goods for customs, health, plant health and other purposes; and 
to enforce rules on prohibited and restricted goods. The border is also a natural 
focus of police activity, as it provides an opportunity to check people arriving and 
it is also the place where by definition the act of smuggling takes place. Border 
control therefore have a role to play in combating illegal immigration and various 
forms of cross-border crime ranging from small smuggling to organized crime and 
international terrorism. 
The above is what Nigeria’s borders connote. These borders exist all over the country where 
Nigeria geographically connects different countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin 
Republic.  
1.6.2 Border Communities 
The term “border communities” most often suggests that the closeness to the border is a major 
point that a given space is known for. With its closeness to different countries, diverse cultures and 
practices rub off on these communities. As such, border communities are highly multicultural 
communities, where traveling and trading frequently take place. They can also be flashpoints 
for international conflicts, most importantly when the two connecting countries are involved 
in territorial disputes. According to Conteh (2005), border communities are locations that allow 
constant movement and exchange during the time of conflict. This is because of the strategic 
positioning of the communities and their proximity to the borders. Hall (2005) identified a set of 
features common to border communities. He averred that border communities often lack the 
needed political and economic control necessary for taking decisions that affect the well-being of 
its people thus leading to a feeling of alienation and marginalization. This owes to the area being 
categorized as sensitive zones under the surveillance and protection of the federal or central 
government of the country. Again, due to their geographical location, these areas are situated on 
the peripheral of the states, making accessibility to the cities assiduous and expensive. And finally, 
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these areas are areas known to be rich in aesthetic features as their relatively underdeveloped nature 
makes it easy for cultural and natural values to be preserved.  In sum, border communities are 
communities that straddle the border. Some of these communities may fall on one side of the 
border making it exclusively a part of a country while many are being divided by virtue of the 
borderline that cut across them, making them a part of both sides of the border. In Nigeria, these 
communities exist across the different regions that share boundaries with neighboring states of 
Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in the North-Eastern and South-Southern Nigeria and Benin Republic 
in the South-Western Nigeria. Specifically, for this study, border communities are communities 
situated along the borders found in three states of the North-Eastern Nigeria namely, Adamawa, 
Borno and Yobe States.   
1.6.3 Insurgency and Cross-Border Insurgency 
Insurgency is an ambiguous concept. The United States Department of Defence (2007) defines it 
as organized movement that has the aim of overthrowing a constituted government through 
subversive means and armed conflict (See Hellesen, 2008:14). This definition suggests that 
insurgent groups employ unlawful means towards achieving an end, which could be political, 
religious, social or even ideological. The goal of insurgency is to confront and overthrow an 
existing government for the control of power, resources or for power sharing (Siegel, 2007:328). 
According to Powell and Abraham (2006), insurgency refers to a violent move by a person or 
group of persons to resist or oppose the enforcement of law or running of government or revolt 
against constituted authority of the state or of taking part in insurrection. Insurgency as defined 
above violates the constitution’s criminal law and the international treaty obligations of a nation 
in the following circumstances:  
When it constitutes an attack on defenceless citizens and other property resulting 
into injuries, loss of lives and properties as well as forced or massive internal 
displacement of people out of their habitual places of residence. When it drives 
business/ investors away from an insecure area and also when it constitutes 
domestic and international crimes punishable by law such as treasonable felony, 
terrorism, murder, crimes against humanity and genocide. (Powell and Abraham, 
2006). 
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Traditionally however, insurgencies seek to overthrow an existing order with one that is 
commensurate with their political, economic, ideological or religious goals (Gompert and Gordon 
2008). According to Kilcullen (2006: 112) “insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political 
space, between a state (or a group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, 
non-state challengers”. He further draws a line between classical and contemporary insurgencies, 
indicating that the latter seeks to replace the existing order, while the former sometimes strives for 
the expulsion of foreign invaders from their territory or seek to fill an existing power vacuum.  
According to Salehyan (2010), insurgent groups seek havens in neighboring countries, where they 
settle for the training of their combatants, stockpile the needed resources, and enjoy a level of 
safety. Once these groups have fully stabilized themselves on external soil, they cease to be a 
solely domestic affair but draws attention from regional governments as their nihilistic existence 
no longer affects a single country but multiples. An example is the LRA in Northern Uganda whose 
activities spread across four countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the South Sudan, and Uganda. Also, in Nigeria, is the phenomenon of 
Boko Haram which has spread across four countries: Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Nigeria. 
Therefore, in this study, cross-border insurgency entails the Boko Haram Sect and its activities 
which cut across border communities in Nigeria and its aforementioned neighboring countries. 
1.6.4 Coping Strategy 
‘Coping’ is majorly a term in psychology used in other disciplines like sociology and biology to 
explain ways through which a society or an organism engages in an ongoing cognitive and 
behavioral efforts to manage specific (external and/or internal) demands that are appraised as 
tasking or exceeding the resources of the individual (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Coping is seen 
as strategies used to tolerate physical, financial or emotional stress (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). 
Folkman and Lazarus stated that coping strategies might be behavioral, such as problem-solving 
techniques, or cognitive. Cognitive coping is emotion-focused and involves using psychological 
approaches to lessen stress, and may include using hilarity, emotional support, or religion 
(Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). Compas (1987) equally supported the above assertion seeing 
problem-focused strategies as strategies which aim at the source of the stress, with an attempt to 
reduce or alter while on the other hand, emotion-based strategy aims at the emotion with an attempt 
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to regulating it. However, in a study conducted by Tobin et al, (1989) to replicate the primary 
dimensions of coping discovered in the past, they proposed that adding new items after reviewing 
the existing scale could increase the possibility that all relevant factors would emerge with a great 
variety of items. Their finding supported a hierarchical structure with three distinct levels. The 
primary consists of eight coping strategies such as problem solving, cognitive restructuring, social 
support, expressing emotions, problem avoidance, wishful thinking, social withdrawal and self-
criticism. The secondary level is construed into two. They are the problem-focused coping which 
involves problem engagement and problem disengagement and the emotion-focused coping which 
involves emotion engagement and emotion disengagement. The tertiary level is concerned with 
dealing with stressful situation in two basic ways which are engagement and disengagement. Much 
later, Park and Folkman (1997) outlined meaning-focused as a third form of coping strategy. This 
is conceptualized to mean changing the appraisal of a stressful situation to be more consistent with 
one’s goals and beliefs as against the problem and emotion-focused coping which attempts to 
change or alleviate the stressful event. Therefore, the cogent function of coping strategies is 
basically to assist an individual, group or communities adapt to whatever situation that confronts 
them.  
Within the context of conflict situation, for people to survive, they are forced to evolve coping 
strategies. Those who do not do so do not survive (Nordstrom, 1997). Civilians living through 
violence will make morally impossible choices to protect themselves and their families. According 
to Sheper-Hughes (2008), civilians confronted with violence are bound to make difficult choices 
in a bid to protecting themselves and their families. In the same vein, communities confronted with 
armed conflict are bound to act analogously to protect their members in defence of themselves. 
Suarez and Black (2014: 1) averred that “conflict-affected populations rely on a sophisticated 
knowledge and assessment of their environment while simultaneously deploying and adapting 
their coping strategies to navigate violence.” Therefore, to Suarez and Black (2014: 5) coping 
strategies are “subtle ways that individuals and communities reconfigure their lives in order to 
evade social, political, cultural, and economic death.” 
Various authors such as (Baines and Paddon 2012; Bonwick 2006; Mégret 2009; Barter 2012; 
Gorur 2013; Levine 2013; Williams 2013) conceptualized coping strategies along a wide 
spectrum: 
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• Hiding, avoidance and fleeing – temporarily or permanently relocating from an insecure 
vicinity to a relatively secured location. 
• Submission, accommodation, and/or cooperation – collaborating with armed groups 
through the provision of real time information and supplies such as food items and other 
types of assistance as may be required of them either voluntarily or out of duress.  
• Contestation and witnessing – mobilizing public opinion to challenge an armed group, 
through human rights monitoring, reporting and advocacy.  
• Confrontation – uniting and forming an armed unit to confront armed groups or joining 
one of the fighting parties to counter such armed groups unleashing terror against the 
people and the community.  
According to South and Harrigan (2012), communities cannot engage these strategies in isolation 
of each other. Practically, civilians will engage a combination of these and many other strategies, 
depending on the specific context and nature of the armed conflict.  
While these strategies have been used to counter threats, they hardly succeed in yielding the desired 
level of safety that the people need (South and Harrigan 2012). Most often, utilizing some of these 
strategies may expose the people to different susceptibilities. For instance, while in hiding, there 
is the need to source for food items thus the need for planting and harvesting crops to feed family 
members and most often, these communities being typically agrarian, make farming their only 
source of livelihood. In the process of sneaking into remote areas, they stand the risk of walking 
into the camps and ambush of the insurgent groups (Suaraz and Black, 2014). In all, the cogent 
function of coping strategies is basically to assist an individual, or communities adapt to whatever 
situation that confronts them. Therefore, for this study, coping strategies refer to the responses of 
border communities to cross-border insurgency which ensures their survival.  
1.7 Justification of the study 
Creswell (1994) opines that the justification or significance of a study must be concerned with 
three major questions which are: How is the study going to add to scholarly research and literature 
in the field? How will the study improve policy? How will the study improve practice? Therefore, 
this study will contribute to scholarship, policy development and practice.  
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Primarily, this study is significant in that it addresses the present reality initiated by the Boko 
Haram insurgency in the border communities, and which largely remains an issue of serious 
concern in North-Eastern Nigeria. The concern is that since the eruption of the Boko Haram 
insurgency in 2003, which has claimed countless lives and properties especially of people living 
in the communities that straddle borders, it has been established that these communities continue 
to exist and are inhabited. Moreover, by virtue of these communities straddling the borders, this 
phenomenon has had a spill-over effect on the neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger and 
Cameroun, thus making this study critical not only to the Nigerian state under study, but also 
towards the improvement of the safety of lives and properties of border communities in Chad, 
Niger and Cameroun.  
Furthermore, to generate a theoretical model, one peculiar to the case study of this research was 
developed from the major findings of the study which directly addresses the coping strategies 
evolved by the border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria for safety and survival.  The study 
contributes to the increasing spectrum of literature on border studies, specifically on the theme of 
coping strategies from the Nigerian-state perspective. More importantly, it is useful for 
engendering further research, and for providing insights into policy and practice in the 
improvement of identified coping strategies of communities and measures that guarantee the safety 
of lives and properties in the border communities of countries experiencing cross-border 
insurgency in West Africa.  
1.8 Limitation of the study 
The major limitation of the study was the inability to generate adequate data especially in Yobe 
state. This was majorly caused by the insecurity of the research area. For lack of fund, the 
researcher was not able to provide for himself security in anyway, and therefore took a risk by 
proceeding into these communities. In each community, limited time was spent by the researcher 
collecting data for safety reasons, as advised by the guides. Furthermore, participants were willing 
to give information in all the communities except in Yobe state where it was observed that 
participants held back certain information in their responses for reasons best known to them. 
However, deducing from the few responses they provided and personal observation by the 
researcher, needed information was gathered for the study. 
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1.9 Ethical Consideration 
Ethics means morals, principle, right, proper, and decent. These are words to be put into 
consideration when carrying out a research. Thus, Bertram and Christiansen (2014) reiterated that 
“ethics has to do with behaviour that is considered either right or wrong”. It is an important 
consideration in research, particularly with research involving humans and animals. Strydom 
(2011), also sees ethics as a set of moral principles which is suggested by an individual or group, 
is subsequently widely accepted, and which offers rules and behavioural expectations about the 
most correct conduct towards experimental subjects and respondents, employers, sponsors, other 
researchers, assistants and students.  
With regards to ethical considerations, the researcher strictly followed the theory of autonomy 
which stresses that the right of self-determination of respondents must be respected. According to 
Burton (2000) and Babbie (2007) this theory indicates that a respondent has the right to participate 
or not to participate in a research study. Also, the researcher has to give space while respondents 
are filling-in the required information in the questionnaire so as to uphold confidentiality and not 
to influence the respondents. Respect for this right form the basis for attempting to ensure that 
informed consent is achieved. Babbie (2007) opines that the essential ethical rule of social research 
is that it must bring no harm to a participant. This is the reason why an informed consent form and 
ethical clearance form (see Appendices ii and iv) were presented to the participants before the 
commencement of the various interviews. Winter (1996) identified certain principles which are 
meant to be addressed by the researcher. These are: 
• All participants should be allowed to influence the work;  
• The wishes of those who do not want to participate must be respected;  
• The development of the work must remain visible and open to suggestions from others; 
• Permission must be obtained before making observations or examining documents 
produced for other purposes;  
• Description of others’ work and points of view must be negotiated with those concerned 
before being published; and  
• The researcher must accept responsibility for maintaining confidentiality.  
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Owing from the above, this study adhered to the ethical considerations in accordance with the 
policies set by the University of KwaZulu-Natal Ethics Committee (UKZNEC). The accepted 
proposal and ethical clearance requirements were submitted through the Higher Degrees 
Committee of the school for approval. Thereafter the proposal was approved, and ethical clearance 
granted. See Appendix III.  
Participants were adequately briefed on the purpose of the study before the interviews were 
conducted. The researcher equally secured necessary permission from the gatekeepers (Traditional 
rulers) before starting the data collection process. The respondents were as well informed that their 
participation in the study was voluntary and if uncomfortable in the process, they were free to 
withdraw from the study at any stage without restrictions. The respondents were also reassured of 
their anonymity and that data collected would be treated with uttermost confidentiality. In addition, 
other scholars’ works used or cited in this study were acknowledged accordingly with proper 
referencing. Upon completion of the final version of the thesis, the thesis will be submitted to 
Turnitin software to check the percentage of plagiarism. The issued originality report will be given 
to the College higher degrees office.  
1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter one: Introduction and Conceptual Clarification 
This chapter provides the background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, 
aims and objectives, the significance of the study, research site and scope of the study, theoretical 
framework, methodology, and the structure of the thesis. It also attempts to clarify some concepts as 
adopted in the study. These include Border, Border Communities, Insurgency, Cross-Border 
Insurgency and Coping Strategies.  
Chapter two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
This chapter covered an extensive review of the literature on border threats in global, regional 
(Africa) and sub-regional (West Africa) perspectives, and a contextual analysis of the construction 
of borderline in Africa. It also reviewed literature on the strategies developed by border communities 
in different kinds of conflict situations across the globe. In the final analysis, the chapter discusses 
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the theoretical framework that underpins the study and a theoretical model constructed from the 
findings of the study. The underpinning theories are State fragility theory, Functional Prerequisite, 
and the Human Need theory. For a phenomenological study of demographic nature, one or two 
theories are insufficient to explain the three-pronged condition necessitating the study communities 
to develop coping strategies with insurgencies, hence the need for three theories, one for each prong. 
The selected theories are useful for this study for the following reasons: while the state fragility 
theory addresses the failure of the Nigerian state to perform its basic function of securing the lives 
and properties of its citizens, the functional prerequisite and the human needs theory reveal the basic 
needs of man for survival and the length to which man can go to get these basic needs for the sole 
aim of survival. This is true for the selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria who 
have developed coping strategies for survival of the Boko Haram upsurge. 
Chapter three: Regional Border Architecture: Africa and West Africa 
This chapter discussed the border framework of the AU and ECOWAS as a regional and sub-regional 
organization respectively, and the implications their implementation or non-implementation have or 
will have on the border security of member states, with emphasis on Nigeria. 
Chapter four: Historical Account of Border Architecture in Nigeria  
This chapter discussed the making of the Nigeria state, the nature and construction of states in 
Nigeria from independence (Nigeria as a federation with regions and 36 states), factors responsible 
for the erection of borderlines between Nigeria and its neighbouring states, and finally, the evolution, 
composition and strategic importance of North-Eastern state and their borders in Nigeria. 
Chapter five: Cross-Border Insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria 2003 -2019 
Using existing literature and data gathered for the study, this chapter extensively reviewed the 
security situation in North-Eastern Nigeria in relation to cross-border insurgency. It attempts a 
descriptive analysis of insurgent activities in the region vis a vis the perception of the local 
population in concrete terms. Finally, the chapter attempted a comprehensive discussion on the 
impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria especially on women and children 
in border communities. 
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Chapter six: Interventions by State and Non-State Actors to Cross-border Insurgency in the 
North-Eastern Nigeria 
This chapter examined the migration flow of the local population as either refugees or IDPs within 
and without the North-Eastern Nigeria and proceeded to question the responses of the government 
to the security challenge and humanitarian crisis created in the region.  This was done by reviewing 
the state counter-terrorism policy and its implementation process and analyzing the data gathered 
from the field to determine the effectiveness of the Government response to cross-border insurgency 
in the North-Eastern Nigeria. The activities of non-state actors who are at the fore front of addressing 
humanitarian needs was reviewed based on existing literature and responses from the local 
population.  
Chapter seven: Survival Strategies of Selected Border Communities in Nigeria 
This chapter extensively analyzed primary data generated from the various FGDs and IDIs 
conducted in the selected border communities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states of the North-
Eastern Nigeria.  Also, secondary data were reviewed in relation to the objectives of the study which 
is investigating the coping strategies evolved by border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria.  
Chapter eight: Conclusion, Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This concluding chapter attempted a review of the whole study, a conclusion deriving from the 
findings of the research and recommendations of better-coping strategies based on the research 
findings. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on reviewing existing, relevant 
literature on themes related to the study. This review covers scholarly works on cross-border 
criminalities which pose threats to borders and borderlands. These include, but are not limited to, 
smuggling of small arms and light weapons, trafficking on human beings, trafficking on narcotics 
etc. from global, African and West African purviews. It equally delved into contextualizing the 
discourse on the construction of borderlines in Africa. The second section presents an overview of 
the theoretical framework underpinning the study. These theories include state fragility theory; 
functional prerequisite; and human needs theory. These three theories conjoin to provide useful 
insights into why inhabitants of the selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria 
evolved coping strategies for the sole purpose of survival.  
2.1 Border Threats from Global, Regional and Sub-Regional Perspectives 
The high wave of globalization and the explosion in communication technologies, have led to the 
springing up of new security related threats that are independent of national boundaries. As a result, 
a new form of war is emerging all over the world; this is because the basic threats to national 
security have changed essentially (Zalur & Zeckhauser, 2002) from orthodox aggression to 
assymetric belicose. These threats no longer arise from ideological and territorial disputes among 
states but from the extent globalization, criminal networks and technological threats have grown 
to challenge the sovereignty of nation states (Zalur & Zeckhauser, 2002). 
Ering (2011) sees border threats as a set of criminal endeavours whose committers and 
consequences go beyond territorial borders. He identifies such criminal activities to be human 
trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, cross-border terrorism, corruption and business 
fraud, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in diamonds, illegal oil bunkering, among others. These 
activities are carried out by individuals and organized criminal groups utilizing key technological 
means such as information networks, the financial system and other sophisticated avenues. Ortuno 
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and Wiriyachai (2009) upheld the view that the past few years have witnessed a significant increase 
in global criminal activities as identified above, while pointing out others such as material and 
nuclear technology, migrant smuggling and the trade in human organs. Equally, evolving crimes 
such as modern piracy, trafficking in poisonous waste, fake medicines, precious metals or natural 
resources are evolving, thus adding to the list of criminal activities that occur along the borders. 
Luna (2008) averred that in recent times, trans-national crime has grown in scope and is 
characterized by increasingly global reach, involved in multiple forms of criminal activity, 
expanding criminal markets to include large-scale financial fraud and cybercrime. These 
syndicates are willing and always ready to protect their activities through violent and brutal means. 
They go to the extent of connecting with international terrorist groups in a bid to exploring and 
devising exceptional and notorious organizational strategies to prevent capture. Globally, no 
region is invulnerable from global reach of transnational crime groups (Ering, 2011). The end of 
the Cold war has witnessed movement of organized crime groups across continents, taking swift 
advantage of new opportunities, and moving more readily into new geographic areas. The key 
international organized crime groups operate in the United States, Latin America, West Africa, 
Southeast Europe, Asia, Russia and all other regions (Ering 2011). 
Boister (2003) defines transnational crimes as crimes that have the potential of causing negative 
consequence across national borders and as well negate the core values of the international 
community. Furthermore, transnational crimes also include crimes that daily occur within a 
country, but their grievous consequences are significantly felt in another country, most often 
neighbouring countries and countries that serve as transit routes for such dastardly acts. Typically, 
transnational crimes include but are not limited to trafficking both in persons, goods and 
commodities, sex slavery, cross-border banditry, terrorism offences, etc. (Sunday and Orji, 2014). 
The UNODC’s definition advances the parties involved in these illicit activities. Transnational 
crime according to UNODC “involves people in more than one country maintaining a system of 
operation and communication that is effective enough to perform criminal transactions, sometimes 
repeatedly” (UNODC Report 2005:14). As such, transnational crimes refer precisely to crimes 
carried out by organized criminal networks otherwise called crime organizations within a country 
and across its borders (Sunday and Orji, 2014).  
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The phenomenon of transnational crimes is not alien to West Africa in particular and to Africa as 
a whole. AUBP (2012) asserts that most parts of the African continent are characterized by 
insecurity, underdevelopment and conflict. Some of the fundamental causes of these problems are 
cross-border criminalities which range from cattle rustling, automobile theft, smuggling of arms, 
ammunitions and commodities, human trafficking, to terrorism among others. This is because even 
in the face of globalization and technological advancement, borders in Africa aside from being 
largely porous, they are often managed by limited personnel that are ill- equipped, ill-trained and 
unmotivated to prevent cross-border crimes and to facilitate harmonious interactions between 
countries as a result of the mismanagement of these borders. This situation has therefore nearly 
perpetually opened the borders to transnational crimes. Because they are largely unchecked, these 
illicit activities carried out across the African borders daily thrive to the extent of becoming 
established on the continent and in the West African region respectively. Below is an assessment 
of the major transnational crimes prevalent in Africa to help unearth the critical need to enhance 
border management in Africa and West Africa.   
2.1.1 Smuggling of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) 
“Small arms and light weapons” depict a broad collection of military grade weapons ranging from 
hand guns to mortars and their missiles. According to the Small Arms Survey (2010), the term 
“light weapons” includes mortar systems up to and including 120 mm; hand-held (stand-alone), 
under-barrel, and automatic grenade launchers; recoilless guns; portable rocket launchers, 
including rockets in single-shot, disposable launch tubes; and portable missiles and launchers, 
namely Anti-Tank Guided Weapon (ATGWs) and Man-Portable Air Defence System 
(MANPADS). SALWs’ combined qualities of destructiveness, adaptability and portability have 
made them weapons of choice for organized criminal groups. Their unchecked availability has 
played a part in causing massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, 
and in the emergence of a culture of violence and the use of children in armed conflicts, events 
which have devastated many socio-economic systems in Africa. Criminals and rebel groups have 
taken advantage of the widespread availability of SALWs to engage in acts that undermine human 
security and state sovereignty (Small Arms Survey, 2010).   
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Eselebor (2008) opined that there are several internal and external sources of SALWs. 
Nevertheless, regardless of their origin, these weapons are smuggled across national borders to 
reach various destinations where they are sold for much gain. The major destination points spread 
across all regions of Africa where they have been nefariously used in fighting civil wars and 
committing violent robberies and terrorist acts. Therefore, there is an established connection 
between border porosity and the proliferation of SALWs which in turn provokes coups, civil wars, 
insurrections, ethnic violence and organized crime in Africa.  
Wannesburg (2005) averred that trafficking of arms and ammunition can be traced to notorious 
international organized crime figures such as Leonard Minin and Viktor Bout who were able to 
carry out the illicit trade of providing arms to governments and rebel groups within the sub-region 
as a result of corruption, civil wars and political instability that was prevalent, making it possible 
for fire arms to be owned legally and illegally on a large scale within the sub-region. These 
weapons were used by rebel combatants to fight civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire 
etc. while criminal gangs used them for armed robbery, vehicle theft, trafficking and highway 
robberies of passengers moving from one ECOWAS state to the other (Addo, 2006).  
The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS Mohammed Ibn Chambas (2007-2010), gave the estimated 
number of small arms in circulation within West Africa at 8 million while earlier in 1993 the UN 
mission gave the figure to be 7 million. These weapons are majorly found within Guinea, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and in other conflict zones like the Casamance province, Southern Senegal, Guinea 
Bissau, Northern Ghana and Nigeria (Kwadwo, 2005). Addo (2006) pointed out that the cross-
border destabilizing activities apparently occasioned by border porosity witnessed in Senegal, 
Guinea Bissau and The Gambia are largely caused by the movement of refugees and the flow of 
small arms across borders. Similarly, in 1993, a UN mission estimated the number of firearms in 
circulation in West Africa to be seven million, with Liberia having between 80,000 – 100,000 
weapons circulating within the country and as such pose a problem that has to be addressed within 
the sub-region as these weapons were traded among member states (Meek n.d).  
What is even more worrisome is that between 1993 and 2018, the number of firearms in circulation 
in West Africa has drastically increased. Recent figures from the Director of the United Nations 
Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), Olatokunbo Ige, indicate that 
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within a period of 25 years, the number has risen from 7 million to 500 million, of which over 350 
million amounting to 70 per cent are found in Nigeria (The News, 2006). Suffice it to note that the 
years between 2008 and 2011 account for 38 major seizures of major weapons majority of which 
were trooping into West Africa from up-north by land, a situation unarguably made possible by 
border maladministration (UNODC, 2013; The Guardian, 2018).  
The aforementioned study carried out by UNODC however revealed that some of these arms are 
locally manufactured. Be that as it may, cross-border firearms trafficking resulting from ineffective 
border policing has spelt doom for citizens of Nigeria and many West African countries, 
particularly those who are resident in the borderline areas. For its part, Cote d’Ivoire was alleged 
to have received several deliveries of military weapons while the figure of deliveries in Liberia 
was given at 49 deliveries in 2002 and 25 deliveries in 2003 (UNODC, 2005). 
 It was also discovered that Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali and Nigeria have a large arms 
manufacturing industry. These arms are smuggled from Ghana through the borders of Togo and 
Benin into Nigeria where they are used in committing serious crimes. An instance to refer to was 
the arrest of some arms traffickers who were discovered to be Nigerians by the Benin Customs 
officers in 2002. The traffickers were in possession of several rounds of ammunition and hunting 
rifles being smuggled into Nigeria from Ghana. This only constitutes a minute part of arms 
trafficked within the sub-region. In 2002, the Nigerian Customs Service equally intercepted a 
shipment of small arms and ammunition estimated to be more than 4.3 billion naira (US $34.1 
million). This was just one foiled attempt out of many that have been carried out successfully along 
the borders with Benin Republic in the West and Niger, Chad and Cameroon in the North.  In 
2017, the Nigerian Customs Service intercepted a 20fts container containing 470 pump action 
rifles imported from Turkey into Tin-Can Port in Lagos (Vanguard, September 21, 2017). 
However, Farah, (2004) averred that the situation persists as many governments were found to be 
accomplices with different suppliers especially China by providing false end-user certificates or 
by supplying some of the regimes in West Africa with armaments. It is a truism that these 
governments do this in exchange for trade agreements.  
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Across the sub-region, different armed groups have been found making use of these weapons to 
spur up local and transnational unrest. Small arms circulate in the Sahel region where pastoral 
societies are experiencing extreme environmental stress and conflict related to food security. In 
Niger, arms are reportedly trafficked between it and its neighbours. In conflict-ridden zones such 
as the Niger Delta of Nigeria, weapons are also readily available. It has been confirmed that 
communities have large stocks of automatic rifles and small arms, which are used in communal 
violence, piracy and other crimes (Davis and Asuni, 2005). Elsewhere, weapons circulate between 
Mali and Côte d’Ivoire, remarkably in the territory held by the Forces Nouvelles rebels. Also, in 
2004 armed fighters from the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 
supported Mandingo groups in violent clashes with the Guerze community in the Guinea Forest 
region.8  
As noted earlier in this chapter Nigeria is saturated with sophisticated arms and weapons of mass 
destruction to the tune of over 350 million firearms capable of fueling conflicts and armed robbery 
in the state (The News 2006). Most of the illicit arms in circulation in Nigeria found their way into 
the country through its porous borders, be it land, air or sea (Eselebor, 2008). Placing emphasis on 
the consequential porosity of Nigeria’s land borders and its devastating effects on the country, 
Eselebor (2008) explained further that the consistent provision of smuggled arms into the country 
particularly via the porous Nigeria – Benin border is quite alarming and needs to be addressed 
because of its catastrophic effect on the country’s national security. Most of the arms trafficked 
across border into the country are utilized in internal conflicts, drug trafficking and armed robbery 
and therefore establishing a continuous cycle of violence and insecurity in which basically women 
and children are brutalized.     
The problems caused by the proliferation of SALW in Nigeria cannot be precisely measured. 
However, (Keili, 2002; Osimen and Akintunde, 2015) averred that there is no dispute that small 
arms have had a devastating effect on the development, governance and day to day life of Nigerians 
 
8 Guinea: Economic crisis and Liberian gunmen threaten stability, IRIN, 15 July 2004. This community is home to 
many of the Guinean migrants to Côte d’Ivoire who left that country when the civil war began and who are resentful 
of the assistance given to refugees from Sierra Leone, Liberia and native Ivorians. The Guinean government backed 
the LURD rebels in Liberia. 
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and as such posed huge threat to our national security, while also contributing in no small measure 
to cross-border insurgency and insecurity of border communities in the country.   
2.1.2 Human Trafficking 
Human beings are another ‘cargo’ for cross-border traffickers and smugglers who move them 
across borders for selfish monetary gains. Trafficked people, mainly women and children, are 
those who are forced out of their countries and brought involuntarily to be sold across borders into 
slavery-like conditions and prostitution.  
Scholars have defined human trafficking differently; however, the definition given by United 
Nations Trafficking in Persons Protocol (2000) encapsulates all. It defines human trafficking to 
be: 
 the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, mainly for exploitation.9  
The scope of the human trafficking problem is widespread in West Africa. In West Africa, this 
phenomenon became aggravated by civil wars which resulted in massive refugee flow, internal 
displacement, the conscription of child soldiers and poor economic conditions (Salah 2001). 
Organized crime groups therefore utilize this situation as penetrating networks to smuggle women, 
children and other undocumented persons for labour and sexual abuse.10 Human Right Watch, 
(2003) averred that the most prominent kind of trafficking which is child trafficking is prevalent 
among eleven out of the fifteen member-states of the ECOWAS namely Benin Republic, Ghana, 
Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Guinea, Togo, Sierra Leone, Niger, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia and Mali. It 
provided statistics of an estimated 200,000 children who are victims of this practice in both West 
and Central Africa. Fitzgibbon (2003) indicated that the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
 
9 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/ProtocolonTrafficking.pdf 
10 Trafficking of humans is defined as a phenomenon where an intermediary, who for a fee or violence or persuasion, 
displaces an individual within or outside the national boundaries of a state or commercial exploitation with the assent 
of parents: IRIN, West and Central Africa, IRIN focus on regional efforts against child trafficking, 21 January 2002. 
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estimated that 200,000–300,000 children are trafficked within West Africa every year. UNICEF 
gave an estimate of 10,000–15,000 West African children who are being sold for the sum of $340 
to farmers to be used as labourers in the cocoa plantations (ILO, 2001). This shows the vibrancy 
of this phenomenon within the sub-region. In 1998, about 10,000 to 15,000 Malian children 
worked as labourers in plantations in Cote d’Ivoire while in 1996, 4,000 children were trafficked 
from Cross River State to different parts within and without Nigeria. Benin had a record of over 
3,000 children trafficked between 1995 and 1999 (ILO, 2001). However, in 1997, more than 700 
children were intercepted in Benin within the first seven months (ILO, 2001).  
Sarah (2003) points out that in West Africa, recognized trafficking routes utilized involve Ghana, 
Cameroon, Niger, Benin Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, Cameroon, Burkina 
Faso, Guinea, Chad and Senegal. Victims of this dastardly act are frequently garnered from rural 
areas close to the highways between Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. Wannesburg (2005) 
points out that from Burkina Faso, children have been trafficked to Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, 
Germany and Côte d’Ivoire. In Mali, Gao is reportedly a transit point for human trafficking. People 
may be conveyed to Algeria, through Mauritania, Western Sahara and Morocco to Spain or 
through Mali, Algeria and Tunisia to Italy/Malta. The US Department of State’s Office to Monitor 
and Combat Trafficking in Persons recently published a report indicating that in 2017, Nigeria was 
downgraded to Tier 2 watchlist among countries with the highest number of traffickers in West 
Africa (Department of State, 2017). To corroborate this fact, Ngor (n.d) reports that Nigerian 
groups dominate the organized human trafficking networks within the sub-region; and have been 
able to spread the tentacles of their operations into Mali, Togo, Benin, Ghana, and South Africa. 
They have successfully established both air and land routes which are used to transport the victims 
to West and southern Africa and Europe.  
Titi Abubakar, onetime Nigerian First Lady, saw this situation as abnormal and therefore 
spearhead the establishment of a non-governmental organization called Women Trafficking and 
Child Education Foundation (WOTCLEF) to vigorously fight against human trafficking in Nigeria 
(Agbu 2003). She harnessed and utilized all available means ranging from legal, political, and 
social, to start off a significant resistance against human trafficking in the country (Agbu, 2003). 
In July 2003, the Trafficking in Persons’ prohibition and Administration Act was passed in 
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Nigeria. As a legislative framework, the Act resists all forms of trafficking in person and protects 
children and adults against criminal networks (UNICEF, 2007). Diverse reasons are adduced as to 
why many Nigerian Children are susceptible to trafficking. UNICEF highlighted these to include 
large family size, poverty, low literacy levels, high school drop-out rates swift urbanization with 
deteriorating public service, and to crown it all is the porous borders of Nigeria – Benin republic. 
This therefore made Nigeria a hub of trafficking in human beings, particularly women and 
children, as it became “an origin, transit and destination country for trafficking women and 
children”. Trafficked women and children dispersed to different parts of West Africa, North 
America, Europe and Middle East from Nigeria mainly via the Seme Border. Benin Republic 
equally serves as a destination country for children trafficked for labour exploitation from Nigeria. 
Women trafficked from Nigeria are equally forced into prostitution in Benin (Chinkwanha, 2007).   
UNODC (2006) revealed that children trafficked into Nigeria are mainly children who are 
voluntarily released by their relatives and the ones kidnapped from Benin and Togo, Cote d’ Ivoire 
and Niger. An estimated 96% of that figure comes from both Benin Republic and Togo, with 90% 
coming from Benin alone. Boys between the ages of five and six years of age trafficked from 
Benin have been seen peddling drugs and sighted working in exploitive conditions in Nigeria’s 
mines, quarries, plantations and construction sites mostly in the South-Western part of the country. 
Trafficked girls are used for domestic services or street hawking as well as commercial sexual 
exploitation. Regarding women trafficked to Europe for commercial sex a February 2018 report 
from CNN estimated that 94% are from Edo State while the remaining is from Kano, Delta, and 
Borno States (UNODC, 2006). 
Olujuwon (2006) highlights the ordeal of the trafficked person in the hands of their end users. 
According to him, trafficked persons suffer physical assault and threats of violence of self and 
family and also psychological issues. They equally suffer from illness and death. Many trafficked 
persons die en-route as a result of dangerous track condition and become ill as a result of dangerous 
working condition. Moreover, trafficked females are constantly raped and harassed by police so 
that the officers could turn a blind eye to this act. Again, trafficked person, friends and family are 
being threatened if debts owed are not paid or report will be made to authorities if the trafficked 
escaped or refused to work.  
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According to Nshimbi and Moyo (2016), there is a re-victimization by government in diverse 
ways. Non-citizens and marginalized persons are being treated unjustly while the officials treat 
trafficked persons as criminals for crossing international boundaries. For instance, trafficked 
person’s passport data page and their identity are printed in newspaper and highlighted in news. 
Furthermore, trafficked persons are forced to return to their countries swiftly without consideration 
for safety, justice or need for prosecution witness. Also, they are detained by police, starved, and 
held in custody longer than necessary while the government fails to put measures that will protect 
family members of trafficked persons from threats of harm or actual harm by traffickers.  
The foregoing points to the fact that border porosity is not only peculiar to Nigeria but to the whole 
of West Africa. Additionally, it reveals the damaging consequences the phenomenon of border 
porosity has on individual countries, citizens, diplomatic activities and on the development of the 
sub-region at large. The foregoing further helps to buttress the need to enhance border management 
on the continent such that cross-border crimes could be brought to its lowest level within the 
shortest possible time, for the socio-economic and political betterment of West African countries 
in particular and of the embattled continent. 
2.1.3 Trafficking of Narcotics 
The problem emanating from drug trafficking is probably among the most alarming problems in 
transnational crime (Muna, 2002). Legally, the US defines drug trafficking as “an offense under 
federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution or dispensing 
of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance 
(or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute or dispense” 
(Ering, 2011). It can also be described as the commercial exchange of drugs and drug apparatus 
which may include any equipment used in the production of illegal drugs or use of them. Drug 
trafficking is a problem that affects every nation in the world and exists on many levels. 
The trafficking of drugs is a dreadful threat that is connected to the porosity of borders. In Africa, 
drug trafficking routes are similar to the ones usually used in smuggling illegal migrants and 
contraband, via West Africa and East Africa into Europe and the US. To this extent, drug 
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trafficking has been widely acknowledged to become a major threat to human security, national 
sovereignty and regional stability (Ering, 2011).  
Studies across regions of the world have shown that drug use is associated with crime and violence. 
The UN has asserted that the production and trafficking of drugs is a major source of financing 
rebellions in West Africa. This is the case in countries that are found to be leading producers of 
Cannabis such as Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal. Cannabis production is 
alleged to provide the finance for arms acquisition. In such countries, farmers prefer to grow 
cannabis rather that cash crops like cocoa, rubber, timber etc. because of its high demand and high 
prices in the world market Neal (n.d). Therefore, drug trafficking is a more lucrative business that 
is used to finance other organized criminal engagements like terrorism, arms trafficking, and 
human trafficking. 
In Africa, the drug issue has been found to be having another dimension. Aside providing drug 
traffickers with routes for drugs smuggled into Europe, Africa is increasingly becoming a 
destination for illegal drugs where they are been consumed, hence the reason for the prevalence of 
drug abuse and addiction. Some African countries have witnessed an inflow of hard drugs such as 
heroin and cocaine. In West Africa, most especially, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal have 
experienced an increase in drug seizures by government officials (ibid.). These substances such as 
heroin and cocaine are found to be used in the cities of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, 
Ghana, Benin and Nigeria but the indigenous cannabis produced in these countries still constitute 
the main substance of abuse in Africa (UN World drug Report, 2010) as it has largely serviced the 
local and regional drug markets. Youths in the cities peddle this substance, even though some of 
them may be sold and trafficked to Europe (EUROPOL Organised Crime Report, 2004).  
Studies have revealed that West African criminal networks in collaboration with other syndicates 
use West Africa ports as transit routes for drugs to Europe and the US. This is so as cocaine and 
heroin have been seized en-route the US and Europe from Togo, Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Senegal (African criminal enterprises, Organized Crime Section, FBI, www.fbi.gov). This 
illicit trade is being facilitated by the vast and porous land, riverine and seaports and extensive 
corruption among government and customs officials provide an ideal environment for illicit trade. 
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In Accra, two Venezuelans were rounded up for allegedly possessing narcotic drugs valued to be 
$38 million. The narcotics suspected to be cocaine were found packaged in 588 pieces of wrapped 
tablets and concealed in paper boxes with a gross weight of 580 kilograms (Ghanaian Daily 
Graphics, 2005). Again, the Spanish authorities intercepted an aged trawler, registered in Ghana, 
off the West African island nation of Cape Verde. Onboard was 3,000 kilos of high-grade 
Colombian cocaine which was seized and the crew who were mostly Ghanaians were arrested 
(Eric, 2005). In December 2004, Spanish patrols equally intercepted a Togo-flogged ship carrying 
4.5 tons of narcotics (ibid.). On a wider scale, the West African Joint Operations Initiative, a 
regional enforcement project set up by America and Nigeria, made seizures totaling 1,390 kilos 
cocaine in Togo, Benin, Cape Verde, and Ghana (ibid.). 
Figure 2.1 shows that a total of 3,161 and 6,468 kilograms of cocaine were seized in 2006 and 
2007 respectively. These statistics given by UNODC as at 31st September 2007 confirms the 
popularity of the porous route in drug trafficking. The rising use of West Africa as a large cocaine 
stockpiling space is further confirmed by seizures made by Latin American and European countries 
of cocaine shipments on its way to Africa (Ering, 2011). 
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Figure 2. 1 Annual cocaine seizures in West Africa 2000 – 2007 
 
Source: UNODC: World Drug Report, 2007 and UNODC Data for Africa 2006 – 2007 Statistics 
in Ering, S.O. 2011. Trans-border Crime and its Socio-economic Impact on Developing 
Economics. J Sociology Soc Anth, 2(2): 73-8 
Figure 2.2 displays the figure of maritime seizure made by European Navies off the 
West African coast between the year 2005 and 2006, signifying an increase in drug trafficking 
activities within West Africa.  
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Figure 2. 2 Maritime seizures made by European Navies off the African Coast in 2005 and 
2006 
 
Source: UNODC individual drug seizures Database and Data for Africa, in Ering, S.O. 2011. 
Trans-border Crime and its Socio-economic Impact on Developing Economics. J Sociology Soc 
Anth, 2(2): 73-80. 
However, in Nigeria, which is the most populous country in Africa and one of Africa’s major 
economic players experiences a significant problem of organized crime. As Muna 2002 observed, 
the police and other security agencies have limited capacity to analyze the structures of organized 
crime, tending to regard all those whom they apprehend as individuals. This observation, though 
sixteen years old, remains valid as there is no existing study to prove otherwise. As suggested by 
Nwannennaya (2017), drug trafficking was initiated in the region of West Africa by Nigerians 
because many drug plants do very well in Nigeria, leading to increase in cultivation and cross-
border transmission. Ghana and Sierra Leone Police Force both allege that drug trafficking was 
introduced into their countries largely by Nigerian criminals who intend spreading the tentacles of 
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their illicit trade activities. However as international drug trading in West Africa seems to have 
been championed by Nigerians and with Nigerian entrepreneurs now being suspected as playing a 
major role in the international drug trade while under the pretext of the legitimacy of their 
businesses, every country in West Africa has the capacity to become a transit route used by 
criminals of any nationality (UNDOC, 2008). 
Nigerian Traffickers are known to operate with impunity in Benin likewise the Beninese in Nigeria 
through the porous Nigeria – Benin border. Traffickers are smart as they use legitimate business 
to camouflage drug operations. Proceeds made are often reinvested in Real Estate and this assists 
them to launder illicit profits (Barbara, 2007). For example, most persons with Nigerian 
International passports that are arrested, prosecuted and convicted of drug trafficking are usually 
couriers working for drug barons in other countries (Ngor, n.d.), and although it has been pointed 
out that Nigeria produces the highest number of criminals than its neighbours, it is still important 
to point out that criminals of other nationalities most especially Beninese may sometimes find it 
easy to claim being Nigerians:  
But even if one were to make allowance for doubts over the true nationality of some 
couriers bearing Nigerian passport, there is overwhelming evidence to support the 
view that drug trade remains one of the specialties of Nigerian criminal group – of 
couriers intercepted with drug transmitting through West Africa, according to 
statistics compiled since 2000-2005, 92 percent were West Africans and no less 
than 56% were Nigerians. UNDOC (2005). 
A striking point to note is the continuous emerging role of Nigeria as a zone of transit. Just within 
West Africa, narcotics are trafficked from Ghana through Togo into Benin cutting across the 
Nigeria-Benin border into Nigeria and all the way into Southern Africa.  
Drug Dealers employ the services of couriers to do the trafficking and are only shown specific 
points of delivery. Drug dealers and ‘pushers’ cut across the different segments of society ranging 
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from highly placed government officials or politicians and business tycoons to unemployed youth 
looking for greener pastures or desperate to be prosperous at all cost to break the chain of poverty.11  
The couriers are mostly youths within the age bracket of 18-40 years. This is 
substantiated from the arrests made. The methods of peddling drugs vary from 
simple concealment in personal effects like bags, boxes and shoes, animals, lining 
of clothing, concealment in women’s reproductive organ (the Vagina), designed as 
talcum powder, packaged in small moulded balls and swallowed, engraved in 
cultural artefacts to so many ingenious unimaginable methods (Agbu, 2008). 
As a measure of tackling this menace, the Nigerian government established the National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) to fight the upsurge in drug trafficking mostly transported across 
the Nigeria-Benin Border via land, air or sea. The creation of this agency was backed up with the 
promulgation of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act which seeks to enforce laws against 
the cultivation, processing, sale, trafficking and use of hard drugs and to empower the Agency to 
investigate persons suspected to have dealings in drugs and other related matters. The NDLEA 
with the cooperation of other international agencies has relatively fought the war against drug 
trafficking. This is evident in the arrest made thus far within the country and at exit points but the 
porous nature of the Nigeria – Benin border remains a bane to the successful operations of the 
agency (Agbu, 2008).   
  
 
11 A Ghanaian Parliamentarian, together with his accomplice, was arrested for alleged drug trafficking, in November 
2005. See the Editorial of the Ghanaian Stateman, 25 November 2005 at 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/newsrunner.php#94959  
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2.1.4 Other Commodities 
Some commodities which are termed as contraband by countries are being smuggled in by 
smugglers.  Such commodities which are either sub-standard or hazardous for consumption are 
being smuggled across African borders. These commodities vary from agricultural products such 
as tobacco, coffee, vanilla, cocoa, rubber, timber and cattle, manufactured goods like cigarettes, 
medicines, beverages, electronic gadgets, vehicle and industrial machinery parts, and precious 
stones such as gold and diamonds. The trafficking and smuggling of contrabands are capable of 
denying governments tax revenues needed for national development. This act not only deny 
governments collectible revenues but also hinders local manufacturing companies from thriving 
as the market is saturated with cheap products, some of which are hazardous to the health and 
safety of citizens.  
Nigeria witnesses the smuggling of commodities such as oil and cars which are mostly smuggled 
across its borders. The nature of our wide border and coastland with the attendant difficulty of 
effective manning because of limited resources has aided both the smuggling out and smuggling 
in of different goods (Nte, 2011). In 2011, 380 cars reportedly stolen in Nigeria were traced to 
Benin Republic.  Oil bunkering has also continued to thrive due to the easy smuggling of the stolen 
oil via the Seme border. According to the Federal Government, some 300,000 barrels of oil are 
illegally exported per day with the Nigeria-Benin border acting as a major transit zone (Nte, 2011).  
Because of the economic and national security consequences, efforts have been made to reduce 
smuggling activities to its minimum across border in Nigeria. This reflected in the massive seizure 
made by the Nigeria custom Service (NICS), Badagry Area Command under the command of 
comptroller Aliu Barbriel Toba. The value of goods seized was put at N573.3 million.  Among the 
seizure were used vehicles, wines, textile materials, bags of rice, and vegetable oil as well as 
pharmaceutical products topping the list. These goods were perfectly concealed in a manner that 
ordinarily will not raise any suspicion (Nte, 2011).   Table 2.1 details transnational, organized 
crimes in the West African region for the earliest periods into the new millennium.  
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Table 2. 1 Variations of Transnational Organized crimes in West Africa 
Predominant 
Border Crimes 
Country/ 
Border Zones of 
activities 
Groups/ Actors 
Involved 
Transit States Recipient 
States 
Narcotics/ Drug 
Trafficking 
Cape Verde, 
Ghana, Nigeria 
and Togo 
Narcotic/ Drug 
dealers 
Ghana/ Togo/ 
Benin/ Nigeria 
Spain, Portugal, 
UK, USA and 
South Africa  
Internet Crime 
(Advance Fee 
Fraud/ Money 
Laundering) 
Nigeria, Ghana, 
Cote d’Ivoire 
and Sierra Leone 
Advanced Fee 
Fraud gangs or 
syndicates/ 
Wealthy 
business men or 
government 
officials 
Syndicates 
commute from 
the Western part 
of West Africa 
(Senegal) across 
to the Eastern 
parts (Benin/ 
Nigeria) 
Nigeria and 
other countries 
where the ‘419’ 
fraudsters are 
resident 
Human 
Trafficking 
All across West 
Africa but 
mainly around 
Benin/Nigeria 
and Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Traffickers who 
serve sometimes 
as middle men, 
trade and 
business partners 
Mainly Ghana 
and Sierra 
Leone 
Other West 
African 
countries, and in 
North America, 
Europe, and the 
Middle East 
Fire Arms 
Trafficking 
Ghana/ Togo/ 
Benin/ Nigeria/ 
Sierra Leone/ 
Liberia/ Guinea/ 
Cote d’Ivoire/ 
Senegal 
Rebels, local 
manufacturers of 
fire arms and 
middle men 
Togo, Benin, 
Guinea-Bissau 
and the Gambia  
Nigeria, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, 
and Cote 
d’Ivoire 
53 
 
Recruitment of 
Child Soldiers, 
Mercenarism 
Mano River 
states including 
Liberia/ Sierra 
Leone/ Guinea 
and Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Rebel Groups 
(including 
LURD, 
MODEL, RUF, 
CDF, New 
Forces (MPCI, 
MPIGO and 
MPJ) 
Same countries 
depending on 
where conflict 
spill-over 
Mano River 
States and Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Smuggling of 
illegal goods, 
minerals and 
natural resources 
and cash crops 
Cote d’Ivoire/ 
Ghana/ Togo/ 
Benin and 
Nigeria, and 
Liberia/ Sierra 
Leone 
Individuals, 
business men 
and women, 
warlords/ civil 
war combatants 
Mainly Ghana, 
Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Cote 
d’Ivoire 
In Europe and 
North America 
Source: Addo, P. (2006). Cross Border Criminal Activities in West Africa: Options for Effective 
Responses 
2.2 Contextual Discourse of the Construction of Borders in Africa 
The construction of borders in Africa can be traced to the nineteenth century when the Europeans 
scrambled for African land and territories. Countries such as Germany, Britain, France, Spain, 
Italy and Portugal came into the territory of Africa, divided and ruled over it until late 1960s when 
most African countries gained their Independence. Phimister (1995) exposes that western 
expansion and colonization project in Africa came before the 19th century, nonetheless Africa 
became identified with borders and arbitrary boundaries in the 19th century. Stuchtey (2011) 
evinces that during the phase of High Imperialism between 1870 and World War I, every larger 
European nation state as well as the USA and Japan participated in acquiring territories outside 
Europe. Africa as a region was a foremost area that the Europeans expanded to and acquired 
territories. The conquest of India in the 18th and early 19th centuries, at about the time that Africa 
was conquered, speaks volumes of European expansion. 
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However, the existence of borders in Africa can be associated with the incongruous incursion of 
colonial powers on the continent altering the original structure of nations. Record of the New 
World Encyclopedia discloses that in 1454 and 1483, the Pope ceded much of Africa to the 
emerging maritime colonial powers, Spain, Belgium, and Portugal. But in the 19th century, 
particularly after the 1884 Berlin Conference, or a period from 1890-1910, the European powers 
established colonial system by partitioning Africa among themselves for economic, political, 
cultural and military gains. Boahen (1985) notes that the period after 1910 was essentially one of 
consolidation and exploitation. 
The exploitation and control of Africa’s human and natural resources goes as far as the period of 
slave trade. Sankarasubramanian (2015) explains that it was during the slave trade that the 
European powers first started controlling territories; the territory would be some land around 
trading posts where European ships could find harbours and offload goods (and in some cases, 
load their ships with slaves). Stuchtey (2011) stresses it further that the formal use of colonial 
violence was symbolized in its most illustrative form in the slave trade with the establishment of 
slave ports on the coasts of West and East Africa as the starting points of slave shipments to the 
plantations of Middle and South America. To a significant degree, there is a great influence of 
slave trade being a political and economic invention on border creation in Africa. 
Scholars of history such as Asiwaju (1985) and Robinson (2002) have emphasized that borders 
construction were either absent or weak in pre-colonial Africa and during slave trade. In the same 
vein, the work of Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011) has shown while citing Asiwaju (1985); 
Dowden (2008) and Wesseling (1996) that the main impact of Europeans’ influence in Africa was 
not colonization per se, but the improper border design. African border construction became 
evident from the moment that the Berlin Conference was concluded in 1885; a period that political 
and economic rivalries between the new industrial nations in Europe became obvious, as well as 
the subjugation of African nations and its traditional territorial structures (Britannica 
Encyclopedia, 2017). 
Subsequently, the abolition of the slave trade resulted in the West bringing African nations under 
a unified but segmented territorial construction. The Western powers initiated and divided African 
land according to their own interest. Brunet-Jailly (2009) shows that Africa was divided with the 
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use of map designed from the Berlin Conference. With the map, land, coastal and Island areas of 
Africa were shared by the European powers among themselves, except territories such as Liberia 
and Ethiopia (Boahen, 1985). In the process of sharing, the Europeans failed to consider the 
seemingly differences existing among the people of the nations that they merged into a 
conglomerated unit. Factually, it was partitioning the African territory that brought about border 
construction. 
Border as a system of checking movement of people from one territory to another became 
conventional only in the 20th century. Fisher (2012) recounts that in 1575, 100 Portuguese families 
and 400 Portuguese troops landed on the African continent's southwestern coast at what is now the 
city of Luanda. They expanded from there, stopping only when they reached German, Belgian, or 
British claims. By twentieth century, the Western powers had developed posts and, in some places, 
implanted symbols to indicate or identify areas and/or territories already conquered. According to 
New World Encyclopedia (2017), decolonization process during the twentieth century saw the 
emergence of nation-states with artificial borders, often crossing tribal boundaries and with limited 
infrastructure. In effect, Western interest in decolonizing Africa was more of protecting Western 
political and economic interest. 
On one hand, border system was an approach that the Western powers employed in forestalling 
advancement of counterparts into areas of interests or areas already occupied. On the other hand, 
border construction was the tool that Europeans used in physically claiming conquered territory in 
Africa. Largely, as a systemic program, through border post the Europeans were able to retain their 
presence in every colonized area in Africa even after the decolonization. Carter and Poast (2015) 
stress that borders constitute the international system of states, and accordingly states will from 
time to time take assertive measures to secure the border, with among the most aggressive 
strategies being the construction of physical barriers, which we refer to as “border walls”. Due to 
the physical role that borders play in arresting cross-border insecurity, Carter and Poast made it 
clear that President Kennedy came to the conclusion that walls are better than wars. 
Border construction has become the most functional practice by which colonization principle of 
divide and rule is brought back to memory. Of course, the colonial legacy relating to border and 
boundary has generated so much disputes and conflict for the colonized countries in Africa. In 
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fact, most cases of conflicts among or between countries after the World War II are based on 
boundary issues. Tolorunshagba (2015), Ikome (2012) and Owhotu (1989), have noted that 
countries such as Nigeria and Cameroon, Libya and Chad, Somalia and Ethiopia, Togo and Ghana, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, Senegal and Gambia, Nigeria and Chad, North and South Sudan, almost went 
to war because of boundary dispute. In particular, Nigeria and Cameroon in 1981, 1983, 1993, 
1994 and 1996 nearly warred over the Bakassi peninsula, until 2012 when the International Court 
of Justice intervened in the boundary issue with its verdict in favour of Cameroon (Tolorunshagba, 
2015, Baye, 2011 and Aja, 2002). 
The colonial policy which established the indistinct boundaries in Africa also presented the 
western powers themselves with serious challenges throughout the year 1900. Accordingly, 
expanding territories and establishing borders led the Europeans to sign many treaties, such as the 
Ottoman-German 1914 treaty; the 1919 Treaty of Versailles (established the term of peace after 
World War I, and obliged Germany to surrender territories under its colony to its European 
counterparts); the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 delimited the boundaries of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, 
Egypt and Sudan. Treaties from 1925 to 1945, and subsequently late 1950s were mostly signed 
between Britain, France and African nations, namely the 1934 British-Egyptian Agreement that 
delimited the border of present day Libya, the 1935 Franco-Italian Agreement concerning Aouzou 
Strip. By late 1950s and early 1960s, African nations had started gaining their independence. 
As observed by Brunet-Jailly (2009), majority of the treaties identified above were signed just to 
ascertain sovereignty and control over territories, resources, and consequently to prevent conflict 
among European powers. Coplan (2010) unveils that borders are nowhere simply the product of 
geography, because borders in North America and Europe were established by war, domination, 
and resistance. In Africa, it is almost the contrary because borders were arbitrarily created based 
on the outcome of Berlin Conference (Asiwaju, 1976 and Englebert et al., 2002). Though the 
Berlin Conference Act emphasizes occupancy right in relation to geographical control, the 
European powers failed to recognize the original limits of nations’ territories; neither did they 
bother to delineate nations’ boundaries clearly in accordance with their socio-geographical 
features.  
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At independence, most of the African nations’ artificially designed borders generated several 
controversies, such that on May 25, 1963, the OAU in Cairo had to compel African nations to sign 
documents maintaining the territorial boundaries handed to them by their colonizers (Zoppi, 2013 
and Munya, 1999). The decision of OAU, now AU, came from the fact that most colonial boundary 
delimitations in Africa were full of errors. This boundary delineation error was not unnoticed 
before and even after the United Nations was established in 1945 to maintain international peace, 
friendly relations among nations and ensure self-determination of peoples or nations (The UN 
Charter, Chapter I, Article I). In fact, it can be said that since the United Nations could do more or 
less little about boundary errors, it had to shift the responsibility to the AU to ensure that African 
Nations maintain colonial-created boundaries to avoid complications. 
Presently however, the United Nations is faced with a serious problem of maintaining international 
peace between some African countries in dispute over boundaries. Again, an argument against the 
organization is that it has arrested inter-state wars, but has failed to end intra-state wars, namely 
insurgency, secessionist movements, terrorism, land or boundary conflict etc. Cases of boundary 
in Africa alone are a sizable workload that the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, called 
International Court of Justice, is trying to determine. Sumner (2004) shows that the cases of 
borders between Burkina Faso and Mali, submitted to ICJ in 1983 are still pending. Also, Somalia 
and Kenya Maritime Boundary Delimitation into the Indian Ocean, Ghana and Ivory Coast border, 
Tanzania and Malawi colonial border dispute are still pending at the ICJ. 
However grievous the effect of colonial borders may be in Africa, there is the understanding that 
changes in boundary functions might lessen boundary tensions across borderland and border 
(Stephen, 1959). Initially, borders were barriers by which a state defends its sovereignty. Brunet-
Jailly (2009) notes that the European states turned their borderlands into military regions where 
combat was rehearsed regularly and eventually took place. He also added that borders were 
originally used to delimit the territorial possessions of sovereign states, which made rulers who 
were eager to picture the boundary line demarcate their possessions. In Africa, precisely West-
Central African States such as Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Benin, borders are used for 
the purposes of goods and services import and export, checking migration flows, as well as 
defending states. 
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In the view of Alesina (2003), in Africa, there are evidences of how separatism or secessionist 
movement and threats in a sovereign state led to the creation of new state. South Sudan is a newly 
created state, after recognizable threats against Sudan from which she separated in 2011. Yet, many 
other Africa states are still confronted with secessionist threats, as in the case of Nigeria, Central 
African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Chad and Senegal etc. (Kam Kah, 
2014; Keller, 2007). Such struggles notwithstanding, the problem of secessionism does not end 
with state creation because newly created states would definitely want to establish their own 
borders for effective economic, political, social and geographical control. So, it is clear that the 
issue of having autonomous boundary or border control in relation to territorial sovereignty is as 
old as European incursion into Africa, and that it would last for as long as secession remains in 
sight. Stothart (2014) establishes that the principle of sovereignty, territoriality and autonomy have 
formed the basis of the international community’s political, economic and legal systems for the 
past 300 years. According to him, the principle entails that humankind is organized principally 
into exclusive territorial communities with fixed borders, which separate the domestic arena from 
the world outside. 
Basically, the construction of borders in Africa was basically to enhance trade, economic and 
political relations of the European countries. Nevertheless, the construction today appears to be 
frustrating its desired purpose. Borders are now more like barriers rather than bridges, and as such 
it frustrates trades even among countries with the closest borders. In relation to this claim, OECD 
(2005) recognizes that borders’ inefficient procedures are barriers which may likely led to poor 
export, competitiveness, or make countries less attractive to investment in, in the face of 
smuggling, fraud and national insecurity. It is vital at this juncture to observe that no country in 
Africa is absolved of inefficient border procedures with complex trade facilitation. There is a 
cogent need to make policies that would make borders bridges and not barriers to reduce issues of 
insecurity, in particular, smuggling. 
2.3 Coping strategies of border communities from a global lens 
From a global prism, Zartman (2011) dichotomizes two kinds of cross-border conflict using the 
terminology “transboundary dispute”. On the one hand, a transboundary dispute may be dispute 
about boundaries which erupts as a result of lack of knowledge or dissatisfaction of position of 
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border lines. On the other hand, dispute across boundaries occurs in one or more countries resulting 
from a singular or diverse, complex issue, but spills into another country, especially a neighbouring 
one. This makes dispute across boundaries more complex than the dispute about boundaries. 
In the Americas, much as in some countries of Europe and Asia, the protracted border conflicts 
between the United States and Mexico offers a reading for understanding dispute across boundaries 
from a global perspective. Those living in the border area of the conflict developed strategies to 
cope with their situation until formal governmental and/or organizational intervention would 
become available or sufficient. Of all the conflicts that have occurred in the United States/Mexico 
border such as those induced by facilitation, development, the environment and water, the 
“aquifers conflict” which sprang up as a result of claim to water resource particularly serves as 
reference point for the current study because it is one which attracted personal, concerted efforts 
of the residents of the borderline areas in terms of coping strategies.  Before engaging in an analysis 
of the conflict in relation to the current study, it is important to first mention that the United 
States/Mexico border has artificialness in common with many African borders like those of Nigeria 
and its neighbours. Another important mention is the lack of institutional framework (also referred 
to by the PCIP as institutional weakness) for managing the aquifers spanning the frontiers, and this 
has helped in aggravating the conflict. A third note of importance is the absence of collaborative 
management of the conflict. Again, much like what Nigeria has earlier been reported to be in West 
Africa, the United States is the major destination of drugs arriving from Latin America, while it 
happens to be the source of cash and guns flowing southwards. Finally, people in their hundreds 
of thousands commute across the border for work and other socio-economic activities while the 
border is known for prevalence of crime and drug trafficking, (Pacific Council on International 
Policy 2009), just as is the case with many a border between Nigeria and her neighbors. 
The principal coping strategy employed by inhabitants of this border community is collaboration 
which the PCIP has succinctly described as meaningful and mutually beneficial “cooperative 
solution”. In this sense, the term collaboration differs from its conventional meaning in Peace and 
Conflict Studies parlance where it depicts a win/win strategy employed by parties to a conflict to 
ensure that both sides are satisfied. Open discussion of all issues of concern, exploring all 
alternative solutions, being honest and committed are required in this instance. By collaboration 
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in this study, we mean the coming together of community stakeholders from the various border 
communities in both countries, i.e. the United States and Mexico to assuage the devastating effects 
of the conflict on themselves as much as to attempt a lasting solution to same – not as parties to 
the conflict, but as victims of the conflict. One feature of collaboration that stands it out as a 
strategy for coping with or managing conflict is that its bi-national nature makes diversity of 
perspectives possible, thereby leading to amicable decisions. Another feature is that those such as 
community heads and group leaders involved in conflict management in the communities, act with 
power in their domains and have the leverage of involving government delegates and 
representatives from NGOs. Again, such inter-community collaboration allows for the deployment 
of expertise in that skilled, experienced and revered personalities get involved in conflict 
management (or coping strategies) to device decisive, long-term plans based on technical 
assessment, while follow-up on decisions reached is made easy.  
Most importantly, collaboration makes room for a wide range of contribution from affected parties 
to get actively involved in the process. In the case of the border riverway border conflict between 
the United States and Mexico, it has been reported that members of each community travel mostly 
in pairs to the other to assist in tracing illegal weapons confiscated by authorities of both countries. 
Closely related to this are activities such as mutual recognition of the powers vested in specific 
individuals who have undergone training from the government of the United States which has 
made a mark in equipping Mexican law enforcement agents as well as other well-meaning civilians 
in curbing the conflicts in the area. Nevertheless, the origin of the collaboration strategy between 
and among residents of the United States/Mexico border is not unconnected to governmental and 
international policies. By international standards, collaboration of water policies is largely 
encouraged because of its importance to society at large. To mention but one renowned policy, the 
1944 water treaty saw the resolution of a number of disputes emanating from shared riverways 
with the exception of the All-American Canal which has yet to be resolved collaboratively.  
According to the PCIP (2009), wastewater treatment and supply of drinking water happen to be 
some of the areas of collaboration of the border communities of the United States and Mexico. 
This has been reported to be a huge success due to the consensual involvement of financial 
institutions such as the North American Development Bank, environmental institutions like the 
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Border Environmental Cooperation Commission, and multilateral institutions like the International 
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). Thanks to the strategy of collaboration, the conflict 
was efficiently managed to the extent that between 2003 and 2009, the lack of access to sewage 
and drinking water in both communities has been drastically reduced to less than 14 per cent (PCIP 
2009), and it keeps getting better by the year. 
Nevertheless, one can point out some challenges to the strategy of cooperation. Viable as it has 
been in the United States/Mexico border community, has not been without its shortcomings in that 
many of the efforts made by border community residents have largely been rather unsystematic 
and ad hoc. As a result, they are not governed by any broader vision on the continued management 
or sustenance of the conflict or even the boundary per se, yet sustainability is paramount in conflict 
management. Consequent upon this, pressure continues to mount on nationalist constituencies of 
the United States that favour unilateral approaches which encourage less engagement with 
neighbors to coping with border conflicts. Be that as it may, indigenes of border communities can 
maintain the collaboration strategy which seems quite viable only if those who see its benefits are 
as vibrant in their propagation of it as opponents of collaboration seem to be in their criticisms. 
Another challenge as recently reported by the PCIP is that for reasons of sovereignty, current 
government regulations in each country undoubtedly impede collaboration among border 
communities in the United States and Mexico, reasons being that the laws of the land supersede 
whatever (collaborative) conflict management (or coping strategy) that best suits the communities. 
For example, gun laws of the United States permit individuals to acquire a range of firearms, unlike 
in Mexico where such possession would be severely punished. In the same vein, some other 
countries like Britain have much relaxed restrictions on case of gun display and are nearly entirely 
unregulated. So, in the collaboration process, border communities on the U.S. end may possess 
considerable legal authority to prevent and disrupt drug crimes and other crimes related to the 
waterway conflict, whereas their Mexican counterparts lack such leverage. This undoubtedly 
makes collaboration difficult, if not completely impossible. 
The civil war that occurred in Colombia in the mid-1990s did not just threaten the diplomatic ties 
between Colombia and its neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela, it equally spread violence across 
the borders of the trio, of which local communities resident in borderlands were hit by the impact, 
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thereby driving them to self-help considering the limited presence or total absence of government’s 
timely intervention. The study of Ramirez (2011) reveals that over the years, this state of affairs 
has largely permitted non-state armed groups and guerrillas in the border areas of the three 
countries. It has also resulted in the proliferation of paramilitaries and drug cartels in the areas. 
Like many borders in Africa, with particular reference to Nigeria, the Venezuela-Ecuador-
Colombia border area is poorly policed and has become key routes for pushing weapons and 
explosives, as well as for networking among international drug traffickers. Unlike the United 
States-Mexico borderline water dispute where governments of both countries took collaborative 
steps towards conflict management, collaborative government-induced cross-border solutions 
have yet to be explored by governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Instead, there have 
been tendencies of violation of national sovereignty as well as minimal control of border which 
grants unhindered transit to armed groups. 
Observing that the idea of state boundaries transcends the mere division of two territories by means 
of lines, Ramirez (2011) noted the importance of the involvement of people with close everyday 
relationship in peacebuilding initiatives as it relates to strategies of coping with conflict situations 
in border areas. To this end, the scholar recognizes what could safely be termed institutionalized 
mobilization as a strategy to cope with security issues in border communities. The emphasis here 
is on civil society cross-border peacebuilding initiatives such as meetings and protests organized 
and executed by women of both countries, humanitarian action initiatives organized by religious 
bodies notably the social Action Agency of the Roman Catholic Church and the Jesuit Service for 
Refugees, a bilateral network for environment, Chambers of Commerce meetings, media forums, 
and conferences from the stables of bordering municipal local authorities. Significant and 
seemingly the oldest of such initiatives would be the academic relationship between the main 
public universities existing in the borderline regions of Columbia and Venezuela. Tables 2.2 and 
2.3 show the operations of civil societies between Columbia and Venezuela. 
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Table 2. 2 Columbia – Venezuela Academic Initiative 
  
Source: Ramirez, (2011).  
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Table 2. 3 Citizens’ cross-border initiatives 
 
Source: Ramirez, (2011). 
The success of this initiative can be rightly judged by its sixteen years of profitable existence. 
Employing the strategy of building a framework for communication between various sectors 
involved in multilateral ties, academic exchange, research and publication coincide with activities 
carried out by the academic institutions involved in the initiative. The ultimate goal was to help in 
establishing a multilateral approach towards promotion of better understanding of the problems 
which underlie disputes from which the border communities suffer in no small measure. As part 
of strategies to better cope with conflict situations in the border areas of Venezuela and Colombia, 
educational institutions in both countries were linked to social organizations as well as local and 
national authorities. Resultantly, urgent conflict issues of concern within and beyond the border 
areas have been addressed. In very tense situations such as that of Bogota and Caracas, peace has 
been promoted in the area through issuance of memoranda proffering joint perspectives in spite of 
differences in economic, political and social conditions of both countries (Ramirez 2011). 
65 
 
In the Colombia-Ecuador space, protest against Colombia’s incursion in Ecuadorian territory to 
burst the Revolutionary armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel group severed the diplomatic 
ties between both countries in March of 2008, and the resultant economic and social consequences 
hit borderland populations in the areas. As coping strategy, the communities that make up the 
border areas of both countries engaged an unhindered cross-border civil society peacebuilding 
cooperation which not only helped in managing the crisis along borderlines but also contributed 
to the normalization of bilateral relations of both countries on a larger scale. Suffice it to note that 
the academic institutional cooperation or collaboration of the border regions, particularly those of 
Cofanes, Pastos, Awa, and other African-American communities spanning the borders later 
enjoyed extension to commit other academic institutions in the hearts of both countries. Through 
what was termed “life plan” initiatives which aroused cultural and traditional based developments, 
such collaborations ensured the strengthening of non-violent resistance to war. 
Another coping strategy employed by the Colombia-Ecuador border communities in managing 
crisis was the establishment of a Bilateral Dialogue Group (BDG), comprising ten renowned 
figures from either country, with the objective of facilitating efforts on mediation by setting up 
dialogues with the conflicting parties (various governments concerned with the conflict), so as to 
solidifying diplomatic bilateral ties. So far, it is glaring that one significant feature of the coping 
strategies employed by the Colombia-Ecuador border communities in surviving the conflict(s) 
threatening their existence is the involvement of diverse sectors which has been aptly described by 
Ramirez (2011: 60) as “articulation of broad momentum of social dynamics” deployed to save 
delicate moments of diplomatic stress. 
The import of border communities evolving idiosyncratic strategies to cope with crisis plaguing 
them cannot be overemphasized in the sense that such an act goes a long way in entrenching 
relative peace in the communities much as it has the tendency of putting the conflict in check in 
the inner parts of the country or preventing it from spreading therein in the first instance. One 
might then as the question of how viable these local strategies might be. Inasmuch as these 
strategies may initially and unilaterally not be viable overall, they have the tendency of helping to 
restructure the approach of the central government and calling the attention of the international 
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community, a situation which is very likely to lead to a satisfactory management or even resolution 
of the conflict and /or crisis. 
Citing the example of Colombia and Ecuador, one can leverage on Jimmy Carter’s mediatory 
efforts in the crisis between the two countries. Again, civil society initiatives helped the conflicting 
countries to garner external interventions from world class agencies towards a fruitful negotiation 
process leading to lasting conflict resolution. Of these interventions, financial aid and convening 
of programs and activities are certainly not the least. In the same vein, cross-border collaboration 
of border communities has the tendency to trigger further and better collaborations at the 
international level. For instance, after several attempts to fully contribute to the peacebuilding of 
Colombia and Ecuador, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was finally able to 
operate on both sides of the border of both countries by developing and executing its own 
initiatives with the help of the Carter Center. In the end, both the UNDP and the Carter Center 
provided assistance to the GBD local initiative, thereby enabling it to engage fully with the 
Organization of American States (OAS) for better outcomes. 
From the foregoing, it becomes undeniable that the proximity of borderland communities to 
borderland violence is analogous to incentive for urgent actions and insights into domestic 
situations in a bid to developing appropriate reactions. To this extent, the coping strategy of 
collaboration or cooperation as evident in the involvement of civil societies in Colombia and 
Ecuador finds credence as a viable cross-border solution to cross-border crises, particularly 
through dialogue and interactions in the face of diplomatic breakdown. Such collaborative efforts 
are worth more than unilateral state responses which arguably make life harder for inhabitants of 
border communities whose neighborhood relations are often deplorably distanced. As reported by 
Ramirez (2011), the decisive cross-border peacebuilding engagement of cross-border civil society 
between Colombia and Ecuador coupled with its attendant international recognition and support 
has meant the rapid development of a rapprochement between the two neighbours. A global 
perspective on coping strategies of border communities in times of crisis having been explored, it 
would be necessary, for the sake of analytical equilibrium, to consider the subject matter from an 
African regional perspective. 
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2.4 Regional perspectives of coping strategies of border communities 
Jaspars (2010) produced a report from a 2009 study addressing the role of community group and 
local institutions in addressing food insecurity and threats to livelihoods in North Darfur, Sudan, 
Northern Africa. This aspect of the study would benefit from the threats to livelihoods area of the 
report to explore the regional prisms of coping strategies of border communities in times of crisis, 
particularly as Jaspar’s discourse on threats to livelihoods is closely related to insurgency which 
is partly the focus of this thesis. Jasper’s study focused on the roles played by community-based 
organizations (CBOs) and analogous groups, and local institutions, in coping with the crisis in the 
borderlines of the northern part of Darfur where violent conflict has been ongoing for over two 
decades. Similar to the borderlines of the northern parts of Nigeria, threats to livelihood taking the 
form of banditry, large scale attacks, localized clashes between government and rebel groups, SLA 
and Arab groups, as well as localized crimes have persisted for many groups in the border areas of 
North Darfur, Sudan. 
Much like the situation in Nigeria and Colombia-Ecuador-Venezuela, this region experienced 
significantly reduced government attention, a situation which further encouraged mayhem and 
necessitated self-help. Likewise, government institutions ceased to function in these (rural) areas. 
What made the Darfur situation more pathetic was the fact that many CBOs and NGOs also ceased 
to function in the borderline areas in focus, while the few who remained functional dramatically 
changed their ways of functionality from active to passive owing to the increasingly worsened 
insecurity situation, particularly in the regions controlled by the opposition. For instance, the 
modus operandi transformed from empowering communities or strengthening governance to 
simply aid distribution particularly to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees.  
According to Jaspars (2010), the basic coping strategy employed by inhabitants of the conflict-
ridden border communities of Northern Darfur in Sudan includes (re)grouping towards 
institutionalized support by professional associations, women groups, CBOs networks, rural 
committees and camp committees. Professionals such as blacksmiths, potters and tanners appeared 
to be faring well in spite of the conflict. This is largely due to their skills been in very high demand, 
thereby enabling them to be able to continue with their profession in the heat of the crisis. Another 
factor would be that in Sudan, blacksmiths are locally highly respected; as such they were able to 
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garner external support to help with managing the conflict and establishing survival strategies for 
the benefit of the border communities. Additionally, their ability to help in coping with the crisis 
situation was further enhanced by their potential to influence policy, thanks to their legal identity. 
Again, women groups played significant roles in the negotiation of safer movement, trade, and 
access to aid and other forms of assistance in the border communities. They also played key roles 
in negotiating between government, SLA and community leaders, as well as other peace 
negotiations relating to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) (Jasper, 2010). 
Practical examples of women’s negotiation roles in the borderline areas as identified by (Jasper, 
2010) include that of the Women’s Development Association (WDA) in Kafod which culminated 
in the prioritization of women activities and the establishment of a kindergarten and a seed bank. 
Agencies had been prohibited from working in Kafod which had come under the control of the 
SLA rebel group in 2004, because the rebel group feared that workers could gather information 
for the government to their own detriment. Following the intervention of the WDA, it was agreed 
that agencies could continue with their activities in Kafod.  
A second example of the contribution of women groups to managing the insecurity in Northern 
Darfur is the key role played by women in Shengel Tobai. The women regrouped themselves to 
persuade local leaders to negotiate safe passage for them in particular and for the entire community 
in general to El Fasher and Nyala, so as to gain access to work, markets and relatives. Negotiations 
by women in this regard saw government and SLA agreeing to providing security along the access 
roads. A third example of the role of women groups in helping to cope with conflict and crisis in 
the study area concerns an initiative known as “Kebkabiya free from arms”. The aim of this 
initiative was to exclude armed persons from both government and rebel groups from entering into 
the town’s market.  
The capacity of women groups to play such important roles in surviving or coping with the crisis 
in the area is fundamentally traceable to their status as the most directly impacted by the risks 
associated with economic activities such as farming and trade mobility. In addition to that, women 
constituted the majority of the population in many of the border communities, and they are 
considered quite trustworthy for being seen as less violent and less political relative to their male 
counterparts. In a similar vein, the CBOs networks, for their own part, “established as a way of 
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remotely managing projects in rural areas, are playing an important role in negotiating free 
movement in their areas and resolving disputes between villages” (Jaspars 2010:15). The aims are 
to empower people and communities, to improve efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of 
interventions, build organizational capacity at the local level, and strengthen governance and links 
between the states and communities (Jaspars 2010). Furthermore, CBOs engaged in mediations 
and negotiations as evident in the activities of the Rural Development Network which played a 
key mediating role between government and SLA concerning security risks in travel conditions in 
the border area troubled by crises. 
In a similar vein, a more recent conflict between the villages of Dalal and Abu Digaise over the 
Abu Dagas Dam helps to highlight the mediatory roles of CBOs in the study communities.  The 
conflict was referred to the Ajaweed Committee, a local conflict resolution mechanism, which 
resolved the conflict by proffering far-reaching recommendations, and by bringing the two villages 
together in a workshop with the aim of discussing issues and improving relationships between 
them. The CBOs’ success in their efforts at coping, survival and management strategies in the 
study areas can be linked to their perception as less partial actors than other leaders in the 
communities, as their group is usually ethnically heterogeneous; whereas the community leaders 
on the other hand are characteristically close to parties of the conflict, either government or the 
opposition, while also ethnically homogenous in many cases. 
The contribution of rural committees to coping with crisis in the border areas of northern Darfur 
cannot be overemphasized. Such rural communities include Village Development Committees 
(VDCs) and associated networks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Figure 2. 3 Committees in Abu Shook 
  
Source: Jasper, (2010). 
 
Figure 2. 4 Chart 2.2. Committees in Abu Digaise 
 
Source: Jasper, (2010).  
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As obvious in the above diagram describing the committees in Abu Shook and its 
interconnectedness, the committees cut across divers sectors of society such as water, health, 
youth, education, human rights, and so on. The main strategy employed by these committees is 
support by remote management which would include long-term food security support in form of 
provision of seed banks; paravet training, water reservoirs and dams. Specific problems around 
land, water and trade were also managed by need-specific groups formed by and mostly 
comprising members of communities themselves. The activities of IDPs camp committees revolve 
around international organizations interested in assisting the population of the crisis-ridden border 
communities in North Darfur, Sudan. These committees represent the interests of IDPs in the 
communities by assisting with distribution of aids. The report of Jaspars (2010) reveals that most 
of the leaders of the IDPs are not traditional leaders, and often thought to be partisan to government 
or rebel groups, hence the necessity of camp committees. 
From both global and regional perspectives of coping strategies evolved by border communities 
in managing conflicts and surviving crises as discussed thus far, the idea of social capital readily 
comes to mind. Social capital, which was put into practice in the instances discussed in this section 
of the thesis, is not new to the international community, but many states fail to leverage it 
(Fukuyama 2000) probably because it is a by-product of shared socio-cultural and historical factors 
outside the control of government (Fukuyama 2001). This definitely makes it a viable tool for 
tackling insecurity situations and minimization of conflicts in borderline areas where social 
amenities, cultures and histories are shared by peoples cutting across two or more politically 
defined lines. As a tool for conflict management in borderline areas, Sanginga et al (2007), citing 
the example of how a combination of voluntary associations ranging from credit and savings 
groups, farming groups and church groups in the South-Western Highlands of Uganda, particularly 
posits that conflicts over scarce natural resources can be minimized where there is strengthened 
understanding of the synergy between social capital and public policy. Thus, the import of social 
capital, notably one that transcends tribal borders in conflict management in borderline 
communities cannot be nipped in the bud, but must be encouraged by individuals, NGOs, CBOs 
and governments alike for its capacity to build unconventional cooperation based on trust. 
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As observed by Gerenge (2016), social capital restructures relationships beyond ethnic or religious 
regroupment while also spurring cooperative predispositions of individuals towards the 
engendering of peaceful resolution of conflicts. The Liberian example where social capital aided 
survival of individuals in situation of total governance breakdown serves to underscore this 
observation. The cooperative engagement of social capital as coping mechanism has also been 
reported by Sawyer (2005) as building block in the reconstruction of post conflict governance 
arrangements. 
2.5 Spill-over effect of cross-border insurgency on the Lake Chad Basin Region 
Running to safety is one of the basic moves that people embark on during a disaster, crisis, violence 
or war. It is also a natural event that happens when life is being threatened by seen or unseen 
danger. Based on these statements one can imagine why people involve in forceful migration 
during war or insurgency. Of course, the act of running to safety is one of the major causes of 
forceful migration, especially if the pull and push factors of migration are considered. In the report 
of European Commission, from its 4th -5th February 2016 International Conference on 
Understanding and Tackling the Migration Challenges: The Role of Research, it was noted that 
poverty, instability, natural disasters and in particular violent conflicts in countries in the EU’s 
vicinity drive people to seek safety and to realize their full potential in Europe. There is a similar 
case in Africa where people run away from violent conflict and becoming Refugees or IDPs. 
The migration flow of people who are affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, crossing 
into neighbouring countries’ border communities is today an alarming humanitarian crisis. United 
Nations (2015) declares that Boko Haram attack has overlapped into regional crises in other 
countries in Central African Republic, such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The agency also notes 
that significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons are adding pressure on host 
communities that are already food insecure and fragile. It is interesting to know that international 
agencies and regional organizations such as UN, AU, and ECOWAS, are showing great concerns 
to arrest the Refugees and IDPs crisis that accompany the Boko Haram insurgency. Their concerns 
can be associated with the fact that Boko Haram is now a regional and global challenge. 
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From the moment of declaring the Boko Haram as a terrorist group due to its level of attacks and 
strategies, which attracted a high response of counter-insurgency from the Nigerian Army and 
international communities, the number of Refugees and IDPs became increased especially across 
border communities in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. UNHCR (2012) estimates 8,806 
Refugees who are Nigerians as its total population of concern in 2011. In the same vein, Barna 
(2014) observe that since 2010 more than 15 000 people have fled as a consequence of the Boko 
Haram attack. The number of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria and across her 
borders in the Northeast is currently very high. UNHCR (2016) notes that in 2015, the Lake Chad 
Basin Region witnessed increasing waves of violence from the Islamist terrorist group Boko 
Haram, who expanded its insurgency from north-eastern Nigeria, where to date over 2.2 million 
people are internally displaced, to neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger, killing there over 550 
civilians and uprooting some 195,000 people. 
When one says that the humanitarian crisis in the countries that Boko Haram has extended its 
campaign and violence is quite alarming, it is taking into account the increased number of people 
who are killed or displaced, stripped of livelihoods which include loss of or lack of access to socio-
economic activity as well as other valuable properties. Talking about the challenges that Refugees 
and IDPs are suffering from in the border communities of Cameroon, Niger and Chad, who are 
hosting over 215,000 Nigerian refugees, they are daily challenged with lack of security, shelters, 
heath, food, water, nutrition, and education etc. UNHCR (2016) remarks that Nigeria’s 2016 
Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) advocates for the needs of nearly 285,000 Nigerian 
refugees who are in host communities, in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Earnestly, life for the border 
communities is not what it used to be with the expansion of Boko Haram to their areas. 
Border communities are presently suffering from insecurity, lack of basic social amenities, such 
as schools, good roads, pipe-borne water, health centers or clinics, among other problems 
experienced before the upsurge humanitarian crises caused by Boko Haram. Since early 2015 and 
2016 military campaign by Cameroonian and Nigerian troops has pushed Boko Haram fighters out 
of villages: throughout the region, entire villages have emptied, and markets shut down (ACAPS, 
2016). The areas or villages that are directly affected by Boko Haram crisis are located in Far 
North Cameroon, namely Mayo Moskota, Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Sava, Gwadale border, Meme 
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Market, Toumboum-Kare, Nguetchewe village, Tolkomare, Mayo Moskota, Kerewa, Bodo, 
Kouyape, Afade, Gourounguel etc. All these areas have been recorded with a form of security 
challenge or being host to people fleeing crisis, such as killing, kidnapping, cattle rustling and 
human rights violations from the Nigerian or Cameroonian troops. 
The border communities of the four West-Central African countries that are directly affected by 
Boko Haram attacks are mainly known for socio-economic production, even though they have a 
long history of unfavourable climate and flood which they have developed coping strategies in 
mitigating it. But as the Boko Haram cross-border attacks continue to build with the target of 
civilian population, especially those in farmland, markets and remote areas along borders, it has 
become so difficult for people to keep up their production capacity. World Food Programme 
(2016) stresses that at the regional level, violence and security threats block productive and trading 
activities, thereby hurting the Basin’s ability to meet growing food security needs. In other words, 
there is a high food shortage or insecurity in the border communities of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger 
and Chad, which increases the region chronic problem of malnutrition. 
There is no doubting the extent at which the border communities have been hit by the Boko Haram 
terror attacks, if one considered that Far North of Cameroon together with Northeastern Nigeria 
are the latest humanitarian assistance focused or concentrated region. Kindzeka (2017) exposes 
that the number of officially registered refugees in Cameroon has climbed to about half a million, 
with fresh arrivals coming from both Nigeria and the Central African Republic. Whereas, the 
United Nations forewarns that if appropriate measure is not taking, the over 1.6 million Refugees 
and IDPs that it estimated in Cameroon may ascend to 2.7 million. Of course, it has been rightly 
mentioned that Refugee and IDPs crisis is the highest challenges of the African countries affected 
by the Boko Haram insurgency. Refugee and IDPs issues are a critical challenge as they always 
cause overstress of available facilities in areas of occurrence; increase demand for humanitarian 
assistance from donors and so on. 
The challenges that Boko Haram insurgency has instigated for the border communities are so 
enormous. From the amount requested to meet the need of Refugees and IDPs from Nigeria to 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger, it cannot be difficult to apprehend the precarious conditions of the 
countries. According to Reliefweb (2017), Regional Refugee Response Plan 2017, launched in 
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Yaoundé, on December 16, 2016, involving 36 partners (UN agencies, national and international 
NGOs), has appealed for approximately USD 241 million for a target population of over 450,000 
people (refugees, host populations and displaced persons). In addition, the sectors that have been 
identified to be greatly of concern include protection, education, food security, health and nutrition, 
livelihoods and the environment, shelter and non-food products, water, hygiene and sanitation. 
Really, overspill effects of Boko Haram insurgency is a serious challenge for the Cameroonian 
government, even as it plunged the entire country into a sudden and unplanned for humanitarian 
crisis. As the government increases her effort to curtail the Boko Haram crisis particularly through 
the strengthening of its region security in the border areas, she has come under attack of gross 
human right violations just as Nigeria military or government was questioned on the same 
allegation in 2014. ACAPS (2016) specifically observes that on January 26, 2016, Nigerian 
civilians claimed that the Cameroonian troops killed at least 40 civilians around Gwadale border, 
who engaged in cross-border chase of Boko Haram members. But the Cameroonian government 
denied this claim. Indeed, it is challenging for a government military to be doing everything 
possible to ensure security, and again be confronted with allegations of human right violations. 
Obviously, military and other security operatives are aware of their obligations as regards the rule 
of engagement in any operation to avoid harassment or death of innocent persons. For a reason of 
the allegation of human right violations made against the Nigerian military, which the Leahy Law 
of the United States prohibits, Nigeria was out rightly denied access to purchase US made weapon 
needed to fight Boko Haram (Tuku, 2014). Up till date, the Nigerian government is still trying 
everything possible to access US-made weapon, to effectively conduct her counter-insurgency 
against Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria. And yet the issue of government military forces 
and Boko Haram insurgents committing gross human right abuses is conspicuously a very big 
concern in the border communities of the Lake Chad region. 
Areas connecting countries other than Cameroon with Nigeria, such as Diffa and Bosso in Niger, 
and Lac in Chad, have been pinpointed to be exposed to overspill of Boko Haram insurgency. 
According to Mercy Corps (2017), in Lac region of Chad and the Diffa region of Niger, the number 
of displaced people continues to rise due to insurgent attacks in border areas and counter-
insurgency operations by each country’s respective national military forces. An estimated 400,000 
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internally displaced persons (IDPs) are now said to be in these localities. The way and rate at which 
humanitarian crisis are getting increased day by day raises concern. It is important to say that 
international communities and the affected countries need to adopt a more realistic peace building 
strategy to support the ongoing military approach that is making insurgents to intensify their 
attacks along border communities. 
Several writings have identified the Lake Chad Basin region to be battling with climatic and 
environmental conditions, even before the occurrence of Boko Haram cross-border attacks and 
humanitarian crisis in the region. While quoting Uche et al. 2014, IDMC (2015) informs that 
livelihoods, access to water and grazing pastures have been under strain for decades as the surface 
area of Lake Chad has shrunk by 90 per cent over the last 45 years. Stressing his analysis further, 
it was revealed that people have increasingly migrated southwards along the Lake Chad basin 
perimeter which, over time, has led some 70 ethnic groups to converge and led to resource 
competition, tension and conflicts. 
Considering the environmental issues of the Lake Chad region, it was unconstrained for the Boko 
Haram to expand its network and spread its activities in the region by capitalizing on local 
populations needs. In the view of Mercy Corps (2017) and Danjibo (2013), many of Lake Chad 
region’s challenges stem from decades of governmental underinvestment, marginalizing the 
communities in the region and instilling a deep-seated sense of injustice, which in turn created the 
enabling environment for the extremist ideology of Boko Haram to spread. In addition, Ahmed 
(2014) states it clearly that 
Many Boko Haram foot soldiers happen to be people displaced by severe drought 
and food shortages in neighbouring Niger and Chad. Some 200,000 farmers and 
herdsman had lost their livelihoods and, facing starvation, crossed the border to 
Nigeria (Ahmed, 2014). 
There is no limit to the migration flow of people affected by the Boko Haram conflict. This is 
because movement depends on where attack is located, or rather where human security problem 
is. Sometimes people crossed back and forth into any of the border communities of the Lake Chad 
Basin countries. According to UNICEF (2017) observation people fled to find security in urban 
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centers. This is why Maiduguri the capital of Borno State, one of the insurgent areas in 
Northeastern Nigeria has been a favorite destination for many fleeing individuals to seek refuge. 
Life in the border communities of the Northeastern Nigeria has been equated with hell given the 
extent of humanitarian assistance and security that is required yonder. It is noted that since there 
is displacement, food insecurity, prices increased in the region, people now lived with the fear of 
hunger, disease and boredom, instead of living with fear of attack from Boko Haram. 
UNHCR and World Bank (2016) also reiterate the social and psychological impact of the Boko 
Haram violence on the communities in the Northeastern Nigeria, Far North Cameroon, Niger and 
Chad. The two international bodies establish that extreme level of violence from Boko Haram has 
taken a social and psychological toll by spreading fear and apprehension among the population in 
the region and exacerbating social divisions and distrust, especially toward those suspected of 
association with the insurgency movement. In the testimony of UNICEF,  
Communities are increasingly suspicious of children who have been linked to Boko 
Haram, creating barriers to reintegration and reconciliation. Society’s rejection of 
these children, and their sense of isolation and desperation, could be making them 
more vulnerable to promises of martyrdom through acceptance of dangerous and 
deadly missions (UNICEF, 2017). 
Gender and children related issues that are generated by Boko Haram insurgency present one with 
some horrendous psychological stresses that local populations are suffering from. But let more 
exploration be made of the psychological effect of Boko Haram attacks on border communities. 
Apart from the testimony of individuals, the United Nations (2017a) has expressed concern about 
the need to protect civilians affected by terrorism, including those who are victims of sexual 
exploitation and abuse, extra-judicial killings and torture. There is none of the security conditions 
identified here that do not cause traumatic stress or post-traumatic stress. For example, the 276 
Chibok girls that were kidnapped in Northeastern Nigeria in 2014, which a large number of them 
are still at large, and even those who were rescued are either with a child or pregnant, is a serious 
psychological challenge because it comes with stigma for both victims, their families and the 
communities at large. 
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United Nations (2017b) has expressed its concern on the weird and unpredictable strategy of Boko 
Haram attacks, which include raids or ambushes on towns and villages, kidnapping, killing, rape or 
forced marriage, directed against local populations mainly in border communities of Lack Chad 
region. All these social crises in the Lake Chad Basin have their psychological reflex or trauma 
stress. For instance, people out of fear of Boko Haram attack in the night, now adopt the habit of 
fleeing to bushes only to return in the morning. Also, the fear and frustration which accompany the 
news or actual act of Boko Haram’s raids or mobilizations is a big trauma for the villages and town 
of the border communities (APF, 2017 and Bagnetto, 2017). Those who have also left behind their 
production assets or job, lost family members, properties or part of their body to attacks, are not 
excluded from among people who have been psychologically strained. 
Nonetheless, it has been noticed that Boko Haram no longer has control over a whole community 
as it did sometimes ago. But the terrorist group has changed its tactics to guerrilla warfare, using 
IEDs, hit and run, and suicide bombing. In launching a suicide bombing attack, Boko Haram has 
become recently accustomed to use children, girls and women in carrying explosive. United Nations 
(2016) reveals that nearly 1 out of 4 suicide bombers in the four countries of the Lake Chad region 
is a child. Exposing a child to the act of carrying bomb or fighting in a conflict is a serious negation 
of child’s right and gross conduct against human right. To a large extent, this current tactic of Boko 
Haram has seen children blowing themselves up in a gathering in markets, garages, or bus station, 
military post and inside vehicles (Castern, 2017 and Haruna, 2017). 
A frequency analysis on suicide bombing reveals that there is increase in the heinous act from 32 
in 2014 to 151 in 2015 (BBC, 2016a). The analysis also shows that Nigeria was with the highest 
bombing, followed by Cameroon, Chad and then Niger. It also reveals that children constitute 
element used for suicide attacks. In other words, one out of five children are said to be used for 
bombing, while 75% of them are said to be girls, who are always drugged before sent on mission. 
This Boko Haram fighting strategy is seriously disastrous to communities’ co-existence, unity and 
peace, if indeed children are the future of a society. This is because children are now becoming 
perceived with suspicions. They are perceived to constitute threat to communities since they are the 
ones that Boko Haram is now using most to carry out attacks. 
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There is only little remedy to Boko Haram attacks at this moment, because the root causes of the 
conflict have still yet to be addressed. It should be recalled that poverty is one of the identified 
remote causes of the Boko Haram. If it is true, one cannot tell if the Boko Haram conflict would 
be curbed anyway soon. This is because Africa’s poverty is still the highest among all continents 
of the world (Beegle et al., 2016). And the border communities of Lack Chad region where the 
Boko Haram conflict is located presently are regions that are suffering high level of poverty, 
drought, malnutrition etc. Seriously, if Africa’s numerous problems including conflicts, such as 
terrorism, insurgency, ethnic-religious and political crisis, and climate change related conditions 
must be curtailed, the issues of poverty, corruption, bad leadership and injustice among others 
must first be addressed. Therefore, it is imperative to examine the security and the humanitarian 
responses of the government most especially and the humanitarian organizations to this reality 
across the North-Eastern Nigeria.  
2.6 Theoretical Framework 
A theoretical framework refers to the process of showing how identified core set of connectors 
within a topic fit together. Obasi, (1999) sees theoretical framework as a scheme for adopting or 
applying the assumptions, postulations and principles of theory in the description and analysis of 
a research problem. Theories are not fixed; instead they are possible explanations which we 
formulate and reformulate in an attempt to make sense of a body of evidence (Baker, 1999). Stacks 
and Salwen (2009) buttress the importance of a theory by averring that theory organizes and 
enhances our ideas, like a map for exploring unexplored territories. Chinn and Kramer (1999) also 
opine that a theoretical framework is a structure that presents the theory which explains why the 
problem under study exists. Abend (2008) cited by Neuman, (2011) provide different meanings of 
theory as follows: 
• A theory is a logically connected set of general propositions that establishes a connection 
between two or more variables;  
• A theory is an explanation of a specific social phenomenon that identifies a set of causally 
relevant factors or conditions;  
• A theory provides insights into the real meaning of a social phenomenon by offering an 
illuminating interpretation and by telling us (what it is all about);  
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• A theory is what a famous social thinker really meant;  
• A theory is an entire worldview, or a way of seeing, interpreting, and understanding events 
in the world;  
• A theory is a criticism based on a political moral viewpoint; it presents and stands for a set 
of beliefs-values from which it critiques the position and arguments of opponents; and 
• A theory is a philosophical commentary on key questions or issues about core issues of 
how we develop knowledge about the social world (for example, how we really construct 
a sense of social reality).  
Explaining a phenomenon may take a theoretical or empirical approach. And a phenomenon may 
be intuitively conceived; however, for it to be generally acceptable, it must entail logical 
interrelated set of propositions that qualify as empirical reality, if not it may not be called a theory. 
Littlejohn (1999) and Kaplan (1964) establish the fact that explanation of phenomenon must be 
empirical in reality before it can be theory. With this view, theory is a systemic concept that helps 
to define a subject in terms of knowledge. As rightly defined by Stam (2007), theory is the systemic 
organization of knowledge in relation to a problem as well as its solution. 
There are diverse and relevant theories that have been developed in the field of social sciences, 
Arts and Humanities to explain phenomena. Out of these theories, three were adopted to 
adequately analyze and explain the root causes of the focus of this study which are viewed from 
three perspectives. These theories are human needs, functional prerequisites and state fragility 
theories. While Functional prerequisite theory and human needs theories were adopted to showcase 
the underlying factor prompting the insurgency witnessed in border communities in North-Eastern 
Nigeria, the state fragility theory was adopted to reveal the inability of the government to perform 
its major function of protecting lives and properties in the border communities. These theories 
assist to bring to fore the reason for the occurrence of insurgency in Nigeria, and later becoming a 
cross-border conflict in the Lake Chad region. In other words, the theories explain why the Boko 
Haram insurgency which started in Nigeria suddenly became a serious challenge for Nigeria and 
why it spilled over into neighboring states like Cameroon, Niger and Chad. They equally expose 
the contending issues that make insurgency primarily concentrated by its intensity, cross-border 
attacks and humanitarian crisis in the North-Eastern Nigeria, without any close end to its effect in 
the wake of counter-insurgency. 
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2.6.1 Human Needs Theory 
Human needs theory is one of the vast concepts developed to explain conflict and its resolution. It 
is believed that conflict is inevitable and a natural event in human existence and relations. Coser 
(1956) is particularly associated with the claim that conflict is inevitable, natural and necessary 
aspect of human society. Being influenced by the view of Simmel Georg, Coser sees conflict as a 
form of socialization and functional, because group formation and relations in any society 
comprise both association and dissociation. As a social function, conflict is thought to be 
instrumental in a group persistence, existence and life. Similarly, the human needs theory which 
is espoused by John Burton came as a reaction to the common belief that conflict is inevitable, or 
that it is in a human essence to be aggressive. In passive agreement, Öğretir Özçelik (2017) reveals 
that Sigmund Freud is a prominent forerunner of the theory that man is aggressive by nature. 
Eweka and Olusegun (2015) stressed that this theory was greatly popularized in the works of 
Abraham Maslow, John Burton, Marshal Rosenberg and Manfred Max-Neef and it posits that 
human beings need certain essentials if they must live and attain well-being in any ramification of 
life. Such essentials are known as (basic) human needs.  Coate and Rosati, (1988) assert that human 
behaviour and social interaction is to a great extent determined and influenced by his needs. When 
the basic needs of a person or group are not met, there is bound to be conflict. In other words, it 
has been proven that there is an innate tendency in man to cause conflict. It only requires an iota 
of dissatisfaction for it to be triggered off. In effect, a person is more likely to behave in a 
disordered manner when his basic needs are not met.  Therefore, the basis of the argument of 
human needs theorists is that at the point where man has no alternative means to meet his needs 
(needed for survival) he is bound to resort to violence, illegality in various forms. From the 
foregoing, it is evident that proponents of this theory have argued it from the conflict point of view 
but this study argues and adopts it to mean that man has basic needs which are paramount for 
survival. A man goes ahead daily to make sure that these needs are met so that his continuous 
survival is guaranteed irrespective of whatever difficulty and looming impediments he is bound to 
face in the process. This, however, is not to ignore the possible role that aggression may play in 
the process. 
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Reacting to the innate concept of aggression, Burton (1988) argues that explaining conflict on the 
natural aggressiveness of humans is little more than a label and less than a theory. He also argues 
that it is simplistic to maintain that conflict is inevitable because of the need to compete for 
inevitably scarce resources. For him, conflict is a social, normal and universal phenomenon. To a 
great extent, Burton was more particular with conflict resolution than its definition. A close look 
at his human needs theory, conflict occurs when people or a group is unable to meet their essential 
and universal needs. Also, it is believed that the universal needs are not limited to food, shelter, 
water etc, they include personal recognition and identity, security which are directly taken for 
human development in a society (Burton, 1979). However, the denial of the individuals or group 
by the society of achieving these above needs would lead to defiant behaviour, conflict or war. 
Going by the explanation of human needs theory that conflict is likely to occur when certain basic 
universal needs of all humans are not met (Danesh, 2011), one can easily understand the origin of, 
continuity and change in the Boko Haram insurgency, including its escalation across Nigerian 
border. Max-Neef (1991) avers that development is focused and based on the satisfaction of 
fundamental human needs.  The border communities of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, are 
lacking in terms of human capital and societal development, with consideration given to social 
amenities and other infrastructural elements. Human needs theory provides a good foundation for 
reading the reaction of Boko Haram to underdevelopment issues in the areas of insurgency, such 
as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, health conditions and low or unequal access to resources and 
income (Nyako, 2015 and Onuoha, 2014). 
In the same vein, it has been explained that conflict occurs from the incompatibility of interest, 
value, goals and position or power influence (Bercovitch, 1983; Folger, 1993 and Omisore and 
Abiodun, 2014). In a way, the interest of the Boko Haram insurgents to achieve personal 
recognition or identity which is closely tied to human needs theory as far as security and 
development are concerned can be argued to have occasioned the insurgency in the Northeastern 
Nigeria. Obviously, insurgency is itself a form of conflict; and conflict is a condition that arises 
from the inability to meet fundamental human and society needs. It can also occur from 
incompatibility of individual, group or organizational goals, interest, value and position relation, 
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since there is always the desire to be independent in the processes of reaching the necessary human 
needs. 
Nigeria as a society has been recognized as a multi-ethnic society, where group formation and 
relationship is based on ethnic composition as well as religious affiliation. According to Parson 
(1949) conflict describes a relationship in which each party perceives the other's goals, values, 
interests, or behavior as antithetical to its own. Explaining conflict on the basis of the 
incompatibility of values, goals and interests which the human needs theory really recognizes is a 
significant way to explain why there is outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency. The Boko Haram 
agenda is against Western education, especially saying that Western Education is forbidden 
(Thurston, 2016). It is a corollary implication of the terrorist group’s view and interest in replacing 
Western education with Islamic teaching and doctrine is the offshoot of the insurgency in Nigeria. 
The incompatibility of the interest of the Boko Haram Islamic group to establish Islamic law, 
education and religion in the northern or northeastern Nigeria to counter: Western education, the 
Nigerian government, civil and criminal law (Nigerian constitution), and/or against “the other” 
religion mainly Christianity created the ground for conflict which became the Boko Haram 
insurgency. Burton (1988) observes that aggressions and conflicts are the direct result of some 
institutions and social norms being incompatible with inherent human needs. Largely, the Boko 
Haram group began its campaign by launching attacks on government and social institutions which 
they perceived to be making it impossible or difficult for people to attain reasonable level of 
security and development in the northern part of Nigeria – and to be inimical to the attainment of 
their goals. 
Imagine a better way of explaining the gap between the poor and the rich; the led who are mainly 
common people (poor) and the leaders who are mainly individuals in governing positions (rich), 
either as political, traditional or religious leaders. There is a sense of relative deprivation according 
to the human needs perspective of personal recognition, positive identity, security and 
development. If one talked about these human needs maxis, it should include having equal 
opportunity to political positions, education, employment and justice. In an instance that a party 
could not fulfill those essential aspects of life, either as individuals or as a group, there is bound to 
be conflict. The International Crisis Group (2014) pinpoints that the people living in northeastern 
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region where the insurgency is prevalent have the worst poverty, illiteracy and unemployment 
rating. The social phenomena may though not be the ultimate causes of the insurgency, but they 
are chief, contributory factors. The conception of Salami (2003) reveals much about not having 
access to needs. 
The relative deprivation necessitated by the seeming collapse of the state structure 
due to the government’s inability to manage corruption, the rising inequality 
between rich and poor, the gross violation of human rights, and inaccessible 
education, could also facilitate radicalization (Salaam, 2013). 
Furthermore, conflict analysis, it has been said, must take account of human relationships, the 
perceptions and misperceptions of parties to a dispute, their shared and separate values, goals and 
motivations in relation to the economic, political, social and physical environments (Burton, 1998). 
With various records of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria resulting out of separate value, interest, 
and the norms of the social group, especially ethnic and religious groups in the Northern region, 
one can easily grasp why the Boko Haram insurgency is particularly prevalent in Northern or 
Northeastern Nigeria. Moreover, religious, economic and ecological indices of the northern region 
reflect that the insurgency was actually a trigger from old patches of conflicts like the Maitatsine, 
identity and poverty crisis (Agbiboa, 2015; Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). Burton indeed warns that 
if conflict is thought to be inevitable, it would limit the opportunity of resolving it. In a situation 
that the northeastern or northern states of Nigeria are dragged behind in terms of economic and 
human development, there is no escape from conflict situations arising. 
A survey of the entire area that the insurgency is overspread in the border community of the Lake 
Chad region shows that people were struggling to meet their basic human needs. This made it easy 
for the founder of Boko Haram to sell its ideology to people, ranging from poor children, women, 
dropout students, and dissidents to ex-fighters from the Lybian upsurge who were at once seeking 
a living and a haven (Anyadike, 2013). It has become common knowledge that the Boko Haram 
ideology is mainly influenced by religion, thus its struggle is a value-based one. Even from the 
testimonies of recruits or followers, the religious reason for joining the Islamic terrorist group is 
nothing comparable with any other reasons, such as the disparities in the application of law, 
poverty, unemployment, and frustration from government or political leaders’ failings on promises 
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to better the condition of the poor in the society, who are always forgetting after elections are won 
(Emuedo et al., 2015 and Blanchard, 2014). 
In a situation where a party or a people in a heterogeneous society is finding it difficult to acquire 
the necessary materials or values that are considered essential for their existence, survival or 
sustainable development, there is certainly going to be a time that frustration and aggression would 
set in, calling for reaction against the other parties who are definitely perceived to be responsible 
for their inabilities and conditions. Staub (2003) observes that cultural and societal conditions that 
frustrate psychological needs make violence more likely, whereas the conditions that help fulfill 
these needs in constructive ways contribute to development of peaceful relation and fully human 
lives. Ajayi (2012) observes that Boko Haram has been in existence since 1995 and was recorded 
with no or less violence until the death of its leader. The height of the group’s frustration came 
when their leader died in police custody. The police being an institution under government was 
thus perceived by the insurgent group as a party in the dispute. 
The application of the human need theory in the analysis of the root or proxy causes of the Boko 
Haram insurgency is to establish that conflicts are not unavoidable, so long as human needs remain 
existent and insatiable. By this, it becomes clear that conflict can be resource-based, value-based 
and interest-based. According to the human need theory, resource and interest-based conflict can 
be resolved with less difficulty through negotiation or bargaining (such resources as land, water, 
air space, money and so on). On the contrary, value-based conflict which reflects the belief or 
norms of a party is not negotiable because values are rarely easily replaceable, adoptable and 
adaptable, yet value is the fulcrum of the belief system of a party. With the tenaciously held belief 
of Islamic terrorists and their religious practices around the world, namely Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, 
Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, it is quite clear that value-based conflict is not a conflict to usually 
reach compromise. Each of the terrorist groups enlisted above often holds hard ground against 
negotiation while encouraging confrontation. But the Nigerian government has indicated interest 
to negotiate with Boko Haram (Channel Television, September 15, 2015). 
Driving on the path of confrontation to coerce a party to accept some conditions and let go of some 
others is another angle to why conflict is said to be inevitable. Giessmann et al. (2011) avers that 
conflict can be avoided especially if parties to a dispute can reach a compromise. In the case of 
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Boko Haram insurgency, it was until the government reacted to the insurgents’ confrontations 
through counter-insurgency that the conflict became escalated. Of course, the escalation of the 
Boko Haram conflict is expected with insurgents already occupying half of the northeastern 
territory in Nigeria. The Nigerian military could not do more than applying a reasonable force in 
retrieving those areas ceased by the insurgents. More so, military and militia operations are 
confrontational, which brings one to another explanation of the human need theory in resolving 
conflict. Burton (1988) explains that conflict may sometimes require the application of force to 
make parties concede to terms of resolutions, or at least come to the table for negotiation. 
Although the Boko Haram insurgents have not given in for negotiations, the Islamic terrorist can 
be made to soften its hard ground through the twin-approaches of counter-insurgency mechanism 
and reconstruction approach to meeting the human needs of communities that are stronghold of 
the insurgents. Notably, the human needs theory cautions that unless the root causes of conflict are 
known and attended to, there is no way of fully resolving conflicts that are serious. It means 
therefore that confrontation may though be employed in conflict resolution (Rummel, 1981), but 
if the remote issues and causes are not well resolved, the conflict would only disappear to reappear 
again in a nearby or distance future, a situation which is termed “negative peace” in Peace Studies 
parlance. This is the case of the Boko Haram and Biafra struggles in Nigeria. 
The seriousness of Boko Haram insurgency by widespread violence across border is a significant 
reason why military operation became an alternative option to negotiation which the human needs 
theory emphasized. Human needs theory emphasizes that analysis of root cause of conflict be done 
first to know the nature of conflict and then the resolution method to apply would follow. As a 
matter of fact, the Boko Haram insurgents’ guerrilla war tactics which is presently hit and run, 
reveal as ever a critical point that the terrorist group is not ready for negotiation but a sophisticated 
military strategy or retaliation. The nature of the insurgency is no doubt a serious one given the 
level of violence intensity, causalities and humanitarian crisis across the Lake Chad region. The 
heinous strategy of the Boko Haram actually called for the offensive approach that the Nigerian 
military adopted, even though the military response has generated numerous civilian casualties 
and fearfulness among the local population (Omilusi, 2016). 
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The Nigerian military counter-insurgency operation against Boko Haram militants is a right step 
in the right direction however, the issues that cause the insurgency must be sincerely addressed to 
see an ultimate end to the insurgency. As previously observed, the human needs theory is a conflict 
resolution proposition that helps to understand why parties engage in conflict. It argues that once 
parties cannot reach their essential needs, they are likely to resort to conflict. Thus, conflict is 
inevitable because some parties would always have some needs that may not be met, such as 
personal recognition or developmental issues. Going by Max-Neef (1991), developmentalism is 
the generator of experience, ideas and currents of thought which failure of it cannot be ascribed to 
lack of ideas or dearth of creativity. Developmentalism takes an economic approach which 
neglects other social and political processes. For this reason, it is sure that the neglect of social and 
political institutions in developmental processes in a society would lead to dispute or conflict. 
By and large, conflict is resoluble, if parties to a dispute can reach a compromise about their human 
needs. Though, it has been commonly argued that conflicts that are value-based are hard to resolve 
through compromise mechanism (Landman, 2010), it is important to note that, if parties to a 
dispute are taught appropriate problem-solving techniques rather than just the instinctive method 
of confrontation and violence, there is an increased possibility for them to shift grounds. In the 
case of Boko Haram, there is a high tendency that insurgents who joined the Islamic terrorists may 
change their positions if their basic human needs are met, especially proper education, employment 
opportunity and free access to sources of livelihood, right to justice, security, positive religious 
identity cum acceptance, and the provision of social amenities in the local environment. This 
suggestion is borne out of the fact that the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency are closely 
tied to the above social phenomenon. In essence, once those human needs are fulfilled for 
frustration to be eradicated, there is a likelihood of the barest reduction of aggression, both factors 
of which have been widely established as significantly responsible for conflict. 
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2.6.2 Functional Prerequisite Theory 
Among the theories that explain the root causes and prevalence of conflict, functional prerequisite 
as a concept delves into issues relating to how society operates as a system. Functional prerequisite 
is a social theory that explains the composition of societal fabric in relation to their functions or 
behaviours. It sees the society as a social system that is structured in a way that each member 
relates not just as a part but as a whole. Functional prerequisite is an expansion of the functionalist 
theory which emerged in Europe in the 19th century, having Emile Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown 
A. R, Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parson and Robert Merton as its foremost proponents (Mooney et 
al, 2007; Haralambos and Holborn, 2004 and Wikibooks, 2017). Functionalist theory is often 
explained in terms of structure functionalism which conceives society in the form of structure, 
with interconnected parts maintaining harmony to achieve social equilibrium for the whole 
structure. 
Where structure functionalism considers how society is constituted with its social institutions, 
functional prerequisite explains the basic elements that are necessary for social order among the 
institutions in relation to the survival and stability of the society. Functional prerequisite is a theory 
that is particularly committed to establishing essential needs that society must provide in order to 
ensure cordial relationship in the functions of the societal structure either as parts or whole. 
Functional prerequisite is mostly attributed to Talcott Parson, who conceives the society as a social 
system whereby its existence and functionality are dependent on the satisfaction of member’s basic 
needs such as food, shelter, clothing, money and safety, all of which are basic required 
prerequisites for the survival of individuals as parts and the entire society as whole (Saheed and 
Khan, 2013 and Parson, 1951a). 
Parson (1951a) avers that a social system cannot be so structured as to be radically incompatible 
with the conditions of functioning of its component individual actors as biological organisms and 
as personalities, or of the relatively stable integration of a cultural system. Parson as a functional 
prerequisite theorist believes that the society is a place where actors, either as individuals or social 
bodies perform certain roles which are inspired by the desire to attain the fundamental human 
needs. Just like the human needs theory, the functional prerequisite theory provides the basis for 
explaining the root causes of conflict in the society from the perspective that if a specific function 
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is not fulfilled, the system cannot maintain itself (Toshiki, 2011). In the analysis of Alberle and 
Cohen (1950), the performance of a given function is a prerequisite to a society’s requirement for 
meeting the basic human needs and stability in the society. 
In relation to how social system performs its function for society to survive, Parson (1951a) and 
(1968b) identifies the following basic prerequisites which must be met in the acronym of “AGIL”: 
(i) Adaptation; relationship or interaction of society with the environment or external-physical 
conditions including its resources, (ii) Goal Attainment; goes with the capacity to set goals, make 
necessary decision and mobilize resources to meet them, which is a basic function of the political 
unit of a social system, just as it has been seen that political activities organize and direct the affairs 
of a society; (iii) Integration, is a value or norm consensus level where social institutions ensure 
uniformity or harmony in the form of internal coherence in the quest of society in satisfying basic 
needs, such as religious or cultural values and beliefs; (iv) Latency or (latent pattern maintenance) 
expects social system to maintain the interaction pattern that motivates actors and manage their 
tension within the system. Maintenance of system may be done by family, school, church or 
mosque which gets involve in behaviour management and solving problems. 
However, the functional prerequisite theory has incurred some criticisms from critics who think 
that it is too abstract or arbitrary to be adopted in a serious empirical research (Ritzer and Barry, 
2001 and Merton, 1968). On the part of Merton, Talcott Parson overgeneralizes the 
interdependence of the social system as parts with the wider society (Holmwood, 2005). Generally, 
it is held that the functional prerequisite neglects the fact that a part of the social system 
(individual) may not be functional in its interrelationship with the (society) as a whole. This is 
because what is functional for an individual or group may not be functional for the wider society. 
Being a renounced student of Parson, Merton uses his easy, “latent and manifest functions” to 
show the need to distinguish between system functions. In Merton’s view, latent functions are 
unrecognized actions of social system with unintended consequences, while manifest functions are 
conscious intentions of social system with objective consequences. It is said also that social system 
may be dysfunctional where it creates undesirable consequences that threaten the running of the 
society (Macionis and Gerber, 2010).  
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Again, functional prerequisite postulation has been accused of assuming that social change is 
static, or rather that interaction in the social system is embroiled in constant conflict. Coser (1956) 
and Dahrendorf (1957), cited by Toshiki (2011), reveal that the static character of functional 
prerequisite necessitated their focus on social change and conflict, particularly seeing that the 
theory is conservative and substituting ‘conflict’ for ‘consensus’, which is thought to be a factor 
leading to social order, stability and innovation in the society. In other words, it is held that the 
function of a particular social usage is the contribution it makes to the total social life as the 
functioning of the total social system (Radcliff-Brown, 1935). Going by this view, if the 
contributions or functions of individual and group are constructive or productive for social system, 
a converse situation especially if actors’ contributions are dysfunctional will lead to disruptiveness 
in the functioning of social system. 
Bringing to the fore the underlying principle of functional prerequisite in explaining the root cause 
of Boko Haram insurgency, it is evident that the dysfunctional contributions of the social 
institutions, mainly the government, education and religious bodies towards societal growth are 
the causes of the terrorist group actions. This claim can be understood by asking first: what is the 
agenda of Boko Haram terrorist group? Secondly, who are its remote and ultimate targets? BBC 
(2016b), Totten (2014) and Thomson (2012) establish that the terrorist group is against Western 
education, which is taken for why the government, religious institutions, educational institutions, 
international organisations, among others, have failed in their responsibilities to the Nigerian 
society in terms of growth and development. In essence, the terrorist group as part of Nigeria 
therefore launched its insurgency against the government and its associated agencies, making the 
general public their target with a bid to meeting the basic human needs, which has proven hard or 
impossible to be met. 
As pointed out by Shuaibu and Salleh (2015) Casimir et al. (2014) and Onuoha (2014), the 
practices of the Boko Haram is a reaction to the functions of the social institutions, such as 
government who failed in its functions to ensure that the minimum requirements for meeting the 
basic human needs such as food, shelter, water, money, education, job opportunity, security, are 
met especially in the northeastern Nigeria. Of course, it could safely be argued that the failure in 
part or in whole of the social institutions to perform their functions in maintaining social order was 
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responsible for the Boko Haram insurgency, because the consensus that is supposed to be a factor 
in social group’s interconnection appears to be absent or replaced with outright conflict. Onuoha 
(2014) stresses that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and weak family structures make young 
men vulnerable to radicalization of the Boko Haram, including itinerant preachers conveying 
religious messages with illustration that government is weak and corrupt. 
The issue of corruption has been observed as the primary social phenomenon affecting the progress 
of the Nigerian state at all levels; economic, political, socio-cultural or environmental level. In the 
analysis of Mathew and Obasaju (2013), corruption and economic growth have been inversely 
relating with each other, causing undue arousal or doom among the people over an age. Boko 
Haram group and its loyalists see the Nigerian government and the elite as responsible for the 
spread of corruption considering the height of their political brigandage, including government 
depressive economic policies and laws which make the society dysfunctional. Onuoha (2014) 
observes that widespread of corruption in Nigeria not only deprived communities of the needed 
amenities and infrastructure but created an environment conducive for recruitment and 
radicalization. 
Human relations in the society according to Parson’s adaptation prerequisite entail the capacity to 
adjust to the environment, such as territory and economic resources. The external environment of 
Nigeria, especially the northern region has been found to be embroiled in one form of violence or 
the other since creation. After Nigeria’s independence was the Biafra war in 1966 and many other 
conflicts that occurred with religious, political and resource undertones, such as Kano Maitasini 
riot in 1980, Kano religious riot of 1990 caused by Reinhard Bonnke’s attempted crusade, Jos 
religio-political riot in 2001, Kaduna violence in 2002, Niger Delta resource conflict, and the Boko 
Haram conflict in 2009 (Boston University, 2014; Adesoji, 2011; Jamal, 2010; Okonta and 
Meagher, 2009 and Afrobarometer, 2002). These external conditions of Nigeria have been 
recognized to have direct and indirect effects in the disruption or disparity noticed in the integration 
and interaction of individual or group in the society as well as their social life. 
As it is anticipated, the Nigerian government by its legitimate responsibility is supposed to have 
addressed the social and economic challenges confronting the nation, considering the country’s 
huge resources and economic wealth. Since the discovery of oil in Nigeria in 1958, she has 
92 
 
remained one of the major oil exporting countries in the world, while having oil resources accounts 
for over 90% of her revenue. As statistics always shows and scholars sadly wonder, what has the 
oil wealth contributed to the well-being of the Nigerian citizens? (Ibrahim et al., 2014). In the 
observation of Boston University (2014), despite a per capita income of more than $2,700 and vast 
wealth in natural resources, Nigeria has one of the world's poorest populations. An estimated 70 
percent of the population lives on less than $1.25 a day. Again, the economic disparities between 
the north and the rest of the country are particularly stark. In the north, 72 percent of people live 
in poverty, compared to 27 percent in the south and 35 percent in the Niger Delta. 
Given the above, it may appear as if the northern region is the least beneficiary of the economic 
resources of Nigeria compared with her other; any such assumption would however only mean 
hasty conclusion. This is because the Northern region has the highest number of people who always 
occupy the highest political positions in in the country. A clear example of such a position is the 
office of the president. However, the main cause of disparity in the economic growth and 
development of northern Nigeria, just as any other region, is poor governance and lack of effective 
leadership seen at all levels of the societal structure (Dambazau, 2014). By this understanding, one 
can rightly say that the grievance or defiant behaviour of the Boko Haram terrorist group was to 
address the disruptive roles of the Nigerian leadership, especially by reforming the social system 
of the wider society through establishing Islamic principles in the country. This however explains 
why the terrorist group immediately declared Caliphate of the areas that it conquered in Borno, 
Adamawa and Yobe, in order to fulfill its mission of establishing an Islamic system. 
It is not an understatement that the founder of Boko Haram was not motivated by the way Nigerian 
social institutions were contributing to the growth and development of the country. Of course, 
preventing the kind of sensation and action of the Boko Haram was why Parson warned against 
not motivating actors of social system in performing their functions. By Parson’s submission, 
The functional prerequisite of meeting a minimum proportion of the needs of the 
individual actors, is the need to secure adequate participation of a sufficient 
proportion of these actors in the social system, that is to motivate them adequately 
to the performances which may be necessary if the social system in question is to 
persist or develop (Parson, 1951a:18). 
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The consequences of failing to maintain the acceptable pattern of interaction in a social system by 
motivating all actors in performing their functions is a liable condition for conflict or itself conflict, 
yet violent conflict or insurgency hardly opens a society easily to development. This is so basically 
because investors always entertain fear not putting their capital and resources in an undulating 
environment where they are not sure of the survival and sustainability of their businesses. Awojobi 
(2014) records that Boko Haram has sacked commercial activities in the North-Eastern Nigeria, as 
banks, markets, shops, parks and government departments occasionally open, from fear of 
unprecedented attacks of the terrorist group. Factually, the security challenges that Boko Haram 
insurgency poses to Nigeria and her neighbouring countries would continue to make the affected 
regions static in terms of socio-economic development unless urgently curbed. 
When the critics of functional prerequisite say that the theory is static, they talk from the 
understanding that individual or group’s interrelationship in social system does lead to conflict. In 
a situation that the existing integration pattern of social system is obsolete, a demand for structural 
change can be inevitable, in particular if the basic needs of members of the structure is not met. 
Radcliffe-Brown cited by Holmwood (2005) posits that for any social system to survive, it must 
conform to certain conditions. The fulfillment of the conditions or prerequisites for meeting the 
needs talked about by the functionalist can be argued as responsible for the social order in the 
structure. Again, the social change that is considered to be orderly in the structure between the 
parts and the whole of a social system is made possible because the social structures (such as 
economic, political, religious, legal and educational system) are able to meet the essential needs 
of its members. 
Once the needs of individuals or groups in a social system are not met, there is bound to be conflict. 
Therefore, some theories such as the action theory, human needs theory and frustration aggression 
theory have been favoured over their functional prerequisite counterpart, because the latter seems 
not to acknowledge that social change is a factor of human’s action prompted by inability to fulfill 
his essential needs, against a structural or evolutionary process of change (Meighan, 1986). The 
Boko Haram, for instance, has found reasons to adopt conflict measures in enforcing social change 
rather than encouraging the consensus process described by functional prerequisite. From the 
strategy of this Islamic terrorist group which is total violence, it can be understood that where 
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functional prerequisite helps to understand that social system exists through consensus of meeting 
basic needs, the occurrence of conflict is the absence of the basic needs or requirements for the 
survival of social system (Levy, 1952). 
One question that begs for answers at this juncture is: what are the un met basic human needs of 
the Boko Haram, inducing the preference of conflict over consensus. First, we see from scholarship 
that the group’s religious values or norms have not been properly integrated by custodians. Samu 
(2012) observes that religion, ethnicity, politics and mimesis of other violent groups (from around 
the world) are all playing together to complicate and undermine community integrative power. 
Also, for someone like Parson, the social system at the level of integration where religion, family 
and cultural custodians belong, must maintain the integration pattern of values and norms to 
achieve harmony and social order.  
Also, at the integration level, political institutions in Nigeria have given only negligible attention 
to political values that should inspire people to perform their civic functions effectively. Over the 
years, instead of the political bodies and leadership to perform their leadership functions, they have 
continued to abuse the system making their services hinder people from meeting their essential 
needs (Bintube, 2015; Omede, 2015 and Samu, 2012). It must be noted that political institutions 
include family as its smallest unit. Specifically, parents have been accused of not taking adequate 
care of their children in the north (Shehu, 2015; Bintube, 2015; NRN, 2013), neglecting the 
teaching of moral values that should make children perform their civic functions very well in 
society. 
In addition, the judicial system too has failed to ensure justice for all within the Nigerian system. 
Largely, the issue of injustice in terms of unfair hearing, misapplication of laws and justice is 
contributory to the ensuing and escalation of Boko Haram conflict (Ibenwa, 2016). 
2.6.3 State Fragility Theory 
The basis for explaining conflict in countries around the globe corresponds with what fragility 
theory sets out to do. The theory points to states’ inability to fulfill their social contract by 
providing protection and basic services for its citizens (Perera, 2015). That something is fragile 
means that it is prone to getting damaged by the slightest carelessness. This is what the Oxford 
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Dictionary means when it says that fragility is the quality of being delicate or vulnerable. After the 
event of World War II, most sovereign states became rippled with internal conflict – civil wars 
and some unbearable conditions working against human and society development, leading them 
to being classified as either failed or collapsed states. In the analysis of Nayi (2012) and Ferreira 
(2015), the concept of fragile state became central point in the discourses of foreign policy 
analysts, international organizations and academics from the early 1990s, as it was employed to 
explain human and global security issues. 
State fragility theory is one of the economic, political, social and environmental concepts in 
explaining human living conditions and society development or countries using comparative 
mechanism. Nayi (2012) establishes that the outbreak of wars, factional conflict, economic, 
religious, ethnic and political conflict, poverty, guerrilla activity and generally the development of 
“new wars” which are beyond conventional warfare, prompted policy analysts to forge new 
concepts such as quasi-state and fragile state. According to Kaldor (2013), new wars are the wars 
of the era of globalization and found in areas where authoritarian states have been greatly 
weakened as a consequence of opening up to the rest of the world. The new wars may occur in the 
form of terrorism and insurgency considering the involved state and non-state actors and their 
goals which always rest on economic, political and social interests or religious identity. 
Having established that state fragility theory is more of contemporary than modern concept, it is 
important to state that fragile states are those that fail to meet the essential human needs of their 
citizens thereby making them vulnerable to security issues, such as poverty, unemployment, 
environmental conditions, violent attacks, kidnapping, trafficking, displacement, etc. Torres and 
Anderson (2004) note that sovereign states are expected to perform certain minimal functions for 
the security, wellbeing of their citizens and the smooth working of the international system, but in 
a situation that these states reneged or failed in their expectations and citizens become obviously 
plunged in difficult living conditions, the states necessarily become classified as ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, 
or ‘poorly performing’. As pointed out by Bolton and Hernandez (2016), 50% of fragile states’ 
populations live on/under $1.25USD a day, which significantly increases the likely hood of 
violence, poor health, low educational attainment, armed conflict as a result of extreme poverty.  
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The state fragility theory stresses the fundamental failure of a state to perform functions necessary 
to meet citizen’s basic needs and expectations. It also shows the incapability of government in 
assuring basic security, maintaining the rule of law and justice, or providing basic services and 
economic opportunities for their citizens. The centrality of state fragility theory posits weak and 
ineffective central government with little practical control over much of its territory; non-provision 
of public services widespread corruption and criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of 
populations (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008). According to the 
Department for International Development (2005), state fragility is where the government cannot 
or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people including the poor. The DFID further 
sees a fragile state as the insecurity of the ruling elite which leads to the victimization of some or 
all of a nation’s citizens as experienced by the Taliban’s in Afghanistan.  
The fragile state theory has been widely used to measure the extent to which a state is 
underdeveloped, developing or developed. It is a very relevant theory adopted in explaining living 
condition of people in relation to human development and global security from the angle of 
government policies, their effects or outcome on the larger society. Explaining the numerous 
developmental challenges confronting Nigeria, from economic recession to factionalisation of 
political institutions and from ethno-religious conflict to insurgency in the northern region, Nigeria 
would qualify as a fragile state better than a failed or collapsed state. FFP (2015) actually calls 
Nigeria a fragile country because of her internal political pressures, ferocious campaign by Boko 
Haram insurgents in the north, and economic recession caused by the falling oil prices. 
Nigeria is one of the countries that have been identified by Fragile States Index (2017) as having 
high alert, using indicator risk of demographic pressure, Refugees and IDPs, group grievance, 
human flight, uneven economic development, economic decline, state legitimacy, public services, 
human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention 
(FFP, 2017). For the past decades, Nigeria has been battling with issues of security, human rights 
and rule of law, economic downturn, political and religious crisis, force migration, herdsmen and 
farmers feud, ethnic or communal conflict, and low income for public servants. In fact, the issue 
of low income or uneven economic development of citizens is one of the many challenges that the 
Nigerian Labour Congress recently set before the Nigerian government. 
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However, a fragile state can be identified using the low-income maxim. Bertocchi and Guerzoni 
(2011) explain that a state condition of fragility in terms of development can be known through 
direct impact of income and growth or indirect impact of aid allocation. Income level is a very 
important aspect of human economic development, whereas job availability is the vital measure of 
a society’s development. Low income countries are those that score 3.2 and less according to the 
definition of World Bank on Country Policy and Institutional Assessment are fragile states (IDA, 
2007). This low-income axiom established by World Bank in 2011 was basically replaced in 2013 
with a more acceptable term called fragile and conflict-affected states (IEG, 2014). In essence, the 
fragile and conflict-affected states include countries that are run with weak policies, institutions, 
and governance. World Bank decision to tag low income countries under stress as fragile is because 
most low-income countries are conflict-affected, which surprisingly are rich in resources. 
Since most fragile and conflict-prone states, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, West 
Africa, Central Africa, Central Asia and Central America are rich in resources (Muggah, 2017), it 
has become general for analysts to explains the concept of fragile states on the basis of state 
effectiveness (Torres and Anderson, 2004). About state effectiveness, particularly in the Central 
and West Africa where countries of the Lake Chad region are found, Muggah (2017) observes that 
the strongest determinant of their fragility is persistence of conflict and unemployment. The Lake 
Chad region has been for long observed with issues relating to protracted conflict, climatic 
conditions, poverty, unemployment, low enrollment in school etc. If state effectiveness is to be 
measured on the basis of state functions towards citizens in the above region, little can be said to 
have been achieved in relation to development. 
Ferreira (2015) has attributed state ineffectiveness to lack of will or capacity to perform its core 
functions and frequent political violence, thereby imposing great challenges for the effectiveness 
of development assistance. In the same vein, DFID (2005) regards fragile states as those in which 
government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the 
poor. Bringing to the fore another standard for identifying fragile states relates to countries with 
the presence of UN peace support operations or peace building, including countries that are far 
from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (OECD, 2014; IEG, 2014 and The World 
Bank, 2013). To help countries especially those that are fragile and conflict-affected out of their 
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predicaments, International Development Association (IDA) has been fingered to primarily 
concern with financing countries on the recognition of performance as well as special circumstance 
of countries (The World Bank, 2014). 
A country that is in a difficult environment may automatically fall under stress and become a 
fragile state, especially when the government fails to assist its citizens in meeting their essential 
needs. For example, the Lake Chad region has for a longtime been marked for severe climatic 
condition which causes water and food shortage, forced migration, poverty and poor health due to 
HIV/AIDS (FAO, 2011). The environmental situation in the Lake Chad region, coupled with poor 
governance due to the unwilling attitude of state to provide protection and basic services to their 
citizens, is the main reason for the region’s fragility. There is a very high rate of insecurity, cross-
border migration, Refugees and IDPs around the border-communities of the region. Magrin, 
Lemoalle and Lajaunie (2015) and (2016) expose that the fragility of the Lake Chad region in 
terms of demographic pressure is exacerbating the vulnerability of poor population. For experience 
like this, fragile states have been regarded as those that are unable or unwilling to harness domestic 
and international resources effectively for poverty reduction (Torres and Anderson, 2004). 
However, fragile states are characterized by low economic growth, low access to infrastructure or 
absence of basic social services, low levels of life expectancy and high level of infant mortality. 
In the same vein, Ferera (2015) sums up fragile states in terms of being vulnerable to conflicts, 
humanitarian crises and environmental shocks. Considering the way countries of the Lake Chad 
region are tied together, the risk of violent attack or fatal diseases cross-border spill is a reality. In 
effect, the Lake Chad region is a highly susceptible environment to degradation and legitimacy 
conflict. Barkindo (2016) explains that environmental degradation could lead to scarcity, which 
will result in corruption, clandestine economy, organized crime, resource capture by the elite and 
the weakened legitimacy of governments in power, making the country prone to violent conflict. 
Of course, there is bound to be frustration, aggression and ultimately violent attack when state 
legitimacy is under contest. 
It is noteworthy to state that the legitimacy of fragile states is always under stress. A state is known 
by its legitimate power, sovereignty and control over territory. However, most fragile states do not 
have total control over their territories. In other words, there is always the presence of factionalized 
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group(s) contesting vehemently for state power. Attempting to quell such groups and their 
activities most often end in violence, and other security challenges which may make a state fragile. 
A remarkable point in the emergence and spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria to other countries, 
which are now regarded as conflict-affected states, was the Boko Haram terrorist group’s interest 
in territorial control and legitimacy. The terrorist group up till now endlessly seeks that its value, 
belief in Islamic religion and laws be establish in the northeastern Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013). 
Consequently, responses from the Nigeria government against the terrorists through state of 
emergency declaration and the deployment of military officials, including the relocation of military 
headquarters to the region of conflict have further made the region very fragile. 
The fragility of the North-Eastern Nigeria and the border communities of the Lake Chad region 
have been a serious concern due to the alarming humanitarian crisis that abounds in the region. As 
known of a fragile state, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger have become plunged by Boko 
Haram into conditions that make them request for international support in the area of peace 
building. Guilbert (2017) recognizes the need for humanitarian assistance by the challenges in the 
Lake Chad region, which include malnutrition and starvation, breakdown of social fabric, human 
right violations etc. According to how citizens of fragile states may be, people in the conflict-
affected region of northeastern Nigeria and the border communities are in a dire need of access to 
food security, water, protection from violent attack, education, sanitation, shelter, healthcare, and 
in terms of human right, they need liberty, freedom of association, free movement and even right 
to life, etc. 
Magrin, Lemoalle and Lajaunie (2015) observe that there are about 50 million people residing in 
the Lake Chad basin. The huge population of the entire basin has been recognized to be under the 
influence of complex system owing to environmental factors and mobility. In the same vein, 
Salkida (2012) establishes that the inhabitants of the very region are contesting for water from the 
Lake. Each country of the region on their part needs water for effective running of dams, livestock 
survival and agricultural production of wheat and rice. Generally, the inability of people to access 
economic resources easily lead to economic grievance, demographic pressure, cross-border 
attacks, and other fragile states risk indicators which make Lake Chad countries classified as 
fragile states with high alert (Dauda, 2016). 
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Scarce resources can bring about factionized or sectarian group in a country which may end up 
employing conflict to fulfilling their needs. This view is greatly recognized by foreign policy 
experts and academics who think that fragile states are also characterized by shortage of resources 
(Nasir et al., 2014; Mildner et al., 2011; Baker, 2008; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005 and 2000; and 
Homer-Dixon, 1999). Conversely, many countries with rich natural resources have also been seen 
to be unstable for reasons that fractionalized groups are seek equal access to the wealth of the state, 
in particular when the state apparatus is dysfunctional. Nordstrom (2008) unearths that the world’s 
fragile states have become dysfunctional, despite vast resource endowments. It is also mentioned 
that natural resources wealth has spurred not economic growth, but corruption, repression and 
violent conflict which make many states fragile. 
Nordstrom accounts for the following for common features of natural resource governance issues 
in fragile states: (i) a high degree of resource dependence; (ii) situations of extreme state fragility 
where groups clash in violent conflict over resources or in attempts to secede by a resource-rich 
part of a country; (iii) rentier states, surviving on rents rather than traditional taxation of the 
population; and (iv) lack of economic development and the persistence of repressive regimes, with 
little ability or desire to promote growth and welfare for their citizens. Nordstrom’s analysis is 
adopted here because it simplifies the position of Maphosa (2012), McNeish (2010) and Peschka 
(2010) on why fragile states is not necessarily countries with scarce resources, but as well those 
that are richly endowed with natural resources, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Nigeria, Libya, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola. 
Fragility in a state can be caused by both natural and man-made factors but the majority of the 
conflict-affected countries are actually the cause of their own fragile situation. According to the 
United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action (2012), conflicts over natural 
resources arise when parties disagree about the management, ownership, allocation, use and 
protection of natural resources and related ecosystems. It is also put forward that conflict becomes 
problematic when societal mechanisms and institutions for managing and resolving it break down, 
giving way to violence. Before conflict becomes violence, it is obvious that most disputing parties 
hardly give room for discussion about contending issues with a view to resolving them. And until 
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states begin to take seriously issues of development would they witness the opportunity to avoid 
chronic indicators of fragility and prevent violent conflict or insurgency. 
Rotberg (2003) posits that in a fragile state, there is a tendency for increased criminal violence 
which further weakens the states’ authority. He further notes that fragile states are usually 
associated with tensed and dangerous warring factions, a situation which most times leads to a 
breakdown of law and order, increased humanitarian disaster, which concerns not only the people 
directly affected, but also people in neighbouring states. As Gros, (1996) notes, ethnic genocide in 
Rwanda and the Balkans or flight of Haitians to Florida can hardly be ignored by the international 
community. Collier et al. (2003) identify a triad of ripple effects that emerge from armed conflict: 
the internal effects (as a result of the burdens of internally displaced persons), the regional effects 
(as a result of the burden of refugee influx) and the global effect (as a result of foreign 
interventionists). According to them, these triadic ripple effects generate unique challenges. While 
the internal effects constitute a problem of food insecurity, loss of means of livelihood, rise in the 
displacement of people, the regional effect constitute spread of contagious diseases across borders 
from the inflow of refugees, and the global effect constitutes the growth in narcotics trade across 
borders – sponsored by foreign, non-state actors. As Hentz, (2004) notes such spill-over have 
occurred in both West Africa (from Liberia) and East Africa (from Democratic Republic of 
Congo). 
The state fragility theory, therefore, gives a critical understanding of insurgency, cross-border 
insurgency and why border communities have to device coping strategies against the looming daily 
threats that confront them. The activities of the Boko Haram sect have seriously challenged the 
security of the state and increased humanitarian crisis in North-Eastern Nigeria especially in the 
form of food insecurity, leading to a rise in prices of consumable items within the nation and 
neighbouring nations of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. This continues to increase the rate of refugee 
influx and adverse economic and security implications (in line with Rotberg, 2003). These are all 
indicators of fragility which the Nigerian government continues to contend with and fails to 
adequately address. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a distinction between the conceptualization and contextualization of the 
various concepts utilized in the study. These concepts which have been used over the years have 
evolved different meanings and definitions. While these definitions were clearly reviewed, they 
were as well contextualized and situated within the space of this study. Again, the existing 
literature was reviewed to showcase the porosity of the African borders and the various inimical 
cross-border activities that constantly take place across these borders. Critical to this study is the 
activities of the Boko Haram sect in the North-Eastern Nigeria which has not only caused chaos 
within the region but has had a spill-over effect on neighbouring countries of Cameroun, Chad and 
Niger. The literature was reviewed to show the effect of this phenomenon on the vulnerable within 
the North-Eastern Nigeria and its neigbours. Conclusively, three theories were presented which 
define the current situation in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Notably, the Functional Prerequisite and 
Human Needs theories reveal the basic needs of man and his innate propensity to pursue them 
purposely towards a goal, which is survival. State Fragility exposes the inability of the Nigerian 
state to perform its basic role of securing its territory and its citizens thus, leading the people to 
evolving coping strategies that will ensure their survival within their various communities in the 
border areas of the North-Eastern region of the country. These three theories adopted adequately 
explained what has led the inhabitants of the border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria to 
evolve coping strategies needed for safety and survival from the three perspectives identified. 
Finally, this led to the development of a theoretical model that explicitly explains the various 
coping strategies developed by these border communities and the effects of these strategies 
towards their very survival.      
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CHAPTER THREE 
REGIONAL BORDER ARCHITECTURE: AFRICA AND WEST 
AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
Historically, African borders have remained porous among many reasons because they are an 
artificial creation of the colonial masters. It has been noted in the preceding chapter that boundaries 
in Africa states were divided by the colonial lords without considering Africa’s social, political, 
and regional peculiarities. This was what the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 was meant to 
achieve so as to meet the aspirations of European superpowers’ in a bid to subsume Africa into 
their notion of nation states (Ahmad, 2013). Scholars have argued on the arbitrariness and artificial 
nature of African borders but in all, the realities that abound and the revelations from actors who 
were directly involved in the construction process prove beyond reasonable doubt that theses 
borders were arbitrarily created. A perfect example confirming the above assertion is a remark by 
Lord Salisbury during the signing of the Anglo-French Convention on the Nigeria-Niger boundary 
in 1906. According to Anene (1970), Lord Salisbury remarked that the colonialists (British and 
French) merely drew lines on maps where they have never reached, allocate mountains, rivers and 
lakes without actual familiarity with the locations.  
In the same vein, a British colonial officer commented that the Eastern Nigeria’s and Cameroon 
borders were arbitrarily drawn with blue pencil and a ruler, running from Calabar to Yola. Even 
during his visit and discussions with the Emir of Adamawa in council, none of them knew he had 
drawn such a blue line across his domain (Anene, 1970). This pattern of action no doubt was the 
occurrence witnessed in the demarcation of borders all over Africa. The result is an adverse 
implication as borders cut across a people with cultural and ethnic affinity all over Africa leading 
to a division of people, distortion of common social values and disorientation of the border 
communities.  
Asiwaju, (1984) noted that such boundaries demarcated cut across communities with a tradition of 
common ancestors, strong kinship ties, shared socio-political institutions and economic resources, 
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common customs and practices, and sometimes acceptance of a common political control. It also 
separated communities of worshippers from age-old sacred groves and shrines. The Somali’s 
example is a case in point where boundaries separates water and pasture for the flocks. It is thus 
obvious that the peculiarities of the people were not put into consideration when creating these 
borders as they partitioned homogenous ethnic and cultural groups and pre-colonial state 
territories. Asiwaju (1985) opined that there were 104 international borders in Africa within 177 
cultural milieu. Posner (2006) as well emphasized on the arbitrariness of the borders in Africa.  
In addition to the above stated fact, Ahmad (2013) added that apart from African borders being 
arbitrary and artificial, some were ill-defined, poorly delimited and demarcated while some were 
not demarcated at all. An example of such is a part of the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary. This reveals 
that the Imperialists had little or no knowledge of Africa especially the hinterland. This is evident 
in East Africa where the Germans, Belgians and British Imperialists had interest even after the 
Berlin Conference. Ahmad (2013) stressed further that the arbitrariness of African borders as 
delimited by the Western colonialists: 
…revealed the ignorance of the colonialists as far as the geography of Africa was 
concerned. It was easy to write down the meridian on paper at a conference in 
Brussels, but when it came to the demarcation and delimitation of the boundary on 
land, the colonial administrator in the Congo and Uganda could not easily trace 
the meridian on the ground. 
The result of this error is serious security threats, terrorism, crime, uncontrolled migration and 
illicit trade witnessed over the years across borders in Africa as expressed by Weber (2012). 
Diarrah (2013) expressed his disgust that it is also an invitation to tensions, conflicts among many 
African countries. From Griffiths (1996) to Nana-Sinkam (2000) there were conflicts in the figures 
of the borders, ranging from 109 to 165, even for the 25percent demarcated. Many of the borders 
are porous, ill-manned, inadequate Custom Posts even where roads cross the borders, while some 
boundaries are without roads, rail or waterways as in the Central Africa Republic-Congo, Tanzania 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
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Africa occupies about 20 percent of the total land area of the earth and hence ranks second to Asia 
in size. Its population, about 1 billion people according to a 2009 estimate, and accounts for about 
15% of the Earth’s population, again second to Asia. The peoples live in 55 sovereign countries, 
and represent a diversity of racial, ethnic, linguistic and cultural groupings, 177 of which are 
partitioned by 109 international boundaries. While most of the countries on the main continent that 
are surrounded mostly by seas and oceans, there are a few island states, which are separated from 
the rest of the continent by vast tracts of water in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Since the majority 
of the 55 countries are on the continental mainland, they share significant lengths of their land, air 
or maritime boundaries.  
Massive size in both land mass and population, abundant natural resource endowment, and 
virtually encircled by water, which if properly harnessed should be of great advantage for her 
economic development, security, peace and stability. Abundant land ensures agricultural, mineral 
and raw material availability which enable the people to engage in productive and profitable 
economic activities. The seas and oceans guarantee less costly means of transportation for personal 
and commercial interactions with each other and with the rest of the world in addition to being 
rich sources of food and energy.  On the other hand, these natural endowments have affected Africa 
negatively since the 15th Century to date by giving room to criminal acts like terrorism and 
trafficking thus threatening the regional and continental peace, stability and security. 
3.2 Illicit activities carried out along African borders 
Various scholars have identified eloquently what activities go on along borders in Africa as a result 
of their porosity. For instance, Martin, (2011) asserts that Africa’s borders are open doors to 
smuggling and other cross-border illegal activities which have evolved trans-national crimes and 
makes such areas trans-national crime zones. Criminal syndicates involved in African conflicts 
especially in the Horn and Great Lake Region and Mano River smuggle arms and ammunition 
across borders with impunity (Kasaija, 2010). A Small Arm Survey Report (2007) reveals that 
porous borders encourage inflow of weapons thus making its acquisition easy and cheap. This is 
largely a major cause of regional instability witnessed in Africa especially in West Africa. Auto 
theft which is a constant phenomenon in South and West Africa is also a constant feature of the 
porous borders. The same report indicated that in South Africa on a monthly basis, about 100 
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vehicles, mainly Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) and Four-Wheel Drives are stolen and smuggled 
across the border into Mozambique with the connivance of border inhabitants who are accomplice 
in this trans-organized crime. Similar experience is reported in West Africa especially in Nigeria 
that cars stolen are smuggled out of the country through the porous borders into Benin Republic 
(Small Arm Survey Report, 2007).  
Again, terrorism has found its way into the African continent through its porous borders. Okumu 
and Botha, (2007) averred that terrorists have been crossing porous borders at will with weapons 
and ingredients for making bombs, especially in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel regions causing 
havoc within the regions. Its threat has been particularly felt in Eastern Africa, where there have 
been repeated attacks by Al Qaeda and its African allies like the Al-Shabab, Boko Haram, etc. The 
experience of August 7, 1998 of the bombing of the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar-
es-Salaam, authenticates the vulnerability of African countries to transnational terrorism. The 
failure of Somalia as a sovereign state gave a foothold to Al Qaeda and worsened the security 
situation of the Horn of Africa. The trend continues in North and West Africa. A common 
denominator in all trans-national terrorist activities is the ease with which borders are used to 
transport radical elements and the ingredients for making terrorist bombs (Botha, 2007; Gourley, 
2012; Onuoha, 2012).  
Furthermore, civil wars in Africa thrived for so long because mercenaries found it easy to 
crisscross states through their porous borders to be able to fight in some of these conflict zones. 
This was witnessed in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Somalia (Musah and Fayemi, 2000). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has 
equally recognised Africa, West Africa more importantly, as transit route for drug trafficking. 
Drug barons utilize the porosity of borders to get their substance into Europe and Asia. As noted 
by Okumu, (2016) UNODC asserted that almost all African countries lack the advanced 
technology to detect harmful substances and goods such as narcotics and weapons. In some cases 
where the border control personnel have seized contrabands, drugs barons may connive with high-
ranking government officials to undermine their efforts. 
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3.3 African Union Mechanism for Border Security 
The changing nature of borders and the challenges of managing them due to technological 
advancement have rendered the traditional approaches such as tackling border management 
problems by a single country or the mounting regimes of tightly secured borders obsolete. While 
some African countries are aware of this trend, they have yet to adopt modern and integrated 
approaches to border management. The African Union (AU) and the eight Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs): Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community 
(EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) have taken up this challenge to enunciate strategies 
and policies that enhance border management at continental and regional levels with an 
understanding that states are key players (Ndomo 2009). 
Since the last five decades (1964 – 2014), the AU and its predecessor, the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), have come up with series of resolutions, decisions, policy directives and strategies 
to assist Africa’s border security as follows: 
a. The 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of state and Government of the OAU, 
held in Cairo (Egypt) in July 1964, as well as Article 4(B) of the Consultative Act of the 
African Union (AU), adopted the principle of respect of existing borders on achievement 
of national independence. 
b. The 44th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, held in Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia) in July 1986, as well as the relevant provisions of the Peace and Security Council 
of the African Union adopted the principle of negotiated settlement of border disputes. 
c. The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, 
Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapon in 2000.   
d. The Kampala Declaration and Recommendations on Refugees, Returnees and Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa came up in 2009.  
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Other than the above, there exist diverse concerted efforts at the border security made by African 
countries. For instance, one can account for the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(1981) and its Protocol relating to the Rights of Women (2002) and the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, held in Durban (South Africa) in July, 2002, which provides for the 
delineation of African boundaries where such an exercise has not yet taken place. In 2006, more 
efforts were made. These include the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human 
Beings, Especially Women and Children; and the African Common Position on Migration and 
Development; the Migration Policy Framework for Africa. 
One can also cite earlier moves such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (1997); The OAU 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999); the African Union Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003); and The African Union Plan of Action on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism as well as the Common African Position on Anti-
Personnel Landmines both of 2004. Also worthy of note are the AU Plan of Action on Drug 
Control and Crime Prevention of 2008 and the AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking 
Campaign as part of the overall Programme of Activities of DSA on Migration and Development 
for 2009-2012. All these confirm the common efforts on border delineation and demarcation 
exercise in order to enhance peace, security, economic and social progress. 
Despite this elaborate list of programmes, there is the need for greater cohesion to facilitate the 
wholistic implementation of the clauses in the documents which the African Union should 
spearhead and give realistic pursuit. 
In response to all the aforementioned border issues in Africa, the organization came up with a plan 
to address all of these issues that confronts members of the Union and the continent at large as it 
has been explicitly identified earlier. This strategy evolved by the AU was meant to enhance border 
management in Africa. It is a step taken to consolidate, coordinate and synergize the isolated 
policies, initiatives, and efforts on border management in Africa. The African Union through its 
Ministers in charge of Border Issues came together between 4th and 7th June, 2007 to fashion out 
ways of managing African borders. The meeting tagged ‘preventing conflict, promoting 
integration’ was meant to declare African Union’s border programme and its implementation 
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modalities. This process was greatly guided by a number of Resolutions made before as stipulated 
in an earlier draft. First, the resolution provides for the principle of respect of existing borders as 
at the time of attainment of national independence. The Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) Resolution AHG/ Res. 16 (I) on border recognises the existing borders of each nation 
as approved by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
OAU, held in Cairo, Egypt, in July 1964. The provisions of the AU Constitutive Act relevant to 
this study are: with the following provisions: 
i. Peaceful settlement of border disputes at a round table Resolution CM/Res. 1069 
(XLIV) on peace and security in Africa through negotiated settlement of boundary 
disputes, adopted by the 44th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the 
OAU, held in Addis Ababa in July 1986. 
ii. Pursuit of the border delineation where it is non-existent in order to enhance peace, 
security, economic and social progress as in Resolution CM/Res. 1069(XLIV), as 
well as in the Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development 
and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government, held in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, which provides for the 
delimitation and demarcation of African boundaries by 2012, where such an exercise 
has not yet taken place. 
iii. Willingness to enhance political and socio-economic unity in the continent.  
iv. Pursuit of efforts at avoiding conflicts through the aid of border programme as 
approved at the 8th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the AU, held in Addis Ababa in January 2007, encouraging the 
Commission to pursue its efforts at structural prevention of conflicts, especially 
through the implementation of the Border Programme. 
3.3.1 Objectives of the African Union Border Program (AUBP) 
The AUBP is to ensure that borders are delineated where non-existing, and yet seriously pursue 
economic reforms and cooperation that will encourage unity, develop cross-border system at both 
national and regional levels, equip personnel to manage borders, encourage regional funding of 
border efforts, foster cooperation on cross-border agreements, recognise AUBP and its functions, 
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join forces with other stakeholders and rising to issues (see Delimitation and Demarcation of 
Boundaries in Africa: General Issues and Case Studies 2013). The Committee equally recognized 
the daunting challenge of transnational criminal activities across African borders and realised the 
need to tackle it.  
In the light of the above, the Committee stressed the need to put in place a new form of pragmatic 
border management aimed at promoting peace, security and stability, and also to facilitate 
integration process and sustainable development in Africa. 
To implement this laudable programme therefore, the committee advanced its implementation 
process and how each task should be carried out by each stakeholder at the national, regional and 
continental levels, to be determined on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. 
A. Border delimitation and demarcation 
For delineation purposes, the states should take responsibility for the process especially in areas 
where they are non-existent within a set time by the Solemn Declaration on the CSSDCA, the 
RECs should provide needed resources and expertise while the AU takes up the full inventory of 
African states boundaries and inform the international communities to make the colonial masters 
release necessary information in their possession regarding the delineation of African borders.  
B. Local cross-border cooperation.  
The local cross-border stakeholder should work in concert with the states, the RECs that has 
responsibility to ensure functionality of regional support programmes, provide legal works to 
ensure cross-border cooperation as well as raises funds at regional level. The major international 
initiatives should subsume cross-border cooperation through AU Commission and would also 
encourage information dissemination and expected practices among RECs.    
C. Capacity building 
In the aspect of capacity building, identification of African and international institutions offering 
training in this regard and explore collaboration through a design of training programme on border 
management. This draft was submitted to the Union for further consideration and implementation. 
Since then several measures have been taken including the setting up of a unit in the Department 
of Peace and Security (PSD) to implement the AUBP and conduct regional workshops to promote 
it. In March 2010, the forum of Ministers in charge of border issues in Africa advised the AU 
Commission to accelerate the implementation of the AUBP after acknowledging its achievements 
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and challenges faced since its launch in 2007.  Some of the achievements include: approval by its 
African ministers of a declaration on AUBD on 7 June 2007, endorsement of its implementation 
strategies at the 11th session of AU Executive Council on 27th June 2007, establishment of a special 
unit to implement the programme on conflicts and security, articulation and systematic 
sensitization of the AUBP at state and REC levels, questionnaire on Africa’s borders survey 
launch, establishment of a data bank on boundaries information (BIS), partnering with German 
Technical Corporation (GTZ) and other specialized institutions, GTZ support for delineation, 
symposium organized with the Republic of Mozambique in December 2008, publications of books 
on AUBP, organizing the first ever maritime boundaries conference in Ghana 9-10 November 
2009 and drafting of a convention for cross-border cooperation.  
In 2012, the Council of Ministers met to review what had been done, the challenges and way 
forward as regards the implementation of the AUBP. It was indicated in the Report the giant strides 
that have been made in the face of some challenges such as: inadequate responses to questionnaire 
sent to member states, only 35 percent of African borders are delineated contrary to CSSDCA’s 
expectation, existing border disputes, lethargy on cross-border cooperation and inappropriate ratio 
between human and technical/ financial resources. The Committee recognized a potential security 
challenge with the crisis in the Sahelo-Saharan region and that states should take control of their 
territories for the purposes of trade and human movements, especially the landlocked territories. 
However, in the face of the enumerated challenges, the Committee reaffirmed the need and its 
commitment to making renewed and consistent efforts to ensure an effective implementation 
process of the different components of AUBP. This commitment led to the creation of a holistic 
strategy known as Integrated Border Management (IBM). It is an approach meant to coordinate 
the implementation of the AUBP in a holistic manner. 
3.3.2 Delimitation, Demarcation and Reaffirmation of Boundaries 
Deadline of 2017 was set by the Assembly of the Union in 2011 but the Council of Ministers 
decided on collection of all data for Africa’s border survey latest in 2012. There was also the issue 
of annual progress report to be sent in by each member state as well as delineation of boundaries 
where that had not been done, using all available legal, financial, institutional measures to ensure 
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compliance with the 2017 deadline set. For the AUBP to thrive, it is therefore necessary for 
Member States having border issues to nip them in the bud through the AU intervention. Another 
element of great importance raised by the Council was the speedy completion of the Guide been 
prepared on good practices in the delimitation and demarcation of boundaries.  
3.3.3 Cross-Border Cooperation 
For the purpose of attaining the AUBP’s strategic objective, it was further agreed that the AU 
Convention be adopted by member states who would accede to this Convention and ensure its 
rapid enforcement by the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Both the AU 
Commission and the RECs should collaborate to encourage and support local initiative on cross-
border cooperation against terrorism and crime, illegal fishing, piracy etc. through information 
sharing, intelligence by ACSRT. Of grave concern is the reduction in the time of transit and 
removal of tariff barriers to ease movement of goods and persons. The issues of joint management 
of trans-boundary resources should be looked into.   
3.3.4 Capacity Building 
Some priorities have been set to meet the crucial issue of capacity building by the Council of 
Ministers. For instance, taking inventory of experts, research and training institutions on the 
continent dealing with border issues, ensuring networking of existing institutions, within and 
without Africa, development of curricula and training programmes on border issues, the 
establishment National Boundary Commission by the Member States that are yet to do so, and the 
organization of training workshops for African border institutions in Africa. This requires 
international partners, particularly the German Government through the GiZ, the European Union 
(EU), the United Nations (UN) and other bilateral and multilateral partner to provide the necessary 
resources while the adoption by the Commission should adopt a more integrated approach, given 
the multifaceted nature of the AUBP. 
3.3.5 Achievement of the African Union Border Programme (AUBP)  
Barkindo (2008) points out that a major problem the African Union faces does not lie in her 
inability to fashion out relevant Treaties and Agreements but in the member-states having and 
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expressing the political will towards implementing such policies. Nevertheless, AUBP has been 
successful to an extent, as some of the objectives have been achieved thus far while the 
implementation process is still ongoing. Some of the identifiable achievements which stand 
remarkable are the adoption of the first declaration on the AUBP by African Ministers in charge 
of Border Issues on 7th June 2007, the endorsement of the Declaration and its Implementation 
Modalities at the 11th Session of the AU Executive Council on 27th June 2007, the second 
Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and the Modalities for the Pursuit and 
Acceleration of its Implementation by the African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, on 25th March 2010, the third Declaration on the African Union Border 
Programme and its Status of Implementation by the African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues 
in Niamey, Niger, on 17th May 2012. Again, the AUBP has provided the necessary technical and 
financial assistance, for crucial equipment and training, among others, for countries implementing 
the declaration. Of note is the establishment of the African Union Boundary Information System 
(AUBIS) which is the database that is involved with systematic sensitization at RECs- and Member 
State levels.  
Through the continent-wide survey of African borders by means of questionnaire to all Member 
States, it has simultaneously completed the demarcation of the remaining 413km of the Burkina 
Faso-Mali border, the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the Comoros, Seychelles 
and Tanzania, the reaffirmation exercises between Mozambique and Zambia (330km), 
Mozambique-Tanzania, Malawi-Mozambique and Mali-Senegal.  
Another landmark achievement of the AUBP is the establishment of partnerships and 
collaborations. The programme has established partnership with development actors, such as the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany especially through the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, multilateral organizations, like the the United 
Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), etc, and has 
secured direct GIZ support for some Member States’ efforts in this regard. Other than this, the 
body organized a Pan-African Conference on Maritime Boundaries and the Continental Shelf in 
Accra, Ghana, November 2009, while also institutionalizing 7th June as the annual African Border 
Day. For the purpose of reference, records and legality, AUBP book series are being published to 
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give practical guides. Moreover, the implementation of cross-border infrastructure projects, 
creation and operation of boundary commissions, border disputes’ settlement, a collection of all 
AU documents on resolutions and declarations issued between 1963 and 2012 on African borders 
are all pointers to the fact that much is acheived (Diarrah 2013).      
3.4 African Union’s Protocol on free movement of persons, goods, services and 
the African passport 
Contemporary insecure cross-border realities in Africa constitute a hindrance for business, tourism 
and education to thrive. It has been observed that Africans can only get a visa on arrival in 25 per 
cent of other African countries, while North Americans, for example, enjoys easier travel access 
on the continent than Africans themselves (African Development Bank 2016). In a bid to Pan-
Africanism, African Renaissance and actualization of Agenda 2063, African leaders 
proposed making the continent "seamless borders” that encourage the use of a single passport 
leading to an abolition of visa for Africans visiting African countries by 2018. This would also 
facilitate free trade engagement across the continent by 2017 (Henderson, 2016). This led to the 
ratification of the AU Protocol on Free Movement and the African Continental Free Trade 
Agreement in March 2018. 
The Agenda 2063 is built upon past and current initiatives of the African Union such as the Lagos 
Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty, the Minimum Integration Programme, the Programme for 
Infrastructural Development in Africa (PIDA), the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural 
Development Programme (CAADP), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
and other regional and national plans and Programmes (The African Union, 2015). This call was 
initially made at the AU Summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2015, where the African 
Heads of State and government officials displayed commitment to a number of actions to 
‘accelerate mobility and integration on the continent’ which include the acceleration of the 
implementation process of the visa-free entry and visas on arrival for Africans by 2018 and African 
passport (Louw-Vangran, 2015).  
This idea of the African Union is modelled after the controversial EU Schengen’s free movement 
agreement, which has led to the creation of a single external border while abolishing many internal 
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borders to enable visa-free movement across the region by citizens (Louw-Vaudran, 2015). The 
free movement of people across border is a priority that will bring trade gains and make for 
economic growth (Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016). This will in the long run foster 
intra-Africa trade, integration and socio-economic development. To this end, Decision 
EX.CL/Dec.908 (XXVIII) was adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January 2016 mandating the 
Commission to develop the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in Africa, as intended in the 
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 1991 Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), which will also lead to the launching of the African 
Passport. This protocol came to fruition at the AU summit in Kigali, Rwanda, in July 2016 where 
the decision on the free movement of persons and on the African passport was passed. The summit 
in Kigali also charged all member states to support and adopt the African passport and to work 
closely with the AU Commission to facilitate the process (Xinhua, 2017).  
As a follow up on the protocol, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU-PSC) 
met on 25th of February 2017 and called for necessary measures to promote this ideal. The Council 
reiterated the importance of free movement of people, goods and services in Africa majorly for the 
facilitation of Africa's regional and continental integration (ibid). Owing from this move, the AU-
PSC meeting held on the 26th February, and presided over by Louise Mushikiwabo, Rwanda's 
foreign minister, deliberated and passed decisions on free movement of people and goods and its 
implications for peace and security in Africa. Reacting to this move by the AU, Liewerscheidt 
Malte noted that the e-Passport initiative is a welcome development that could help to re-inject 
some momentum into the regional integration process which is long overdue (Xinhua, 2017).  
3.5 The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons 
The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) came into being on 28th May 1975 
when the treaty establishing it was signed in Lagos, Nigeria, among Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Adepoju (2004) affirms that the quest for the establishment of a 
sub-regional organization by West African states was born out of the tremendous experiences 
garnered from other regional groups. 
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Article 27 of the Treaty affirms a long-term objective to establish a community citizenship that 
could be acquired automatically by all Member States’ nationals, i.e. a borderless West Africa 
(Adepoju, 2005). Thus, the ECOWAS treaty was described in London as “one of the most 
ambitious projects of its kind in the world (The Times, 1975)” and in West Africa as by far the 
most momentous and far-reaching economic treaty (Daily Times, 1975). A key objective of the 
preamble to the treaty is to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and people in 
the sub-region with the aim of promoting co-operation in economic activities for closer relations 
among its members. This objective is aptly and succinctly captured in the words of Okom and 
Idoaka (2012): 
In 1975, 15 West African States12, conscious of the overriding need to accelerate, 
faster and encourage the economic and social development of their states in order 
to improve the living standards of their peoples; convinced that the promotion of 
harmonious economic development of their states calls for effective economic 
cooperation largely through a determined and concerted policy of self-reliance; 
recognizing that progress towards sub-regional economic integration requires an 
assessment of the economic potential and interests of each state decided to create 
an Economic Community of West African States which they signed on 28th May 
1975 in Lagos, Nigeria (Okom & Udoaka, 2012). 
Owing from this therefore, the Commission enacted The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, 
Goods and Capital and the Rights of Residence and Establishment in 1979. This protocol is 
premised on three major provisions of the treaty establishing the ECOWAS of which sub-
paragraph (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 2 calls on Member States to ensure by stages the abolition 
of the obstacles to free movement of persons, services and capital, while paragraph 1 of Article 27 
of the confers the status of Community citizenship on the citizens of Member States, and also 
enjoins Member States to abolish all obstacles to freedom of movement and residence within the 
Community. In the same treaty, paragraph 2 of Article 27 of further calls on Member States to 
 
12The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissan, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra-Leone, togo and Upper-Volta. 
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exempt Community citizens from holding visitor's visa and residence permits and allow them to 
work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories.13 
The Protocol thus stipulates that the Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and 
establish in the territory of Member States, and that the right of entry, residence and establishment 
referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be progressively established in the course of a maximum 
transitional period of fifteen (15) years. Another important provision of the Protocol is that the 
right of entry, residence and establishment which shall be established in the course of a transitional 
period shall be accomplished in three phases, namely: Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa, Right 
of Residence, and Right of Establishment. Removing all obstacles to free movement is the only 
way a borderless region could be realized. The ECOWAS Community envisioned the change of 
the Union into one “massive borderless region, an ECOWAS of peoples, not countries (Daily 
Times, online, mar 15, 2008 p.1)”. This was reiterated by the ECOWAS Commissioner for Trade, 
when it was said that “The ECOWAS Commission... has developed a vision to have an ECOWAS 
of peoples and a borderless region...” (Daramy 2008). 
3.5.1 Operationalization and Implementation of the Protocol on Free Movement of 
Persons, Goods, and Services  
Adepoju, (2001) opined that the Free Movement of Persons Protocol, the first to be ratified and 
operationalized in West Africa ushered in an era in which the free movement of ECOWAS citizens 
within member countries was once again possible. This was a remarkable stride made by the 
Commission. According to Abdoulahi (2005) for the movement of persons to be guaranteed, 
restrictions on the entry of private or commercial vehicles in member states were to be removed 
upon possession of valid driving license, Matriculation Certificate (Ownership Card) or Log Book, 
Insurance Policy and International customs documents recognized within the Community. Again, 
a private vehicle can remain in another member state for up to 90 days, while commercial vehicles 
are restricted to 15 days (within which it is not allowed to engage in business) and are both 
renewable upon expiration of the permit (Onwuka, 1982). To further facilitate movement of 
 
13 Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement Of Persons, Residence And Establishment.  
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people, ECOWAS has issued ‘brown card’ insurance scheme for inter-state road transport for 
faster and effective movement of persons, goods and services (Abdoulahi, 2005). 
The delayed second phase (Right of Residence) of the Protocol came into force in July 1986, when 
all Member States ratified it, but up till 2007, the Right of Establishment had not yet been 
implemented (Adepoju et al, 2007) and nothing in scholarship and practice proves any different to 
date. 
In response to the challenges inherent in promoting and supporting such an approach, the 
ECOWAS 30th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in 
Abuja in June 2006, mandated the Executive Secretariat to take the initiative in defining an 
ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration. This was adopted in January 2008 at the 33rd Summit 
of Heads of State and Government in Ouagadougou, with a focus on the following: promoting free 
movement within the ECOWAS zone; promoting the management of regular migration; policy 
harmonization; controlling irregular migration and human trafficking, particularly of women and 
children; protecting the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, taking into account the 
gender and migration dynamics dimension. The primary objective of the ‘Common Approach’ is 
to improve the management of migration through the development of a harmonized system and a 
comprehensive, balanced approach as a basis upon which member states would develop, 
strengthen, implement and coordinate migration policies and programmes in cooperation and 
partnership with the international community (ECOWAS 2003; 2008). There is however a general 
lack of information on the framework document at national level, even among national officials. 
Again, in March 2000, the heads of state and government met in Abuja to fashion out renewed 
efforts to create a borderless ECOWAS territory after being bothered about the lethargy in 
implementation. A decision was made on enhancing regional infrastructure to promote economic 
integration. In achieving this, an economic feasibility study was to be commissioned within six 
months for the construction of two rail networks namely, a coastal route from Lagos to Cotonou, 
Lomé and Accra, and a second Sahelian route linking Lagos to Niamey and Ouagadougou. This 
decision was a response to the poorly maintained communication and transportation facilities 
hindering cross-border trade, economic activities and movements of persons (Adepoju, 2007; 
ECOWAS 2000a). Other issues to foster economic integration were discussed. They include the 
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establishment of a free trade zone and private sector involvement; compliance with the principle 
of 90 days free entry, and free movement of persons; the removal of all checkpoints on 
international highways within ECOWAS states; the policing of the diverse border posts solely by 
essential agents (customs and immigration officials); and the abolition of rigid border 
bureaucracies, alongside the upgrading of border procedures through the use of passport-scanning 
machines (ECOWAS, 2000b).  
To implement the outcome of the meeting, it was decided that border patrols would be constructed 
by the neighbouring countries of Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mali, to 
monitor and guard each nation for an improved relationship between the police and other internal 
security agents on the information sharing and on staff training. In the same vein, the need for the 
effective use of ECOWAS travel certificates, the introduction of ECOWAS Brown Card travel 
certificates and a multi-country Schengen-type visa, and the adoption of a single ECOWAS 
passport were deliberated on. Compulsory residency permits were to be stopped, and immigration 
officials would grant ECOWAS citizens the maximum 90-day period of stay at entry points with 
effect from 15 April 2000. Member States are still expected to ratify the extradition convention 
that was signed in Abuja in August 1994, but which has remained largely in the archives 
(ECOWAS, 2003). 
3.5.2 Challenges militating against the successful implementation of the Protocol on 
Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services 
The implementation process of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons has slowed down as a 
result of the daunting challenges which impede the successful implementation of the protocol 
through the various stages of the process. The cause of this can be traced to what border symbolizes 
to some states. Some see the border region as an open area which allows for peaceful interchange 
while it is a closed area which stimulates tension and conflicts to some (Barkindo, 2008). As 
observed by Asiwaju (1992), borders are seen by operators of the machine of state in Africa and 
areas once under colonial dominance as perpetual area that generate conflict. Such conflicts 
emanate through the adherence of the African elite to the notion of state-centric mentality which 
makes the elite perpetually live in the euphoria of independence and are all out to defend and 
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safeguard their hard-won national sovereignty which can be realized by protecting and securing 
the borders to guarantee the defense and security of the state (Barkindo, 2008).  
Dina (2014, p. 37) opines that, “the West African borders are that of chaos, denial of rights to 
move freely, humiliation of country citizens, myraid road blocks, shameful extortions and lack of 
political will to pursue the implementation process by Member States”. This was and is still the 
plight of African borders. These borders are used for clandestine purposes. It was observed that as 
many member states harbor and accommodated illegal labour migrants without much stress, but 
the economic the economic downturn yielded chronic unemployment among nationals the illegal 
immigrants became targets for reprisals through expulsion (Ojo, 1999). Adepoju (2005) also 
agreed with Ojo’s submission but goes further to include political instability. Foreigners get the 
blame when governments face worrisome economic and political problems and they become 
victims of hostility of the local population for whatever economic, social and political problems 
being witnessed at that time. This had brought about alien must go orders as in Nigeria (1983 and 
1985); Ghana in (1969); Cote d’Ivoire (1999); Senegal (1990); Liberia (1983) and Benin (1998).  
Economic recession in most West African states stalled the implementation of the proposal on free 
movement. Nigeria which was a strong advocate and was enjoying oil boom suffered economic 
downturn which took its toll on her neighbours, once oil boom rescinded and hence in 1985, she 
broke the Articles of faith. 4 and 27 by expelling between 0.9 and 1.3 million undocumented 
migrants, mostly Ghanaians (Adepoju, 2009). The last straw was the expulsion of about 200,000 
undocumented migrants, which shook the community at large to its foundation.  
This phenomenon of expulsion of foreigners was also witnessed in Ghana as many community 
citizens were expelled out of Ghana, Nigerians being the majority as there were a lot of Nigerians 
in Ghana at that time. The expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana was majorly due to the fact that 
there has been an emerging general perception of foreigners as the cause of ‘large-scale 
unemployment that had befallen Ghana’ (Aremu and Ajayi 2014). Ab initio, the composition of 
the aliens in Ghana was from other West African states such as Togo, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and 
Côte d’Ivoire. However, by 1931, the Nigerian population was highest as more Nigerians were 
invited in by settled Nigerians due to the successes recorded in different businesses that they ran. 
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This therefore gradually raised tensions in Ghana with the increasing entry of foreigners and the 
dire socio-economic conditions of Ghanaians. Peil (1974) captured the sentiments thus: 
They (Nigerians) are target workers; immediately they get a few Cedes they go into 
retail trade and they prosper too. They don't part with their money easily; they are 
unfriendly and do not help friends when they are in financial difficulty. They are 
impatient with buyers, arrogant and difficult to come to terms with. They are thrifty 
and clannish. They don't seem to trust Ghanaians and confide in them. 
The government therefore took steps which led to the mass expulsion of the Community citizens.  
Again, Cote d’Ivoire, blessed with vast natural resource, had a small domestic labour force, and 
was able to accommodate aliens about a quarter of its waged labour force. This became possible 
as the country’s first post-independence president ignored the “arbitrary borders” of the 
colonialists and encouraged influx from her poor neighbours such as Burkina Faso, Nigeria, 
Liberia, Senegal and Ghana who flooded the plantations illegally to do menial jobs that the 
indigenes detested doing. They were given the privilege to bring in their families, and allowed to 
marry the indegenes, settle and as well vote. At some point, there was a shift in the country’s liberal 
immigration policy which was against foreigners who had dwelt with them for years, leading to a 
growing violent anti-immigrant reaction. The introduction of the concept of ivorite, and the denial 
of immigrants of some of the rights they previously enjoyed sparked displeasure and mistrust 
among immigrants, thereby resulting to thousands of nationals of Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and 
Nigerian returning to their various countries (Adepoju 2003). 
The sub-region is riddled with multiple regional economic groupings spread across different parts 
of West Africa. These include the Senegal River Development Organization, the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission, the Mano River Union and the West African Economic Community all encompassed 
by ECOWAS. They all differ in composition, objectives, memberships and structures. They also 
allowed for multiple interests in groups with conflicting objectives. To meet the financial 
obligations became a problem (Ojo, 1999). Adepoju (2005) agreed to this observation by Ojo. This 
in a way explains the inability by member states to execute the protocols (Ojo, 1999). It became 
obvious that member states took decisions which negate the ECOWAS Protocol of free movement. 
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Liberia in mid-2004, took a decision to expel aliens (those supposed to be Community citizens). 
She informed Embassies of ECOWAS member states (Nigeria and Ghana) to register their citizens 
who supported them financially and military-wise when the country was almost falling apart. 
Mauritania equally indicated to a pull off in 1999 which she eventually did in June 2000. Cape 
Verde was almost pulling out but for the attempted coup which halted the decision. 
Agyei and Clottey (n.d) asserts that within the ECOWAS sub-region, due to internal crisis, many 
member states failed to fulfill their obligations toward the sub-regional body. Border disputes 
between member states also took their toll as witnessed between Senegal and Mauritania, Ghana 
and Togo and culminated into expulsion of Community citizens, which is not in consonance with 
the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. Liberia’s civil war that started in 1989 became 
contagious and as such filtered into and engulfed Sierra Leone, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau 
and Cote d’Ivoire, thus leading to mass displacement of people internally and commonly referred 
to as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Record has it that almost 70 per cent of Liberia’s 
population was displaced, as thousands who fled to Sierra Leone to seek refuge were soon 
displaced as hostilities broke out there in March 1991. Refugees were therefore dispersed to 
Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, only to be caught up in another fight which made them scatter to Mali, 
Ghana and Burkina Faso (United Nations, 2003). 
Furthermore, most member states have ratified, or sustained a series of legislations which restrict 
‘foreigners’, including nationals of Community states, from participating in certain kinds of 
economic activities which is antithesis to the spirit of ECOWAS. According to (Adepoju 2005) 
some anti-alien moves were made by member state such as the National Identity Card scheme 
which was launched in Nigeria mid-February 2003 which was to “effectively control” illegal 
immigrants and their inimical activities. Liberia followed suit by introducing compulsory exit visa 
for all residents in the country. This move was criticized as violating the fundamental right of its 
citizens to free movement in and out of the country. In March 1999, Ghana equally ordered all 
foreigners to register in order to collect identity cards. At this move, immigrants became 
apprehensive recalling the 1969 Alien Compliance Order that culminated in the expulsion of non-
Ghanaians. 
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These steps were taken after the ECOWAS revised Treaty of 1992 reiterated the right of citizens 
of the Community to entry, residence and settlement, charging Member States to recognize and 
implement these rights in their respective territories. Although, (Adepoju, 2002) averred that the 
abolition of the compulsory residency permit and granting of the maximum 90- day period of stay 
to community citizens by immigration officials at point of entry took effect from April 2000 and 
led to the scrapping of border posts and checkpoints situated on international highways which have 
constituted a menace to free movement of persons and goods. Checkpoints between Nigeria and 
Benin were removed while border patrols were instituted by Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Togo, Ghana, 
Benin, and Burkina Faso to collaborate with the police to monitor and police national frontiers. In 
a bid to modernize border procedures, passport scanning machines were also designed to ease off 
the rigid border formalities and to facilitate free and easier movement of persons across borders. 
ECOWAS Report (2007) says that in realizing its vision of free movement from an ECOWAS 
states to another through the creation of a single economic space for abode and business, the inter-
state borders remain mini “iron curtains” and “narrow gates” which impedes and restricts free 
movement. With visa requirements removed, travelers continue to suffer harassment from 
customs, immigration and police Even though, the ECOWAS Heads of State had reached an 
agreement in January 2007 that only two checkpoints should be maintained along common borders 
(Hounkpatin 2006) it was not honoured. The former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo 
reacted sharply against the failure during the Lome Summit in December 2000, arguing that the 
region was losing out economically and politically. According to him, ‘businessmen who thought 
they would benefit from integration are frustrated and sometimes find it easier to transact business 
outside the region’ (National Concord Newspaper 2000). He stated that government officials at 
border posts see any foreigner crossing into their country as a victim to be harassed and exploited. 
In an interview conducted with a woman who had USD 2000 removed from a concealed wallet to 
prevent customs officials at the Seme border from stealing them. Such occurrences of illegal search 
and seizure of valuables are still the order of the day. 
 As at 2008, the Nigeria-Seme border had a lot of illegal road blocks with touts used as agents to 
collect illegal levies from migrants. These touts though not uniformed men were duly recognized 
by frequent commuters and security men who uses them for their extortion purposes. These touts 
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who act as fronts for the unscrupulous officers are familiar with and exploit hidden routes unknown 
to security operatives and constitute a very negative impediment on the free movement of 
community citizens (Adepoju, 2005). This phenomenon came as a shock to the media 
practitioners, as they were able to witness the reality on ground which is an ordeal Community 
citizen go through at point of entry. After over 30 years after the enactment of the Protocol on Free 
Movement, the situation in the borders presents a scenario that negates the provision of the 
Protocol. They therefore vowed to use the media to expose this anomaly and as well clamour and 
advocate for the speedy and full implementation of the protocol on free movement.  
According to Dina (2014) one witnesses a long queue of vehicles awaiting entry permission to a 
Member State for several days thus slowing down economic integration, makes free movement 
worrisome, frustrating and very annoying experience to undergo as a result of the unnecessary 
formalities introduced by the corrupt officials who were out for extortion. Mohammed Ibn 
Chambas, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, in one of his speech alluded to this in his 
account: 
Whenever I speak in public, one of the first questions I get asked is the difficulty 
that ordinary people face when they try to move around in the region… The cross- 
border obstacles they face, particularly at the frontier where the processing of 
documents is extremely cumbersome and fraught with harassments, intimidation 
and oftentimes plain extortion. On the highway, you still find a lot of unauthorized 
checkpoints and road blocks. All of these stand in the way of free movement of 
persons… (and) goods (Leadership Magazine, 2009). 
In 2007, Jacob Buba at a business forum to assess ECOWAS business activities with a view to 
improving the process, laid blame at the doors of importers thwarting fiscal policies, import and 
export regulatory frameworks to which Ghanaian businessmen disagreed and laid the blame on 
immigration, customs and the police officers.  
In many cases, truck-loads of goods crossing the borders have to stay at the borders 
for long periods to go through cumbersome formalities even when documents have 
been provided… After long delays, trucks, passengers and vehicles at the borders 
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are usually subjected to further delays at the several police and customs posts on 
the routes… all these happen inspite of the numerous (ECOWAS) protocols… to 
facilitate free movement of goods and people (The Nations Newspaper, 2007). 
3.6 Conclusion  
ECOWAS and EACs have been at the fore front of encouraging free movement of persons across 
borders of member states through policies that encourage free entry for member states and visa on 
arrival for some states they have working relationships with at the sub-regional level. Since 2002, 
the AU is stepping in. After reviewing the benefits which they have denied themselves over the 
years, it is now deemed fit to encourage free movement of persons among member states through 
the introduction of a unified passport for member states.   
Nigeria being one of the strongest proponents of this move has also been found not to be so 
committed to this course in terms of the implementation process. As averred by James, (1989), 
Nigeria being one of the moving force towards the establishment of ECOWAS violated one of the 
major provisions which is the abolition of visas to encourage trans-border movement of persons, 
goods and services. This was witnessed when Nigeria closed her borders between 24th April 1984 
and 28th February 1986 without due notification given to neighboring states most especially the 
land-locked Republics of Chad and Niger who relied greatly on the Nigerian Costal ports for most 
of their importation. Plea was made by these countries, but Nigeria didn’t oblige. Professor 
Asiwaju pointed out that the action taken by Nigeria was a far cry to what her counterparts did. 
Togo under the leadership of President Eyadema, erected high security wire fencing along the 
border with Ghana while South Africa erected electric fences and land mines along the borders 
with Botswana, Mozambique and Angola (Asiwaju, 1992). Barkindo, (2008) asserted that all 
member-states of the ECOWAS especially Nigeria, have many checkpoints fully manned by 
armed officers, which increase in number and intensity as the borders are been approached 
particularly on local market days around the border. This depicts that though they profess to be 
committed to this course, their actions and activities do not depict this. The nefarious activity of 
security operatives along the borders is a clear testimony to this point and despite the outcry from 
migrants the governments seems indifferent to this anomaly as they take no step to curb such. 
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Professor Anthony Asiwaju (2008) alluded to this as he stated that “important decisions are taken 
but these are often contradicted by observable action on the ground”.  
Routes keep increasing as illegal migrants patronize them consistently. Great fallout from this 
phenomenon is the fact that the borders have been opened up to trans-border criminal activities 
evident in the smuggling and cross-border crimes that occur along the borders which in turn 
endanger and threaten the life of people (Okunade, 2017). These activities have been seen as a 
norm and not as an aberration. This also explains why the activities of insurgent groups most 
especially Boko Haram who utilizes the porous borders along Cameroun, Chad and Niger to carry 
out its dastardly act by taking over some border communities over the years. This phenomenon is 
the reality even though the government has always indicated and pledged their support towards 
the defense of its territory by securing the borders.  
Member states need to come to a realization that approaching issues from a rigid national 
sovereignty standpoint has not been helpful in effectively managing and securing the borders. 
There is therefore the need for them to show more commitment and determination not only in the 
speeches they make but in the actions they take towards implementing the protocol. In other words, 
when member states realize the importance and the benefits member states stands to gain, this 
naturally boost their political will toward the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol. This can 
be measured in the zeal and commitment thrown into the implementation process. Now that the 
AU is throwing its heavy weight on the same for a borderless Africa, it is only hoped that member 
states will be willing to making this dream a reality. This is because the commitment they show to 
this course determines the extent of success of the implementation process of the Protocol. The 
benefits therefore, trickle down from the regional level to the sub-regional level and to Nigeria as 
a state. Until this is done African borders will remain porous and instead of gradually turning them 
into bridges, they will perpetually remain barriers at the detriment of member states.     
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF BORDER CONSTRUCTION IN 
NIGERIA 
4.0 Introduction 
Drawing on existing literature, this chapter provides an historical overview of the border 
arrangements in Nigeria. Different regimes that have existed in Nigeria are reviewed to establish 
why and how states were created to making a total of 36 that currently exist in Nigeria. The chapter 
equally seeks to bring to the fore the rationale for partitioning Nigeria from its neighbours and the 
strategic importance of the Nigerian borders along the North-Eastern Nigeria. The essence of this 
discourse is not to justify the demarcation of the borders in the North-Eastern Nigeria but to 
provide historical insight into the different roles borders in Nigeria have played over time and 
which it still plays till date. Pertinent to this study is the way these borders have enhanced 
insurgency within the North-Eastern Nigeria.  
4.1 The making of the Nigerian State  
Nigeria as a country located in West Africa came into existence in the 1914 and attained 
independence in 1960. The country’s region was one of the favorite territorial areas of the British 
colonialist in the 19th century, who coined Nigeria’s name out of the words “Niger Area” (Olusoji, 
et’al. 2014). According to Falola and Heaton (2008), before the birth of Nigeria in 1914, through 
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates, Nigeria comprised different 
independent chieftains, states, kingdoms and empires. These, among others, included the Borno 
Empire, the Hausa States, and the Sokoto Caliphate, in the North and in the South the Igbo 
segmentary societies, Benin Kingdom and the Oyo Empire.  
The geographical location of Nigeria on the map of West Africa shows her occupying between 
Latitude 4°N and 14°N and Longitudes 4°E and I5°E. Nigeria has a total land area of 923,768 
square kilometres. The country is bordered by Cameroon in the east, Republic of Chad in the north 
east, Benin Republic in the west, and Niger to the north. Its coast lies on the Gulf of Guinea in the 
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south and it borders Lake Chad to the northeast. Nigeria is a country with notable geographical 
features, such as the Adamawa highlands, Mambilla Plateau, Jos Plateau, Obudu Plateau, the Niger 
River, River Benue and Niger Delta.  
In the pre-colonial era, Nigeria as a region was occupied by different nations with different 
historical background, linguistic, cultures, religion and so on. Shaw et al. (2002) reveal that people 
were already living in the south-western region of Nigeria as early as 11,000 BC. Also, Falola and 
Heaton (2008) stressed that there is a 9000 BCE Late Stone Age evidence of indigenous habitation 
in Iwo Eleru rock shelter in southwestern Nigeria, as well as the Nok with their Iron technology 
and civilization in 600 BCE living near the present-day Abuja. In fact, the chronological account 
that Falola and Heaton presented showed that 1000-1500 CE registered the centralization of states 
in Nigeria, such as the Kanem, Borno, Benin, Ife, Oyo, and the Hausa city states. 
The above identified places earlier formed the country Nigeria. But a drastic change occurred in 
the composition of the country during the European scrambled for Africa. Sekina (2003) observed 
that from the Golden Age (1300), when the Europeans engaged in trans-Saharan trade (i.e. slave 
trade and other commodities trade such as gold, cocoa, palm oil), the Nigerian-European 
economic, political and social relations were dominated by slave trade, and that resulted in 
monumental changes in the history of the nation. Even after the abolition of slave trade in 1807 by 
the British, the Nigerian-British relations still reflected elements of slave trade until the annexation 
of Lagos, a southern region as Crown Colony in 1861. This period gave room for legitimate trade 
between Nigeria and Britain. 
In the record of Jayeola-Omoyeni and Omoyeni (2014), the northern region of Nigeria came under 
the influence of Islamic revolution in 1804. The Islamic revolution or Jihad led to the establishment 
of Sokoto Caliphate, which expanded Islamic religion beyond its previous bound among the elites 
to the common people. By 1900, the British had entered into the Northern region of Nigeria, 
created the Northern protectorate, which was concluded in 1903, with the conquest of Sokoto 
Caliphate and the killing of the Sultan. According to history, the Northern region was easier for 
the British colonialists to penetrate compared to the west-eastern region. Crowder (1964) explains 
that the presence of traditionally installed rulers or chiefs in the north aided the British rule so well. 
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Northern people were already used to taking orders from their Emirs whom the British employed 
in ruling the people indirectly, and therefore prevented any form of resistance to tax system. 
Nigeria became fully placed under the British government control in 1914, when it was 
amalgamated by Sir Frederick Lord Lugard. Due to Lugard’s influence on Nigeria, some scholars 
regard him as the founding father, but some others think it was Herbert Macaulay, the father of 
nationalism, who with some journalists used newspapers in 1908 to report and critique the 
performance of the colonial government (Falola and Heaton, 2008). After Lord Lugard rule in 
Nigeria were other five eminent colonial masters before independence in 1960. These rulers 
include Sir Hugh Clifford (1919 – 1925), Sir Arthur Richards (1943 – 1948), Sir John McPherson 
(1948 – 1954), and Sir James Robertson (1954 – 1960). All these British rulers operated with a 
writing constitution. The first of it came after Lagos became a Crown Colony, when the British 
Colonial Constitution was introduced with a Legislative Council comprising a Chief Justice, a 
Colonial Secretary and a senior military officer to command imperial forces (Olusanya: 1980, p. 
518).  
Another way of referring to British system of government in Nigeria is its indirect control of all 
the regions or territories of the country. Gale (2007) observes that the chief characteristic of British 
rule in Nigeria was its system of local administration, known as indirect rule; a system of 
centralized political units with local (or native) chiefs at the lowest rungs of the hierarchy. 
According to him, the system functioned well in the North, with variable success in the West, and 
poorly in the East. The failure of the British indirect rule in the East has been accounted to the 
absence of paramount chiefs among the Ibo, Ibibio, and other ethnic groups who made up the 
Eastern province of those days (Afigbo, 1956). The units of Igbo society in Eastern Nigeria were 
too small to shoulder indirect rule, and again they already had a local system of governance. 
By the end of World War II in 1945, the British rule in Nigeria had begun to face pressure from 
the campaign for independence, just as witnessed in countries under colonial rule, namely Kenya, 
Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, Senegal, etc. The pressure that was put on the British government 
drew on the provision of Atlantic Charter of February 12th, 1941 where United States President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Minister Winston Churchill agreed on the autonomy of imperial 
colonies. To a great extent, Gale (2007) shows that the pressure on Britain later called for the 
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constitutional conference of May and June 1957, which demanded immediate self-government for 
the Eastern and Western regions, and the Northern to follow in 1959. Nigeria would have gotten 
her liberation as early as mid-nineteen fifties but for a technical delay by the British government. 
Eventually, Nigeria’s independence came on October 1, 1960. And as a self-governing state, with 
three regions, namely Western, Eastern and Northern region, Nigeria was administered from the 
center by Nnamdi Azikiwe who the Governor and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who was the Prime 
Minister. However, Nigeria became a Federal Republic in 1963. During that period, the Midwest 
Region was carved out of the Western Region, making Nigeria a federation of four Regions. 
However, the First Republic which entertained a parliamentary system of government came to an 
end in January 1966, due to a coup which lasted till 1970 (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Evidently, 
the 1966 coup had a real influence on the making of Nigeria. This will be adequately substantiated 
in the succeeding section.  
Having achieved independence, Nigeria as a West African country became a major influence in 
sustaining the outcome of the nationalist project against colonization; western power and colonial 
policies. It has been widely written how colonial policies depressed African economy and political 
structure. Olusegun and David (2012) specifically observe that economic policies in the colonies 
were geared toward the benefit and interest of the colonizing powers. However, immediately after 
independence, Nigeria with her population size, economic, political and military strength made the 
move to reverse colonial policies resulting to economic depression. First, Nigeria with other West 
African countries brought about the regional organization known as ECOWAS in 1975. According 
to International Democracy Watch, ECOWAS’ aim was to achieve collective self-sufficiency for 
the member states by means of economic and monetary union creating a single, large trading bloc. 
It holds therefore that Nigeria is not just a West Africa state by geographical location, but by the 
role that she is playing in the region. Bach (1978) averred that the Nigeria’s foreign policy among 
other West African states has been basically directed towards the integration of African countries. 
There are 18 countries that make up the West African countries, namely Nigeria, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, the island nation of Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, the island of Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Príncipe and 
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Togo. However, the member States of ECOWAS exclude Mauritania, the island of Helena, São Tomé and 
Príncipe. Figure 3.1 shows West African countries on the map of Africa.  
Figure 4. 1 Map of Africa showing Nigeria’s size and location among other West African 
Countries 
 
Source: mapsofworld.com 
The map above provides a vivid understanding on the existence of Nigeria, the position or area 
she’s occupying on the African landscape, which however made the Europeans especially the 
French and British colonialists interested in the region, even as they thrived greatly in terms of 
economic activities. It also helps to know why Nigeria is very much concerned about the 
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cooperation and integration of West African states. Historical analysis of economic benefits from 
the Niger River Basin, Gulf of Guinea and Lake Chad region by (Mabogunje, 2009; Omede 2006 
and Andersen et al., 2005), explains how Nigeria was particularly a contested region between 
France and Britain. Nigeria till date is still benefiting from the huge natural resources that her 
region is endowed with, which include relatively good weather, agricultural and mineral gift. Since 
it is not all states in West Africa or African region that is blessed with enormous resource, it 
becomes dutiful for Nigeria to extend brotherly hands to other countries. 
A remarkable feature of Nigeria as a federation is her willingness to assist other countries in Africa 
with her enormous resources, so that they can achieve adequate development through trade, socio-
cultural, political and economic relations, and even peacekeeping missions, should there be any 
instability. Azkagu (2015) and Olawale (2015) lay emphasis on Nigeria’s contribution in 
establishing ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), including its peacekeeping operations in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. Olawale (2015) mentions that Nigeria, with all its attributes of 
natural resources and size, is equally and naturally expected to take the lead in the peace process 
of her geo-political zone. It was also observed that Nigeria had the highest number of soldiers 
(over 10,000) during the Liberia Peacekeeping mission, with a financial contribution of 8 billion 
dollars (Olawale, 2015). The role and performance of Nigeria in peacekeeping in West Africa, 
Africa and the world at large has made her to be regarded as a superpower at least in West Africa. 
The above explains why Nigeria occupies a position in West Africa that makes her a subject of 
concern since the outbreak of the Boko Haram Insurgency. Apart from the humanitarian crisis that 
Nigeria’s insurgency has affected her neighbours with, there is certainly the threat of insurgency 
leading to the division of the country. Forest (2012) observes that Boko Haram members are drawn 
primarily from the Kanuri ethnic group (roughly 4% population who are concentrated in the 
northeastern Nigeria, such as Bauchi and Borno), and Hausa and Fulani (29% population spread 
throughout the northern states), while other members came from Niger, Cameroon and Chad. 
Examining the area that the Boko Haram concentrates its attacks on, it is clear that the terrorist 
group desires a nation-state of its own. Apine (2014) avers that Boko Haram’s form of terror 
against Nigeria undermines the very foundation of a nation-state.  
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4.2 The politics of state formation in Nigeria  
Nigeria is today a country with a total number of 36 states, and six geopolitical zones, namely 
South-West, North-Central, North-East, North-West, South-East and South-South. Nigeria is also 
a country with about 374 diverse ethnic groups, the three major of which are the Hausa, Yoruba 
and Igbo (Salawu et al., 2011). There are also over 400 languages spoken in Nigeria from the over 
1000-2500 languages spoken in Africa depending on different estimates (Ayatse et al., 2013 and 
UNESCO, 2010). Nigeria is again the most populous Black Country in the world (Okadigbo, 
1989), which according to National Population Commission (NPC) is currently inhabited by 182 
million people. Also, going by the 2015 World Bank account on countries GDP, Nigeria is the 23th 
richest country of the 195 countries that are presently in the world. 
As commonly held, Nigeria is the giant of Africa, a continent that is so blessed with numerous 
natural resources and serves as a resource extraction site for most parts of the world. This 
description of Africa also exposes why Nigeria is a favorite destination for most countries of the 
world, in terms of economic, political, military and socio-cultural relations. For most countries of 
the world, Nigeria’s crude oil is one of the best, which explains why over a long time, the country’s 
major oil exporters have been the US, China, India etc. Of course, Nigeria is rich in oil and other 
mineral resources which include tin and columbite, coal, iron ore and limestone (Chinago et al., 
2015). In a sense, it can be said that discussing Nigeria without making reference to her natural 
endowment in human, mineral and capital resources would be tantamount to embarking on an 
incomplete task. 
Considering the physical and socio-cultural features that make up any human society, Nigeria is a 
heterogeneous state where diverse ethnic groups live together as one people. The reality that 
Nigeria is a territory with multi-ethnic people must have played a huge role in the country’s 
adoption of a Federal System. It is believed that any country with diverse ethnic and linguistic 
composition as Nigeria needs a federal system. Scholars such as Dickson (2016), Babalola (2015), 
Sagay (2008), Wheare (1964) and Tamuno (1998) stress that federalism allows power sharing 
among the central and regional governments such that each of the entities can operate 
independently. However, concentrating power on the central alone in Nigeria against true federal 
system has continually raised arguments on the devolution of power. Really, until the federal unit 
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allows the decentralization of power among its states and local councils, Nigeria may never 
achieve reasonable development, nor be counted among countries that practice true federalism. 
As earlier mentioned, Nigeria was first governed at independence through parliamentary system 
which was mainly administered by a regional government in the West, North and East. The 
regional government registered three main governing parties which included National Congress of 
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the Eastern region, headed by Nnamdi Azikiwe, Action Congress 
(AC) in the Western region, headed by Obafemi Awolowo, and National People’s Congress (NPC) 
in the Northern region, headed by Ahmadu Bello. Lergo (2011) reveals that the three parties 
dominated their regions and sought to control Nigeria at a federal or national level. In essence, 
these three-party leaders controlled the affairs of Nigeria throughout the First Republic. But it was 
unfortunate that their regime was plagued by antagonistic regionalism, ethnicity, declined 
revenues, and bitter power struggle which led to the first coup in 1966 (Oluwole, 2014). 
Going by the issues that caused the coup which resulted into a civil war in 1967, it became wise 
to adopt the colonial system of divide and rule in fragmenting the different regions of Nigeria into 
divisional units called states. Twelve states were first created by Yakubu Gowon who became the 
Head of State in 1966. His action was mainly to respond to the regional minority and majority 
ethnic rivalry, including a national political power struggle. As Lergo (2011) points out, the 
creation of 12 states in 1967, 21 states in 1987, 30 states in 1992, and 36 states in 1996, made the 
power structure of the country to change, particularly as minority ethnic groups started having 
influence in the power equation of the country, unlike what was the case during the regional 
government period. To date, ethnics such as the Ijaw, Urhobos, Junkuns Itsekiri, Biroms, Tiv, 
Ibibios, Efiks etc., are treated as minority among the three major ethnic groups of Hausa-Fulani, 
Igbo and Yoruba in Nigeria (Rose et al., 2014 and Sagay, 2008). 
The formation of Nigerian states can be said to have been influenced mainly by ethnic and political 
consciousness or ideologies. Oluwole (2014) explains that ethnicity and ethnic nationalism are 
critical to state-making as both generate solidarity and garner popular participation of people in 
politics, yet, ethnicity, by its adversarial nature, is contraindicated to the concept of nation-
building. This claim is true of Nigeria, as there are 36 states already, yet the country is still divided 
along ethnic and political lines without a reasonable advancement or human development. The 
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condition of Nigeria presently brings to mind the argument that state creation brings about physical 
growth at the grassroots but there are doubts if it could transform the economy of states (Adetoye, 
2016). 
The total numbers of states that are found in Nigeria today were created by the military 
governments. In order to respond to unrests from ethnic agitation, religious, political or elite crisis 
witnessed during the First Republic, the Second and the Third Republics, the military Heads of 
State at different points deployed states creation as a mechanism for appeasement or conflict 
resolution. Citing Suberu (1999), Rose et al., 2014 reveal that 
With the counter coup of July of 1966, in particular, the reins of power fell directly 
into the hands of Yakubu Gowon, an officer from the Angas tribe, an ethnic minority 
in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. Gowon’s decision to divide the country into 
12 States in May 1967 dramatically altered the configuration of the federal 
structure and the nature of majority-minority relations (Rose et al., 2014). 
However, the above quotation is not to say that what Gowon did was right or wrong, it is just to 
show that state creation in Nigeria was mainly influenced by ethnic compositions. In fact, the 
below quotation from Rose’s study would further prove ethnic influence on state creation in 
Nigeria. In her view, 
By giving relative satisfaction to the long-standing ethnic minority demands for new 
States, Gowon’s 12 State structure not only overturned the structural hegemony of 
the North, but also liberated many minority communities from the regional 
stranglehold of the majority groups and undermined local ethnic minority support 
for the secessionist bid of the Eastern region (Rose et al., 2014). 
The following were the states created in Nigeria after conceivable and open ethnic or political 
agitations for self-control, in particular the Eastern region cessation campaign in 1967: North-
Western State (covering Sokoto and Niger Province), North-Central state (comprising Katsina and 
Zaria), Kano State, North-Eastern State (comprising Bornu, Adamawa, Sarduana and Bauchi 
Provinces), Benue-Plateau State, Kwara State, Western State, Lagos State (Comprising of the 
Colony Province and the Federal Territory of Lagos), Mid-western State (covers the present Mid-
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Western State), East-Central State (comprising of present Eastern region except Calabar, Ogoja 
and River Provinces), South Eastern State (comprising of Calabar and Ogoja Provinces), and 
Rivers State (comprising of Ahoada, Brass, Degema, Ogoni and Port Harcourt Divisions) 
(Babalola, 2016). 
The military regime of Gowon (1966-1975), Murtala Mohammed (1975-1976) Ibrahim Babangida 
(1985-1993) and Sani Abacha (1993-1998) were particularly characterized by state creation. In 
other words, no civilian regime in Nigeria created a single state, and this was largely due to the 
over sensitive nature of the ethnic diversity and political rivalry of the nation which civilian heads 
of state and government found more convenient to cope with, compared with their military 
counterparts. So, the military regime of Gowon created 12 states, Murtala created 7 states, 
Babangida who relocated the capital of Nigeria from Lagos to Abuja in 1991 created 11 and Sani 
Abacha created 6, making the states in Nigeria a total of 36 with a Federal capital territory. 
Obviously, the long run effect of state creation in Nigeria continues to date as agitations for 
creation of more states by minority ethnics are yet to cease, and sometimes boundary dispute is a 
common hitch from state creation, especially if deposits of valuable resources are perceived to be 
available or discovered around or between the boundaries of the old and new states. The boundary 
cases of Kogi and Benue, Akwa-Ibom and Cross River State are good examples. Border dispute 
among states is a common type of conflict after ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. However 
grievous as the ideology and negative effect of state creation may be in Nigeria, there is the claim 
that state creation has helped in strengthening the Nigerian federation, ensuring Nigerian unity and 
building the nation (Yongo, 2015). 
Executing the project of building a nation, that is a federal state, cannot but rest totally on 
constitution. Most military regimes in Nigeria failed to consider the constitution while ruling the 
state. Abacha regime was seriously guilty of this. Throughout his regime, Nigeria was regarded as 
a totalitarian state because he employed dictatorship style of governance. Until his death in 1998, 
the country suffered a blow of bad judicial processes and rule of law. It was until Obasanjo was 
elected and sworn-in in 1999 as a democratic president of the country that the constitution became 
functional and effective, as power was centralized at the federal level among the legislature, the 
judiciary and the executive, while the governors and local chairpersons exercised control at the 
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state and local levels respectively. Below is a map of Nigeria showing its states, borders and 
neighbouring countries. 
Figure 4. 2 Map of Nigeria showing the 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory 
Source: The United Nations Cartography Department: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/nigeria.pdf 
By and large, the formation of Nigeria and her divisional entities called states is the working of 
the colonialists, Nigerian nationalists and military heads of state that have governed the country at 
one point or the other. Lately, in 2015 the construction of the country along ethnic, religious and 
political lines became more open, as political parties mainly the PDP and APC struggled for power 
at the central stage. These parties played the old card of using ethnic and religious criteria in 
determining elections outcomes in Nigeria. From the selection of candidates, party campaigns and 
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voting, political parties hit up the polity and created ethnic and religious divisions among the 
citizens. 
In relation to the above caption, Abubakar (2016) and Nyuykonge et al. (2015) record how it was 
a general conception that it was for the intervention of international communities, cooperation 
among the elite that the sitting President, Goodluck Jonathan after losing election encouraged 
peace by relinquishing power to the elected President, General Buhari (an act that was never 
recorded in Nigeria’s history that a sitting president lost an election), Such intervention saw that 
Nigeria was not plunged into a political war or another cycle of military coup. If records of post-
election violence in Nigeria since the start of the Fourth Republic were to be considered, a possible 
refusal of President Goodluck Jonathan to accept defeat would have fomented the greatest post-
election disaster that could ever be imagined in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, Nigeria is a state of several nations that were fused together by the British colonial 
lords just for economic gain (Umejesi, 2012). This statement reflects why it was the annexation of 
territories and resources, unlike the slave system, that dominated post-colonial rule in Africa. 
Consequently, Nigeria as a reality of colonial rule in Africa has continued to struggle internally 
and externally in sustaining her territory, people and policies that the British government 
bequeathed to her. Among the challenges that Nigeria is confronted with today is nationhood and 
nation-building. The crises of nationhood and Nigeria’s perennial quest for constructing a national 
identity among its citizens have effectively been hampered by strong divisions among its citizens 
(Akinola, 2012). However, this challenge is one created out of the ethnic groups acting only for 
their members’ interests and courses against national interest, if ever there were any. 
4.3 Factors responsible for the erection of borderlines between Nigeria and its 
neighbouring states 
A state power and sovereignty during the colonial era was determined by absolute control over 
territory which includes an expanse of land, water and air space (Rizmal, 2013 and Matz, 2005). 
Referring to a state in time past was based on territorial control maxim, it is not different from 
what it is today, even as countries strive to indicate or exercise control over their territory by 
measure of land, water and air space. Nigeria among other countries of the world is today 
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enmeshed in the struggle of determining her territorial boundaries, due to claims and counter-
claims of ownership from neighbouring countries over the same areas that either country had once 
exercised authority over. For instance, boundary dispute has at one time or the other pitted Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin Republic against one another, such that today, the individual 
countries are seeking a resolution through border construction in order to protect their control of 
territories. 
It can be asked, what are the factors that would make a country or state erect borders along their 
territorial boundaries, when it is clear that borders are walls or barriers? Response to this question 
is what this section is all about, especially as Nigeria and her neighbours have constructed some 
borderlines along their boundaries. The following are factors that led Nigeria and neighbours to 
dispute over territorial boundary and borderline construction. 
4.3.1 Traditional Claim 
It has been said once that Nigeria is made up of many nations who rarely had constructed borders 
from the beginning of their existence, even though they practiced a culture of identifying their land 
or territory with certain elements such as trees or plantation, mountain, water edge or stream, sea, 
lake, rivers bank, and so on. Using traditional elements as evidences to buttress Nigeria’s claim of 
ownership over the land and maritime boundary dispute between her and Cameroon at the 
International Criminal Court of Justice (ICJ) was rejected (Etekpe, 2013). It was rejected because 
the colonial masters of Nigeria and Cameroon never considered traditional elements in occupying 
territories. Yet, maps and geographical features such as rivers and mountain were also used by 
France to show boundary limit. This is similar to Africa nations’ using rivers and mountain to 
identify their boundary limit. According to Robertson (2013), France mainly occupied territories 
through signing of treaties, such as Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 on delimitation 
of Lake Chad.  
However, it is quite unfortunate that the traditional claim of Nigeria referring the Efik people who 
are Nigerians as the original inhabitants of Bakassi peninsula (i.e. the particular land and maritime 
area in dispute), was rejected at the International Court of Justice who ceded the area to Cameroon. 
The rejection of Nigeria’s claim was made possible because colonial boundary depictions 
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contravene traditional ones. In fact, this is why there are numerous boundary disputes among 
African countries apart from Nigeria and her neighbours. Today, legitimate boundaries are only 
those drawn by the colonialists. Of course, the ongoing Nigeria-Cameroon boundary delimitation 
which involves using colonial treaties and maps prove how legitimate boundaries are those drawn 
by colonialists (Robertson, 2013 and AUBP, 2013). The delimitation exercise has continued to 
witness challenges from the local people who disapprove colonial claims demarcating their lands. 
Nigeria and her other neighbours different from Cameroon also have disputes over their boundaries 
but they did not consider the option of taking Nigeria to court. A reason is that inhabitants of the 
countries’ borderlands share common historical background and cultural affinities such as 
language (Folarin, 2014). If traditional claims were to be considered in judging boundary disputes 
between Nigeria and her neighbours, it would only keep the case going unending, and colonial 
evidential claims are not also an alternative for passing judgments either. In a sense, controversies 
in traditional claims which are challenges in delimiting boundaries are why most countries, 
especially Nigeria and her neighbours have resulted in building borderlines. 
Nigeria built the Bakassi borderline with the creation of Bakassi Local Council in 1994 to maintain 
stronghold over her territory against Cameroon. A similar act was also noticed in the erection of 
borders between Nigeria and Benin Republic. Afolayan (2000) exposes through Prescott’s report 
of 1959 that Nigeria-Dahomey (Benin) boundary was drawn by France and Britain to prevent the 
territory falling under the control of another European country. In the same vein, after the 
independence of the two African countries, there were issues of insecurity along their borderlands 
which warranted the building of further barriers around the borderlands in order to protect 
individual country’s territorial integrity. Folarin et al. (2014) specifically observe that the activities 
of the Beninese, who incessantly and forcefully collect taxes from Nigerians along the Nigeria-
Benin border villages is a reason for encouraging border-posts. 
Extant literature has pointed out that border posts are erected mainly to forestall insecurity or 
unnecessary encroachment into the territory of a sovereign state. Spencer (2007) particularly 
underpins that border is the first line of defence against terrorism and the last line of nation’s 
territorial integrity. True as this claim is, borderline or border post approach to defending a territory 
has become frustrated due to same ethnic group division across countries’ boundaries or 
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borderlands. Folarin et’al. (2014) establish the fact that people with historical and cultural 
interactions are based on a long-shared border of Nigeria, Chad and Niger. Capitalizing on shared 
cultural make-up by border communities, political and economic relations of countries (i.e. Nigeria 
and its neighbours), as well as the nature and structure of the inherited borders from the 
colonialists, it has become very uneasy to operate borders as it is seen in the western countries. 
The challenge that traditional claims over boundary poses today explains why ICJ could not easily 
pass verdict on most African boundary cases brought before it. For example, it took the court over 
8 years, from 1994-2002, to pass judgment over Nigeria-Cameroon boundary dispute. Again, the 
court had to boycott traditional claim of Nigeria presented before it. The court would hardly have 
been able to conclude the case if traditional evidences were to be entertained against treaties. In a 
way, how would the court have passed judgment over Nigeria-Benin boundary if the countries had 
called the court into their dispute? Passing verdict on Nigeria-Benin boundary and avoiding 
people’s traditional make-up would present a huge problem. This is because the border 
communities of the two countries reflect some ethnic interactions such as with the Yorubas, the 
Eguns of South-Western Nigeria on one side and the Yorubas, the Gouns, the Fons of the Republic 
of Benin on the other side (Babatunde, 2014). 
By and large, traditional factor in boundary dispute is so sensitive that care needs to be taken before 
reaching any conclusion. This explains how Nigeria and her neighbours have arrived at the 
technical way of exercising control over their territories using borderline. According to National 
Geographic Society, a boundary is a real or imaginary line that separate two thing or regions of 
the Earth. In effect, borderline can be regarded as rectilinear or serpentine line constructed along 
boundaries. However, constructing borderline is a challenge for Nigeria and her neighbours, 
because avoiding the separation of members of an ethnic group across the country’s boundary is 
tough, yet incumbent on both national and international governments. This difficulty is what the 
colonialists failed to consider before partitioning African land. If Nigeria and her neighbours 
become insensitive to the ethnic and cultural interaction challenges in constructing boundaries, 
then they may end up further compounding the boundary issues that the Western colonialists 
created. 
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4.3.2 Economic resource factor 
Resource is one of the real causes of dispute and conflict in many nations across the world. Nigeria 
and Cameroon have quite some records of clashes over land and waterways in 1980s and 1990s. 
For Nigeria, the Bakassi peninsula which lies on the Gulf of Guinea and the estuary of Calabar-
Cameroon axis belongs to Nigeria, especially if the historical background of the Old Calabar 
Kingdom people inhabiting the area were to be considered. However, Cameroon drew its own 
claim of ownership on legal documents among which is the 1961 referendum of the Southern 
Cameroon people to join Cameroon; the people are considered as the original occupants of the 
Bakassi peninsula. In the opinion of the International Court of Justice, of the two African countries, 
Cameroon’s evidence from the treaties signed by French colonialist at different time such as, in 
1913 and 1931 proved the ownership of Cameroon of the disputed sphere than Nigeria 
(Tolorunshagba, 2015). 
Nigeria and Cameroon did not engage in clashes over boundary until there was a signal that the 
area of dispute might be harbouring a large quantum of oil resources (Tarlebbea et al., 2010). 
Holding the point that Addax, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, and TotalFinaElf oil companies are 
operating close to the sphere in dispute, there arises the assumption that oil might be seated in the 
Bakassi peninsula, around the Calabar estuary between Nigeria and Cameroon. The effect of this 
assumption was the escalation of Nigeria and Cameroon boundary dispute in 1970s, 80s and 90s 
respectively. Etekpe (2013) and Babatunde (2012) observe that Nigeria and Cameroon engaged in 
hostility in 1972, 1973 and 1981, causing the death of Cameroon soldiers called Gendarmes and 
some local population of the Bakassi people. There had never been any open clash between Nigeria 
and Cameroon until the issue of oil resource came along. 
In the case of Nigeria and Cameroon, it is clear that gaining ownership right over the territory in 
dispute is having right over resources found in the area. More so, in Africa, land and water 
resources are invaluable assets that often lead to dispute or conflict. Tolorunshagba (2015) reveals 
that if not that Nigeria exercised her political willpower in accepting the ICJ verdict over Bakassi 
peninsula dispute which favoured Cameroon, the two countries would have gone to war. This 
claim is evident with Abacha’s erecting border post in the Bakassi peninsula during his regime. 
Also, presidents before Abacha had made some moves to forestall ceding the particular areas in 
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dispute to Cameroon, especially the water ways that flow into the Southern part of Nigeria, Cross 
River, Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa States, due to the economic and security benefit. 
Talking about the importance of the land and maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon, 
what comes to mind immediately is the Bakassi peninsula. The peninsula is a host to different 
kinds of natural and economic resources, such as fish, shrimps, logs, crabs, periwinkles etc. 
Tolorunshagba (2015), Omoigui (2012) and Ibekwe (2012) note that the colonial masters of 
Nigeria and Cameroon also had dispute over the Bakassi area at some point but settled it partially 
since they had opposed interests with the 1913 Anglo-German treaty, and subsequently with the 
1931 Exchanged of Notes between France and Britain. Apparently, the economic resources 
situated along the boundary of Nigeria and Cameroon is a real factor in why the two countries 
ended up in border conflict and the current border delimitation or demarcation exercise. 
According to Abiodun (2014), delimiting the boundaries between Nigeria and Cameroon 
especially in the north is a tough task. There is no doubt that delimiting borders in the Northern 
region which connect Nigeria with Cameroon, Chad and Niger, would present serious challenges, 
especially if one considers that the very region is a large expanse of land and water such as the 
Lake Chad. There is also a long historical record of economic relations, religious, cultural and/or 
marital ties between the Hausa-Fulani in Northern Nigeria, namely Sokoto and Borno, with Chad 
and Niger people. In spite of all the socio-cultural and physical interconnections that border 
communities in Nigeria share with neighbouring countries, the economic and security interests of 
each country weigh heavily on agitation for the demarcation and delimitation of their boundary. 
It was easy for Nigeria to cede 33 villages located in the land area of Lake Chad connecting it to 
Cameroon on the basis of ICJ’s verdict, in the sense that the affected areas are somewhat not 
presently known for harbouring vital mineral resources, otherwise Nigeria would not have totally 
succumbed to the court’s judgment as seen with some other countries of the world. A Senior 
Advocate of Nigeria and Judge who represented Nigeria in the boundary case at The Hague, Bola 
Ajibola dissents undoubtedly the ICJ’s decision considering only legal position on the case against 
Nigeria’s submission based on effectives and historical consolidation (Ajibola, 2012). Generally, 
ICJ’s judgment which ceded Nigerian villages and Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon is a great boost 
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to the Cameroonian economy, even as Cameroon now taxes fishermen and traders in the ceded 
region. 
There is also a situation of economic resources resulting to reinforcement of borderline between 
Nigeria and Benin Republic. The border between both countries, namely Idiroko and Igolo 
respectively, is a source of economic development. This border compares to other borders in the 
southwest of Nigeria linking Benin Republic providing almost equal opportunity for the two 
countries to boost their economies in a sense of cross-border trade. Afolayan (2000) notes that 
Benin has a very limited domestic market, thus she serves as a transit corridor for imported goods, 
and local farm exports from Nigeria. Benin is the major link to Nigeria from her west wing, 
connecting Togo, Ghana and other West African countries along that linear position with Nigeria. 
It holds therefore that the Nigerian and Benin economies are interrelated through trade, with the 
expansion of local communities across the border of the two countries. 
Expanding across the boundary of Nigeria and Benin by the local populace as a result of making 
economic gain in either country is a major reason for defining borderline. Areas such as Ajegunle, 
Ikolaje, Eti-Koto, Itaoba and Sale in Nigeria, have been observed to extend by settlement and road 
links towards Benin. Since the populations of communities mentioned above are mainly farmers 
and traders, their economic interaction has sometimes frustrated economic policies, or complicated 
currency issues of either country. (Afolayan, 2000) remarks that disparities in the economies of 
the two countries (Benin and Nigeria) are essential elements that affect trans-border movement 
and trading. It is also why both countries, particularly Nigeria, are encouraging borderline so as to 
confront external influences on their economies. This is not to suggest that Nigeria does not want 
to open her economy to foreign market, but that she has to put a check to the possibility of flooding 
of her market with foreign goods and currencies. 
4.3.3 Political Control Factor 
The struggle for power, essentially economic and political control in the colonial era was 
responsible for boundary division between the states in today’s Africa. According to Ebuti (2016), 
in earlier centuries when slave trade was the order of the day, accessing economic resources 
through opening up of territories to British control was a big motivation for British conquest of 
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Nigeria. However, when slave trade was abolished in the 1885, the British colonialists started 
adopting political approaches and, where necessary, military force against traditional rulers, 
influencing them to sign treaties on the basis of protection. There is hardly a country that was 
colonized by the Europeans in Africa that had no treaty relating to its territory. In short, treaties or 
political alliances relating to territories and boundaries are now predominant factors causing 
boundary conflict between countries in Africa. 
Treaties signed in relation to Nigeria’s boundary include the Obong of Calabar treaty with Britain 
in 1884 over Bakassi peninsula, Anglo-German Agreement of 1913 regarding the boundary sectors 
between Gamana and Cross River, and between Cross River and the Bight of Biafra, the 1931 
Exchange Note between France and Britain ratifying previous treaties, and the 1961 General 
Assembly Plebiscites of Northern and Southern Cameroons (Tolorunshagba, 2015; Omoigui, 
2012; Baye, 2011 and Ngang, 2007). Where the British did not sign a treaty, they applied force in 
annexing a territory. Examples included the British invasion of Sokoto, Kano and Kanem Borno 
in 1897-1903; the deposition of Kosoko, the slave-trading king of Lagos and installation of 
Akintoye by British Consul, Beecroft in 1849, and the 1861 annexation of Lagos by Britain to gain 
monopoly over trade in the Niger Delta (Ebuti, 2016; Audu et al., 2015; Inyang et al., 2014 and 
Sagay, 2008). 
A careful observation of the enlisted treaties above of how Britain penetrated Nigeria reveals that 
the ideology of treaties ensued immediately after the abolition of slave trade. To exercise total 
control over territories, the colonial masters introduced treaty and borderline mechanism which 
helped them to demarcate their areas of interest with posts or pillars. Apparently, border system 
was created to prevent the encroachment of colonial counterparts on another’s territory. It was 
meant to show colonialist’s presence in a territory and forestall encroachment into already 
occupied territory by others. Rudin (1938) explains that the expression “too late Hewett” depicts 
English late arrival to Cameroon, already occupied by the Germans. In Rubin’s writing, 
Hewett had been busy getting native kings along the coast near Bonny to place their 
crosses on the numerous treaty forms he had with him. Later, on July 19, 1884, he 
discovered that he had come too late, for Kings Bell and Akwa had already made 
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their treaty with Dr. Nachtigal, who had come with the Mowe under instructions 
from Bismarck to establish German rule (Rudin, 1938). 
Several documents on colonialism expose how colonialists were meeting traditional rulers and 
extending hand of protection to them against external influence but ended up occupying lands, 
exploiting or extracting resources and using border post and gunboat to prevent any threat to their 
areas of interest. In the preceding event to German conquest of Cameroon, and the formal 
announcement to the world in October 15, 1885, it was observed that the Germans were bribing 
the chieftains to sell their country against the will of the great majority of natives, who had long 
wanted English control (Rudin, 1938). The emphasis here is that occupation of territoris during 
colonial era was achieved signing of treaties with traditional rulers. Consequently, the treaties now 
constitute stumbling blocks in determining issues in boundary dispute between countries, notably 
Nigeria and her neighbours. 
In respect to Nigeria and Cameroon boundary dispute, the colonialists were discovered to only 
consider the land and water resources as the focal point of their interest more than the people who 
occupied the land when signing agreements. Today, people of same origin are now found across 
different countries’ boundary (Dimico, 2014; Papaioannou et al., 2013 and Asiwaju, 1985). This 
controversial situation is why Nigeria and Cameroon boundary case took many years to resolve, 
while Niger and Benin boundary or island case was just concluded in 2016 since 2002, with ICJ 
declaring that the island of Lété Goungou belongs to Niger. Delays and complex processes in 
boundary case arbitration inform the decision of Nigeria and Cameroon to entertain political 
resolution rather than compulsory jurisdiction, which may not survive argument on traditional 
claims. 
Ikome (2012) reveals that prior to, during and after court sessions by ICJ on the boundary case 
between Nigeria and Cameroon, meetings were organized at The Hague comprising delegates from 
Nigeria, Cameroon and the UN secretary General, Kofi Annan. With their meetings, they sought 
political resolution to the boundary dispute, instead of compulsory jurisdiction. One of their 
meetings in 2011 gave birth to the Greentree Agreement. It was the agreement that mandated the 
delimitation of the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon, relocation of Bakassi people into 
Nigeria as well as the proper settlement of some of them who agreed to remain in Cameroon 
147 
 
(Tolorunshagba, 2015). Also, the agreement provided Cameroon with sovereignty over Bakassi 
peninsula, and Cameroon now has its security forces called Gendarmes providing security at the 
delimited borders in the Bakassi peninsula. 
Currently, security is a big issue that Nigeria and her neighbours are battling with. Ray (2016) and 
Shuaibu et al. (2015a) unearth how Boko Haram insurgency which started in Nigeria became a 
cross-border conflict. The terrorist group now threatens the peace of not just Nigeria, but her 
neighbours and the world at large. As a result of the group’s violent attacks and tactics, such as 
using border communities as war zones and borders as escape routes and access to arms and 
ammunition, Nigeria and her neighbours have revived their Multi-lateral Joint Task Force 
established in the 1990s to enhance their border securities. This is not done without some political 
processes, such as the meeting of all the continent’s presidents in (Chad) to discuss the kind of 
economic or military contribution that needed to be made. 
Politically, Nigeria and Cameroon have forged a synergy that enables free military operations 
around their borders in order to arrest the Boko Haram insurgency. This synergy includes free 
movement of Refugees and IDPs which by the principle of territorial sovereignty it may not have 
been possible. UNHCR (2015) acknowledges the “open door policies” that exist between the 
countries of the Lake Chad region, in order to support the free flow of mixed populations (e.g.  
Refugees, returnees and third country nationals) arriving in the countries. Initially, borderlines 
were encouraged to check movement and maintain security around the porous borders of the 
involved countries. However, now that there is great insecurity around those borders, countries are 
mounting border security posts to protect their territories without barring movement. They also 
encourage camps to be built along their borders as a political measure to immigration crisis. 
The political factor in borderline construction has become more vivid as the Boko Haram terror 
continues to force people out of their natural habitation. Each country is now seen to mount 
surveillance and security posts in their border areas. This action being a response to insurgency, 
that is providing security, has largely aided the protection of territories from external crisis in a 
case of overspill conflict. A typical example of border-post creation relates to Cameroon whose 
military presence was almost absent in the Far North, but now visibly present due to Boko Haram 
attacks. Igidi (2014) observed that cross-border movement is now difficult for Nigerians who 
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spend the night among relatives in Cameroon and next day go to their businesses or farms in 
Nigeria, since the government of Cameroon does not want refugees to stay along borders, and 
therefore positioned gendarmes both in camps and along borders in Minawao, Gadala, Barnake 
etc. 
How tremendous is the political understanding of the Cameroonian government towards Nigeria 
over a period of counter-insurgency against the Boko Haram? Until the Cameroonian government 
joined Nigeria in fighting the Islamic terrorist group, insecurity as regards border communities’ 
attacks in Cameroon was scarce. However, the moment the Cameroonian, Nigerien and Chadian 
governments reached an agreement to support Nigeria in her counter-insurgency efforts, these 
countries started witnessing sudden aggravation of insecurity and attacks on their border villages 
and towns (Oyewole, 2015). However, it was these countries’ experience with Boko Haram attacks 
that caused bracing up of their borders with posts and checkpoints (Comolli, 2015). In essence, 
cross-border security is apparently a new dimension in the relations of the Lake Chad countries. 
4.3.4 Trade and Commerce 
Over a long time, the borders between Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon, connecting Borno, 
Adamawa, Yobe and Sokoto in Northern Nigeria, has been a route for the movement of different 
goods and services, migration of people (slaves), and especially the pastoralists who plied the 
Sahara and Sub-Sahara regions. Prior to colonial era, the core parts of northern Nigeria basically 
served as route for commercial activities to states such as Sokoto, Kano, Katsina, Zaria and Borno 
Empire. When colonial rule became inevitable, the British government led by Lugard in 1903 
gained entrance into the Northern region, conquered first; Kano, Sokoto and then Borno, before 
establishing indirect rule over the regions with appointment of new Emirs and chiefs (Flint, 1989). 
One major reason that the British colonialists conquered the northern region of Nigeria was to 
establish the European capitalist ideas or ethics through trade. 
However, commerce and trade were the gateway that facilitated the contact of the British with the 
northern leaders and its people in Nigeria. Before the arrival of the Europeans in Africa and the 
British colonialist in Nigeria, the Fulbe people who are today referred to as Hausa-Fulani lived 
mainly on livestock and trading business, such as cattle and other animal products. Kerven (1992) 
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reveals that the Fulbe people who are pastoral Fulani depended largely on livestock and operated 
the system of paying cattle tribute to their Emir. According to Kerven (1992), it was this cattle tax 
called jangali that the British government formalized into the colonial taxation system, which 
operated during its rule in Northern Nigeria. 
Historically, one knows that the pastoralists were awesome migrants who travel wide to provide 
care for their animals. Records also show that pastoralists went across territorial boundaries in 
order to trade their commodities. This accounts for why Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, 
which are Sahel and Sub-Sahara countries in Africa are hosts to a number of Fulbe ethnics. The 
Fulbe people were subdivided into three categories in Nigeria before colonial incursion, namely a 
ruling and settled aristocrats, other settled and primarily agricultural Fulbe and the pastoralists 
(Kerven, 1992). That the pastoralists naturally moved from place to place in Africa without much 
hinderance, traded among themselves across nations’ boundaries and settled where they got 
pasture for their cattle, are strong points that colonialists’ presence and establishment of regions 
as protectorates brought about borderline. Bach (1978) notes that Benin was a transit point for 
cattle travelling from Northern Nigeria and Niger to Ghana. 
The borderline between Nigeria and her neighbours was non-existent and invisible until the British 
and French respectively colonized the four neighbor countries. Suffice it to reiterate that British 
determination to put an end to the slave trade in the end prepared the way for the eventual British 
occupation of Nigeria (Inyang et al., 2014). Inyang and Bassey who quoted Orugbani (2005) reveal 
further that the British appointment of Consuls for the Bights of Biafra and Benin was mainly for 
the purpose of regulating trade between British merchants and Old Calabar, Bonny, Bimbia, the 
Cameroons and the parts of the territories of the King of Dahomey. The desperate interest and 
motive of British government in trade is why there was the amalgamation of the Southern and 
Northern protectorates. It is also why diverse ethnic nations were merged, while other ethnics were 
separated along countries boundary. 
Using settlement pattern of border communities and ethnic groups, particularly the Hausa-Fulani 
and Kanuri who reside at the boundary of Nigeria and Niger (having limited or regulated trade 
access to one another today), it should be clear what borderline has done in Africa. Borderline was 
introduced by the colonial masters mainly to gain control over territories, economic activities, 
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trade and commerce. In the excerpt of Refugee Documentation Center Ireland, July 7, 2009, the 
largest ethnic groups in Niger are the Hausa (53%), while the Fulani are (7%). In Nigeria, another 
large ethnic group is Hausa-Fulani, predominantly found in the Northern region and sharing 
boundary with linages in Niger, namely Gaya, Dosso, Maradi. A significant effect of colonial 
boundaries is the alteration or disconnection created in trade relations between the Hausa-Fulani 
in Niger, Chad and Nigeria. 
Let us imagine that there were no border or boundary between Nigeria and her neighbours, trade 
and commerce or economic relations between the countries would be as smooth as it was before 
colonial era, and ultimately free and less heightened by tension and insecurity. To ask why there 
is insecurity such as smuggling, piracy, deportation of people, boundary encroachment etc., it is 
because there is no mutual agreement, trust, confidence, understanding and cooperation between 
the countries involved. Funteh (2015) and Omede (2006) note that Nigeria and Cameroon, as well 
as Nigeria and Benin sometime in the 1960 and 1970’s, were at logger-head due to security issues. 
In the same vein, but for the current insecurity sparked off by Boko Haram in Nigeria, with an 
overspill effect in her neighbouring countries, in terms of cross-border attack, Refugees and IDPs 
challenges, the magnitude of the cooperation now enjoyed between Nigeria and her neighbours 
may not actually have been possible. 
Remarkably, is disheartening that Nigeria and Cameroun have recorded several clashes over their 
boundaries. It is also sad that the reason the two countries have engaged in hostilities is because 
of boundary dispute. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Nigeria and her neighbours now allow 
political, economic and military relations to drive their friendship. Chukwu (2016) remarks that 
Nigeria and her neighbours are now into international cooperation and assistance in order to 
strengthen their borders and constantly check movement of people and materials in the face of 
insurgency. Security demands in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon have finally led the countries 
to set up the Joint Trans Border Security Committee. Nigeria and Cameroon signed the agreements 
leading to the establishment of the committee in 2012 to create a peaceful atmosphere, enhance 
their trade, economic and political relations. 
Without misplacing a point, border security is a significant way by which countries can protect 
their national integrity, economy and increase their local market gains as well as opportunity for 
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growth and development. Moreover, nothing gets into a country without passing through the 
borders. In countries such as Nigeria, Cameroun, Niger and Chad, borderline and/or border posts 
are a basic strategy for controlling illicit trade across border, or rather illegal materials being 
imported into the countries. However, despite mounting border security, there is still an unabated 
challenge in regulating illegal entry and exit, flow of arms and ammunition and other contraband 
products into the countries. GIABA (2013) establishes the fact that illicit small arms and light 
weapons trafficking and proliferation remain prevalent and continue to underpin high levels of 
violence and criminality in West Africa. The need to improve the security of a state is supposed to 
go beyond constructing borderline. 
It is not hard to point out that all the countries of the Lake Chad region are guilty of building 
borderline or checkpoints for the purpose of security alone without minding the effects on trade 
and economy of their nations. Though in the eye of the countries, building border posts are meant 
to curb illicit trade and improve trading and so on; border post construction cannot be the 
appropriate approach to border security. Onuoha (2013) explains that if Nigeria and her neighbours 
had properly administered their borders, the issues of insecurity would have been limited. In his 
analysis, the Nigerian borders are known for limited presence of security and law enforcement 
officials, who most of the time are few in number, poorly trained, work with inadequate and 
obsolete equipment, and sometimes poorly remunerated. Due to the enlisted challenges faced by 
countries and their border security operatives, trade that border is expected to promote has become 
overregulated, restricted and chained. 
4.4 The making and strategic importance of North-Eastern states and borders 
in Nigeria 
There is no region in Nigeria that is not endowed with a natural resource. The North-Eastern States 
in Nigeria are particularly known for arable land for agriculture and animal produce. However, it 
is easy today to identify or associate the North-Eastern states with insurgency, poverty, Refugee 
or IDPs and so on. But the region was once known for trade, commerce, well-founded political 
institutions which announced Nigeria to the world (Aregheore, 2009). In fact, the region has a 
great ovation between 1380-1893 when it overcame attack from neighbouring Arabs and Hausa. 
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It is unfortunate that British aggressive expansion in the 19th century, when northern Nigeria was 
made protectorate, completely altered the northeastern region structure. 
Babalola (2016) establishes that despite the loss of sovereignty in Northern Nigeria as a result of 
British conquest of Sokoto Caliphate, Kano and Borno Empire, the strong political and cultural 
traditions of these societies initially enabled many to accommodate nominal British rule with little 
change in their way of life. But the settlement pattern and strategic importance of most of their 
societies changed drastically after Nigeria’s independence. The Northeastern Nigeria witnessed its 
own change mainly with the region being divided firstly into Gongola State, Bornu, Bauchi in 
1967, and later in 1976, Gongola being split into Adamawa and Taraba, while Yobe and Gombe 
were created out of Borno and Bauchi respectively. This is how the northeastern part of Nigeria 
came into existence with its six states today. 
In relation to the pattern of settlement in Northern Nigeria before independence and even colonial 
era, Solomone (1996) reveals that the region was dominated by the Hausa, but in 1810, however 
the Fulbe-speaking nomadic tribe, popularly called Fulani, invaded the Hausa states, under the 
leadership of Uthman dan Fodio, and established an Islamic central authority under the Sokoto 
Caliphate. Without a fight, Bornu Empire which is now part of the Northeastern Nigeria broke 
away after a few years from the central authority. The point here is that the Fulani invasion of the 
seven Hausa states, namely, Biram, Daura, Kano, Katsina, Gobir, Rano, and Zazzau, as well as the 
later birth of other non-Hausa states depicted the “Bastard Seven” namely, Zamfara, Kebbi, Yauri, 
Gwari, Kwararafa, Nupe, Ilorin, and introduced a drastic change in the lifestyle and settlement 
pattern of the Hausa and the Fulani people. 
It is well-known that nomadic Fulani have transhumance lifestyle with seasonal movement in 
search of water. There are also some of them who are sedentary. This is because the Fulani 
settlement is classified into two types, namely dry-season and wet-season camps. The former camp 
is usually patronized in November to March when cattle are carried around in search of pasture 
and water. To a great extent, this pattern of settlement started to change after the infamous jihad. 
Sampson (2014) pinpointed that surrender to Dan Fodio’s jihad and the subsequent establishment 
of the Islamic Caliphate changed the complexion of state–religion relations in Hausa communities. 
Since the Fulani were largely pastoralists, Sampson establishes that 
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Town Fulani (Fulbe Sirre) never lost touch with their Cattle Fulani relatives, but 
they settled as clerics, teachers, settlers, and judges—and in many other ways 
filled elite positions within the Hausa states, adopted the Hausa language, with 
many forgetting their own Fulfulde language. And their adoption of Islam 
increased the Fulanis' feeling of cultural and religious superiority to surrounding 
peoples (Sampson, 2014). 
A glaring change in the composition of northeastern states and communities is seen in its religion 
or religious perception and ethnic affiliation. There is presently serious ethnic identity diffusion 
among the Hausa, the Fulani and Kanuri, such as was not in the 19th century. It does not come easy 
to identify who is Hausa or Fulani, just as one would do with the Yoruba and Ibo ethnics in Nigeria. 
The complexity of the Hausa and Fulani identity is why Northern Nigerian people are better 
referred to today as Hausa-Fulani. In terms of religion, the majority of Hausa-Fulani are Muslims, 
credit to Usman Dan Fodio Jihad against Hausa rulers who were practicing paganism. In the 
description of Chafe (1990), paganism could be referred on the basis of Jihad response to social 
and economic problems or endless war among Hausa states, compulsory military exercises, 
oppressive taxes and levies, arbitrary seizures of property and unpredictable behaviour of the 
sarauta (titled) class. 
The success that was recorded with the Jihad War explains why Northern Nigerian communities, 
structure or composition revolve largely around Islamic religion, socio-cultural practices and law. 
There is a wide practice of Sharia Law or Sharia Penal Code in the Northern region of Nigeria. 
The Penal Code Law was enacted in 1959 and amended in 1963. According to Human Right Watch 
(2004) Sharia is seen by many Muslims as an entire system of guidelines and rules which 
encompass criminal law, personal status law, and many other aspects of religious, cultural, and 
social life. The importance attached to Sharia Laws came openly in 2000, shortly after 1999 return 
to democracy in Nigeria, when Northern States adopted and began to apply Islamic law even to 
criminal matters. Peters (2005) reveals that Zamfara state was the first to adopt Sharia Law, on 27 
January 2000, while Niger followed suit in May. Currently, there are twelve states that have 
adopted Sharia Law in the North, by setting up courts. They include Zamfara, Niger, Katsina, 
Sokoto, Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Kaduna, Yobe, Borno, Jigawa and Kebbi. 
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With a shared interest in religion, culture or politics, it can be said that what differentiates northern 
states from each other is just the region. This is because the northern states of Nigeria, mainly the 
Northwest and Northeast tend to key into same ideologies, even as they have a shared 
chronological relation in trade, commerce, marriage, politics, religion and so on. They also 
happened to have similar experiences all time-round as regards ethno-religious and political 
conflict, health challenges and education issue. The Boko Haram insurgency that has destroyed 
the fabric of the Northeastern states in terms of security, economy, education, peace stability, 
human and infrastructure development, has also had its toll on Northwestern and North central 
states. IFRA-Nigeria (2014) records how the first quarter of 2014 witnessed an upsurge in terrorist 
attacks with the bombings that took place in Abuja, the capitol of Nigeria, leaving over a hundred 
dead and many others injured. 
It is very easy today to identify North-Eastern region with conflict or insurgency. And of all the 
regions in Nigeria, it is the most hit by Boko Haram who has made its communities theaters of 
asymmetric war and established its Caliphate. It was for the insurgent group’s heinous attacks and 
violence that Federal government of Nigeria declared a State of Emergency on May 14, 2013, in 
Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, where communities have suffered great insecurity (Olufemi and Layi, 
2014 and Udo, 2013). Apart from viewing the North-Eastern region on the basis of insurgency, 
the entire Northern states of Nigeria have history associating them with ethno-religious and 
political conflict. Only that the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-Eastern region has dominated 
the socio-academic spheres of conflict in Nigeria, owing to its intensity and consequences. 
Sule (2015) unveils that since the early 1980s, ethnic and religious crises have become a re-
occurring decimal, especially in northern Nigeria. He identifies the following as conflicts that were 
encountered before the emergence of Boko Haram, namely Maitatsine crises in Kano, 1980, Zuru 
1980, Maiduguri 1982, Yola 1984, Ilorin 1984, Bauchi 1984 and Kano 1984. Others are the crises 
in Kafanchan 1987, Gure Kahugu 1987, Birnin Kebbi 1990, Katsina 1991, Tafawa Balewa 1991, 
Kano 1991, Jalingo 1992, Kaduna Polytechnic 1992, Kasuwar Magani (Kaduna) 1994, Kaduna 
2000, Jos 2001, Kano 2001, Tafawa Balewa (since 2000) and Nasarawa 2001, Jos 2004, 2008 and 
2010. There have also been the Chamba-Kuteb crises in Taraba State 2013, Tiv-Jukun crisis 2013, 
Bassa- Igbira crisis in Toto 2012 and a host of others. 
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The negative impact of conflict in Northern Nigeria (particularly North-East and North-West) is 
obviously a spatial factor for the region’s poor rating on Human Development Index in May 2016. 
Though the region has for long been confronted with natural and man-made disasters, such as 
drought, dissertation, deforestation and uncontrolled diseases resulting in poverty, famine and 
malnutrition etc. Vittozzi (2017) stated that UNICEF projected that 400,000 children in North-
East Nigeria would suffer acute malnutrition in 2017, and without treatment, approximately one 
in five of those children – more than 75,000 – was likely to die. It is also on record that UNICEF 
attended to 160,000 children who are victims of severe malnutrition in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa 
states in 2016. Recent reports of natural and man-made disaster in North-Eastern Nigeria are 
alarming and thus impacting negatively on the image of the region (Vittozzi, 2017). 
Against the endemic maladies that Northeastern region of Nigeria is suffering from presently, the 
region is well-known for cattle rearing and agricultural produce.  In effect, the region boasts 
produces contributing enormously to Nigeria’s economy, such as cattle, cowpea, hides and skin, 
wheat, sorghum, maize, millet, groundnut, cotton, sugarcane, beans, rice, yam, fish, and vegetables 
(e.g tomato and pepper) (Ibrahim et al., 2014; Aregheore, 2009 and Blench, 1997). Nonetheless, 
the natural resources in the northeast include, iron ore, tin and columbite, limestone and other 
related ceramic materials etc. There is no doubt that the Northeastern region is a strategic location 
in Nigeria. This is because its economic resources if well harnessed would aid Nigeria’s 
development greatly especially in agriculture. 
Going by the analysis of Nairametrics on Internally Generated Revenue (IGR), the North-Eastern 
states could only generate 26 billion naira for Nigeria in 2015. If one compared the region’s IGR 
with the other regions in Nigeria, the Northeastern generated the least IGR in 2015, whereas South-
West generated the highest which is (339bn), followed by South-South (179bn), South-East 
(62bn), North-West (48bn) and North Central (38bn). There is no reason to wonder why the North-
Eastern region generated the lowest revenue because insecurity has continued to slow its 
production rate. ACAPS (2016), Emmanuelar (2015) and Awodola (2015) reveal that the North-
Eastern states especially Borno, Yobe and Adamawa are currently suffering from acute food 
shortage among other security threats to human and society life. Unless concerted effort is made 
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through peace building and other conflict resolution mechanisms, it would be hard to end the 
insecurity in North-Eastern Nigeria. 
It is worthy of mention that the insecurity situation experienced in the border communities of 
North-Eastern Nigeria is a major cross-border or international crisis for Nigeria. This is because 
the border communities in the North-Eastern region, being troubled by Boko Haram are closely 
bounded by three countries which explain the strategic importance of the region. The North-East 
zone plays an integral role in the national security of Nigeria (Nyako, 2015). Nyako specifically 
stresses that North-Eastern Nigeria has a profound implication for Nigeria’s security strategies 
ranging from immigration policy, custom policy, labour law etc. It was for this reason that Nigeria 
did not hesitate to enter into border security agreement with her neighbours, as Boko Haram turned 
the border communities into war zones and escaping into other countries after attacks. 
The intensity and trend of Boko Haram insurgency which have caused overspill conflict for 
Cameroon, Niger and Chad are strong evidences in saying that the communities that linked Nigeria 
with the three countries are very important for Nigeria’s security. Tull (2015) observes that prior 
to 2013, Cameroon seemed less affected by Boko Haram insurgency and was a safe haven where 
the authorities tolerated the group in the context of an unspoken mutual non-aggression pact. 
Nevertheless, the attitude and approach of Cameroon changed toward Boko Haram as the group 
began to use its border communities with Nigeria as transit routes, recruitment centers, for 
trafficking arms and ammunition, and launching attacks. 
The following are some towns or villages in Northern Cameroon bordering Nigeria that Boko 
Haram have launched attacks: Bodo, Kouyape, Nguetechewe (Luccino, 2016). Meanwhile, the 
following places have also been identified as either network, cell, recruitment or transit zones of 
Boko Haram in Cameroon: Fotokol, Maroua, Amchidé, Kerawa and Ashigashia, Kerawa and 
Ganse, Zlevet, Kolofata, Kousseri, Amchidé. Other areas, such as Mayo Tsanaga, Diamare, 
Mandara have been identified for fuel and food supply or safe haven for Boko Haram. Apart from 
Cameroon and Nigeria, Chad experienced its first attack from Boko Haram in 2015 when the 
terrorist group attacked Ngouboua, while Niger has mainly suffered Boko Haram attacks in its 
Southern region particularly in Differ on the Nigerian border. Generally, after Nigeria, Cameroon 
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is the country with the highest intensity of the terrorist group’s operation, thereby informing of the 
security importance of the border communities connecting Nigeria to Cameroon. 
The International Crisis Group (2016) reveals that the Far North is the poorest of Cameroon’s 
regions and has the lowest school enrolment rate with the presence of smugglers, proliferation of 
highway robbers, traffickers and petty criminals. In effect, the insecurity suffered in Far North 
Cameroon which is a border area with Nigeria is similar to that in Northeastern Nigeria. Scholars 
such as Shuaibu (2015) and Adenrele (2012) have identified overspread poverty in Northern 
Nigeria as a root cause of Boko Haram Insurgency. It is unfortunate that Boko Haram had to take 
advantage of the social crises which include poverty in the Northeastern Nigeria as well as Far 
North Cameroon in its campaigning. The International Crisis Group notes that Cameroon was non-
reactive even though the jihadist group’s presence was in the country in 2011, benefited from a 
network of local collaborators and exploited the vulnerabilities that the region shares with north-
eastern Nigeria. 
Considering the fate that Nigeria and her neighbours have suffered in the hand of Boko Haram, 
each of the country is now seen working hard to improve their border security, check movement 
and proliferation of arms, banditry, trafficking, smuggling and Refugee or IDP flow. Nforngwa 
(2014) notes that Cameroon in her security effort has made Rapid Response Battalion (BIR) which 
was initially created to fight highway robbery and piracy to take up border security. On the part of 
Nigeria, the Nigerian military and other security bodies, such as Civilian military or vigilante have 
done well restricting Boko Haram to a designated area (i.e Sambisa forest from where the terrorist 
group is mainly operating). The Nigerian military should be commended for measuring up to the 
tactics of the Boko Haram that is overly unconventional. 
The Boko Haram terrorist’s unconventional tactic was noticed in the group’s targeting religious, 
academic and political institutions; public infrastructure such as schools, churches, markets, 
mosques, police stations, military posts and UN building, etc. Today, its attacks are soft targets 
against civilian or military persons in open places, and the attacks usually involved a suicide 
bomber using IEDs to blow self-amidst a gathering of people in open space. Falode (2016) explains 
that unconventional warfare is the use of ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide-
bombings, sexual assaults as well as targeted assassinations. Considering these unconventional 
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tactics, the spate at which they were experienced before now, is a reason why the Nigeria military 
needs to be commended on its security effort particularly in the Northeast. 
To this end, the evolution of North-Eastern states, their strategic importance to Nigeria and 
neighbouring countries can be summed up in the close relationship that all countries’ border 
communities share in agriculture, trade, commerce, religion, culture and ethnicity etc. Factually, 
border communities are very important areas for any country’s security, sovereignty and integrity. 
Countries that have encountered cross-border conflict such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger 
can attest to this, or rather those that have boundary dispute where the boundary is host to natural 
resources. To note, a major reason that Nigeria and its neighbours have encouraged the 
delimitation of their boundary is to define their territorial sovereignty, integrity or defend their 
territories against external control and insecurity. Upholding the integrity and security of Nigeria 
is why the North-Eastern Nigeria, particularly the border communities are very strategic and 
important. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion Nigeria came into existence as a nation-state with its borders cutting across already 
established communities, cultures and clans therefore disrupting the established activities that 
constantly along such spaces of which trading and free movement are not the least. By virtue of 
being borders, these spaces thus became restrictive in activities and movement thereby attracting 
undue attention which was hitherto inexistent. On the other divide, these borders have posed some 
challenges to the Nigerian government. Firstly, for a long time, these spaces have caused rancor 
between Nigeria and her neigbours. For example, Nigeria and Cameroun had a border dispute on 
the Bakassi Penninsula which escalated to the level of the ICJ which ruled in the favour of 
Cameroun, thereby legitimizing Cameroun’s claim to the Pennisula. Nigeria accepted the verdict 
but is not pleased with it. Again, while these borders are meant to be safeguarded and properly 
managed by the Nigerian government, they remain porous and unsafe a region where cross-border 
criminalities take place unchecked. Nigeria’s borders in the North-Eastern are heightened tension 
leading to insecurity within the region and across the nation. Instead of these borders serving their 
purpose as a controlled corridor, they facilitate criminal activities, such as smuggling, armed 
robbery, trafficking and above all constitute a fertile ground for cross-border insurgency to thrive. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 CROSS-BORDER INSURGENCY IN NORTH-EASTERN 
NIGERIA 2003 - 2019 
5.0 Introduction 
Drawing on available literature and statistics, and data gathered from the study area, Chapter five 
lays a foundation and as well gives an insight into the socio-political cum economic factors 
prevalent in the North-Eastern Nigeria making it easy for the Boko Haram sect to evolve. It equally 
provides a discussion of emergence of Boko Haram, its mission and the nefarious activities carried 
out so far by its members in the region between 2003 and 2019. This chapter also deals with diverse 
patterns in which the Boko Haram activities manifest in the study area and likewise the sect’s 
modus operandi deployed in carry out such dastardly attacks.  The chapter goes further to critically 
examine the grievous impacts of the activities of the terror group on the local population and the 
region in general. Consequently, the various counter effort and progress made by the Nigerian 
government targeted at tackling the Boko Haram menace is reviewed bringing to the fore its 
successes and failures. However, the constant attacks and impact on the population and the region 
depicts that the efforts are far from ending the Boko Haram surge within the region. The factors 
responsible for this, discussed extensively in the chapter, are not far-fetched.  
5.1 The evolution of Boko Haram in the North-Eastern region 
In Nigeria, it has been observed across all regions that crises are bound to happen/ imminent based 
on the prevalent situations which naturally lead to upheavals. This manifestation has been 
witnessed across various regions of the country in different magnitude based on the nature of the 
crisis and the actors involved.  Salaam (2012) identifies such factors to include “poverty and social 
injustice; illiteracy and the educational disparities between the northern and southern regions; 
ingrained cultures of corruption; the lack of professional law enforcement capacity; the availability 
of illegal weapons; the intelligence failure or inability of the security network to prevent and end 
conflicts; the sublime structure of the Nigerian government, especially in leadership posting and 
resource distribution; and the porous borders and socio-economic ties across borders.”  
160 
 
Since return to civil rule in 1999 till date, a number of Islamic groups both (liberal and extremists) 
had sprang whose demands has led to conflict and violence in the Northern region most 
importantly the North-Eastern Nigeria thus having serious security implications on the geo-
political zone and Nigeria at large. Two major occurrences have shaped the security situation of 
the North-Eastern Nigeria. They are the Sharia Crisis which eventually led to the ongoing Boko 
Haram crisis. It is therefore important to trace the evolution of these phenomena.  
The transition to civilian rule in 1999 was greeted with annoyance by some northerners. While 
some saw it as a threat to their authority, others perceived it as an opportunity for cultural and 
religious renewal (Agbiboa, 2013a). Such perception came through as a result of the loss of power 
by the north to a Christian southerner which was considered as a political setback which called for 
moral and religious resuscitation. It was in the light of this and quest for religious purity that the 
Zamfara state governor, Ahmed Yerima, embarked on a restoration campaign of the Sharia Law 
in 1999. And to him anyone who governs a society without the Islamic law (Sharia) is an infidel 
(Agbiboa, 2013a).  
This initiative in no time became popular across states in the North as Muslims massively 
supported the move (Last, 2000).  The clerics were equally not left out as they saw it as a rare 
opportunity for a restoration of the religious and moral custom squashed after colonial subjugation 
(International Crisis Group, 2010). The common people gave their support because they saw 
Sharia as a tool for liberation from the hand of the corrupt politicians by creating a safe, just, safe, 
and compassionate society devoid of corrupt practices (International Crisis Group, 2010). The 
political class equally gave their support because they saw Sharia as an alternative means of 
mounting pressure on federal government particularly, the President, having lost hold of the 
national government. The Sultan of Sokoto Muhammadu Maccido initially did not give his support 
but had to give in as a result of the position he occupied (Shekarau, 2004). The lead taken by the 
Zamfara Government in the implementation of Sharia Law attracted other state governors to follow 
suit though with varying levels of commitment (Shekarau, 2004) all targeted at reinforcing the 
movement of restoration championed by Usman dan Fodio’s Sokoto Caliphate two centuries back 
(Ekot, 2009).  
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This wave of Sharia across the north stirred the federal government in denouncing Sharia Law on 
the basis of its incompatibility with the freedom of religion embedded in the Nigeria constitution 
(Kendhammer, 2013). This met a sharp resistance by the northern governors who argued and 
quoted the section of the constitution which vested on the states the concurrent powers to establish 
their own court systems (Kendhammer, 2013). President Obasanjo, in response avoided a 
confrontation so as not to ignite religious sentiments and merely admonished pro-Sharia states to 
exercise some sense of control in the application of Sharia law (Kendhammer, 2013). This caution 
was not heeded as some states went ahead in fully implementing Sharia. An example to point out 
was the sentencing of Amina Lawal to death by stoning for adultery in 2002 (Ibrahim and Lyman, 
2004) which was later overturned by the Sharia Court of Appeal.14  
The implementation of Sharia did not go down well with non-Muslims and this further strained 
the already weak relationship between Christians and Muslims, because, in several areas, the 
minority Christian populations believed Sharia infringed on their fundamental rights and as such 
will restrict their actions for instance playing and listening to music publicly as well as public 
alcohol consumption and that there is every possibility they will be subjected to such laws. All of 
these resulted in uprisings in Kaduna and Kano in 2000. The protest in Kaduna State was intense 
as half of the total population is Christian. The clashes resulted in over 2,000 deaths (Ekot 2009).  
In 2000, former Governor of Borno state, Mala Kachallah through the Borno state Sharia 
Administration of Justice Law introduced Sharia laws in the state. In executing this, the Governor 
instituted an Implementation Committee in February 2001 under the chairmanship of Professor 
Abubakar Mustapha the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Maiduguri while the late 
Mohammed Yusuf was a member (Ali Modu, 2014). As it started off, amputations and flogging 
were used as punishment for offenders, (World Report, 2011).  
As the tenure of the incumbent was running out, the leadership of the Boko Haram sect saw in 
view the opportunity to unseat a government that was not ready to support their cause which is full 
implementation of Sharia law by pitching it tent with Senator Ali Modu Sheriff a strong opposition 
and aspirant to thwart the second-term aspiration of the sitting governor, so that Ali Modu Sheriff 
 
14 see https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/26/world/facing-death-for-adultery-nigerian-woman-is-acquitted.html 
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could be the governor come 2003. The sect decided to support the candidature of Senator because 
he had promised to implement Sharia in full which is a promise the incumbent did not keep. Ali 
Modu Sheriff also decided to join forces with the sect because of the numeric strength of its 
membership majorly composed of youths which will aid in achieving his governorship ambitions 
and he will in turn implement a stiff Sharia law when he assumed political power (Smith, 2015). 
Unfortunately, upon assumption of office, Ali Modu Sheriff reneged on his promise of 
implementing the Sharia law in its entirety and this strained the relationship between Yusuf and 
the governor [International Crisis Group, 2014].  Again, Sheriff was said to dump a local gang 
called ‘ECOMOG’, which he allegedly utilized as thugs during campaigns and election. He then 
decided to join Yusuf thus, boosting Boko Haram’s membership base and giving it a stronger voice 
to articulate vigorously its stance against the failure of Sheriff to implement the Sharia Law (Smith, 
2015). 
5.1.1 Structure and composition of Boko Haram 
Boko Haram is a sect that is philosophically rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam. Orthodox 
Islam to them detest Western education and working in the civil service (Onuoha, 2010). This 
clearly explains why the group is widely known as the Boko Haram, which literally means 
‘Western education is a sin’ (Boyle, 2009). Howbeit, this notion was allegedly rejected by the 
acting leader of Boko Haram, Mallam Sanni Umaru in one of his statements:  
Boko Haram does not in any way mean ‘Western education is a sin’ as the infidel 
media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means ‘Western Civilisation’ 
is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are 
opposed to formal education coming from the West … which is not true, the second 
affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture 
is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western education 
(Vanguard, 2009).  
However, the mission and philosophical stance of the group is clearly spelt out in one of the 
statements of the sect captured below: 
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We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out Jihad (religious 
war) in Nigeria and our struggle is based on the traditions of the holy prophet. We 
will never accept any system of government apart from the one stipulated by Islam 
because that is the only way that the Muslims can be liberated. We do not believe 
in any system of government, be it traditional or orthodox, except the Islamic system 
which is why we will keep on fighting against democracy, capitalism, socialism and 
whatever. We will not allow the Nigerian Constitution to replace the laws that have 
been enshrined in the Holy Qur’an, we will not allow adulterated conventional 
education (Boko) to replace Islamic teachings. We will not respect the Nigerian 
government because it is illegal. We will continue to fight its military and the police 
because they are not protecting Islam. We do not believe in the Nigerian judicial 
system and we will fight anyone who assists the government in perpetrating 
illegalities (Boko Haram statement Leadership 2011). 
From the above statement the sect’s ideological mission is quite conspicuous, as it is to overthrow 
the Nigerian state and then compel and enforce stringent Islamic Sharia law across all regions of 
the country. A member of the group pointed that the group’s mission was to ‘clean the Nigerian 
system which is soiled by Western education and maintain Sharia all over the country (Hazzad, 
2009). Their motivation is stirred up from the conviction that the Nigerian state is being taken over 
by social vices, and so ‘the best thing for a devout Muslim to do was to “migrate” from the morally 
bankrupt society to a secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society devoid of political 
corruption and moral deprivation’ (Akanji, 2009). Those who do not believe in this course were 
therefore tagged kuffar i.e. disbelievers; those who go against the truth] or fasiqun i.e. wrong-doers 
(DCCN, 2009). The sect has a unique mode of dressing. They typically wear turbans, full beards 
and live in communities (Onuoha, 2010).  
The precise date of the emergence of the Boko Haram sect has raised a lot of controversy. Howbeit, 
based on the assertion of the Nigerian Director of Defence Information, Colonel Mohammed 
Yerima, the sect has been in existence since 1995, under the nomenclature of Ahlulsunna 
wal’jama’ah hijra (Taiwo and Olugbode, 2009). According to Temilola (2013), Boko Haram 
known as the Jamatu Ahlis Sunna Lidda was formed in 1995 in Northern Nigeria, purposely for 
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the propagation of the prophet doctrines and teachings. It was initially led by Abubakah Lawan, 
who later departed Nigeria for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia handing 
over to Mohammed Yusuf as the leader. Onuoha (2010) averred that the sect has subsequently 
metamorphosed under different names such as the “Nigerian Taliban, Yusufiyyah sect, and Boko 
Haram”. He noted that the name ‘Nigerian Taliban’ is used derogatorily by the local people to 
condemn the philosophy and teachings of the sect. Though the sect is structured along the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, it had no link or dealings with them (Onuoha, 2010). Adesoji, (2010); Cline, 
(2011); Onuoha, (2010); Waldek & Jayaseka, (2011) all asserted that Boko Haram was formed in 
2002 by a radical Islamic Ustaz named Mohammad Yusuf in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. 
Mohammed Yusuf, born on the 29th of January 1970, in the village of Girgir in Jalasko local 
government of Yobe State, founded Boko Haram in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the sole 
aim of establishing sharia government in Borno State under then-Senator Ali Modu Sheriff 
(Adesoji 2010). 
According to Onuoha (2010), he developed his radical ideological stance from the Quran schools 
he attended in Niger and Chad after he dropped out from secondary school. Yusuf’s radical stance 
generated discord among other moderate Islamic scholars like the late Jafa Adam, Yahaya Jingir, 
Sheik Abba Aji and himself as he was seen as an extremist. His association with the sect equally 
caused friction in his home as one of his wives revealed that they always quarreled with him for 
associating himself with the Yusufiyyah i.e. Boko Haram. Suffice it to note that earlier 
organizations with similar ideologies as had sprang up years before the emergence of Boko Haram. 
One example of such terrorist organizations is the Maitatsine Movement in Kano. 
5.1.2 Maitatsine Movement in Kano 
In the 1980s, there was a movement with similar ideology to that of Boko Haram which caused a 
lot of upheaval and death toll in the north. This movement came into being as a result of the same 
prevalent situation which heralded Boko Haram as a group. This movement called Maitatsine was 
led by Mohammed Marwa, a Cameroonian living in Kano. He exploited the dwindling economic 
situation in northern Nigerian at the time to incite and kick start an insurgency in the 1970–80s. 
The group carried out its maiden attacks in Kano in December 1980 where Marwa was killed. This 
aggravated the crisis and made it spread further into Bulumkutu, a few kilometres away from 
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Maiduguri in October 1982, to Rigasa village and Kaduna city in Yola in March 1984 and into 
Gombe in April 1985 where it stopped, leading to a death toll of around 10,000 (Isichei, 1987). 
Marwa’s major sermon was premised on purifying northern Nigeria off the corrupt ruling elites 
for the economy to be improved. This made it easy for him to recruit members who are majorly 
poor as they were readily convinced towards his course. This explains why he had mass followers 
because the people were tired of the tough situation despite the oil boom witnessed in the country 
and as such yarned for economic emancipation and justice, just like those in Fodio’s era. This 
stance was reiterated by the federal government’s commission of inquiry set up to investigate the 
Maitatsine uprising and disturbances in Kano. It averred that unemployment and economic distress 
among other factors are responsible for the emergence of the Maitatsine insurgency (Lubeck, 
1985). 
5.2 Patterns of Cross-Border Insurgency in the selected border communities in 
North-Eastern Nigeria  
Boko Haram insurgency has manifested in different forms across the North-Eastern Nigeria. As 
studies have shown, border communities are the first recipient of these dastardly acts carried out 
by the devilish sect. Salkida (2012) points out that communities attacked in the region are mostly 
border communities where life has been horrible, brutish and short-lived.  Most of the attacks 
carried out by the sect are done across the borders of the country and that is why border 
communities suffers the most. All the respondents alluded to the fact that their communities have 
suffered a lot of attacks from the sect. They equally expressed their worries and fears of imminent 
attacks on their communities. Some of the respondents went ahead to mention in concrete terms 
the number of times such attacks have being carried out and as well counting their numerous losses 
in the process (Field trip November 2017). As indicated above, the manifestation of the Boko 
Haram attacks shows up in different form in the border communities.  
In Michika and Mubi border communities of Adamawa State, the local population revealed the 
diverse ways in which Boko Haram attack manifest. These vary from suddenly shooting 
sporadically which make the people scatter all over the community, destruction of banks, police 
station and market places and burning of houses in the communities. According to AM-6 (January 
2018):  
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Boko Haram attack our community by shooting guns here and there. It just 
happened when some were in church and some in the market. They just started 
hearing gun shots and everybody started running helter-skelter. It happened one 
faithful Sunday, I can't remember the date. Before that day people were in fear and 
have the feelings that something like that may happen. The fear was there even 
before the attack. 
 AMB-1 (November 2017) also said that          
They attacked on Wednesday, when they entered the market, they started shooting 
and by then they already attacked the Army Barracks and have captured it after 
this, the soldiers ran away and the insurgents came with their armored tanks and 
other weapons with which they bombed the police station and the prison, at this 
point every one ran out of town and no one was left. 
FGD-AMBW (November 2017) showed that the first time Boko Haram came into Mubi 
community, they started with shootings everywhere which led to a stampede of both the local 
residents and the soldiers themselves. Although they did not kill people yet at that time as they 
fired bullets into the air, they proceeded to the Military Barracks, and it was at this point that both 
the civilians and the soldiers (Military) had to take to their heels as the Joint Task Force (JTF) 
were not given the go ahead to fight back, they therefore decided to run away with us. The women 
noted that they were all hiding in the nearby bushes until members of the sect left the community. 
They noted further that they do not mind allowing the insurgents take away their belongings as 
their life is more important to them.  
In the experience of AMB-4, Boko Haram attacks started manifesting with the killing of a few 
individuals in the community, and it was at this point that people became afraid and suspicious. 
Soon, they got information that the sect has started attacking communities in Borno State leading 
to the death of many including the inhabitants of those communities and members of the JTF. It 
was at this point the local population became apprehensive and finally the attack got to Mubi 
community. In the view of AMB-5, the Boko Haram did not come into the community as a group. 
They only enter like normal people before they start to shoot from different angles of the 
167 
 
community killing innocent inhabitants and burning down houses and churches. Many other 
respondents in the community attested to this point as well (AMB-6, FGD-AMBY, FGD-AMBV, 
November 2017). 
The manifestation of the Boko Haram attacks in Gamboru-Ngala and Baga communities in Borno 
State is not in any way different. FGD-BGM pointed that when members of the sect came into the 
village, “they drove us out and started burning things in the village killing our women and 
children.” BG-1 added by saying that the community was not only attacked by the Boko Haram 
but that they carted away their food stuffs and farm produce that they met in different houses. 
FGD-BGY and FGD-BGC pointed out that members of the sect come into their village, chase out 
people, kill a lot of people and burnt down houses. They pointed the researcher’s attention to some 
buildings burnt down by Boko Haram during their attacks. It is such a horrible sight as some of 
them put up small huts for them to sleep in. In Baga community, BB-4 gave a comprehensive view 
on the manifestation of Boko Haram’s attacks in the community. He classified such to be full of 
chaos, pandemonium and wanton destruction of lives and properties. FGD-BBW averred that 
during attacks, “members of Boko Haram set many places in the community on fire even after they 
convinced us that they will not harm us but they later start to destroy places”. Members of the Civil 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) did not say less as they were of the view that Boko Haram members upon 
arrival in the community start to shoot at anybody they see be it the old, children, men and women 
while in the process those that can run, ran for safety while those that cannot were caught and shut 
immediately (FGD-BBC November 2017).  
The same pattern is what is witnessed in Yunusari and Kanamma communities of Yobe state. YY-
1, FGD-YYM, FGD-YYW, FGD-YYY, FGD-YYV, YK-1, YK-2, FGD-YKM, FGD-YKY, FGD-
YKW, FGD-YKV (November 2017) alluded to the fact that Boko Haram’s attacks came with 
sudden sporadic gun shots leading to pandemonium all over the community. And at the end of 
such attacks many life and properties are always lost.  
5.2.1 Modus Operandi of the Boko Haram during their attacks 
Boko Haram deploys different tactics in carry out attacks. This has been found out from the various 
attacks they have carried out across the North-Eastern region of Nigeria. These tactics vary based 
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on the way the sect have evolved over the years. When Boko Haram kick started their attacks in 
2009, they used light weapons like machetes, sticks, bow and arrows but as they got wider support 
and strong capital base, all these were speedily replaced with sophisticated weapons, arms and 
bombs. According to the (Economist, 2011; Kira, 2011; Freeman, 2012), after much training 
gotten from affiliated terrorist groups, the Boko Haram switched from the use of ‘knives, 
machetes, bows and arrows and petrol bombs’ to the use of ‘suicide car bombings, improvised 
explosive devices used with such dramatic effect in Afghanistan and Iraq and synchronised 
assaults like those witnessed in Mumbai in November 2008’. This tactic greatly contributed to the 
casualties the sect suffered in the different open confrontations they had with the Nigerian Army 
after the sect declared a war on the Nigerian state (Aliyu, et’al, 2015).  
Information gotten from the local population attests to the above stated. In Michika and Mubi 
communities, the local population explained the different tactics utilized by the Boko Haram based 
on the different attacks they have experienced. The experiences given shows that they have been 
attacked both in the day and in the night. AM-1 recalled one of the attacks experienced on the 9th 
of September 2014, between 9am to 10am.  He termed it an hour of sorrow as members of the sect 
came into the community with many cars (Hilux) and motorcycle and were shooting sporadically. 
They killed many residents of the community. FGD-AMW gave the same view. They averred that 
they see members of the Boko Haram come in with cars (Hilux) and motorcycles en-mass while 
some of them who are already within the community join them in the attack. The religious based 
organizations such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and JAMA’ATUL NASRIL 
ISLAM both said that members of the sect entered the village at night while others lay ambush in 
surrounding bushes for villages who want to run. FGD-AMY gave a different dimension. 
According to them: 
The Boko Haram came into our village to live with us so that they can be able to 
spy the activities of the village, they spy from places even on the mountain tops. 
And they also made use of our own people and got series of information from them. 
They even paid some of the people to buy their interest. They were also putting on 
soldiers’ uniform and they got the people very confused. 
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FGD-AMM, FGD-AMV equally alluded to this fact by saying that Boko Haram send spies to 
check on their activities within the community. They noted that, they employ different methods in 
carrying out their attacks. Firstly, they target all forms of security that may want to repel their 
attacks before they start to burn houses and kill innocent people.  
According to the AMB-1 (November 2017): 
A few members of the Boko-Haram came into the community and lived among us 
until when they felt they can attack us. They started by shooting and this made all 
the community members run away. This was the tactic they used in entering the 
community before they started to destroy a lot of things. They went to the Emirs 
Palace, destroyed it and took away his properties, they also entered the ‘Hakimi’s’ 
house where they met his son and they killed him. In the process, they looted and 
as well destroyed a lot of properties worth over N10billion. They equally burnt 
churches, Mosques, entered peoples’ houses and took away their animals and their 
belongings. 
Also, FGD-AMBW explained how Boko Haram has being carrying out its activities in their 
community. They pointed that the sect started by coming into their community to kidnap 
individuals. While some were kidnaped in their different offices some were kidnaped during events 
and later found to have been slaughtered and dumped somewhere in the community. Others were 
never found dead or alive. They further said that 
As time went on, we began to hear that Boko-Haram were in Madagali and Gulak, 
which means that they were getting close. Because of this news, many left the 
community under insinuation that Boko Haram will soon get to the community but 
fortunately, they did not show up and this made the local population return to the 
community. Shortly after our return, Boko Haram came on a Wednesday and 
attacked us unawares. With this they were able to capture Mubi (FGD-AMBV 
November 2017).  
On the other hand, AMB-4 explained how crafty the sect is in terms of how they operate. They 
discovered that Boko haram came in and lived with them without people knowing it. They lived 
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like normal people to the extent that they did business with them until they were able to mingle 
with the local population and the community itself such that they knew the nooks and crannies of 
Mubi, and before they knew it they were familiar with the whole community thus making it easy 
for them to attack the community. This conforms with what AMB-5 said. He said that members 
of the Boko Haram disguised themselves like brothers to the local population. They presented 
themselves like visitors who mean no harm, and this made the people accepted and accommodated 
them. Thereafter, they began acquiring information from the people. This information was what 
was used against the people during attacks. According to FGD-AMBM, FGD-AMBW, and FGB-
AMBV the Boko Haram came into the Mubi community as merchants, sellers and herdsmen who 
meant no arm. Members of the sect came into Mubi and associated themselves with the villagers 
like normal people without the knowledge of the people that they are evil. Not so long they started 
to kill and destroy properties in the community. They advanced by using female suicide bombers 
in purdah who walked straight into public places like the market before detonating the bomb which 
will lead to a lot of casualties. Equally, they use religious teachings and sentiments by claiming 
that western education is forbidden as it has no good to offer. Based on this, they were getting the 
people convinced that western education has brought nothing but harm and stagnation to the 
people. 
Moreover, the tactics employed by the Boko Haram in attacking in Gamboru-Ngala and Baga 
communities of Borno state are quite similar to the preceding. FGD-BGM revealed that the Boko 
Haram come into the community from different directions with the aim of surrounding it and with 
this no one can escape. Anyone who tries to run, and hide is picked up and killed. FGD-BGW 
alluded that they enter our village with cars (i.e. Hilux) and motor-cycles. This puts a lot of fear in 
them that they must hide themselves in their houses as women. This was also the description given 
by the village head. He only added that once they come into the community, they patrol the 
community like government security forces (BG-1 November 2017). FGD-BGY pointed out that 
most often members of the sect appear in military uniform (Khaki) inside a lot of Hilux and on 
motorcycles. They equally noted that they come into the community in the night when people are 
already sleeping, and they start to fire leaving no way of escape for the local population. 
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In Baga community BB-1 reiterated that members of the sects at the on-set came in as friends. 
They announced they will not attack the community, and this gave the local population confidence 
to remain in the community only to renege on their words later with an attack on the community. 
He regretted further that if they had known they would have left the community with their families 
and some of them would have still be alive till today but unfortunately, they are dead. According 
to BB-5 who gave the timing of Boko Haram attacks, he said the insurgents came into the village 
at night between 9pm and 12am and opened fire on the people leaving everyone to run for his or 
her life.  BB-4 noted that the attack started on a Wednesday and many Christians and Muslims 
were killed, and a lot of properties and homes were bombed. According to FGD-BBC the Boko 
Haram also attack the community in the morning. They recalled a particular one in which they 
came into the community very early in the morning and started pursuing the local population. The 
military present in the community tried to repel the attack but the Boko Haram were too much for 
the JTF to fight. Despite that the CJTF joined forced with the JTF, they were not able to combat 
the Boko Haram forces (FGD-BBC November 2017). 
The trend was slightly different in the Yusufari and Kanamma communities of Yobe state. 
Harmonizing all the responses, YY-1, FGD-YYM, FGD-YYW, FGD-YYY, FGD-YYV, YK-1, 
YK-2, FGD-YKM, FGD-YKY, FGD-YKW, FGD-YKV pointed that Boko Haram members 
initially came into the communities as preachers. They started by gathering the local population 
with the motive of preaching to them, but members of the sect then suddenly change by 
surrounding the people and at this point those who have laid ambush in bushes around the 
community get a signal then they begin to shoot sporadically, and because the people have been 
surrounded, they cannot run anywhere. This is when they then start their operation. The men and 
boys are taken away to join them to fight. They also enter their houses and cart away their groceries 
and farm produce for survival in their camps However, a youth in Yusufari community recalled 
his personal experience with members of the sect during one of their attacks. He said that the attack 
was witnessed on a Monday. They broke into their home, killed his father and took him away. He 
was taken round the community amongst other jobless youths and they were offered the 
opportunity to work with them with a fantastic salary. This looked a great opportunity to some of 
the youths and they followed them (FGD-YYY November 2017).  
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Moreover, on the 24th January 2019, the Boko Haram struck in a community in Yobe state. A 
vigilante said that “as you know, yesterday was our market day in Gaidam, so they took advantage 
and came in large convoys and started shooting. There was confusion in the whole town. They 
overpowered the troops and the soldiers eventually fled. We lost two persons and several others 
were injured. Some persons were also abducted” (Sahara Reporters, 2019). He noted that they (the 
insurgents) burnt down houses and looted food items. In like manner, on the 13th February 2019, 
members of the sect attacked the convoy of the Borno state governor while he was on his way to 
Gamboru-Ngala a border town and one of the communities selected for the study in Borno state 
(Sahara Reporters, 2019). 
5.2.2 Early warning signals received by border communities prior to the Boko Haram 
attacks 
At this juncture, it is pertinent to identify if there were some early warning signs in some border 
communities prior to the Boko Haram attack. According to the National Institute of Disaster 
Management (2014) Early Warning System (EWS) is defined “as a set of capacities needed to 
generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information of the possible extreme 
events or disasters (e.g. floods, drought, fire, earthquake and tsunamis) that threatens people’s 
lives” (East Asia Summit, 2014). Early warning is useful for averting and avoiding conflict. Such 
information is to assist individuals, communities and organizations vulnerable to prepare and act 
aptly and in sufficient time to reduce the likelihood of harm, loss or risk. It also assists in reducing 
or preventing casualty in any occurrence of violence. In this wise, it then becomes imperative to 
inquire if there were some early warning signals in the affected border communities to warrant the 
high toll of not just the humanitarian situation created but the high rate of death rate.   
In Michika and Mubi communities, there was a divergent view. Some local population averred 
that they got no early signal while some alluded that they got some signals. They gave instances 
that corroborate this fact. FGD-AMY gave two different views. While some alluded to the fact 
that there was no warning prior to the Boko Haram attacks, some said though they got warning, 
which came in the form of rumours that members of the sect where somewhere close and close 
and could attack soon but they did not believe such. The experience of AM-4 depicted that there 
was a warning as they saw many people running from the neighboring village for safety. According 
173 
 
to AM-7, there was an attack on the neighbouring village and as a result they warned the villagers 
to stay alert and be watchful. It was noted that before the village was attacked, a First Bank branch 
was destroyed, and an attack carried out in a neighboring village. Some said they saw the Boko 
Haram flag hoisted in the neighbouring village. This presupposes the fact that there was a signal 
(FGD-AMM November 2017). In fact, AM-5 said that some relatives in neighbouring village 
which was attacked warned them that they were likely going to be attacked soon as they got a tip 
off that Boko Haram has an intention of capturing Mubi and to achieve that, they will have to pass 
through Michika and with this an attack is imminent.  
In Mubi town, a group of women attested that they got a warning signal. In their words, they said 
that 
“we received some warning but this warning as I told you earlier on, when we 
heard of their first coming we ran away but it turned out to be mere speculations, 
but when the warning came the second time, we heard that they were somewhere 
close and we thought it was going to be like the first time. There was warning but 
not officially, only as rumours” (FGD-AMW November 2017). 
AMB-4 equally reiterated this fact. In his words 
Yes, we were getting warnings like rumors and there was fear all over, on some 
instances, people will even run but nothing will happen because we are not sure of 
their coming and we didn’t accept such rumors. We were just living in fear 
sometimes we run away just like that and then come back, until the real calamity 
befell us (AMB-4 November 2017).  
Equally, the response of AMB-1 aligns with the above points. Moreover, he went further to give 
the specific dates. He said that   
one month before the invasion of Mubi, there was rumour that Boko-Haram were 
coming, then people just started running away, it was around September, when we 
first ran, so after this, we realize that the news was just mere speculation so we 
come back and stayed all through September so it was after we came back that the 
insurgents decide to attack Mubi on the 29th of October, 2014. By the time they 
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eventually attacked, we didn’t get any warning or rumors of their coming, we only 
heard their gun shots on that fateful Wednesday signifying their presence in town 
and the market place which got people confused and running helter-skelter (AMB-
1 November 2017). 
A group of youths also lend their voice to this by agreeing that they usually get signals from their 
neighbors who had suffered attacks in Madagali and Michika before the attack got to them in Mubi. 
Members of the vigilante also said that there were signals. They pointed out that they were alerted 
by inhabitants of Maraba as members of the Boko Haram came in through the village and 
proceeded to Mubi (FGD-AMBY November 2017). 
The same trend continued in Gamboru-Ngala and Baga communities of Borno State. Respondents 
gave varying responses. While some said there was no early warning sign, some said there were 
some sort of signals which came as a warning to the local population. According to BG-1, FGD-
BGM, FGD-BGY, BB-1, BB-4, FGD-BBW, FGD-BBY, BB-5, BB-6 it was clear that there were 
no warning signals at all as the Boko Haram just carry out attacks unannounced in Baga 
community. 
According to FGD-BGW, as some said the community got no alert of any sort prior to the attacks 
a few said there was a time their neigbours informed them that they got some signals of an intended 
attack by the sect which did not eventually occurred (FGD-BGW 2017). Equally FGD-BGY noted 
that “sometimes, they give us warning, for example if the place they are about to attack has some 
military personnel, they will inform them before attacking that particular place. In short, some 
community get warning while some don’t get any warning and we are part of those community 
that didn’t get any warning. Sometimes they will attack like five persons, kill four and send the 
remaining one to go and deliver the message of their coming on a specific day” (FGD-BGY 2017). 
It was also affirmatively pointed out that they got some warnings from surrounding communities. 
And all they could do is to be vigilant while hoping and praying that such will not happen, but it 
eventually happened. There was little which we can do about it as the members of the sect come 
in fully armed. In fact, they are more armed that officers of the JTF and that is why they always 
overpower the JTF whenever they attack (FGD-BBC November 2017). 
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In the communities of Yusufari and Kanamma in Yobe state, the responses were unique. 
According to YY-1, FGD-YYM, FGD-YYW, FGD-YYY, FGD-YYV, YK-1, YK-2, FGD-YKM, 
FGD-YKY, FGD-YKW, FGD-YKV, the local population got warnings signals before they were 
attacked by the Boko Haram. This warning came mostly in form of letter addressed to the 
communities. While interacting with members of the JTF, they negated the assertion of the local 
people as they asserted that they got no glimpse of the Boko Haram attack. They said further that 
members of the sect attack whenever they want to and that is why they are always alert and combat 
ready as they can strike anytime. 
In all, the question that readily comes to mind is that as some of the communities had a glimpse of 
the Boko Haram coming to attack why did they waited for them and ended up being victims? This 
question was posed by the researcher and the responses across board was that they have no place 
to run to as their homes remain their homes. Some of those who left the communities came back 
as all they live for abound within the communities. This is in line with the assertion of the 
Humanitarian Review, (2017) which reported that around 200,000 Nigerians taking refuge in 
neighbouring states of Cameroun, Chad and Niger as refugees are seen returning to their various 
homes and communities.  
5.3 Nefarious activities of Boko Haram 
Boko Haram’s first attack occurred on the 24 December 2003 when its members took up arms 
against security forces in Yobe State. It attacked police stations and government buildings in the 
towns of Kanamma and Geiam in Yobe State. These buildings were occupied by members of the 
sect for some days, hoisting the flag of Afghanistan’s Taliban movement over the building top. 
After some days they were dislodged by a joint operation of soldiers and police and in the process, 
18 members of the group were killed while several dozens were arrested (Suleiman, 2007). On 31 
December 2003 Boko Haram members left the village and diffused into other northern states after 
the inscription of the word ‘Taliban’ on a capture vehicle (Morgan, 2009). In 2004 it calved out a 
base called ‘Afghanistan’ in Kanamma village of Yobe State, a border town close to the Republic 
of Niger (Awofadeji, 2009). 
The activities of the sect became more terrifying from 2004 when students of tertiary institutions 
in both states of Yobe and Borno such as the University of Maiduguri, Ramat Polytechnic and 
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Federal Polytechnic etc, who are members of the sect withdrew from school, tore their certificates 
into shreds and joined the group for Quaranic lessons and sermons (Lawal, 2009). On 21 
September 2004 members carried out attacks on Gwoza and Bama police stations in Borno State, 
leaving many policemen dead, setting ablaze Gwoza police station and carting away arms and 
ammunition. A few weeks later the police launched a reprisal attack on the sect and in the process, 
24 members were killed, and 22 rifles and other ammunitions were recovered from the operation 
(Alanamu et’al, 2006). Aliyu Tishau, a major member of the group, disclosed in an 
interview with Africa Independent Television (AIT) in 2011 that:  
What we are demanding is that those states that have independently declared their 
states Sharia states should implement it to the letter. Have you seen Sharia cut the 
hand of someone who steals a cow head, while someone who corruptly enriches 
himself is left to go free? They [northern political elites] have chased away local 
prostitutes and brought in international red light prostitutes to replace them. They 
have also banned local alcoholic drinks, yet they drink imported spirits in their 
respective government houses. Is that Sharia? They are insincere, so they must be 
effective in the implementation of Sharia. Sharia is being abused.15  
It was observed that while Yusuf lived in material comfort, most of his followers lived in utter 
poverty (Lawal, 2009) and still had to pay a daily levy of 100 naira to Yusuf their leader. This 
formed the basic source of funding for the group, in addition to donations from politicians [most 
especially the former governor of Borno state Ali Modu Sheriff who was alleged to be a major 
sponsor of the sect), government officials, individuals and organizations within Nigeria (NDIA, 
2009). Ali Modu Sheriff was alleged to be a major sponsor because upon assuming office in 2003 
he appointed Buji Foi a prominent disciple of Yusuf, into his cabinet as the Commissioner for 
Religious Affairs while Yusuf was equally appointed onto a Hajj committee which was responsible 
for selecting Muslims for lesser Hajj (Comolli, 2015). These appointments were seen to be a 
gateway for Boko Haram to have access to state funds to support their course. It was perceived 
 
15 Sahara Reporters, ‘The Punch interview: I told the Inspector General of Police in advance that Abuja would be 
bombed, says Boko Haram leader’, 21 September 2011, http://saharareporters.com/interview/punch-interview-i-told-
inspector-general-police-advanceabuja-would-be-bombed-says-boko-ha?page2. Retrieved on 21st September, 2017. 
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that it is with this the sect was able to acquire its first set of arms and ammunitions (Walker, 2012). 
The sect was also alleged to be receiving funds from external sources. In 2007, Mohammed Yusuf 
and Mohammed Bello Damagun an Ustaz who was a member of the group called ‘Nigerian 
Taliban’ (Pham, 2007) were arrested and tried for offenses related to terrorism. Mohammed 
Damagun was arraigned before a federal high court in Abuja on three count charges such as “being 
a member of the Nigerian Taliban, receiving a sum of US$300 000 from al-Qaeda to recruit and 
train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorism, and aiding terrorists in Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf was 
arraigned on five count charges, among which was receiving funds from al-Qaeda network in 
Pakistan to recruit terrorists who would attack residences of foreigners, mostly Americans residing 
in Nigeria (Suleiman, 2007). Though, Yusuf was discharged and acquitted, he and some of his 
members were re-arrested in 2008 by security operatives and handed over to the Inspector-General 
of Police for prosecution. They were granted bail by an Abuja High Court on the 20th of January 
2009 (Taiwo and Olugbode, 2009). Also, between 2007 and April 2009 some prominent members 
of the group such as Bukar Shekau from the Niger Republic were arrested in Borno and Kano and 
were either handed over to the police for prosecution or deported. Regrettably, these members 
always found their way back into Nigeria often through the porous borders.  
The continual arrest of Boko Haram suspects most especially suspected leaders and the refusal of 
the Bauchi state government to allow the sect freedom to freely and publicly advance its course 
and recruit more people led to a massive revolt by the sect. The state government purposely denied 
them the opportunity as it was perceived that an outbreak of religious violence was imminent in 
view of the radical ideology of the sect.  Crisis started in Bauchi, Bauchi State on the 26th July and 
lasted till 30th July 2009 (The Economist, 2009). In the process of retaliation members of the sect 
attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi. This met a formidable response 
from soldiers and armed policemen who warded off the attack on the police station and nabbed 
members of the sect in neighbouring vicinity. President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua also authorized 
the immediate deployment of all the national security agencies to all neighbouring states to contain 
the crisis. Though security personnel were placed on full alert to make sure that the attacks by 
members of the sect do not spread elsewhere (This Day, 2009), it eventually filtered into 
neighbouring states few hours after the presidential order was given. The attack on the Dutsen 
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Tanshi police station was the “curtain raiser” for a series of civil unrest that spread across four 
states such as Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno in the succeeding days.  
Attacks were carried out by the sects on police stations in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe State, in 
the early hours of 27th of July. This forced the state government to impose a curfew to curb the 
crisis from escalating and filtering to neighbouring states. In Potiskum town, fundamentalists 
launched an attack which destroyed many public properties and a police area command. In Kano 
State, Wudil police station was attacked leaving five policemen injured, including CSP Sagir Idris, 
a Divisional Police Officer (DPO). Many weapons such as rifles and AK47 were carted away by 
members of the sect. Three of the fundamentalists were killed and 33 others arrested, including 
some Chadians who could speak neither English nor Hausa (This Day, 2009). This reveals that 
foreigners from neighboring Niger and Chad constitute members of the sect. 
In Maiduguri, Borno State, members of the sect attacked the police headquarters and some 
government structures. The Police Mobile College was also attacked, and in the process, nine 
houses were burnt and some policemen killed. They equally attacked churches and mosques, 
burning down over 30 vehicles in the process 19 at the Deeper Life Bible Church, three at the 
Celestial Church, five at the National Evangelical Church Mission and 11 at Elysian Yan’Uwa 
(Lawal, 2009). Lamisula and Gamboru police stations were as well raised down by the sect. The 
attacks were so intense in the city of Maiduguri within the five days of attacks because Borno State 
is adjudged to be the sect’s stronghold. However, the mayhem was eventually controlled by 
Operation Flush which was a joint operation of the Nigerian military and the police, coordinated 
by the Borno State special security task force. The operation, led by Colonel Ben Ahanotu on the 
28th July, carried out a heavy blitz on Mohammed Yusuf’s residence leading to the capture of 
Mohammed Yusuf in his residence where he was hiding in a goat pen two days later. 
Unfortunately, after some hours in police detention, Yusuf was killed in what could be termed to 
be an extrajudicial killing, even though, police officials maintained that he was killed in the process 
of absconding from police net (Schulze, 2009). The death of Yusuf generated a controversy over 
how he died. Howbeit, the commander of the operation, Colonel Ben Ahanotu, reiterated that he 
personally handed over Yusuf to the police chief in Maiduguri after his arrest (BBC, 2009). This 
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prompted late President Yar’Adua to order an investigation of the killing of Yusuf’s death by the 
National Security Advisor (Onuoha, 2010). 
A retaliatory attack was carried out by Yusuf’s followers. This led to the death of many soldiers, 
five prison warders and 28 policemen.  It equally led to massive displacement of over 3,500 people 
across various part of the region, over 392 women widowed and over 1,264 children orphaned. 
Government and private Properties destroyed consist of “48 buildings, three primary schools, over 
12 churches and a magistrate’s court” (African Independent Television, 2009). In addition, 
“security forces freed about 180 women and children believed to have been deceived by their 
husbands and teachers that they were in Maiduguri to attend a religious function” (Mukairu and 
Muhammed, 2009). Table 5.1 below helps to give a better appraisal of the different attacks 
witnessed in the North-Eastern region, the killings and the destructions of properties these attacks 
led to in concrete terms. 
Table 5. 1 Cross-Border insurgent attacks carried out in the North-Eastern Nigeria    
between 2003-2017 
S/N DATE OF 
ATTACK 
STATE PLACE OF 
ATTACK 
CASUALTY/ IMPACT 
1 23rd – 31st 
December, 
2003 
Yobe State Police stations in 
Geidam and 
Kanamma towns 
of Yobe State 
Several police men were killed, and 
weapons and vehicles carted away 
2 23rd 
September
, 2004 
Borno State Police stations in 
Gwoza and Bama 
towns of Borno 
State 
Four policemen, two civilians were 
killed and ammunition carted away 
3 10th 
October, 
2004 
Borno State Kala-Balge town 
on the border with 
Chad 
12 policemen were taken hostage 
and were never found 
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4 26th July, 
2009 
Borno State Maiduguri Many members of the sects were 
killed including the leader 
Mohammed Yusuf. A mosque was 
also burnt down. 
5 7th 
September
, 2010 
Bauchi State A prison where 
Boko Haram 
suspects were 
kept 
Four people were killed in the 
process. This includes a soldier, a 
policeman and two residents. 
6 24th – 27th 
December, 
2010 
Plateau and 
Borno States 
Jos and Maiduguri Many people were killed. 
7 29th 
December, 
2010 
Borno State Maiduguri Eight people were shot dead 
8 27th May, 
2011 
Borno State A police station, a 
police barracks 
and a bank in 
Damboa town 
near the border 
with Chad 
Eight people were killed. This 
include four police men and four 
civilians 
9 29th May, 
2011 
Bauchi State A beer garden in a 
military barracks 
Thirteen people were killed while 
33 people were wounded. 
10 6th June, 
2011 
Borno State  Biu town A Muslim cleric Ibrahim Birkuti 
who detest the sect was shot dead in 
front of his house. 
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11 7th June, 
2011 
Borno State  A church and two 
police posts in 
Maiduguri 
14 people were killed. 
12 16th June, 
2011 
Federal 
Capital 
Territory 
[FCT] 
National Police 
Headquarters in 
Abuja 
Two deaths were recorded. 
13 20th June, 
2011 
Katsina State A police station 
and a bank in 
Kankara 
Five policemen and two civilians 
were killed. 
14 27th June, 
2011 
Borno State A beer garden in 
Maiduguri 
25 persons were killed and several 
injured. 
15 25th 
August, 
2011 
Adamawa 
State 
Two police 
stations and two 
banks in Gombi 
Seven policemen and nine civilians 
were killed. 
16 26th 
August, 
2011 
FCT United Nations 
Building in Abuja 
23 people were killed. 
17 4th 
September
, 2011 
Borno State Zinnari area of 
Maiduguri 
A Muslim cleric Malam Dala was 
shot dead in front of his house. 
18 12th 
September
, 2011 
Bauchi State A police station 
and a bank in 
Misau 
Four policemen and three other 
people were killed 
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19 13th 
September
, 2011 
Borno State An ambush by 
Boko Haram 
members in 
Maiduguri 
Four soldiers were shot and 
seriously wounded. 
20 17th 
September
, 2011 
Borno State Maiduguri Babakura Fugu, bother-in-law to 
late Mohammed Yusuf was shot 
dead in front of his house two days 
after attending a peace meeting 
with Nigeria’s ex-President 
Olusegun Obasanjo. 
21 1st 
October, 
2011 
Borno State Baga market, 
Maiduguri 
A butcher and his colleague were 
targeted and killed at Baga market 
The same day, three civilians were 
killed in a shoot-out between Boko 
Haram members and soldiers when 
fire was opened on military patrol 
vehicle on its way to deliver food to 
soldiers at a checkpoint.   
22 3rd 
October, 
2011 
Borno State Baga market Three civilians including a drug 
seller, a tea seller and a passer-by 
were killed.  
23 23rd 
October, 
2011 
Kaduna State A police station 
and two banks in 
Saminaka. 
Two people including a policeman 
and a bank security guard were 
killed. 
24 23rd 
October, 
2011 
Kaduna State A market in Katari 
town.  
Two people were killed in the 
attacked. 
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25 25th 
October, 
2011 
Yobe State Damaturu A policeman was shot dead in his 
house. 
26 29th 
October, 
2011 
Borno State Bulabulin 
Ngarnam area of 
Maiduguri 
A Muslim cleric Sheikh Ali Jana’a 
was shot dead. 
27 2nd 
November
, 2011 
Borno State Maiduguri main 
market 
A soldier was shot dead while on 
duty. 
28 4th 
November
, 2011 
Borno State Maiduguri  Former Borno State governor’s 
motorcade was attacked on his was 
from the airport to the government 
house. 
29 9th 
November
, 2011 
Borno State A police station 
and the office of 
the Federal Road 
Safety 
Commission 
[FRSC], Maina 
Village 
The two structures were destroyed 
but no life was lost. 
30 26th 
November
, 2011 
Yobe State A police station, 
six churches, a 
shopping 
complex, a beer 
parlour, a high 
court, a local 
These government structures were 
destroyed with 11 cars destroyed. 
No life was lost but three 
policemen and a civilian were 
wounded. 
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council building 
in Geidam town  
31 27th 
November
, 2011 
Borno State Maiduguri A protocol officer in the office of 
the Borno state governor was shot 
dead on his motorcycle while 
driving home. 
32 4th 
December, 
2011 
Bauchi State A police station 
and two banks in 
Azare  
A policeman, a soldier and a 
civilian were killed. 
33 4th 
December, 
2011 
Borno State A wedding 
ceremony in 
Maiduguri 
The groom and a guest were killed. 
34 7th 
December, 
2011 
Kaduna State Oriyapata District 
of Kaduna city 
Eight people were killed in the 
attack. 
35 13th 
December, 
2011 
Borno State A military 
checkpoint in 
Maiduguri 
10 were killed and 30 got injured in 
the gun duel. 
36 17th 
December, 
2011 
Kano State A raid on the 
hideout of Boko 
Haram leader in 
Darmanawa area  
Three police officers and four 
civilians were killed. 14 Boko 
Haram suspects were arrested 
while huge number of arms, 
ammunitions and bombs were 
seized. 
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37 22nd 
December, 
2011 
Borno and 
Yobe States 
Maiduguri and a 
police building in 
Potiskum 
20 people were killed in Maiduguri 
while four policemen and one 
civilian were killed in Potiskum. 
38 25th 
December, 
2011 
Niger State 
Yobe State 
Plateau State 
Saint Theresa 
Catholic Church 
in Madalla town, a 
suicide bomber 
attack on a 
military convoy at 
the gate of the 
State Security 
Service [SSS] 
headquarters in 
Damaturu and a 
church in the Ray 
Field area of Jos  
42 worshippers were killed in the 
Madalla attack, three SSS officers 
and the suicide bomber a Boko 
Haram member were killed in 
Damaturu while a policeman was 
killed in Jos. 
39 28th 
December, 
2011 
Adamawa 
State  
A beer parlour in 
Mubi town 
No life was lost but 15 people were 
injured. 
40 30th 
December, 
2011 
Borno State A military check-
point in 
Maiduguri 
Four Muslims worshippers who 
just left the Mosque after attending 
Friday prayers were killed.  
41 3rd 
January, 
2012 
Jigawa State A police station 
on Birniwa town 
A teenage girl was killed and a 
police man wounded. 
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42 5th 
January, 
2012 
Gombe State 
Adamawa 
State 
A church in 
Gombe city and a 
hotel in Mubi 
Six worshippers were killed and 10 
other wounded in Gombe city 
while five people were killed in a 
hotel in Mubi. 
42 6th 
January, 
2012 
Adamawa 
State 
A church in Yola 
and an area in 
Mubi town 
Eight worshippers were killed in 
Yola while 17 Christian mourners 
mourning their relatives killed in an 
attack on a hotel on the previous 
day were shot dead in Mubi Town.  
43 7th 
January, 
2012 
Borno State Biu town Three Christian pokers were killed 
and seven wounded. 
44 9th 
January, 
2012 
Borno State Biu town An SSS officer and his civilian 
friend were killed after leaving the 
Mosque. 
45 10th 
January, 
2012 
Yobe State A beer garden in 
Damaturu 
Five policemen, two other people 
and a teenage girl were killed. 
46 11th 
January, 
2012 
Yobe State A filling station in 
Potiskum 
Four Christians were killed as they 
stopped to buy fuel. 
47 13th 
January, 
2012 
Adamawa 
State and 
Gombe State 
Pubs in Yola and 
Gombe city 
A police man and three others were 
killed while two others were 
injured. 
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48 17th 
January, 
2012 
Borno State A military check-
point and a raid on 
a Boko Haram 
hideout in 
Maiduguri 
Two soldiers and four Boko Haram 
gunmen were killed in the attack on 
the military check-point while 
soldiers apprehended six prominent 
member of the sect during the raid 
on their hideout. 
49 20th 
January, 
2012 
Kano State Multiple bomb 
explosion in Kano 
226 people were killed and several 
others injured. 
50 26th 
January, 
2012 
Kano State An explosion in 
Sabon Gari area 
Many people were injured and 
many commercial buses were 
damaged. 
51 7th 
February, 
2012 
Kaduna State  Army 
Headquarters in 
Kaduna 
A Boko Haram member who 
disguised and dressed in a military 
uniform blew up himself and died 
in the process. 
 
52 7th 
February, 
2012 
Kano State Kano market and 
military barracks 
Five people were killed. 
 
53 15th 
February, 
2012 
Kogi State Korton Karfi 
prison 
A warder was killed while 199 
inmates were freed in the process. 
54 8th April, 
2012 
Kaduna State A church was 
bombed on Easter 
Day  
38 people were killed in the attack. 
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55 29th April, 
2012 
Kano State Bayero University Two teaching staff member, one 
non-teaching and 15 Christians 
were killed. 
56 17th June, 
2012 
Kaduna State Random attacks 
on different 
churches  
12 people were killed while 80 
people were injured. 
57 7th August, 
2012 
Kogi State Attack on a 
branch of Deeper 
Life Church 
19 people were killed. 
58 24th 
November
, 2012 
Kaduna State A bomb attack on 
St. Andrew 
Anglican Church 
situated in the 
Armed Forces 
Command and 
Staff College, Jaji 
15 people died in the process. 
59 25th 
December, 
2012 
Borno State Attacks on 
Mosques in 
Maiduguri 
56 Christians were killed. 
60 29th 
September
, 2013 
Yobe State Attack on Giba 
College 
Over 50 students were killed. 
 
61 14th 
March, 
2014 
Borno State Giwa military 
cantonment was 
attacked 
Some Boko Haram members 
detained were released though 
some were re-arrested. 
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62 14th April, 
2014 
Borno State Government Girls 
Secondary School 
was attacked in 
Chibok 
276 female students were abducted. 
63 14th April, 
2014 
FCT, Abuja Bomb blast in a 
Motor Park at 
Nyanya 
75 people were killed while 200 
were injured. 
64 31st 
October, 
2014 
Gombe State Bomb blast in a 
central bus station 
in Gombe city 
Eight people were killed, and 17 
people were injured. 
65 28th 
November
, 2014 
Kano State Multiple suicide 
bomb explosions 
and gun attacks at 
Kano Central 
Mosque 
35 Muslims died and 157 injured in 
the process. 
66 6th 
December, 
2014 
Niger State An attack on 
Minna Prison 
164 inmates were released.  
67 3rd – 7th 
January, 
2015 
Borno State Widespread 
killings in Baga 
Over 2000 people were killed, 
properties were also destroyed, and 
the town was taken over by the 
Boko Haram sect. 
68 18th 
January, 
2015 
Cameroun Attacks on 
villages in 
Northern 
Cameroun 
Three people were killed, and 80 
people kidnapped. 
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69 16th June, 
2015 
Chad Bomb explosions 
in the Police 
Headquarters and 
Police Academy 
in N'Djamena 
24 people died and over 100 people 
injured. 
70 24th 
March, 
2016 
Adamawa 
State 
Sabongari village 14 women and two girls were 
kidnapped. 
71 6th June, 
2016 
Niger 
Republic 
Bosso Town 30 Nigeriens and two Nigerian 
soldiers were killed while Boko 
Haram fighters took over the town 
leading to a mass exodus of about 
50,000 dwellers. 
72 28th July, 
2016 
Borno State An attack on 
humanitarian 
convoy in Kawuri 
Two soldiers and three civilians 
were injured. 
72 29th 
October, 
2016 
Borno State Bomb attacks in 
Maiduguri 
Nine people died and 24 got 
injured. 
73 5th 
November
, 2016 
Borno State A military barrack 
in Mallam Fatori 
While an Army Lieutenant Colonel 
and four soldiers were killed, four 
soldiers got injured. 
74 13th May, 
2017 
Borno State A twin suicide 
attack on 
University of 
Maiduguri 
(UNIMAID)  
A security guard Mr. Daniel Musa 
was killed in the process. 
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75 16th May, 
2017 
Borno State Suicide bombers 
strike in Shuwari 
and Mandari 
villages of 
Konduga LGA. 
Some lives were lost including the 
suicide bomber. 
76 8th June, 
2017 
Borno State Three suicide 
attacks were 
carried out on 
Jiddari/ Polo 
general area of 
Maiduguri 
Metropolis. 
13 people were killed while 24 
people were injured. 
77 19th June, 
2017 
Borno State An attack was 
carried out on 
Kofa village. 
17 persons including five suicide 
bombers died while 11 people were 
injured. 
78 20th June, 
2017 
Borno State An ambush was 
laid by members 
of the sect as the 
remains of late 
Seargent Rahila 
Antakirya was 
being conveyed to 
Lassa village in 
Askira -Uba LGA 
for burial. 
While scores were killed, 14 
women mostly police officers were 
kidnapped. 
79 25th June, 
2017 
Borno State Attack was 
carried out on 
UNIMAID and 
16 lives were lost including a 
UNIMAID security officer. 
192 
 
surrounding 
communities of 
Kaleri, Muna 
Garage general 
area. 
80 7th July, 
2017 
Borno State A suicide attack 
carried out in 
UNIMAID 
Two suicide bombers were killed. 
81 12th July, 
2017 
Borno State An attack on 
Molai Kura area 
of Maiduguri 
Metropolis. 
12 CJTF members, four suicide 
bombers and seven villagers were 
killed while 23 others were injured. 
82 16th July, 
2017 
Borno State A clash on a piece 
of grazing land in 
Maiduguri. 
A life was lost and another injured. 
83 25th July, 
2017 
Borno State An ambush was 
laid for a federal 
government 
envoy on their 
return from an oil 
exploration 
mission in 
Bornoyesu village 
of Magumeri 
LGA. 
While 20 soldiers, 16 CJTF, and 
five UNIMAID staff were killed, 
scores were injured and three 
UNIMAID staff were abducted. 
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84 1st August, 
2017 
Adamawa 
State 
An attack on 
Mildu village in 
Madagali LGA. 
While seven inhabitants were killed 
and many injured, the village was 
set on fire. 
85 8th August, 
2017 
Borno State An attack on 
fishermen in Baga 
in Kukawa LGA. 
31 fishermen were killed. 
86 8th August, 
2017 
Borno State An attack carried 
out in Duguri and 
Dabar-Wanzam 
border. 
While 17 people were killed in 
Badar-Wanzam border, 14 people 
were killed in Duguri. 
87 23rd 
October, 
2017 
Borno State Three female 
suicide bombers 
attacked 
Maiduguri. 
13 people lost their lives and 16 
people were injured. 
88 26th 
October, 
2017 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
A clash between 
the CJTF and 
members of Boko 
Haram during 
their raid on a 
military base and 
as well as a loot on 
villages. 
Six soldiers were killed in the 
process. 
89 30th 
October, 
2017 
Nigeria and 
Cameroon 
A suicide attack in 
Cameroon and 
Nigeria.  
16 people were killed. 
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90 30th 
October, 
2017 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria.  
An overnight 
attack on a village 
where many 
members of the 
sect were 
apprehended. 
Eleven people were slaughtered 
overnight. 
91 1st 
November
, 2017 
Northern 
Cameroon 
A suicide attack 
was carried out. 
Five children were killed and two 
were wounded. 
92 2nd 
December, 
2017 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria  
An attack in a 
market in Biu 
Town, Borno 
State 
13 killed, 53 people injured, and 
two suicide bombers killed. 
93 15th 
January, 
2018 
Chad A village south of 
Daboua, Chad 
18 people were killed, two 
wounded, and 10 women 
kidnapped. 
94 22nd 
February, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
A government 
school in Dapchi 
village 
91 students were abducted. 76 were 
rescued, 2 were found dead and 13 
were still missing.   
95 2nd March, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria  
A military base in 
Rann 
11 persons were killed out of who 
were three UN workers. Equally, 
30,000 people fled the town into 
Cameroun.  
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96 24th April, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
Near Gamboru 
town in Borno 
state. 
18 forest workers were killed.  
97 29th April, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
Wumbi village Three civilians were killed and nine 
injured.  
98 2nd May, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
In a Mosque and a 
market in Mubi 
Town 
More than 27 dead and many 
injured.  
99 17th June, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
Twin suicide 
bombing in 
Damboa 
government area 
in Borno state 
At least 23 people were killed and 
many injured. 
100 15th July, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
An ambush in 
Balagallaye 
village in the 
Boboshe area 
outside Bama 
23 soldiers were declared missing. 
101 20th 
August, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
An attack in 
Mairari village 
At least six people were 
slaughtered. 
102 30th 
August, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
Nigerian Army 
post in Zari 
village in Borno 
state 
48 soldiers killed. 
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103 11th 
October, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
A fierce battle in 
Metele Village, 
Borno state  
18 soldiers died in a duel with the 
Boko Haram terrorists. 
104 2nd – 18th 
November
, 2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
Attacks on 
Kukawa, Ngoshe, 
Gajiram, Kareto 
and Metele 
villages. 
About 100 soldiers killed and 31 
injured. 
105 20th 
December, 
2018 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
An ambush 
outside of 
Damaturu town in 
Yobe state 
14 Nigerian military and police 
officers killed. 
106 28th 
January, 
2019 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
An attack on Rann 
town 
At least 60 people were killed.  
107 16th 
February, 
2019 
North-
Eastern 
Nigeria 
A suicide bomber 
attack on Jiddari 
Polo 
neighbourhood, 
Borno State 
Eight people killed. 
108 22nd 
March, 
2019 
Lake Chad 
Basin Area. 
An attack on 
Chadian Forces in 
Dangdala, Chad. 
23 soldiers killed. 
Source: Compiled by author 
5.4 Impact of the cross-border insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria 
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The impact of Boko Haram activities in the North-Eastern Nigeria most importantly in the States 
of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno cannot be over-emphasized. The region has stopped to observe civil 
order, resulting in the appalling humanitarian situation manifesting in human right abuses, human 
casualties, displacement both internal and external, loss of means of livelihood, lack of medical 
facilities and absence of other basic amenities. The humanitarian situation in North-Eastern 
Nigeria has degenerated further as a result, various humanitarian agencies having limited access 
to rural areas where the displaced persons are relocated. The alarming refugee inflow and the spill-
over of Boko Haram violence off the Nigerian borders to neighbouring countries such as Chad, 
Cameroun and Niger over time have resulted in grave regional security consequences. This is 
despite the formation of a Joint Border Patrol Command established by the Federal Government 
which is composed of the military, Immigration, Customs, Civil Defence and the Police, to deal 
with the increasing security issues emanating from the insurgency (This day, April 16th, 2014). 
While some continued to reside in those communities (border communities), some are displaced 
across the borders into Chad, Niger and Cameroun as refugees and some into neighboring states 
of Gombe, Taraba, Bauchi, Jigawa, Plateau etc. as Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs’) (HNO, 
2016). Equally, all of these came out distinct from the data gathered from the study area and it is 
obvious that the affected population have and continues to witness a distortion in their daily living 
in terms of access to basic necessity of life both in the border communities, host communities and 
IDP Camps established across the region. These afore explained has made life extremely difficult 
for those who reside in this region of the country. This discourse on the effects of the phenomenon 
of the Boko Haram insurgency on border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria will be 
unveiled in categories. They are 
i. Destruction of lives and properties 
ii. Insecurity and lack of protection 
iii. Excessive sexual and gender-based violence 
iv. Health system 
v. Education system 
vi. Grounded economic activities 
5.4.1 Destruction of lives and properties 
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Firstly, the phenomenon of the Boko Haram has led to a high death rate within the North-Eastern 
region (See table 5.1). Also, the violence has led to the destruction of many properties. The 
responses of the local population in all the selected border communities depict this. The researcher 
equally observed this to be true in the region and in the border communities visited. In all the 
communities, AM-1, AMB-1, BG-1, BB-1, YY-1, and YK-1 averred that the Boko Haram attacks 
has brought a lot of set back to the community. AM-1 said that “we lost our wives, children, 
husbands, many lives have been lost and properties has been destroyed.” Equally, AM-4, AMB-5, 
BG-5, and BB-4 supported the above. They pointed out that a lot of lives and properties have been 
lost in the process of the different attacks the community has faced. They pointed further that 
though many businesses, and government establishments have been destroyed, they laid emphasis 
on the churches and Christians that have being destroyed and killed during the attacks and how 
this has caused rancour between the Christians and Muslims in the community. Also, FGD-AMY, 
FGD-AMBY, FGD-BGY, FGD-BBY corroborated the above point. Some of them who are 
Christians said that the Boko Haram majorly attack the Christians. They (Boko Haram) wanted 
everyone to become a Muslim and this has led to enmity among Christians and Muslims in the 
communities leading to mistrust. They have turn into enemies in the community. Some pointed 
that “the market day used to be on Saturdays but because of the situation, we now have market 
days as Saturdays and Sundays. Saturdays for the Muslims while Sundays for Christians”. 
In the summation of AM-6 the attack has created a lot of animosity between members of the 
community, family, friends and relatives started having suspicions against one another; 
particularly across religious line. Christians and Muslims groups, Fulani/ Hausa and other ethnic 
groups in the community. The Muslim clerics equally pointed to the death of many villagers as an 
effect of the Boko Haram attack. AM-5, and BG-6, stressed the loss of lives and destruction of 
properties of inhabitants of the community. According to AMB-4, “the effect is too many, one of 
it is that our places of worship were destroyed, the market was burnt down, like our Mosques were 
all destroyed or burnt down Churches in town were all burnt down even the ones in the neighboring 
villages (outside of town) were burnt, economic activities were greatly affected, so you see, this is 
a very big effect”.  
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Based on the assertion of FGD-AMV, FGD-BGC, FGD-BBC, FGD-YYV and FGD-YKV, the 
main aim of the Boko Haram is to destroy and that is what they always come to do in their 
communities and other places they have carried out attacks. That is why once they come in they 
don’t only target and kill officers of the JTF but they also kill members of the communities. To 
cap it up, FGD-AMW, FGD-AMBW, FGD-BGW, FGD-BBW, FGD-YYW, FGD-YKW noted 
that they have lost so many “treasures” among which are their husbands, children and fellow 
women including properties and harvests from their farms. The same was said of the men. 
According to FGD-AMM, FGD-AMBM, FGD-BGM, FGD-BBM, FGD-YYM, and FGD-YKM, 
many lost their wives, children, and relatives. Again, houses, government structures and hospitals 
have all been destroyed by the Boko Haram. Some noted that the situation has strained their 
relationships with many of their friends who no longer come to visit them like before. This is 
majorly because of the fear of being victims when in the community and because transportation to 
and fro has been affected.    
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5.4.2 Insecurity and lack of protection 
Firstly, the violence has led to a breach of human rights and contravention of the humanitarian 
law. This is witnessed in the recorded injuries, death, sexual violence, disappearances, detention, 
forced displacement, forced recruitment and attacks on civilian areas (IDP Protection Strategy, 
2015). The IDP Protection Strategy report further notes that ‘due to the fluid nature of the conflict, 
it has been challenging to determine the exact numbers of the displaced and there is still a lack of 
consensus about the numbers’. In 2013 statistics of IDPs given by the National Emergency 
Management Agency (NEMA) and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs 
(NCFRMI) indicate about 150,000 persons displaced across the region. As at the end of 2014, 
varied figures of IDP statistics had been given which ranges from 700,000 to 1.5 million. In 
February 2015, the figure had increased to 1,235,294 in the North East and North Central of 
Nigeria. The report pointed out that the difficulty experienced in getting a definite displacement 
figure is partly due to the fact that these figures are gotten only from IDPs camps, bearing in mind 
that most IDPs do not take refuge in camps but with distant family members residing in the cities 
far from their places of abode. 
The Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) (2016) points out that the displaced population 
constitutes 81% living in host communities, thus, putting a strain on available limited resources. 
The report pointed further that the government response through the activities of the Nigerian 
armed forces and other armed groups has gravely affected civilians, majorly the vulnerable groups, 
such as ‘the elderly and chronically sick, people with disabilities, female and child-headed 
households, unaccompanied/separated children, adolescent boys and pregnant and lactating 
women’. IDPs in camps are accommodated in crowded shelters in solitary, insecure or 
unconducive areas, and as such are susceptible to all forms of molestation and abuse and further 
attack from the Boko Haram sect. In fact, UNHCR’s report have shown that the camps are not 
secured, unwarranted arrest are made and freedom of movement is not guaranteed (HNO, 2016). 
16,925 Nigerians have returned back to Nigeria from Cameroon owing from the inhumane 
treatment they were given which does not meet up with the international standard. In host 
communities, limited resources become scare due to the geometrically high demand on them 
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(UNHCR, 2015). Borno, where most of the attacks are carried out host the highest number of IDPs. 
Table 5.2 shows that the figures of IDPs in the six states of the North-Eastern Nigeria. 
Table 5. 2 shows the number of Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) between August 2018 
and October 2018 
 
Source: Displacement Tracking Matrix Round 25  
The state hosts 83% of the displaced persons’ in the four states, Yobe hosts 10%, Adamawa 
hosts 6% while Gombe which hosts the least hosts 1% (HNO, 2016). 
Furthermore, the 2017 HNO revealed that, the majority of the 6.7 million people who reside in 
Borno and in many of the affected LGAs in Yobe and Adamawa are still in need of protection. 
Limited provision and curtailment of humanitarian services worsen the protection risks to 
vulnerable people. While some areas are moderately accessible to humanitarian organizations 
since April 2016, the state of insecurity perpetually limit humanitarian access to affected persons 
in the hinter part particularly in Borno. This is largely due to the Boko Haram violent activities 
and counter military operations which have exacerbated the protection risks. Consequently, the 
affected population – particularly the vulnerable and the people with special needs such as the old, 
the disabled, the sick, unaccompanied/separated children, adolescent boys, pregnant and nursing 
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women – face death, body injury, displacement, kidnapping and psychological trauma. The HNO 
(2007) affirms that: 
there have been attacks in and around IDP sites, with all roads leading out of 
Maiduguri subject to attack. Logistical challenges (infrastructure damaged by the 
conflict) and security restrictions (curfews and road blocks), as well as shrinking 
humanitarian space due to military operations and requirement for armed escort is 
challenging many INGO’s policies and attacks on Government installations further 
limits service providers reach.  
The report further shows that amid the insecurity, over 152,000 Nigerian refugees have returned 
from Niger and Cameroon as a result of the inhumane treatment they received there. Such practices 
alien to international best practices have increased the number of IDPs within the region. While 
close to a million IDPs have returned to their LGAs of origin in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, many 
of them and returning refugees have not been able to return. Those who have returned to these 
newly accessible areas have realized that people in such areas lack security and basic services for 
daily survival. The returning IDPs also reported possible threat to their lives especially their 
women and children who lock themselves in their houses for fear of abduction by the Boko Haram 
through the assistance of those who did not leave their LGAs and have established a strong 
relationship with the Boko Haram.  
Despite the presence of the JTF in the communities and efforts of the various vigilante groups 
established in the communities, they still feel unsecured. The Leaders of communities visited 
expressed their fears even though the attacks on their communities has reduced. They still largely 
feel unsecured and their expression showed fears for their subjects. The leader of Michika 
community said that “as you can see the community is devastated and we are just trying to recover. 
We only hope we will not be attacked again as we don’t want to lose any member of the community 
again (Interview at Michika, 2017). It is so sad to know that a new attacked was carried out by the 
Boko Haram in Gulak town the capital city of Madagali local government on the 6th November 
2017. This attack which was carried out at around 6.30pm made many of the local population flee 
the town for safety. One of the villagers who took refuge in a bush recounted his experience. He 
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said that villagers had to run for their lives when they noticed that even officers of the JTF fled the 
scene (Daily Trust, 2017).  
This therefore shows that the region most importantly, the border communities are still very unsafe 
for the local population to reside in as attacks are still being carried out by the dreaded extremist 
group called the Boko Haram. 
5.4.3 Excessive child abuse 
The Boko Haram conflict has led to serious violations against children who constitute 55 per cent 
of the IDPs (HNO, 2016). It further averred that in the North-Eastern region, 2.1 million children 
are affected by the Boko Haram conflict. Out of the displaced population, 1 million (i.e 55per cent) 
are children and 48 per cent of these are under the age of 5 (481,000). During conflict situations, 
displaced children are prone to abduction, abuse and molestation because, they are separated from 
their families who are to cater for them. These abuse ranges from abduction to killing, sexual 
violence against boys and girls and recruitment by Boko Haram. Boko Haram make use of these 
children as combatants, especially the boys who are used in the process of carrying out attacks 
while the girls are used for suicide attacks and for domestic purposes in their various camps across 
the region. It was discovered that the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and vigilante groups equally 
make use of these children in manning checkpoints, routine patrol and intelligence gathering. 
Kidnapped girls are being exposed to physical and emotional abuse, torture, forced religious 
conversion, forced labour and forced marriage (HNO, 2016). Due to mass exodus and 
displacement, most of these children are unable to locate their families, while some of the 
unaccompanied are orphans as their parents were killed in the various attacks. According to Human 
Right Watch, (2016), 
 Children who are unaccompanied and/or separated from their families, and who 
are not rapidly identified and provided with safe alternative care can struggle to 
access to food, water, health services, adequate shelter, psychosocial support and 
education and are at increased risk of abuse, neglect, violence, exploitation, 
including exploitative labour and sexual exploitation. There have been reports of 
trafficking of children for sexual exploitation and forced early marriage.  
204 
 
The report equally states that kidnaped children rescued face rejection by their communities based 
on the atrocities they had committed. The adolescent boys who mostly are not found in IDP camps 
and centres are said not to face only the risk of being abducted by the Boko Haram but also of 
being detained by security forces and local security groups on speculation of being supporters of 
Boko Haram. Also, rescued girls who have being sexually abused by Boko Haram are stigmatized 
against, most especially the pregnant ones and those who have given birth while in captivity or 
after their rescue or release. This is why many of them are always unwilling to return to their 
communities, basically for fear of rejection and the feelings that they will bring dishonour to their 
families. 
5.4.4 Sexual and gender-based violence 
The insecurity in the North-Eastern Nigeria has led to increased sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV). As children are susceptible to abduction during crisis situations so are women and girls 
susceptible to exploitation, rape, and forced marriage during these periods knowing fully well that 
domestic violence and early marriage is a common phenomenon in the region (HNO, 2016). In 
2013, despite the fact that such reports are hardly made, 30% of women in the six states of the 
North-Eastern Region reported their experiences of sexual and gender-based violence (HNO, 
2016). The prevalence of SGBV exacerbated in the border communities, host communities and 
IDP camps as the Boko Haram conflict became intensified. In the process of attack, the sect 
abducted women and girls in the border communities, move them to their camps and use them for 
domestic purposes, sexual abuse and lately as suicide bombers. Over 2000 women and girls 
kidnapped by Boko Haram are repeatedly ‘raped, forced into marriage/labour/religious 
conversion, physically/sexually/ emotionally abused and are highly vulnerable, exposed to 
sexually transmitted infections, and often impregnated by their captors’ (IDP Protection Strategy, 
2015). Some adolescent girls have been found taking up the role of the bread winner thus, engaging 
in street/ commercial sex so as to be able to survive and cater for their families (IDP Protection 
Strategy, 2015). Women and girls in different IDP camps especially camps in Borno, have made 
report of engaging in ‘survival sex’ for a number of reasons which include exchange for food and 
free access in and out of the different IDP camps (HRW, 2016). While some of them were able to 
summon the courage to voice out and make such report, many have been cowed and as such they 
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cannot make sure reports (HRW, 2016). 2017 HNO statistics reveal that six out of every ten 
females are reported to have been involved in sexual and gender-based violence. Also, 85 per cent 
of victims of this dastardly act who solicited for care and help between June and August 2016 were 
victims of rape (HNO, 2016). The data gathered from the study area also conforms to the assertions 
made by the HRW. It was observed that the overpopulated nature of the camps and host 
communities has led to a restriction on peoples’ privacy and likewise, there is a breach of human 
rights and dignity with impunity most especially that of women and girls. In this situation, women 
and girls are not free and willing to voice out these obvious concerns and challenges majorly 
because of fear of stigmatization, revenge, and a denial of basic daily needs for survival. Some of 
the women displaced from Adamawa who returned to their Local Government Area announced 
their fear of being abducted while in the community and as such stay in doors to avoid being 
abducted (Interview at Mubi, 2017).  
5.4.5 Deterioration in health system 
The Boko Haram violence which started in 2009 has led to an appalling deterioration in the health 
system and has given rise to an “outbreak of preventable communicable diseases, restricted access 
to essential medicines and care for non-communicable diseases and a lack of services for pregnant 
and lactating women and the elderly” (HNO, 2016 p8). This has led to a very high mortality rate 
within the region given the population of people living in the areas with limited health services 
and high occurrence of disease to be 12 million (HNO, 2016). The respondents most especially 
the women, corroborated this assertion. According to a group of women, not all the people who 
died in the communities were killed by the Boko Haram, many of them died from ailments which 
could not be treated for a long time thus degenerating and eventually leading to death (FGD-BGW 
November 2017). Based on the FMOH report, more than 40 per cent of health facilities have been 
destroyed, many were found burnt down while others had been looted in the process (FMOH, 
2016). This was observed to be true as a good part of the structures destroyed are health centres 
and hospitals. According to the data gathered, members of the communities averred that the Boko 
Haram did that so that people in the communities will not have access to the limited medical 
facilities available to them. AMB-5 said that ‘Members of the sect on different occasion carted 
away medicines from the medical facilities before destroying them’. This has limited the local 
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population’s access to medical care. The respondents especially the community leaders and the 
women explained their ordeal in this regard and how it has affected their communities negatively 
especially the sick and the older population and the pregnant women who need constant medical 
attention. Consequently, it was observed that there is the spread of different communicable 
diseases that ought to have been curbed with the immediate attention of medical personnel within 
the communities, but the opposite is the case has there were no government medical personnel 
albinitio when the Boko Haram attacks was fierce.  
 In Yobe and Borno, there is less than one primary health care centre per 10,000 dwellers (FMOH, 
2016). In many of the LGAs recently recovered from the hold of the Boko Haram within the region, 
the health system is in shambles as it has been severely disrupted. In areas where there are IDPs, 
the limited health facilities have been overstretched due to the high number of IDPs. This is the 
situation in Borno and other part of the region. An assessment carried out by FMOH (2016) found 
that 450 health facilities have been destroyed in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Gombe, out of which 
334 are situated in Borno alone. In addition, the health system in the region lacks the availability 
of needed skilled health care workers, essential medicines, and medical equipment.  
Owing from the fragile health status of the region, there has been the outbreak of polio which 
quickly spread through the North-Eastern region and across the borders into the neighboring states.  
This added to the prevalent presence of measles, malaria meningitis and acute respiratory disease. 
This situation put children below the age of 5 years at risk of contracting these diseases as they do 
not have access to the needed vaccines to combat these endemic diseases. This is evident in the 
HNO report (2016). According to the report, 
Four cases of wild polio virus type 1 (WPV1) plus two cases of vaccine derived 
polio virus type 2 have so far been reported in three LGAs in Borno since August 
(the first in Nigeria for more than two years). Over 2,000 cases of measles were 
reported from Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe since the beginning of 2016 and there 
is an ongoing measles outbreak in Borno temporary IDP sites (HNO, 2016). 
Again, in the host communities, the vulnerable group such as children under 5 years, females (15-
49 years) and the old (above 60 years) under the poverty line have needs which have thus far been 
difficult to be attended to by the relevant people. This affects the elderly (0.5 million) greatly 
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because old age comes with its problems making those in this category have special needs for daily 
survival. These special needs have not been met as they are been overlooked. This is the same 
situation these categories of people face in the IDP camps. Women within the reproductive age 
have been adversely affected by this phenomenon. Statistics shows that: 
over 1 million women within the reproductive age do not have adequate family 
planning, ante-natal care and post-natal care, safe delivery, emergency obstetric 
care, prevention and treatment of STIs and HIV, rape treatment and other life-
saving reproductive health services (HNO, 2016).  
In 2016, it was discovered that an estimated 180,000 pregnant women were affected by the poor 
state of health in those communities.  And given the high maternal mortality rate already been 
witness within the region before the Boko Haram conflict started it only means that the incidence 
of death will keep increasing as pregnant women and teenage girls continue to deliver without the 
professional assistance of the needed skilled medical hands such as doctors, nurses and mid wives 
(HNO, 2016). These issues thus become major issues of health concern as it poses greater threat 
to the region and the country at large. Lack of medical care in the region will only aggravate the 
rate of mortality as this has been the phenomenon in the region before the emergence of the Boko 
Haram insurrection.  
5.4.6 Education System 
Education is another sector that has suffered greatly in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Before the 
conflict broke out, western education has received enormous clamour for rejection from different 
quarters in the Northern part of Nigeria. A major proponent is the Boko Haram which is against 
western education. This explains why they vigorously campaign against all forms of western 
education and this greatly reflects in their various attacks as they consciously target and destroy 
institutions of learning be it primary, secondary and tertiary (literature on attacks on schools). The 
start-off of the conflict led to a distortion in the education sphere and has totally destabilized the 
education system within the region. Nearly 3 million children between the ages of (3 – 17) have 
therefore being deprived of education in the region most especially in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa 
where the conflict is intense (IDP Protection Strategy, 2015). It was observed in the communities 
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that make up the study area that many schools were burnt down making academic activities 
grounded in the communities. In fact, AM-1, AMB-1, BG-1, BB-1, YY-1, YK-1 noted that the 
education system within the region most especially in their communities is non-functional as their 
children do not have access to good education since the crisis started.  
The IDP Protection Strategy report asserted that displaced and non-displaced children and 
education personnel living in the affected areas are not able to access education. Moreover, over 
645 teachers have also been murdered, more than 19,000 displaced, over 591,200 schools have 
been damaged and destroyed (IDP Protection Strategy, 2015). The report further showed that in 
some communities and areas where the conflict is fierce, schooling has been stalled consistently 
for years. Almost all the school structures, teaching and learning materials in the newly recovered 
areas under the siege of Boko Haram were found to have been destroyed and burnt. This is 
perfectly the case as observed in the selected communities for the study.  
Moreover, the local population in the selected communities made a shocking revelation. This 
concerns the teachers and academic workers in the communities. A lot of them have been targeted 
and killed by the Boko Haram while others who survived the various attacks fled the communities. 
According to FGD-YKM the Boko Haram attacks forcefully drove away the teachers from the 
community when they were being subject of kidnap and attacks. However, in communities like 
Yusufari, and Michika, some forms of academic activities were observed. When asked who the 
facilitators were, they were referred to as volunteers who decided to come in and salvage the 
situation.   
 The IDP Protection Strategy report further stated that in some communities and areas where the 
conflict is fierce, schooling has been stalled consistently for years. This has adversely impacted on 
host communities as they become overpopulated due to the influx of people from affected areas 
especially children. A few schools that exist in host communities become overpopulated thus 
straining the limited and scare educational facilities that existed before the upheaval. Almost all 
the school structures, teaching and learning materials in the newly recovered areas under the siege 
of Boko Haram were found to have been destroyed and burnt.  
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Education workers have been consistently targeted. Personal death threats have led to the exit of a 
large number of teachers from the profession while some of them have fled the conflict zones. 
Teachers available are largely untrained and to great extent cannot handle and tackle the massive 
psychosocial needs of learners who might have been through various degrees of trauma as a result 
of the conflict. In fact, the report pointed out that the untrained teachers and volunteers available 
to support and salvage the deteriorated education situation in the newly recovered areas equally 
have some psychological needs as they are also victims of the conflict. Eventually, a large number 
of these displaced children especially those that have gone through secondary displacement 
movements become susceptible to exploitation (sexual and labour), abduction and recruitment into 
armed groups as well as early pregnancy and marriage. Two cases in point are the recent abduction 
of the Chibok and Dapchi girls in Nigeria by the Boko Haram sect (see Table 5.1). These girls 
were abducted in their schools and were driven pass the various security check points in those 
communities. While some of them have been released for an exchange with some of the Boko 
Haram members in custody some are yet to be released.  This situation puts a whole generation at 
risk of being denied access to education which will have adverse effect on the individual and also 
on the society as a whole. 
5.4.7 Disrupted economic activities 
Finally, another fundamental impact the Boko Haram insurgency has brought on the border 
communities is a disorder in the economic activities within the communities. Based on 
observation, farming which happens to be the main pre-occupation of the local population in the 
North-Eastern Nigeria has suffered a set-back. Farmlands have been destroyed because of the 
illegal activities of the Boko Haram on them. They have stolen all the farm produce leaving the 
farmland bare. It was further observed that economic activities are stalled in all the selected border 
communities. The major economic activity in the communities is trade and this has been affected 
drastically as villagers only offer for sale produce from their farmlands. Again, the markets have 
been destroyed making business activities impossible. In communities where there are banks, 
many of them have been burnt down after they were looted by members of the sect making banking 
activities interrupted for a long time in those communities. The local population attested to this. 
They all expressed their grief at this phenomenon. According to the respondents, the insurgency 
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has brought a setback to them as their markets, and farmlands have been destroyed and their 
monies, and food items carted away by members of the sect. Many of those who ran out of the 
communities and later returned according to FGD-AMW, FGD-AMBW, FGD-BGW, and FGD-
BBW met their houses looted upon their return into the communities. Their groceries, farm 
produce and so on had been carted away by the Boko Haram.  
This conforms with the assertion of Fanuise and Entz, (2017) that the Boko Haram having 
destroyed the farmlands in the region have been confirmed to have shifted their activities to 
stealing livestock, cattle mostly. This is because they have exhausted the looted foodstuffs and, in 
a bid to survive they need to find a substitute. Searcey, (2016) substantiated this with the assertion 
that members of the sect have reportedly being found across the Nigerian borders moving cattle 
stolen from Cameroon. In fact, a Boko Haram spokesman, Abu Aisha who is said to may have 
been killed in early 2015, was a notorious cattle rustler (Fanuise and Entz, 2017). 
The infiltration of the Boko Haram in some trading activities in the region has made the Nigerian 
military ban such trade as it contributes to the sustenance of the sect. In 2016, the Nigerian 
government stopped the cattle trade in Maiduguri, which is where Boko Haram hails from, on the 
speculation that the trade contributes to the continuous survival of the group (Ulf, 2016). It was 
discovered that Boko Haram with the help of some middlemen sold stolen cattle in cattle markets 
in Maiduguri at ridiculous prices, so they can be sold off on time (Obaji, 2017). Again, in 2017, 
fish trade was banned in communities close to the Boko Haram enclaves (Searcey and Gilbertson, 
2017). This was done to avoid penetration by the Boko Haram as it has been discovered that many 
of their agents come to such markets to sell some of the goods and items stolen from the people 
during the different attacks carried out. 
5.5 Challenges to Cross-Border Counter insurgency in Nigeria 
In the face of counter-terrorism strategies employed by the federal government so far, Boko Haram 
continues to wax strong by constantly making its presence known in Nigeria and as well spreading 
its tentacles across neighbouring states. This is manifested through its activities and constant 
attacks. This depicts a failure of the government’s effort towards fighting the scourge of Boko 
Haram in the country and in the North-Eastern region in particular. The reasons will be discussed 
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below. 
To start with, the initial military approach introduced to combat the Boko Haram is largely 
problematic. As opined by Solomon, (2016) it is certainly difficult to fight an organization when 
its identity is not known, let alone its organizational structure. Owing from the lack of human 
intelligence resources the Nigerian state has on the Boko Haram sect, it was difficult for her to 
ascertain the true identity of the sect. Hussein pointed further that while an article in the Economist 
noted that Boko Haram has no vivid structure and chain of command, it is difficult to admit this 
because of a number of reasons such as the sect’s sophisticated mode of carrying out attacks, its 
significantly increasing public relations crusade, its capacity to carry out attacks in several places 
simultaneously, and its ability to send recruits in hundreds for training in supporting countries. This 
suggests that even though the sect seems a loose organization to the observers, this does not mean 
that the chain of command does not exist in the real sense. This is what the intelligence unit need 
to unravel so that there can be a more coordinated response and approach in combating the sect. 
Hussein suggested that for the sect to be able to carry out multiple attacks and coordinated bombings 
in different cities, presupposes the fact that the sect operate a decentralized system allowing each 
cell carry out its own activities independently. This reality therefore faults the federal government’s 
response and explains Thomson, (2012 p56) position that, 
The government’s reaction to rely solely on force is probably a mistake, even if 
understandable-its heavy-handed reactions of the past have exacerbated the 
situation and may have even pushed the Boko Haram to enhance its capabilities. 
Further, as often is the case with insurgencies, portions of the local population is 
apt to sympathize more with insurgents when the government reacts harshly. This 
is critical since sympathy may manifest in additional manpower and resources. In 
addition, Boko Haram likely has connections to resources and training it did not 
have even three years ago. 
Secondly, the huge financial strength of Boko Haram poses a big threat to the government. The 
support the sect has al binitio has being so sustaining while it keeps increasing as the sect continue 
to engage in criminal acts. As pointed out earlier, the sect got financial support from wealthy 
individuals like the former Borno State Commissioner Alhaji Buji Foi and some politicians, 
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prominent northern businessmen and religious leaders, as well as various Gulf charities to fund its 
nefarious activities (Solomon, 2012). According to Fanusie and Entz, (2017), the sect engages in 
both low and high kidnapping while huge sum is being demanded from captives as ransom. This 
forms a major source of finance for the sect as they constantly have captives from who ransom is 
demanded (UNICEF, 2017; Cooper, 2016). In April 2013, the group demanded and got a ransom 
of $3 million for a French family (BBC, 2013). Moreover, between February and June 2013, the 
sect was suspected to be behind the kidnapping of many Nigerian officials who could comfortably 
afford ransoms of $10,000 (Zenn, 2013). Quite a number of reporting in 2013 pointed to the former 
as different cases of kidnap of former and serving local government officials were reported and 
ransoms of tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars were paid (Audu, 2013). Furthermore, in 2014, 
Boko Haram kidnapped Cameroon’s vice prime minister’s wife. Months later, she was released 
alongside some Chinese hostages, and others for a huge ransom (Sahara Reporter, 2014). Thus, 
the then -U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield averred 
in mid-2014 that, “Our suspicions are that they are surviving on very lucrative criminal activities 
that involve kidnappings” as the sect was believed to have gotten a huge proceed of up to $1 
million as ransoms making this the sect’s largest source of funding (Wroughton and Stewart, 
2014).  
Boko Haram has also gotten funds through extortion and taxation (Fanusie and Entz, 2016). The 
sect has succeeded in extorting money from the Nigerian government, and from individual, 
successful business owners, in exchange for protection. Multiple news reports have asserted that 
some Nigerian government officials paid Boko Haram to stay clear of their spheres and localities. 
A spokesperson of the sect mentioned that governors of Bauchi and Kano states in northern Nigeria 
paid them off to stay clear of their states. Between 2004 and 2011, this ‘protection’ fee in totality 
summed up over $1.5 million dollars per year for the two states involved (The Nation, 2012). The 
informant affirmed that the governor of Kano went into this agreement with Boko Haram in 2004, 
while his counterpart in Bauchi started in 2008 (The Nation, 2012). Boko Haram started a number 
of attacks on both states when they stopped payment in 2011 (Aziken, et’al 2012). The sect equally 
gives out cash gifts, no-interest loans, and support in-kind, to local merchants.  
This strategy is used to gain the trust of these individuals and use them for the sect’s whims and 
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caprices. The strategy has also assisted them in recruiting, smuggle and steal for the sect (Gift and 
Graft, 2016). ‘As recently as April 2016, Boko Haram recruited fighters by giving young 
entrepreneurs loans, and then conscripting them into the group when they could not repay’ (Nigeria 
Armed Forces, 2016; CNN, 2016). Inhabitants of territories held and controlled by Boko Haram 
from 2013 to 2014, were taxed and failure to pay attracted a death penalty (Zenn, 2013). The sect 
frequently threatens business merchants, government officials and politicians with abduction if 
they resist and fail to pay the group for protection (Chothia, 2015).  
In 2013, the sect robbed not less than 30 banks. In 2014 the sect was said to have made an overall 
revenue of $6 million from bank robberies (Fanusie and Entz, 2017). In addition, the sect has been 
found engaging in stealing from villagers. Items such as gold and jewelries were found with some 
apprehended members of the sect 100 likewise large number of cattle has been reported stolen 
from villagers by the sect 101 considering the fact that the market price for each cattle is $500 
(IRIN, 2015). In fact, findings from the field trip of this study revealed that in some villages the 
sect has made a firm arrangement with villagers to make a delivery of certain items at the end of 
every month in exchange for protection else they would be killed. Some farms were wholly taken 
over in some localities (Fanusie and Entz, 2017).  
Finally, Boko Haram has gotten support from famous terrorist. According to Fanusie and Entz, 
(2017) Osama bin Laden supported the sect with a seed $3 million in 2002 while al-Shabaab and 
AQIM and other terror organisations have consistently funded the sect though the amount is 
unclear (Agbiboa, 2013). Some estimates put the annual amount of money that AQIM sends to 
Boko Haram at “low hundreds of thousands of dollars,” (Stewart and Wroughton, 2014) inclusive 
of a direct assistance of $250,000 in 2012 (Cocks, 2014). This solid financial base has made the 
sect strong enough to carry on its activities irrespective of the counter move by the government. 
The lingering Boko Haram scourge is closely linked to the spread of radical Islamist ideologies 
(Adesoji, 2012). Sufism which has been the predominant form of Islam in Africa is gradually 
giving way to the Salafist orientation, which is keenly linked to radical Islam (Hills, 2010). 
Salafist Islam (a school of thought associated with jihad and the austere Saudi tradition of 
Wahhabism) (Johnson, 2011) denounce the West and Western culture and strictly adheres to the 
reading of the Koran. “It believes in direct action to both purify Islam of false believers and to 
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reinstate Islam across the world Islamic community” (Hill, 2010). These radical ideologies 
consist of the Tablighi clerics from Pakistan and Wahhabist preachers from Saudi Arabia 
(Adesoji, 2012).  Wahhabism most especially is keenly associated to the ideology of Al-Oaeda 
and allied militant Isla mist groups. A cogent stand these fundamentalists hold is the notion that 
the Nigerian state is “taagut, or evil, unworthy of allegiance on the part of true Muslims” 
(Adesoji, 2010). This religious perception explains why politicians, policemen and other 
government officials have being subject of attack by the sect.  
One major factor that has led to this switch is technology. Technology through the internet and 
social media has led to a geometric growth of radicalisation amongst Nigeria's Muslims especially 
the youths (Adesoji, 2010). Mohammed Yusuf who himself was a trained Salafist and was a great 
ardent of the fourteenth-century jihad ideologue, Ibn Taymiyyah nurtured his followers with this 
doctrine before he was killed (Johnson, 2011). Though he was killed but his message outlived him 
and has become strong and viral within the North-Eastern region. In the process, the Nigerian 
government was not conscious of this wave hence the geometric spread of the radical ideology 
among Muslims in the country.  
This is surprising given that the sole aim of the group is to convert Nigeria and Nigerians into a 
Muslim Wahhabist state and Muslim Wahhabists respectively and the fact that it recruits from the 
Ibn Taymiyyah network of schools which Yusuf had created (Mantzikos, 2010). The result was 
partially the difficulty of the state's intelligence apparatus to penetrate Boko Haram. Consequently, 
recruitment seems to be taking place amongst disciples of a particular religious leader in a 
particular area (Adesoji, 2010). These ties of allegiance between disciple and religious clerics are 
strongly difficult to break. Also, the government has failed to recognize the potential assets that 
extremist groups readily have at their disposal (Solomon, 2012). The existence of armed gangs in 
northern region in Nigeria is a vivid example. These groups include but not limited to the 
Almajirai, Van Tauri, Van Daba, Van Banga and Van Dauka Amariya etc. and they readily serve 
as a recruitment ground for extremist groups (Adesoji, 2010).  
Furthermore, counter-terrorism drive by the government is crippled by the inability of the 
Nigerian Police Force to gather intelligence and carryout forensic investigations (Solomon, 2012). 
According to Amnesty International (2011 p30), “most police stations do not document their 
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work, there is no database for fingerprints,' no systematic forensic investigation methodology, 
only two forensic laboratory facilities, few trained forensic staff and insufficient budgets for 
investigations”. As a result, the police tend to rely solely on confessions made and most often 
extracted from suspects under duress, which form 60 per cent of all prosecutions. In this situation 
the culprits often escape while the innocent suffers. In terrorism cases, despite the large numbers 
of arrests of alleged Boko Haram members and sympathizers made, none has been followed up 
to a reasonable conclusion. This has therefore led to the growth of Boko Haram and its ability to 
constantly carry out its dastardly activities. Corruption within the rank and file of the Nigerian 
Police therefore, continues to undermine and impede the counter-terrorism initiatives (Amnesty 
International, 2011).  
In addition, while military action taken by the Nigerian government is deemed necessary in its 
counter-terrorism effort, apprehensions have been raised over the modus operandi of its 
engagement and the general conduct of troops in the theatre of operations which is far from the 
standard rule of engagement (Eugene, 2016). Counter-terrorism efforts are therefore proving 
unproductive owing from the brutality unleashed by the security forces on the wrong targets 
(Solomon, 2012). The Joint Military Task Force (JTF) in the North-Eastern region, engages in 
unlawful killings, arrests, extortion and intimidation of the poor residents of the region. Evidences 
has shown that rather that carry out intelligence-driven operations, the JTF randomly engage in 
house-to-house searches, and at times shooting young men found in these homes (Amnesty 
International, 2011). This was the tactics used by the JTF in the Kaleri Ngomari Custain area in 
Maiduguri on 9th July 2011, where twenty-five people were shot dead in their homes by officers 
of the JTF, women and children were molested, homes were burnt, and many men and boys were 
reported missing (Amnesty International, 2011). Such immoderations on the part of the JTF 
can only reduce the popularity of the government’s drive against the terrorism as security services 
meant to protect their lives and properties come into their homes to kill their husbands and sons 
and molest their women and daughters.  
This situation is further worsened by the fact that officers who make up the JTF are not indegenes 
of that region and are not familiar with the culture and the terrain of that locale and as such the 
inhabitants see themselves as under the siege of a foreign security arrangement (Nicoll, 2011). 
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This has therefore made the people loose trust in the counter-terrorism efforts of the government 
because of the wide gap that exists between the promises made and performance witnessed. While 
promises have been made to end the scourge of Boko Haram, the actions of government do not 
reflect nor show a sense of commitment to this drive.  
5.6 The Effect of Boko Haram insurgency on women and children in border 
communities          
The need to provide a gender and age-based analysis of the overspill effects of Boko Haram 
insurgency arises from increase involvement of women and children in terrorist attacks. Since the 
emergence of Boko Haram insurgency, children and women have been the most vulnerable and 
affected individuals, especially if gender and age variance of community setting is to be 
considered. UNICEF (2016) explains that the years of violence by Boko Haram in Africa’s Lake 
Chad basin have seen 1.4 million children displaced, while at least one million are still trapped in 
hard-to-reach areas. Obviously, displacement around border communities of Nigeria and her 
neighbours, especially where Refugee camps are situated involves a high number of children and 
women more than men. Reliefweb (2017) and Dobbs (2016) note that Minawao camp in far North 
Cameroon initially hosted 18,000 refugees, but now it hosts almost 65,000 people who are 
Nigerians fleeing Boko Haram atrocities, and more than half of the refugees are women (54 per 
cent), reflecting the camp demographic, and about half are 35 years or older. 
What Boko Haram has exposed women and children to can be somewhat used to explain the 
nature, trend and dynamics of the terrorist conflict. Women have particularly been used to boost 
the morale of Boko Haram militias, who are promised wives in return for partaking in the terrorist 
movement or courses. In the testimony of Crisis Group, 
By awarding “wives” to fighters, it attracted male recruits and incentivised 
combatants. Because women were not considered a threat, female followers and 
forced conscripts could initially circulate in government-controlled areas more 
easily, as spies, messengers, recruiters and smugglers. For the same reason, from 
mid-2014, Boko Haram turned to female suicide bombers. Increasingly pressed for 
manpower, it also trained women to fight (Crisis Group, 2016: i.). 
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The role and position of women in Northern Nigeria spells why the terrorist group took advantage 
of women and again resorted to using them as object of attack or defence during combat. Al-
Manteeqi (2016) establishes that under Sharia, women are not equal to men, but are considered 
inferior; they are object of many disparaging remarks in the earliest Islamic source texts, which 
form the basis for Sharia. Considering Sharia law in Northern Nigeria, women have not been 
treated any way better than the earliest Islamic texts conceived of them. Typically, the region’s 
religious and cultural norms, codified in law, have defined women’s status through marriage and 
childbearing and largely confined them to a domestic role (International Crisis Group, 2016). In 
the same vein, women take little or no active part in public functions such as politics. Apparently, 
they are politically marginalized due to the Islamic practice of Purdah. 
In the North-Eastern Nigeria, Islamic values and practices make women’s role and positions 
predominantly unequal with and subordinate to men. Although some Islamic women work as 
traders, farmers, and some others work in offices, but their roles have largely been subsisted under 
men’s leadership. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that socio-economic and political 
marginalization of women is a significant factor or influence in the Boko Haram crisis. Mercy 
Corps (2016) and Onuoha (2014) prove that some youth or rather women out of the decision to 
improve their socio-economic status, gain self-protection, retained their marital status and promote 
their religious beliefs allied with Boko Haram. Though, the vast majority of women have been 
acclaimed to join the terrorist group by force conscription, namely abduction or threat of death. 
Bloom and Matfess (2016) hold that Boko Haram’s reliance upon women and girls are a part of 
an organizational shift that includes forced conscription as a means of generating support. The 
terrorist group did not gain full or worldwide recognition until it kidnapped the Chibok girls. Even 
when it bombed the UN building in Abuja in 2011, the attention and responses of the International 
communities were not as decisive and loud as it was with the abduction of the Chibok girls on 14 
April 2014. Ever since Boko Haram caught the world attention through rampage abduction and 
hostage taking of the Chibok girls, it has not ceased to conduct its activities by placing women and 
girls at the center. It is a common and current tactics of Boko Haram to use women and girls for 
suicide bombing. As pointed out by Searcey (2016), it is most baffling the ability of the insurgent 
group to turn captured women and girls into killers. 
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Examining Boko Haram strategy, women or girls and children are a source of fuel for their 
struggle, just as the other terrorist groups in the world, such as Al Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) or ISIS, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Hezbollah and Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have employed women’s influence in furthering their courses (Sawicki, 
2016 and DePetris, 2014). In the analysis of Bloom and Matfess (2016), Boko Haram depends on 
female operatives disproportionately as Tamil Tigers, who have used 46 women over the course 
of 10 years, while Boko Haram in a little over a year and a half have deployed more than 90 
women. UNICEF (2017) remarks again that since 2014, 117 children have been used in suicide 
attacks in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. It must also be noted that women and children are 
also the ones who always end up the most affected by any war, conflict or violence. 
Bringing to the fore what women and children suffer during natural or man-made crisis, it appears 
that they are naturally vulnerable, but it is the socially constructed male domination or 
marginalization in many societies that make them so. The humanitarian crisis across the border 
communities of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad Republic, where women and children have 
been discovered to dominate records of Refugees and IDPs including those who are critically in 
need of healthcare, education, and rehabilitation, is a living testimony that women and children are 
though vulnerable by systemic causes. Reliefweb (2017) reveals that some 68 per cent of children 
go to school in the camp, far above the Far North’s 46 per cent education rate average, but still 
below the 84 per cent national average in Cameroon. How disturbing children are confided to an 
environment that is absolutely not proper for their upbringing, and again their future is threatened 
by uncertainty. 
Women and children’s health challenges which are as a result of insurgency in the border 
communities reflect another major concern. Oxfam (2016) records how children were at risk of 
death from malnutrition in the Lake Chad region in September 2016. In the same vein, women and 
girls abducted by Boko Haram are mostly victims of rape which make them physically, sexually 
and emotionally abused, and even exposed to sexually transmitted diseases (UNHCR and World 
Bank, 2016). Oxfam (2016) adds that even within camps, rape, sexual abuse or exploitation are 
reported in 50 percent of 20 IDP sites in Nigeria. According to International Crisis Group (2016), 
women being locked up in compounds where most guards and much of the staff are men, have 
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exposed them to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), or led them to “survival sex” with 
camp officials and security personnel in exchange for food, money or permission to leave the 
camp. 
With scarce health resources in border communities hosting Refugees and IDPs, and increased 
health conditions of women and children which are requiring more assistance in camps in Nigeria, 
Cameroon and Niger, Chad, it can be said that there is certainly a big challenge. One of the 
challenges can be understood in the slogan of “there is no place like home”, which became active 
as some Refugees and IDPs in Minawao in Cameroon express their desire to return to their own 
town and villages in North-Eastern Nigeria, amidst relative and improving security situation 
(UNHCR, 2016). And those who did not wish to be returned yet, they raised concerns over living 
conditions, provision of basic services and damage to their homes and infrastructure, including 
schools and health centres. Categorically speaking, persons who are affected by insurgency, 
particularly women and children are in dare need to regain their life and improve their livelihood. 
The willingness of IDPs to return home can be understood from the fact that many of them had 
sources of reaching their basic needs before insurgency displaced them and their labours. However, 
the inability to meet the basic needs, namely of food, shelter, clothing, and exercise great freedom 
or liberty beyond being restricted to camps counts for the challenges experienced by IDPs. But a 
primary challenge of IDPs is getting enough foods, water, shelter, health care, and other forms of 
human security. ACAPS (2016) reveals that IDPs within host communities or informal camps 
report the highest needs followed by those in formal (government-run) camps. ACAPS also notes 
that returning IDPs usually receive no assistance despite the near-total destruction of homes and 
civil infrastructure. 
For instance, being concerned about the health challenges of the displaced people and local 
communities, Medecins Sans Frontiere (MSF) had to open three primary health care clinics that 
serve the needs of around 35,000 people. The agency also runs a 72-bed hospital in Maimusari, 
which includes a 12-bed maternity unit and 60 beds for pediatrics, nutrition, and intensive care 
(MSF, 2015). Among other assistance rendered by MSF include providing support to local health 
authorities in Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad; treating the wounded, running mobile clinics, 
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and providing mental health care etc. In a remark of how women and children are particularly 
vulnerable on the basis of health challenges, MSF notes that in Chad 
Some pregnant women have walked several kilometers in searing heat to seek 
medical attention. People are living without proper shelter, and do not have access 
to food or clean drinking water. Due to the harsh living conditions and the rainy 
season, we are already treating patients with diarrhea, malaria, and respiratory 
infections, as well as malnourished children (MSF, 2015). 
The challenges that women and children have been exposed to due to Boko Haram insurgency is 
really not small. But there is acutely limited or inadequate fund to meet the displaced person’s 
needs, in which women and children have the highest number. In order to meet the need of women 
and children, UNICEF alongside its partner has to dramatically increase its humanitarian response 
in 2016, while in 2017, it requests over US$ 195 million to meet the lifesaving needs of women 
and children across the Lake Chad basin (UNICEF, 2017). UNICEF’s request for huge fund for 
lifesaving is because the majority of displaced persons are sheltered by communities who 
themselves count among the world’s most vulnerable. Obviously, social amenities such as health 
centres, roads and water pipelines are not on ground or already damaged by insurgent attacks. 
Nonetheless, another gender and age-based oppression that women and children have been 
subjected to is the stigma and humiliation that those who were raped or impregnated by Boko 
Haram insurgents suffer in the communities. According to International Crisis Group (2016), the 
blurred lines between Boko Haram member, abductee, slave, wife, supporter, victim and 
sympathizer have left many women and girls with the stigma of association. In other words, it is 
becoming tough due to socio-cultural and religious issues to reintegrate, rehabilitate and 
reconstruct both communities and individual affected with the Boko Haram crisis. Women who 
became pregnant from rape or force marriage with Boko Haram are particular stigmatized in the 
form of isolation and alienation by some family members. In effect, children who are born out of 
such conditions are considered as fellows who share the blood of criminal fathers. 
Humanitarian agencies such as the UNICEF, Mercy Corps and conflict analysts have severally 
remarked on how women, girls and children are discriminated against by their society because 
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they were found to have been involved with the Boko Haram militants, either by rape, force 
marriage, suicide bombing, or as militia. In a reference, Carsten (2017) reveals how UNICEF was 
obliged to inform people that the children or girls that were used as fighters or bombers by Boko 
Haram are themselves victims and not perpetrators. Of course, the majority of victims of Boko 
Haram, and who are more discriminated against are girls and women; those who survived but lost 
their body part (s) to suicide bombing mission and now disabled; those who are rescued from the 
custody of the militants, are largely ostracized and rejected by their family, or discriminated against 
by the society at large. 
The challenges of those who are directly or indirectly affected by the Boko Haram insurgency is 
so enormous that the government of the Lake Chad regions, international communities, NGOs and 
concern individuals are seeking urgent ways to end the crisis. In other words, the humanitarian 
crisis that is generated by the Boko Haram attacks is one of the highly rated challenges in the world 
(Akinbi, 2015 and Shuaibu et al., 2015a). It is therefore germane to work out a well-structured 
strategy or modality that will help to arrest the insurgency in no longtime. To be frank, the root 
causes of the insurgency which includes poverty, political and religious extremism, 
unemployment, and corruption must be sincerely addressed in order to end the conflict. And it 
must be noted that if the remote causes of the Boko Haram insurgency are not addressed, the 
consequence would be that the whole military effort that has helped to reduce Boko Haram 
hostility would be a waste. 
A reason for emphasizing that the root causes of Boko Haram crisis must be first attended to, for 
example poverty, is because studies have identified that poverty is a major influence in the 
insurgency. While citing David Francis, Ahmed (2014) establishes that majority of foot soldiers 
of Boko Haram are not Muslim fanatics but poor kids who were turned against their corrupt 
country by a charismatic leader, namely late Mohammed Yusuf, and presently, Abubakar Shekau. 
This explains why the government of affected countries must stand up to their responsibilities as 
leaders and provide the basic amenities as well as enabling environment that would help citizens 
to have a better life. At this point, governments are supposed to raise the standard of their 
empowerment programmes so that people, especially the less privilege are truly empowered and 
their feeling of injustice, inequality and inequity in the society are corrected. 
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At this juncture, a point to note is that comprehensive solution to the Boko Haram generated 
humanitarian crisis is not the obligation of the government of Lake Chad region alone. This is why 
apart from the earlier mentioned world agencies; World Food Programme is using its office to 
provide support to affected persons by insurgency in the Lake Chad region. The strategy of 
providing assistance to reduce humanitarian crisis alone cannot help to end the Boko Haram 
insurgency. What will help is that each country and government of the Lake Chad region focuses 
their strategies on conflict resolution and peace building, even as military operation is ongoing. 
They need to engage in programmes that will positively and directly impact the life of the people 
and reduce their socio-economic challenges, especially in the Northeastern Nigeria where the 
insurgency is prevalent. Government should imbibe the agenda of UNDP making work or job 
creation a priority rather than aids given. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the past and present security situation in the North-Eastern Nigeria. The 
discussion shows that the peace of the region has been and remains continuously truncated for long 
due to the menace of the Boko Haram Sect within the region. The research demonstrated that the 
activities of the sect have largely led to massive humanitarian crisis in the region causing the local 
population a lot of pain and hardship. The effects of such attacks have been enormous, and it 
remains so in the North-Eastern Nigeria. These effects keep lingering as the government has not 
being able to intervene and tackle such in a timely way. The North-Eastern Nigeria and the border 
communities thus continue to thrive in the mess the Boko Haram insurgency has brought upon 
them. This situation clearly exposes the fragility of the Nigerian state. According to Rotberg, 
(2003), he posits that in a fragile state, there is a tendency for increased criminal violence which 
further weakens the states’ authority. He further notes that fragile states are usually associated with 
tensed and dangerous warring factions which most times leads to a breakdown of law and order, 
increased humanitarian disaster, which concerns not only the people directly affected, but also 
people in neighbouring states. Collier et al. (2003) identify three ripple effects that emerge from 
armed conflict: the internal effects (as a result of the burdens of internally displaced persons), the 
regional effects (as a result of the burden of refugee influx) and the global effect (as a result of 
foreign interventionists). According to them, these three ripple effects generate unique challenges. 
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While the internal effects constitute a problem of food insecurity, loss of means of livelihood, rise 
in the displacement of people, the regional effect constitute spread of contagious diseases across 
borders from the inflow of refugees, and the global effect constitutes the growth in narcotics trade 
across borders sponsored by foreign non-state actors. A reality of these three dimensions is what 
is witnessed in the North-Eastern Nigeria.  
The succeeding chapter will examine the various responses especially from the Nigerian 
government to this phenomenon and the result such interventions have yielded if there is any. In a 
conflict situation like this, the attention of the humanitarian organizations both international and 
local is drawn to such areas for the sake of rescuing victims and relocating them to safe places. 
This chapter will equally access their efforts in the area and achievements thus far recorded.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
INTERVENTIONS BY STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS TO 
CROSS-BORDER INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH-EASTERN 
NIGERIA 
6.0 Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on discussing and analyzing the efforts of the different levels of governments 
towards combating the scourge of cross-border insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Primary 
data gathered, supported with existing literature are utilized to show the interventions of the 
government towards the activities of the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern region most 
particularly, within the study area. The analysis shows the interventions of the concerned 
institutions of government in terms of combating the Boko Haram insurgents and responding to 
the humanitarian crisis in the troubled communities and IDP camps in the North-Eastern Nigeria. 
In other words, the successes, failures, acceptance and non-acceptance of such institutions by the 
people identified within the study area are considered. In the same vein, in every disaster region, 
it is expected that humanitarian organizations (indigenous or international) find their ways into 
such areas purposely to save life and reduce the rate of casualties. Owing from this, the activities 
of different humanitarian organizations are discussed and their successes analysed.  
6.1 Legal Strategies to cross-border counter-insurgency in Nigeria 
As the growing activities of the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria became alarming, and 
the international community especially the United States began to black list Nigeria and Nigerians, 
it became imperative for the Nigerian government to intervene by joining the league of countries 
who have come up with a legal frame work to combat terrorism. Accordingly, the Nigerian 
government took immediate action by coming up with a legal framework to fight the scourge of 
Boko Haram. After series of letters and reminders from the Nigerian president to the National 
Assembly, the Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) was passed. This process birthed the Terrorism 
Preventive Act (TPA) on the 22nd February 2011 and was signed by the president in June 2011 
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(Sampson & Onuoha, 2011). This anti-terrorism bill was adopted by former president Jonathan’s 
administration to deal with exigencies caused by the Boko Haram (Omede, 2011). According to 
(FGN 2013; Umar 2013) the TPA focuses on the arrest and trial process of terror suspects, ways 
to stop terrorism, and break the link between international terrorist groups and the Boko Haram. 
The Money Laundering Prohibition Act (MPLA) of 2011 which was revised in 2012 targets at 
cutting off the local and international financial support system of terrorism and covers the trial 
process of terrorists (FGN 2011b, 2012). The Federal High Courts who remain custodians of the 
law interpret these laws to government agencies that are responsible for implementing them like 
the ONSA, EFCC, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), The 
Inspector General of Police, Prisons Service, and Nigerian Fraud Intelligence Unit (NFIU) (FGN 
2011a, b, 2012, 2013). 
Moreover, on the 30th April 2014, a comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Strategy 
(NACTEST), was ratified for execution by President Goodluck Jonathan. This strategy 
encapsulates the counter-terrorism policy framework of the federal government of Nigeria. 
Barkindo and Bryans (2016) averred that it is a comprehensive approach that is meant to identify 
the core causes of terrorist activities and fashion out the best way to tackle it. According to Dasuki 
(2013: 9) “NACTEST takes a comprehensive and holistic approach to counter-terrorism”. This 
approach though recommends a soft and hard method, it place much emphasis on the soft method 
which aims at delving into the root causes of extremism/ religious radicalisation and/ or terrorism 
and come up with the best way to dissuade the furtherance of such (Ackerman 2014). The second 
edition was approved under President Buhari’s government on August 23, 2016 (Eugene, 2016). This 
initiative put into consideration the nature of the terrorist threat that confronts Nigeria, the response 
procedures and mechanism, and the roles stakeholders have to play, and finally the institutions that are 
needed in the counter-terrorism mission (Eugene, 2016). The NACTEST is systematically grouped into 
five work streams, each with its distinct objectives. They are: 
a. Forestall  
b. Secure  
c. Identify  
d. Prepare  
e. Implement.  
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While ‘Forestall’ is targeted at stopping and discouraging people from becoming terrorists, 
‘Secure’ reinforces protection capacity of the state and its citizens against terrorists, ‘Identify’ aims 
at pre-empting danger through early warning signs and detection, ‘Prepare’ aims at mitigating the 
impact of terrorist attacks while ‘Implement’ work stream gives an outline of how coordinated 
cross-governmental institutions can be coordinated for an effective counter-terrorism drive 
(Eugene, 2012). This move by the government though considered as an applaudable initiative did 
not come without its flaws. However, in its flaws, this counter-terrorism move gained support from 
external actors and made it possible for Nigeria to be classified as one of the countries committed 
to fighting terrorism. These countries include USA, Australia, Canada, Belgium, New Zealand, 
Ethiopia, Indonesia, France, South Africa, India, United Kingdom, Italy, Pakistan, Turkey, 
Philippines, Uganda, among others. Also, the promulgation of the Act made the United States 
remove Nigeria from the global list of states sponsoring and supporting terrorism on July 24, 2011, 
thereby ending the diplomatic rift that existed between the two countries. 
6.2 Security response(s) to cross-border counter-insurgency in Nigeria 
Owing from the high wave of atrocities committed by the Boko Haram sect, in June 2011 the 
Federal Government under former President Jonathan set up a special Joint Task Force (JTF) in 
Maiduguri comprising of the military (Army, Air Force and Navy), the Department of State 
Security (DSS) and the Nigerian Police Force (Amnesty International, 2011). This unified move 
was strategically made to promote a unity of purpose and that resources can be pooled together 
among the security forces to fight a common enemy and restore peace and order in the North-
Eastern Nigeria. Again, the formation of the JTF was done to promote the unrestricted flow of 
information between the different security units without any of the security unit feeling superior 
or undermined as the case may be. Again, as part of a counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the 
federal government the National Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT) was established in 2007 but 
became active in 2012. The central point of the NEPT is composed of several security agencies 
and government departments charged with the responsibility of implementing Nigeria’s national 
security agenda (Azazi, 2012). The activities of the NFPT were overseen by the Office of the 
National Security Adviser (ONSA), while the National Security Council, headed by the President, 
occasionally met to evaluate national security matters. The Nigerian government equally 
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established a committee to oversee the security in North-Eastern Nigeria.  
The JTF was deployed at different times with different code names based on the enormity of the 
security threat that exists at the time. The first JTF to be deployed in 2011 was named “Operation 
Restore Order I”. Later in the year, two more units were launched and were named “Operation 
Restore Order II and III”. In 2013, after the declaration of a state of emergency in three North-
Eastern Nigeria namely, Adamawa, Yobe and Borno states, Operation BOYONA was established. 
The acronym connotes Borno, Yobe, Nasarawa and Adamawa Operation. In the same year, 
Operation BOYONA was renamed Operation Zaman Lafiya and in 2015 it was renamed Operation 
Lafia Doyle meaning “Peace by force” (Osakwe & Audu, 2017). 
 In 2011, 30,000 security personnel forming part of the special task force were deployed to put in 
force the state of emergency and curfew declared (Omede, 2011). Moreover, to control, monitor 
movement and the smuggling of arms in and out of the country through the porous borders in the 
affected region, the government closed the borders between northern Nigeria and neighbouring 
states of Niger, Chad and Cameroun (Baldauf, 2012; Forest, 2012) which has been proven to be 
constantly utilized by the Boko Haram. Solomon (2012) averred that the fundamental motive 
behind closing these borders was to prevent Boko Haram members from escaping into 
neighbouring countries and as well thwart all efforts at receiving reinforcements of foreign jihadi 
elements who have found their ways into the region illegally. The whole idea was to make it easy 
for the JTF to fish out members of the sects before escaping into neigbouring states. However, 
given the porous nature of the country’s borders, this measure was greeted with minimal success 
as some of these elements still found their ways into the country through its porous borders. This 
gives room to question the implementation process of the country’s security strategy as reiterated 
by the Chief of Defence Staff, General Andrew Azazi who noted that the Nigerian national security 
strategy lays emphasis on the safety of Nigerians and the stability of the country and as such relies 
solely on utilizing new technology needed for surveillance, intelligence, informatics and detection 
as the basis for achieving the counter-terrorism strategy (Azazi, 2012).  
The alarming rate at which terrorism was thriving in the region was worrisome (Johnson, 2012). 
Various attacks that have been carried out in the region attest to the foregoing. Reports have it that 
the Boko Haram has carried out many attacks in the region, one of which is the Magumeri local 
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government. Magumeri has witnessed series of attacks that had claimed the lives of many of the 
local population. Again, it was in this local government that an ambush was laid for exploration 
workers of the “Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), contracted staff of University 
of Maiduguri and 15 members Civilian JTF” in Bornoyesu village which led to the killing and 
kidnap of some of them in July 2017 (Vanguard, 2017). Perhaps, it can be said that for members 
of the civilian JTF to be on the team shows that they were more trusted not only by the local 
population but also by the government institutions and organizations when it comes to combating 
the Boko Haram. Furthermore, the Kurmiri village was attacked on the 18th September 2017. This 
attack led to the death of the Chief Imam of the community and four others who were slaughtered. 
According to investigation, members of the sect came into the village “armed with Ak47 rifles, 
knives and machetes, but decided to execute their victims using knives, because the sounds of 
gunshots would alert many residents hence repel the attacks” (Vanguard, 2017). During this attack, 
no reprisal attack was recorded. 
In addition, an attack carried out on the 6th of November 2017 is another case in point. Thousands 
of the local population had to flee the town of Gulak the headquarters of the Madagali local 
government when they noticed that the military and the police has being displaced by members of 
the Boko Haram Sect. A fleeing resident who spoke to Daily Trust confirmed the above assertion. 
According to him “Boko Haram have taken over the town and thousands of us are here in the bush, 
we don't know what will happen to us. Can't you hear gun shots?" (Daily Trust, 2017). It is to be 
noted also that a recent Boko Haram attack on the Magumeri community on the 26th November 
2017, claimed the lives of three soldiers and six others injured. It was reported that “the terrorists 
attempted to dislodge the Forward Operational Base in Magumeri, Borno State” so as to 
successfully carry out their attack on the community (Vanguard, 2017). However, they eventually 
succeeded in attacking and destroying some platforms in the community asides the soldiers killed 
(Vanguard, 2017).  
Moreover, as the insurgent became more sophisticated in their operations, their attention was 
shifted from soft targets to hard targets because they now have the capacity to carry out such 
attacks. Therefore, the insurgents took their activities to the Federal Capital City (FCT), Abuja 
where a successful attack was carried out on the UN headquarters on the 26th August 2011. To 
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curb a reoccurrence of the preceding, the government took some steps to enable the security forces 
function optimally. Check points were erected at various entry points and strategic locations 
around the federal capital territory of Abuja after it was attacked twice. Also, while a state of 
emergency was declared in specific location of Niger, Borno, Yobe, and Plateau states where the 
activities of the sect is being felt (Economists, 2011), a curfew was enforced in Adamawa state 
(BBC News, 2012).  
To sum it up, the above mentioned attacks and many more carried out in the North-Eastern Nigeria 
were either carried out without any reprisal attack from the JTF, or with a reprisal attack but were 
over powered by the insurgents due to heavy fire arms they used and the guerilla kind of warfare 
that they utilize mostly and in fact, the Threat Tactic Report on Boko Haram categorically stated 
that different reports have shown that, the Nigerian soldiers in the Baga town stripped off their 
uniforms to avoid being targeted by the advancing militants (TRADOC, 2015). To curtail this, the 
JTF embarked on a door to door search in the communities to fish out insurgents that take cover 
in those communities.  
According to Osakwe & Audu (2017) the JTF engaged in a fierce search on suspected houses 
shielding and sheltering insurgents in a bid to root them out from their hiding place. This yielded 
substantial results as suspected terrorists and many who were caught with arms were arrested. In 
the same process, diverse kinds of arms, IEDs and ammunitions were recovered from the 
operation. Despite this workable strategy employed, it did not deter the Boko Haram from 
spreading its tentacles and advancing its activities which further worsen the state of security in the 
region. At a point, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) established in 1998 by the military 
of four countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad were co-opted to join the JTF in the 
fight against the Boko Haram. Benin Republic joined after the kidnap of the Chibok girls in April 
2014 (Amnesty International 2015). This troop got support from the AU and Lake Chad Basin 
Commission (LCBC) with its headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 
2016).  
The MNJTF by virtue of operating at the borders was mandated to protect the local population in 
the border communities against Boko Haram attack. The troop patrolled these areas and as 
occasion demanded assisted the JTF when and where necessary (Dietrich 2015). In June 2016, the 
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Nigerian Air Force in collaboration with the MNJTF launched an air strike to provide aerial cover 
for the MNJTF who was able to identify and bombed various enclaves of the Boko Haram within 
the Lake Chad Basin (Mutum 2016). The same operation was repeated in October 2017, leaving 
all the terrorists dead in Urga, Borno State (Erunke 2017). However, the co-operation between the 
MNJTF and JTF suffered a setback as it triggered fierce attacks by the Boko Haram in the Lake 
Chad region making the security situation deteriorate. They carried out these attacks to discourage 
countries from directing supporting Nigeria in its fight against terrorism (Buchanan-Clarke and 
Lekalake 2016).  
Many countries gave a hand of support to Nigeria in its fight against terrorism. In 2014, France 
and the UK offered training to the Nigerian military on counter-terrorism (Pate 2014). Germany, 
France and Italy offered technical and security support to the Nigerian military (Adele, 2013). 
Between 2013 and 2014, China, France, Canada, Israel, South Africa, Russia, Norway, Ukraine, 
Czech Republic, and the United States supplied arms to Nigeria to combat Boko Haram (Amnesty 
International, 2015). Some drones and five combat helicopters were donated to the Nigerian 
government by the Chinese and Russian governments respectively. Further, in September 2014, 
the Russian government trained officers of the Nigerian military, DSS and Police (Amnesty 
International, 2015). Cameroon asides the support rendered through the MNJTF, allowed the 
Nigerian Air Force access to its airspace should there be a need to do so. Finally, the UK trained 
the Nigerian judiciary and rendered advice on crisis management, legal frameworks and bomb 
scene management (Amnesty International, 2015). 
At some instances, the Boko Haram took the fight to the door steps of police offices and military 
formations killing many officers on duty (see table 5.1). As a matter of fact, findings from the field 
show that the border communities were neglected and left to their fate in the face of the looming 
perils that confronted them. This was the assertion of majority of the respondents and a section of 
the local population interacted with in the selected border communities. Many of the community 
leaders pointed out that the communities were neglected by the government for a very long time 
including the officers of the local government who were supposed to be more concerned in the 
plight and pains of the local population. According to AM-2, AMB-1, FGD-BBM the population 
were left to suffer, and they did suffer in the hands of the Boko Haram who came into the 
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community at will and did whatever pleased them without any counter action to prevent their 
constant incursion.  
A question was posed to the researcher in Yunusari: “as you can see when you came in, you can 
see a lot of buildings and properties destroyed and burnt down. Who did you think burnt them 
down? And why did you think they were able to burn them down?” (YY-1 November 2017). He 
gave a very succinct response to this amid tears by women around him: “the Boko Haram burnt 
down our houses, schools, hospitals, bridges, and so on because they were not stopped in anyway. 
The government didn’t show up at all” (YY-1 November 2017). During group discussions with 
the women in the selected communities, their responses were given amid sorrowful mood and tears 
as it made so many of them remember the losses they have suffered. They pointed that they lost 
many of their loved ones during the different attacks of the Boko Haram on their communities. 
They made it very clear that this was possible for the Boko Haram because the government did not 
intervene. Furthermore, the youths displayed their displeasure with great annoyance while being 
engaged in group discussions. Though they corroborated the above assertion, they further pointed 
out that the failure of government to intervene made them regrouped themselves to defend their 
people and fight back oppressing Boko Haram.  
However, though many of the respondents in the selected communities were of the view that they 
were neglected, it was observed that the military were present at strategic locations around the 
communities. It therefore appeared that the respondents were not being sincere by accusing the 
government of total neglect. In their responses some were of the opinion that they came in late to 
intervene when the Boko Haram had succeeded in killing their people and destroying their 
properties. Some others were indifferent as they pointed that their presence has brought nothing 
good to them. Although, some of the leaders said that though the military intervened lately but 
their presence at least douses the tension in the communities. The general perception of the 
respondents showed that the presence of the military has being a curse to them as they have not 
really assisted them in anyway. They believe that the JTF are not capable of confronting and 
combating members of the Boko Haram sect especially when they come to attack. They averred 
further that on different instances have they seen members of the JTF take to their heels when the 
Boko Haram come into the communities. Though officers of the JTF seems willing to combat the 
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menace of the Boko Haram, they have proven not to be capable of dealing with such (FGD-AMV, 
FGD-AMBV, FGD-BBC, FGD-YKV November 2017). Furthermore, they pointed that the youths 
and their male children are being harassed and maltreated by officers of the JTF for reasons best 
known to them. FGDs conducted with the youths equally confirmed this act. They said that officers 
of the JTF harass them a lot because they see them as informants for the Boko Haram (FGD-AMY, 
FGD-AMBY, FGD-BGY, FGD-BBY, FGD-YYY November 2017). According to a youth, he said 
that  
we the young men and male children in the community are not free to move around 
and this has made us stay home most of the time without doing anything 
meaningful. This is what we are facing. Our friends cannot even come and greet us 
again……. (FGD-YYY November 2017).     
The occurrences in the North-Eastern Nigeria attest to the above. There have been reported cases 
of officers of the JTF maltreating the local population. Such incidence was reported to have 
repeated itself in Borno state on the 12th of November 2017 where a soldier was said to have shot 
his superior for trying to stop him from maltreating civilians and thereafter shot himself. This 
incidence clearly shows that an officer has taken this to the extreme by committing murder and 
suicide at the same time for being restrained from maltreating civilians (Channels Television, 
2017). Furthermore, many of the respondents lamented on hardship they have brought on them. 
One of which is the restriction on their movements within the communities and outside of the 
communities. They are not allowed free movement and that has impeded them from carrying out 
their daily activities. Many of the FGDs conducted revealed this. According to some women in 
Michika community, they said that they are not being allowed to go the farms and markets freely 
and as such they are not free to carry out their activities (FGD-AMM November 2017). This partly 
confirms the assertions of (Ulf, 2016) on the ban the Nigerian government placed on cattle trade 
in some cattle markets in Maiduguri and (Searcey and Gilbertson, 2017) on fish trade in 
communities close to the Boko Haram enclave. 
Again, in the face of a counter moves and reprisal attacks by the federal government, Boko Haram 
continues to wax strong. It furthers spreads its tentacles by recruiting from neighbouring countries 
like Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali (Smith, 2011). This assertion was made by Boko Haram 
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spokesmen as they make bold their recruitment activities in these states. It is therefore on this 
premise that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has out rightly 
condemned Boko Haram and thrown its full weight behind the Nigerian government’s security 
initiative against the group. Significantly, in spite of the security measures introduced, the violent 
attacks of Boko Haram increased both in geographical scope and gravity. The security situation 
became horrifying that, the former President Jonathan admitted and confessed that the current 
security state is worse than the civil war of 1967 – 1970 which saw the death of more than a 
million people. He noted that during the war, it was quite easy to predict rightly where the enemy’s 
attack will come from but in the current circumstance, it was a herculean task thus making it 
difficult to launch a targeted combat. General Owoye Andrew Azazi, the National Security 
Advisor to President Jonathan until 22 June 2012, also alluded to failure in combating terrorism. 
He stated that this was caused as a result of the ill-equipped nature of military infrastructure 
making it difficult to tackle the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram (Solomon, 2012). There is 
need to examine this claim in a separate study which aims at comparing the military readiness of 
the Nigerian Military with that of Boko Haram. 
6.3 Humanitarian responses in the selected border communities vis-a-vis cross-
border insurgency 
In a disaster zone, it is expected that a major consequence will be a high toll of humanitarian 
situation. The humanitarian responses such situation receive goes a long way in determining the 
level of humanitarian crisis it creates. By implication, for the situation not to get worsened, it is 
imperative that a swift intervention is necessary so that lives can be saved. As pointed out by 
Salkida (2012), the persistent violence witnessed in the North-Eastern Nigeria most especially in 
the border communities who are the first victims of the Boko Haram attacks has led to a high toll 
of humanitarian crisis. According to him, life in many communities of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe 
states, such as Kawuri, Gwoza, Gamboru-Ngala, Baga, Shuwa, Konduga, Bama, Ajigin, Giwa, 
Chibok, have been characteristically horrible, brutish and, to say the least, short-lived. The region 
has stopped to observe civil order, resulting in the awful humanitarian situation showing up in the 
form of human right abuses, human casualties, displacement both internal and external, loss of 
means of livelihood, lack of medical facilities and absence of other basic amenities (OCHA, 2018). 
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The humanitarian situation in North-Eastern Nigeria degenerated further because various 
humanitarian agencies having limited access to rural areas where the displaced persons are 
relocated (Salkida, 2012). However, recent literature reveals that the huge humanitarian crisis 
created by the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria since 2009 latter attracted 
attention and responses from different quarters such as the government (state and federal), to 
address both the security and humanitarian needs in a bid to save lives that are in danger within 
the region. According to NORTHEAST: Humanitarian Response (2017),  
Insecurity, especially in parts of Borno and Yobe states, continues to hamper 
humanitarian operations. However, through coordinated logistics and civil-
military coordination efforts, humanitarian teams can now, to the extent possible, 
access areas previously inaccessible and new depths of devastation are 
uncovered: civilians desperately need food, health, protection, shelter, water and 
sanitation, and education (NORTHEAST: Humanitarian Response, 2017). 
 
The above shows that at some point, the affected communities became accessible to different state 
and non-state actors to render humanitarian assistance needed for daily survival such as food items, 
clothing, and shelter etc. It is therefore imperative to investigate the various humanitarian responses 
of the aforementioned actors ranging from the Nigerian government through its agencies known as 
the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the State Emergency Management 
Agency (SEMA), to government of different nations and the Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) both international and national to victims and communities affected by the activities of the 
Boko Haram.  
6.3.1 Responses from Government actors  
National legislation accords the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) the legal 
responsibility for disaster response across the states of the federation even though there are state 
and local governments with their own specialized agencies who directly govern the affairs of such 
environments. Unfortunately, NEMA established in 1990 for disaster management in Nigeria 
failed to launch operation in the North-Eastern Nigeria when the Boko Haram activities started in 
2009 and left many homeless, helpless and stranded. Not until when there were agitations and 
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outcry from different quarters that the federal government swing into action in 2015 and at this 
time, the humanitarian situation had gone worse that it became impossible for the agencies to 
handle such solely (Chidume, et’al 2018). However, according to HCA (2017) the Nigerian 
government through NEMA and SEMA have to some extent attended to the humanitarian needs 
of the affected people in the North-Eastern Nigeria especially in the area of food. Chidume, et’al 
(2018) noted that NEMA provided several relief items and support services to affected areas part 
of which were sympathy visitations by its officials to affected areas, bereaved individuals, 
community leaders and District Heads and IDP camps. It equally, organized several meetings and 
workshops to sensitize corps members and secondary school students in selected schools on 
disaster management. These efforts NEMA carried out in collaboration with relevant stakeholders 
as SEMA, local governments, community leaders and NGOs.  
The HCA (2017) gave a disappointing remark on the efforts of the Nigerian government to 
humanitarian crisis so far in the North-Eastern Nigeria. This crisis started at a time when there was 
economic buoyancy and as such, it was expected that the government will take the lead by making 
available sufficient funds and disaster management experts needed for a comprehensive 
humanitarian response, but the opposite was the case. In the communities selected for the study, 
there was a mixed opinion among the local population from interviews and FGD sessions 
conducted. While some believed the government through NEMA and SEMA brought relief to 
them through the provision of food items, some averred that they got no support from them. The 
youths most especially, falls into this group. The community leaders all alluded to the fact that at 
some point, the government through NEMA and SEMA came to their rescue by supplying them 
with food items. According to the AMB-1:  
NEMA, came from the federal government while SEMA was from the state 
government and they all helped in various ways, they brought help since when the 
people of Gwoza were here when we ran and came back, they still brought us some 
relief materials. The government came with their help around early 2015 from 
January to march because that was the time when people were coming back. The 
assistance provided by the government was also very impactful because people 
relied on it for their survival, this was due to the fact that even those who had 
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something which they left behind were destroyed or stolen, so when people came 
back there was nothing, it was the assistance from the government that helped us 
to recover from this loss (AMB-1 November 2017).  
Again, FGD-AMW, FGD-AMBW, FGD-BGW, FGD-YYW confirmed that the government 
brought them food items therefore making it possible for them to have food to eat. Moreover, a 
group of women in Michika community pointed out that even though the government brought help 
to the community, the distribution process was not fair. While some got the food items many did 
not get (FGD-AMW November 2017). This response showed that there was partiality in the 
distribution of the limited items brought. The youths equally gave their views on the support given 
to them by the government. Virtually all the youths in the communities were of the opinion that 
the government (federal, state and local) has neglected them for too long and they have not assisted 
them in any way. They all pointed this out angrily during the FGD sessions.  
Equally, they were embittered against the government because of the way the security situation is 
being handled which continues to endanger the lives of the local population. They pointed out that 
the performances of the JTF have proven to them that they are not capable of fighting the Boko 
Haram whenever they attack. Reiterating this AM-5 was very blunt in his opinion as he noted that 
government has not done anything as he is yet to see any from the government. The view of AMB-
4 also corroborates the above as he said that he has not seen any, but he has heard in the news that 
support has being rendered to the local population. The response of BB-4 was slightly different. 
He averred that though the government brought support to the community, but it was done for a 
brief time as they no longer come again. According to him:  
NEMA and SEMA helped us at first, but now maybe they are tired, they are not 
helping us like before. Getting to months now, we've not heard from government. 
People live on support they get from humanitarian organizations (BB-4 November 
2017). 
Furthermore, there was a mixed opinion among the local security groups known as the Civilian 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) by the Nigerian government in the border communities. While the FGD-
AMV, FGD-AMBV opined that their communities got support from the government, but it has 
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not been consistent, others FGD-BGC, FGD-BBC, FGD-YYV, FGD-YKV were emphatic on the 
point that the government has not supported the communities in anyway. They displayed their 
displeasure in their expressions.  
Asides the financial constraints that NEMA faces, there was a scuffle for relevance between 
NEMA and SEMA which impeded a successful implementation of whatever activity NEMA is set 
to do. Murtala and Abubakar (2017) gave a clear explanation of why governments’ responses are 
limited through NEMA and SEMA in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Firstly, it was identified that the 
relation and coordination between the federal and state governments is weak. According to them, 
“everyday governance is marked by weak and limited inter-governmental coordination”. 
Basically, the State governments favoured a situation where the federal government through 
NEMA and the humanitarian organizations liaise with them through the SEMAs for a coordinated 
humanitarian response in the troubled areas. As a result of this state governments turned down 
decisions reached at the federal level between NEMA and the humanitarian organizations.  
While this power play went on, the situation in the affected areas became worsened. They averred 
further the state of unpreparedness of the state governments to tackle the menace of the Boko 
Haram in the region. SEMAs across the region had low capacity to respond immediately because 
they had no specific budget allocation meaning that they only make request as the occasion 
demands Murtala and Abubakar (2017). In response to this, the federal government insisted that 
the status quo remains because the state governments have been accused of misappropriation of 
funds and lack of transparency and accountability (Murtala and Abubakar, 2017). Specifically, 
they (the federal government) noted that there has been reports of corruption, diversion of 
humanitarian materials, and a misuse of power against the state governments. Moreover, the 
SEMAs being an office under the Ministry of Special Duties have their staff members drawn from 
civil service of the states who do not have the experience and the needed training for humanitarian 
engagements. This therefore reflects in their operations and activities in the various camps as they 
do not have the knowledge of “camp coordination and management, food distribution or protection 
monitoring, and were not familiar with the operating procedures of international humanitarian 
organisations” (Murtala and Abubakar, 2017).  
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Owing from the preceding, obviously, not much has been done by the Nigerian government 
through NEMA to respond to the humanitarian challenges the Boko Haram insurgency has created 
in the North-Eastern Nigeria. As a result, there is heavy dependence on external state actors and 
non-state actors for humanitarian responses in the troubled region and in the various IDP camps.  
6.3.2 Responses from international actors and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) 
Historically, NGOs especially, international humanitarian organisations have proven to play a key 
role in conflict zones where humanitarian crisis is prevalent. They are always seen at the fore front 
of violent scenes saving lives at the expense of their own lives. Also, international state actors 
mostly developed countries of the world identify with the plight of nations that experience such 
humanitarian crisis by sending relief materials and giving donations to alleviate the suffering and 
hardship that the population in the disaster zones face. Since the Boko Haram violence started in 
2009, the presence of various international humanitarian organisations have been seen in the 
North-Eastern Nigeria, most especially in the different IDP camps where the daily needs needed 
for survival are provided to the IDPs. According to OCHA (2017: 4) “90 humanitarian 
organisations have provided aid to 4.5 million people, including nearly 2 million people who are 
reached monthly with food assistance and over 4 million people who received out-patient or 
medical health services”.  Equally, donations have being given in cash or in kind by different 
countries, international organisations and concerned individuals. 
From the preceding, the bulk of the funds available for such missions in the region are donations 
given by international state actors, Non-Governmental Organizations and concerned individuals 
to attend to the needs of the troubled and displaced persons. Odufowokan (2016) gave a list of 
donors towards this course in the North-Eastern Nigeria. The World Bank donated 800 million US 
dollars, Aliko Dangote and some concerned individuals donated 6.5 million naira, the United 
Nations Development Funds (UNDP) donated 248 million US dollars. Some concerned countries 
equally gave their support among which are the Australian government with a donation of 9 million 
Naira, the United States government with a donation of 200 million dollars, and Saudi Arabia who 
donated 750 million naira. Also, support materials were donated such as food items in the forms 
of grains such as millet, maize, ground nut, sorghum, and cowpea, clothing such as dresses for 
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women and children and shelter in the form of tents. Chart 6.1 and table 6.1 show the support 
gotten from different countries and agencies in figures in 2015 and in the current year 2019.  
Figure 6. 1 Humanitarian Donations in Nigeria as at 2015  
 
Source: Murtala and Abubakar (2017) 
Table 6. 1 Donations from Countries and Organizations as at January 2019 
 
Source: Nigeria 2019 (Humanitarian Response Plan).  
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From the chart and table, the United States government topped the list with a donation of 
48,364,272 million US dollars while the Switzerland government gave the least with a sum of 
1,296,415 million US dollars. These donations summed up reveal the heavy support the 
humanitarian crisis in the region has attracted from different concerned actors.  
In the selected border communities, one unique feature observed was the noticeable presence of 
different humanitarian organizations in the form of structures and facilities erected majorly Water, 
Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) facilities. These facilities create a hygienic environment suitable 
for daily survival. In the responses of the study population, they noted that support have been 
gotten from the different NGOs at various times and such support to an extent has aided their 
survival in the communities. The relief materials have been in the form of food items, medicine, 
clothing etc. The leaders of the communities alluded that the support they have gotten from such 
organisations and NGOs have made it possible for the local population to survive. In his response, 
AMB-1 revealed that there was a formal meeting organized by the United Nations High 
Commissioner in Adamawa state. He said categorically that,  
we had A UN-Adamawa Peace Initiative in partnership with United Nations High 
Commissioner for refugees, they bought to us food items such as rice, Maize, beans 
and other organizations too who gave their own assistance, but I can’t remember 
some of them gave their assistance through red cross and were given to us. They 
sent items like blankets, mats, Rice, Maize, Milk which was given to women, cloths 
for little children, drugs for pregnant women and the sick as well as the old people 
to relieve them of the hardship/pains they incurred while escaping for their lives 
(AMB-1 November 2017).  
According to AMB-4 some humanitarian organizations (names not mentioned) came from Abuja 
and did some recordings of the losses of the local people which was of course majorly their houses, 
market places and government structures. Equally, they selected 50 people, 25 Muslim and 25 
Christian under Muslim Council and CAN respectively who they provided with grinding machines 
and sewing machines.  
241 
 
The youths also made it very clear that different NGOs have come to their rescue. According to 
FGD-AMBY, FGD-BGY, FGD-YKV they have gotten support from different NGOs’ specifically 
from the UNICEF, UNHCR, SALVATION WONDERS, SAVE THE CHILDREN, ACTION 
AGAINST HUNGER and the RED CROSS. They asserted that the NGOs have provided them 
with food items, shelter and even sunk boreholes in some communities. This falls in line with the 
opinion of the FGD-AMBV who pointed out that the NGOs provided them with zincs for roofing 
and food stuffs so that the people can have food to eat. They were thrilled that they (NGOs) were 
really concerned about the well-being of the people in the community.  
Observing the whole humanitarian assistance the selected communities have gotten, of a truth, it 
can be said that the NGOs are doing their best to support the local population but far from it, the 
support gotten so far does not match the needs on ground indicating a high level of poverty in these 
communities. This then raises questions as to where the support systems of NEMA, SEMA, and 
other actors focuses on. The best response will be that they focus more on the IDPs in the various 
camps. It is then imperative to examine the level of response in the IDP camps.  
Examining the situation at the various IDP camps established by the government and where 
attention is more concentrated more than the border communities, the reality is the same. 
According to Lenshie and Yenda (2016), the challenges IDPs face in the various IDP camps across 
the North-Eastern Nigeria are enormous and overwhelming. Due to the huge number of the IDPs 
in the region, there is a heightened level of competition for limited resources such as water, food 
and temporary shelter. As a matter of fact, the scarcity of these essential needs has led to what can 
be termed a secondary displacement of the IDPs in the region. There have been reports of several 
human rights violation of both women and children as they constitute a huge percentage of the 
IDPs. These are violation of the Kampala Convention which mandates a creation of a better living 
conditions for the IDPs through the provision of basic needs essential for daily survival. Asides 
reports on abuses, there have been reports of malnutrition in the IDP camps (Ojeme 2016) and 
cases of food items and other relief materials diverted by officials of the camps for their personal 
use and the elites (Faluyi, et’al 2019). In Yobe State, two traditional rulers were sanctioned for 
diverting food items meant for the IDPs (Joel 2016). There have been accusations of some 
government officials repackaging and diverting grains donated for the the IDP camps especially 
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rice (Haruna 2016c) and a few NGOs sourcing for financial aid from international donors under 
the pretense of carrying that out in the interest of the IDPs (Salau 2016).   
Figure 6.1 shows the irritating scene of how children queue for food in their tattered clothes and 
embarrassing bowls and plates. The sight of this tells the living conditions these children and their 
mothers are subjected to in the various IDP camps across the region.  
Figure 6. 2 Internally displaced children queue to receive supplementary food in Banki IDP 
camp, Borno state, North-Eastern Nigeria 
 
Source: Murtala and Abubakar (2017) 
If the above explained is the situation in the recognized IDP camps, then it shows that the 
observations made in the selected border communities are valid, hence the need for urgent attention 
in those communities.  
6.4 Conclusion 
The responses of the government to the security and humanitarian challenges that exist in the 
border communities are limited and does not seem capable of addressing the phenomenon in the 
region. In 2011 when the Nigerian government responded to the Boko Haram crisis, she was 
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compelled to doing so due to the actions of the international community especially the United 
States sanction which blacklisted Nigeria as one of the supporters of terrorism in the world. With 
this move, the Nigerian government swung into action by coming up with a legal framework to 
tackle the menace of Boko Haram. In June 2011 the Anti-Terrorism Act was signed by the 
president and a tactical security force was established to combat the Boko Haram insurgency and 
restore peace and normalcy in the North-Eastern Nigeria. It should be noted that this effort was 
coming 2 years after the insurgency started. In 2009 the insurgents used local arms and weapons 
to attack soft targets but in 2011, they have become more grounded and sophisticated in their 
activities due to the support they got from international terrorist networks. This reflected in their 
modus operandi and the kind of weapons that they use. The simple interpretation of this is that 
while the Boko Haram was busy causing mayhem in the North-Eastern Nigeria and collaborating 
with the likes of Al Quaeda and ISIS, the Nigerian government was not concerned and did not take 
the insurgents serious. So, their response was coming at a time when the armoury of the Boko 
Haram could match that of the Nigerian military. This and many other factors as discussed in 
chapter five have made it difficult for the government to totally dislodge and end Boko Haram 
attacks in the North-Eastern Nigeria.  
Moreover, the same could be said of the government’s response to the humanitarian crisis that 
ensued form the Boko Haram menace. The response of the government through NEMA did not 
come until when the various actors pushed the government to do so in 2015. And at this time, the 
humanitarian needs had increased geometrically signifying the huge funds needed for such 
intervention. In responding to the humanitarian needs, the Nigerian government was impeded in a 
way. The federal and state governments had severed relationships which trickled down to their 
agencies (NEMA and SEMAs) meant to carry out such missions. Both agencies were involved in 
a tussle for relevance. While the SEMAs want to be in full control of the ground work, NEMA 
equally wants to exercise its right as the national body empowered to respond to and manage 
disaster in Nigeria. This among many other factors articulated in chapter five have impeded the 
federal government from effectively responding to the humanitarian challenge that exists in the 
North-Eastern Nigeria.  
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It is therefore clear that the responses of international state actors, international organisations, 
NGOs both local and international and concerned individuals have been the major source of 
humanitarian intervention witnessed in the North-Eastern Nigeria while the concerned institution 
which is the Nigerian government has been lackadaisical in the whole process. No wonder it was 
observed in the selected communities that the only visible presence of government was the military 
who the local community do not have so much trust in because of their failure to curb and combat 
previous Boko Haram attacks in their communities. According to the 2019 Humanitarian Response 
Plan, the total required funds amounts to US$847,703,581 while the donations on ground amounts 
to US$10,823,698 meaning that so far only a minute fragment of the total needs can be catered for 
as it stands because the available funds can only cover 1.3% of the total needs. Holistically, this 
means that a lot need to be done for the plight of the displaced to be alleviated in the North-Eastern 
Nigeria. However, the border communities should not be left out in the process basically for two 
reasons. Firstly, the local population already have a feeling of neglect by the government 
governing a country they are a part of and secondly, sooner or later, the displaced will find their 
ways back to their communities to resettle. Therefore, it is imperative for these communities to be 
reconstructed and rehabilitated so that the people can return to their normal life.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES OF SELECTED BORDER 
COMMUNITIES IN NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA 
7.0 Introduction 
Cross-border conflict is not particular to Africa or to Nigeria, and same can be said about the 
phenomenon of inhabitants of conflict-ridden border communities employing local strategies to 
cope with crisis. Literature has revealed that regions outside of Africa have been faced with same 
phenomenon and in some ways were able to survive as a result of evolved strategies that made it 
possible for them to cope in one way or the other. As this chapter is dedicated to discussing the 
coping strategies evolved by the communities to tackle and combat the scourge of cross-border 
insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria it is equally imperative to discuss the coping strategies 
border communities have evolved in the past from a global and continental perspective as provided 
in existing literature on the theme of coping strategies by marginalized communities across the 
different continents of the world. Succeeding is the discussion on the coping strategies selected 
border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria came up with for continuing survival in the 
communities and from this a conceptual model from the findings of the study to situate the 
dynamics of coping strategies in selected border communities vis-a-vis cross-border insurgency 
witnessed in the North-Eastern Nigeria will evolve. Finally, though coping strategies assist greatly 
to sway through situations confronted with but how sustainable are these strategies to ensure that 
they continue to guarantee survival. It is on this note that it is necessary to dissect the short term 
and long-term effects of these coping strategies based on the information gathered and 
observations made in the communities with a view to making workable suggestions that will 
ameliorate the living conditions of border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria.  
7.1 Coping strategies evolved by the selected border communities 
As established in previous chapters, the nefarious activities of the Boko Haram in the North-
Eastern Nigeria has been gruesome causing serious humanitarian crisis in the region especially in 
the border communities from where they launch attacks. Many in the region have been displaced 
246 
 
as either refugees or Internally Displaced persons (IDPs). According to statistics, in Adamawa and 
Borno states, about 190,000 persons have moved between November 2017 and mid‐August 201. 
While 153,000 are IDPs, 36,000 are returnees (OCHA, 2018). Moreover, despite the presence of 
the JTF in the communities who do their best to curb the Boko Haram insurgency, attacks are still 
being carried out on the communities. The confessions from the local people revealed that the 
government has not helped the situation. The security they provided cannot fight Boko Haram 
hence, the reason why the Boko Haram attack is so intense in the communities. This exposes the 
fragile nature of the Nigerian state. The state has failed in its core function of protecting the lives 
and properties of its citizen. The security situation in the North-Eastern Nigeria is far from being 
resolved as lives of both the civilians and the soldiers are being lost to several attacks by the Boko 
Haram (EASO,2018; TimesLive, 2019), and this continue to have adverse economic and security 
implications (in line with Rotberg, 2003). As this phenomenon continue to thrive, witnessing a 
displacement of people across the region, many continue to live in the border communities where 
the insurgents attack and (or) use as a launch pad whenever an attack was and is to be carried out. 
How these communities continue to survive and exist remain unexplored. This is the lacuna this 
study explored and investigated. 
In the selected border communities, it was observed that the coping strategies evolved by the local 
population were targeted at safety and survival of the local population within the communities. It 
was discovered across the selected communities for this study that the local population generally 
adopted five major pragmatic strategies to ensure their safety and survival within these 
communities. These include:  
i. reconciliation and unity  
ii. vigilance and prayerfulness 
iii. the formation of local vigilante groups  
iv. bargaining.  
These identified strategies which to a great extent, have been deployed by the selected communities 
and ensured their survival will be discussed to demonstrate the different and overlapping patterns 
of their utilization by the selected communities.   
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7.1.1 Reconciliation and Unity 
Unity and oneness are critical factors that guarantee peace and progress in any group, environment 
and community. A community that is partitioned along ethnic, religious and social divide will never 
stand. According to Weran (2017), for peaceful co-existence in any community, there must be 
cooperative and inter-religious dialogue achievable by occasionally creating fora for debates as to 
how to facilitate and improve cooperation among the civil societies, religious leaders, and different 
groups within a space. Without this especially in conflict-prone environment, misconception, 
division, and conflict is bound to erupt. Diverse examples of countries that have experienced and 
some still experiencing this phenomenon include India, Columbia, Venezuela, Sudan, Rwanda, 
Cameroun, Mali among others. In Sudan, Sudan Inter-Religious Council (SIRC) was formed by 
four religious groups namely. The Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), the International People’s 
Friendship (IPF), International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD), and the Society for 
Religious Dialogue (SRD) to consolidate the ideals of co-existence, tolerance and cooperation 
among different religious groups in Sudan (Weran, 2017). The SIRC was commissioned to carry 
out four key functions which are to commence dialogue and facilitate unity among religious leaders, 
guard religious freedom, resolve conflicts between religious groups and lastly to encourage 
cooperation among religious sects.     
Nigeria has a history of ethno-religious conflict resulting from divergent values, interest, and the 
norms of the social group, especially ethnic and religious groups in the Northern Nigeria. This 
easily explains why the Boko Haram insurgency is primarily domiciled in Northern or North-
Eastern Nigeria. Agbiboa, (2015); Shuaibu and Salleh, (2015) noted that religious, economic and 
ecological indices of the northern region reflect that the insurgency stemmed from the remnants of 
conflicts like the Maitatsine, identity and poverty crisis as proven in previous chapters.  Therefore, 
when the Boko Haram attacks started, they began attacking Christians and burning down churches 
in these communities. YY-2, AMB-5, and BG-5 pointed out that many Christians who fled at the 
dawn of the attack never returned into the community as at when the interview was conducted. 
This led to discord and created enmity between the Muslims and the Christians who have lived 
together for years as neighbors and families within the same communities because, the Christians 
saw this as an attack on them and their places of worship. FGD-AMBW, FGD-BGW, FGD-BBW, 
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FGD-YYW, and FGD-YKW attested to this fact most especially women. The core reason for this 
perception among Christians is not farfetched and at this juncture it is important to briefly cast 
back on the evolution of the sect in the Northern Nigeria and why they their attacks led to a rift 
between Christians and Muslims. The radical ideology popularized by Mohammed Yusuf which 
outlived him and thereafter propagated by his disciples was solely meant to Islamize Nigeria. 
According to Mantzikos (2010) the main target of the sect is to convert Nigeria and Nigerians into 
a Muslim Wahhabist state and Muslim Wahhabists respectively and the fact that it recruits from 
the Ibn Taymiyyah network of schools which Yusuf had created attests to the assertion (Mantzikos, 
2010). This was the same phenomenon witnessed in Sudan where the non-Muslims and non-Arabs 
and their culture were assaulted ceaselessly. This took the form of “direct and indirect assault 
which included forcible assimilation (forced Islamization and Aarabization), driving men out, 
internal starvation, force displacement and relocation, indoctrination, rape and other gender 
assaults, aerial bombardment, militia raid, enslavement and malign neglect. These assaults on 
human dignity have been most evident in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains of west and 
central Sudan; and more recently in Darfur, western Sudan” (Beny and Hale, 2015:16).  
In Nigeria Maiduguri precisely, an attack was carried out by the sect on a University residence in 
August 2013. The insurgents killed the men, separated women who are Muslim and the non-
Muslims, and the Christians among them were serially raped (Barkindo et al 2013). Such attacks 
on Christian women by Boko Haram can be regarded as an extension of other institutionalised and 
long-term discriminatory practices against them in northern regions. Onapajo & Uzodike (2012) 
attributed this act against Christian women to the age long discriminatory practices they are 
subjected to, both in the domestic and professional domains in the Northern Nigeria. They have 
fallen victims of acid-attacks for carrying out activities that are termed to be ‘un-Islamic’ or 
‘dishonouring Islam’, such as a refusal to wear the hijab (Turaki 2010). In 2006, riots occurred 
after a Christian female teacher seized a Qur’an from a student and that led to the killing of over 
50 Christians who were mostly women and children. (Alao 2009). 
In the light of the preceding, it is obvious what could be the level of discord and disunity the 
phenomenon of the Boko Haram has caused in these communities where neigbours now became 
foes to themselves and were combat ready should there be a need for that. Moreover, religious 
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leaders could not salvage the situation especially the Christian clerics as they were losing grip of 
their flocks who faced attack daily. Christian clerics interviewed in the border communities in 
Adamawa and Borno States averred that during that period, they were helpless as they were in a 
confused state having to watch over the Christians as their shepherd, making sure that they were 
protected from attacks. However, the tide turned after the Boko Haram attacks got a new dimension. 
In their various attacks, they began attacking and killing Muslim clerics and as well burning down 
Mosques (see Table 5.1) but at this time the discord had already being established to a point that 
members of both faiths has started to harm one another.  
Upon return of the inhabitants into some of the communities, they had to put an end to the 
cacophony between members of both faith by restoring peace and unity which is the only foundation 
upon which the fight against the Boko Haram can be made and planed as it became clear to the 
local population that the Boko Haram attack not just Christians, but they attack everybody found 
within the environment during attacks. This was made clear in the interview sessions conducted 
with the community leaders. They all averred that at the initial stage, the Boko Haram attacks turned 
members of the same community against one another most especially, Christians and Muslims 
which degenerated into intra-community attacks and as such needed to put an end to that for unity 
to be restored into the community. BG-1 noted that “peace needed to be restored among the 
Christians and Muslims in the community because, they were fast becoming enemies” (BG-1 
November 2017).  AMB-4 equally pointed out that, “our home is our home. We are staying and 
praying to God for peace. It has been very difficult. We just adjusted, and everyone try to maintain 
vigilance” (Mubi November 2017). 
This thus led to different efforts targeted at this course. At different points, reconciliation meetings 
were held to reunite warring parties in the communities. It was noted by some leaders of the 
communities that the Bishop of Maiduguri came in and met with the youths and others, preaching 
the message of peace and unity which is a panacea to ensure safety in the community. This move 
was very effective in reuniting the people most especially, the youths. AMB-4 said that:  
when we came back, we started uniting the religious leaders with government 
officials. We called a meeting just to understand each other, and by that we grew 
stronger and suspicious people or movement were reported to the military, that’s 
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how we experience peaceful living. The government, religious leaders and 
traditional leaders were all part of the movement for uniting the community. That’s 
how we were able to co-exist (Mubi November 2017). 
The above assertion seemed a genuine and sincere one as it was observed in the communities 
especially in Adamawa and Borno states that people lived in harmony as they went about their daily 
activities. Worthy of note was the kind of unity and solidarity that existed among the women and 
the youth. This was greatly exhibited during the different interview sessions across the communities 
as they shared their pains and loses together. Despite the past events that turned them against each 
other, they saw the need to put the past behind them for peace to reign in the communities. This 
same strategy was used in Sudan. Regardless of the complicated nature of the conflict, Muslim-
Christian inter-faith and inter- religious initiatives made attempts to address the religious and ethnic 
conflict. For instance, in the north, in 1995, some Arab elites through the Middle East Council of Churches 
inaugurated an Arab group to facilitate Islamic-Christian dialogue (Weran, 2017). This move for unity 
and oneness largely remain a major means through which peace can be restored. In the case of the 
selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria, the reunion formed a strong foundation 
upon which other strategies were built. This will be revealed in succeeding discussions.  
7.1.2 Vigilance and Prayerfulness 
Upon the failure of the state to carry out its security duties of defending the territorial integrity of 
the Nigerian state and as well protecting and safeguarding the inhabitants of peripheral 
communities in the Northern Nigeria most importantly, the North-Eastern region, inhabitants of 
border communities in the region took it up as a duty to defend and protect their domains and as 
well secure the life of inhabitants. Chapter 5 exhaustively discussed the various efforts of the 
government in tackling the menace of the Boko Haram and how and why such efforts have failed 
thus leading to an escalation of the crisis within the region. On return of the inhabitants into their 
communities, as explained in 7.1.1, aggrieved parties especially along religious lines were reunited 
for formidable force to be built to confront the dastardly acts of the Boko Haram. It was on this 
pedestal that the selected border communities were able to rebuild the trust that once existed among 
them which in turn assisted in making unified decisions and carrying out unified actions as well. 
Before many of them were chased out of their communities, the Boko Haram insurgents had come 
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to live with them. They came in as friends who have decided to relocate from their base and resettle 
in the new communities where they found themselves. Little did the inhabitants know that they 
were wolves in sheep clothing.  
As accommodating communities, they were accepted and given assistance for speedy settlement. 
In the process the Boko Haram spies mingled with the people consciously identifying and 
observing their strengths and areas of weakness before they invited their members into the 
communities for actions. Respondents from communities visited in Adamawa and Borno states 
alluded to this assertion pointing out that they fell for it in a big way as they were caught unawares 
in many of the attacks. YY-4, FGD-BGM, FGD-BGW, and FGD-AMM explained that after peace 
was restored into the community, members of the communities discovered that members of the 
Boko Haram lived with them as spies without them knowing. They have mingled and related so 
well with the local population that they know the nook and crannies of the communities. Once they 
are able to have a full grasp of the terrain, they alert their members and then the attack happens. 
AM-1 averred that: 
They (members of the Boko Haram) came into our village to live with us so that 
can be able to spy the activities of the village, they spy from places even on the 
mountain tops. And they also made use of our own people and got series of 
information from them. They even paid some of the people to buy their interest. 
They were also putting soldiers’ uniform and they got the people very confused 
(Michika November 2017). 
 These set of youths opened the researcher up to another dimension of strategy used by the sect. 
Putting on army uniforms made it difficult for the people to distinguish the real soldiers from the 
fake ones and since they are always armed made it impossible for the local people to act.    
This tactic used by the Boko Haram worked so well for them as it reflected on the impact the various 
attacks carried out on the communities had on them. This was possible because the insurgents knew 
where, when and how to attack for a maximum impact to be felt. This dealt a huge blow on many 
of the communities as many lost their lives and many ran for safety. And so, upon return and 
reconciling aggrieved parties, there was a call for vigilance in the communities and as such 
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members were advised to be police of themselves and report any suspicious movement or any 
strange face sighted in the communities. They took a decision to be wary of strange faces especially 
those they never saw before in the communities. The women upon sighting any quickly made a 
report to a male youth or a man close to them who then swings into action by raising alarm for such 
people to be accosted. In the response aggregated such people were approached in fierce manner 
and if no reasonable and convincing responses were advanced by the suspected persons, they were 
either mobbed or taken to the village square for further questioning. FGD-YYW, FGD-BBM, FGD-
BGW noted that many of them (insurgents) that were identified came into the community as 
strangers and they were warmly accepted and welcomed. It was also pointed that upon their arrival, 
they provided them with shelter and food without knowing they are enemies (FGD-AMM, AMB-
1, FGD-AMBM, FGD-BGM November 2017). This close relationship they once had with these 
insurgents assisted them to be able to recognize many members of the sect that come into the 
community as spies thereafter and they were able to apprehend and foil their proposed attacks. 
This strategy has been advanced in the literature as a key strategy for combating insurgency or 
domestic terrorism at various levels be it national or community level. According to the United 
States Department of States (2017) the height of ISIS’s activities in Iraq and Syria, the terrorist 
group got sympathizers from Sweden who were mostly men of immigrant background but not 
related to Syria or Iraq in any way. These men gave their support by leaving Sweden for Syria to 
join the group as foreign terrorist fighters. Report has it that out of the 300 persons who travelled 
to join ISIS, 44 were killed while fighting while 146 returned to Sweden. The return of these 
individuals was viewed with skepticism by the Swedish government as they suspected that the 
returnees could stage an attack on the Swedish soil and even influence others to wanting to travel 
to Syria to fight.  
The Swedish Security Services (SAPO). In late 2016, SAPO intimated the public through its media 
of a reduction in the number of travelers. As a result, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 
(SCCA) embarked on awareness program by linking up with different agencies and communities 
sensitizing them on the threat that the foreign terrorist fighters pose and the need for them to be 
vigilant for such attacked to be prevented. Again, this same strategy was recommended in late 
2015 after the Paris attacks. In concrete terms, “SÄPO stated the reason for raising the alert level 
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was not due to specific evidence of planning, but for a need to raise the citizenry’s vigilance 
following the Paris attacks” (United States Department of State, 2017: 157). This was the situation 
in many European countries that were targets countries of the refugees and migrants from the 
troubled Syria. It was discovered that ISIS wanted to exploit the situation to smuggle in their 
operatives as refugees into those countries. This forced such countries to raise alarm and call for 
an increased vigilance among its security operatives and citizenry.  
The preceding explicitly shows the potency in this strategy. As primary as it seems, it is capable 
of tackling insurgency at the basic level. It is therefore not out of place for these communities to 
have resolved to this strategy as one of the strategies to tackle insurgency in their communities. 
The communities were able to carry this out religiously as their safety partly depend on it. FGDs 
with the women across the communities revealed that though many of them lived in fear, they had 
to summon courage so that they can be vigilant enough to be able to identify the spies in their 
midst and fish them out. This they did not do without been prayerful. Though, this may seem 
insignificant, it is a strategy which communities believed has so much worked for them. Many of 
the respondents noted that they keep offering prayers to God and they are convinced he hears them. 
Many averred that when it is possible to gather, Muslims offer their prayers in the Mosques while 
the Christians offer theirs in the church. Many of the women pointed out that while their husbands 
and matured sons stood guard in the communities, they stayed at home and prayed for the safety 
of themselves, their husbands and children and the communities at large (FGD-AMW, FGD-
AMBW, FGD-BGW, FGD-BBW, FGD-YYW, FGD-YKW November 2017).  
7.1.3 Formation of local vigilante groups  
Communities seeing the security vacuum created decided to provide security for themselves. All 
they did was making use of an established system to achieve this aim. They converted a group of 
people into the local security force of the communities. As averred in subsequent chapters, 
inhabitants of these selected communities are majorly, farmers, fisher men, traders and hunters. 
Those who are hunters automatically became local security men to guard the communities. They 
were called local vigilante groups formed in the communities for the sole purpose of surveillance 
and policing against the insurgents who continue to attack and kill the people uncontrollably. FGDs 
and interviews revealed that men and the youths in the communities formed the vigilante groups. 
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Part of their duties are to constantly patrol the communities and mount check points at strategic 
locations of the communities. According to AMB-1:  
at first we gathered all the “Jauro’s” (Assistant district heads) for series of 
meetings with the security personnel’s, we formed “Yan Banga” (local Vigilante), 
and all the assistant district heads took precautionary measures in their district 
such that any strange face see in the community will be reported to them and they 
will also report the same to the military, and those local vigilantes were stationed 
in the nook and crannies of the community  where bad people can hide in, or use 
as an exit, all the places were well monitored. In the community, we know all the 
people there, so any strange face we see, we report because we didn’t know where 
the person comes from and the security men will take action on the person. Even in 
the market, the leaders of various associations in the market were all called and 
cautioned to be vigilant, that whatever they find or see as suspicious they should 
report to the authority that was how we were able to protect ourselves (Mubi 
November 2017).    
FGD-AMV, FGD-AMBV, FGD-BGC, FGD-BBC, FGD-YYV, FGD-YKV noted that they made 
use of local weapons in attacking the insurgents such as local guns, machetes, bow and arrow, and 
big stick called “Gora” in Hausa. These local weapons are used in protecting the local people and 
according to them they have proven to be highly effective in helping them defend themselves and 
the communities. FGD-BGC noted that these weapons are always prepared with traditional charms 
for them to be efficacious. BB-2 affirmed same but was particular about local guns, bows and 
arrows which can be shut from afar. Moreover, those who handle such weapons wear some charms 
on their bodies before handling such weapons. This serves as protection for them and it has assisted 
in reducing casualties when they are being attacked by the insurgents.  
Vigilantism is not a new phenomenon in Africa. In fact, it predates the formation of formal policing 
structure in many African countries. In Nigeria, it existed before the Police force was established 
by the British Colonial government in 1861. Vigilante groups serve as a major Informal security 
actor in the provision of security in several African communities. The informal security sector can 
otherwise be termed the “informal policing structure” or the voluntary policing sector (VPS). In 
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Nigeria, these formations have been ascribed different nomenclature such as neighborhood watch, 
vigilantes, traditional police, and community guards of all vigilante is the term widely used. In 
traditional Nigerian communities, vigilantes are known as yan banga (vigilante) in the north, ndi-
nche (guards) in the east, and olodes (hunters/ vigilante), among many more names. According to 
Ogbozor (2016), “Vigilantism dates to the precolonial era, when vigilante groups were small, 
characterized by loose and uncoordinated leadership and activities, and operated independently in 
the various local areas of the federations. As time went on, the vigilante groups unified to form the 
VGN, with operations at the local, state, regional, and national levels”. The position taken by the 
vigilante groups in different communities is justified because the major security force which is 
saddled with maintaining peace and order across the country is insufficient, ill equipped, and ill 
managed. Ogbozor (2016) explained that Nigeria has about 377,000 police officers to protect the 
population of 170 million. Despite that it’s a ratio of one policeman to 500 Nigerians, half the 
number of policemen serve the politicians as security aide to protect them and their families instead 
of been deployed to local communities. He averred that police officers now prefer to take up duties 
where they can get more income and gratifications such as manning security checkpoints, guarding 
central and commercial banks, and serving politicians. This preceding explains why many 
communities in Nigeria have taken up the role of securing their environments. This is called 
community policing16. In like mind, the border communities took a decision that was best for them 
if they really wanted the Boko Haram attacks on their communities to abate or stop eventually. 
 This strategy as averred by the respondents proved effective as the vigilante groups made up of 
the men and the male youths in the communities were courageous enough to confront the 
insurgents and foil many of their attacks in these communities. AMB-1 with a show of pride noted 
“they (the Vigilantes) were attacking in front while the soldiers were following them from behind, 
these charms will make any modern weapon that you know inoperative and ineffective against 
them, so with this method, the vigilantes in front and soldiers coming from behind, that was what 
we used in capturing Mubi from the insurgents. You know when the local vigilantes came in, guns, 
became inoperative in Mubi, because of the local charms, so we believed in this and through the 
 
16 According to Trojanowicz and Buequeroux, (1990, p. 5), “community policing is a new philosophy of policing, 
which emphasizes the working partnership between police officers and citizens in creative ways in order to solve 
community problems relating to crime, fear of crime, and neighborhood disorders”.  
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use of this arms, the local vigilantes will go and apprehend the insurgents face to face with their 
weapons and hand them to the soldiers, and they were only using bow and arrow, Gora, and local 
guns, this was what they did, and even up-to now, traditionally we still value this strategies and 
charms in northern Nigeria” (Mubi November 2017). They (the vigilantes) became prominent to 
an extent that they were recognized as the Civilian Joint task Force (CJTF) and this name soon 
spread across the region.  
According to the Vanguard (2016) “initially, the civilian joint task force (CJTF) members were a 
bunch of idle, but angered young men, residing in different parts of the Northeast, who tolerated 
years of hostility of their population and intrusion of their territories by the insurgents. Fed-up, 
they decided to join the anti-terror war voluntarily to liberate their communities from the hands of 
Boko Haram. Such guts deserved special commendations”. Their activities and achievement in 
providing local security attracted the attention of the Chief of Army Staff General Buratai. He 
officially recognized the groups in the North-Eastern Nigeria and appreciated the giant stride they 
are making in assisting the Joint Task Force (JTF) to combat the Boko Haram. They were therefore 
mandated to work in collaboration with the JTF in securing the communities and warding off any 
form of attack by the deadly Boko Haram sect. They were specifically deployed in gathering 
intelligence for the JTF to block supplies to the Boko Haram camps and to ambush them at the 
point of attack (The Vanguard, 2016).  
7.1.4 Bargaining 
Bargaining as a strategy though could not be linked directly to any of the responses by the local 
people was deduced to be used by some of the border communities selected for the study if not all 
of them in the real sense of it. Though no respondent in all the communities mentioned that this 
measure was utilized at some point or the other, interactions with some officers and men of the 
JTF across board pointed to the fact that communities bargained with the Boko Haram covertly. 
Specifically, in the selected border communities in Yobe state, the researcher observed that the 
local people held back some information as regard the coping strategies they came up with or that 
they have adopted to ensure their survival. In a bid to get useful information from them, they said 
nothing aside the fact that they rendered prayers to God for safety and the efforts of the vigilantes 
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who have taken it up to fight and protect the people against the Boko Haram attacks (FGD-YYW, 
FGD-YKW November 2017).  
They (the local people) expressed their grievance against the government and all its institutions 
that have been involved in the fight against the Boko Haram. They showed so much apathy for the 
JTF present in the communities and picking a clue from that the researcher interacted with the 
members of the JTF. In the process some soldier revealed why this was so. The soldiers noted that 
they are not getting support from the people because they already entered into an agreement with 
the Boko Haram and anyone who divulges useful information stand the risk of been killed. When 
they were asked what they offer the Boko Haram, they (JTF) noted that all the local people have 
to offer was their farm produce which is what the Boko Haram need for survival in their different 
camps as they do not have constant supply of groceries from their sources and giving real time 
information to the insurgents.  
Basically, they (the soldiers) stressed that whatever bargain they did was meant to prevent the 
Boko Haram from attacking their communities thus making them safe while they offer groceries, 
cattle and some other items in exchange monthly. The assertion of the Financial Task Force 
corroborates this finding. According to the report, “Nigerian authorities report that Boko Haram 
members confiscate farms from villagers, or tax farmers and require them to give produce to Boko 
Haram” (FATF, 2016). And since this bargain has been made and sealed, they see the JTF as 
intruders who have come to truncate their peace and safety as the presence of the JTF will only 
attract the attention of the Boko Haram to carry out attacks on the communities. This is so because, 
their presence automatically distorts the arrangement and agreement already made and since the 
Boko Haram need these items for daily survival in their enclave, they have no choice than to attack 
and forcefully get what they need to get from the communities. In the process of this happening, 
many lives are lost.  
A number of reporting in 2013 pointed to different cases of kidnap of former and serving local 
government officials who paid ransoms of tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Boko 
Haram (Audu, 2013). Also, many news reports have asserted that some Nigerian government 
officials paid Boko Haram to stay clear of their spheres and localities. A spokesperson of the sect 
mentioned that governors of Bauchi and Kano states in northern Nigeria paid them off to stay clear 
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of their states. Between 2004 and 2011, this ‘protection’ fee in totality summed up over $1.5 
million dollars per year for the two states involved (The Nation, 2012). The informant affirmed 
that the governor of Kano went into this agreement with Boko Haram in 2004, while his 
counterpart in Bauchi started in 2008 (The Nation, 2012). Boko Haram started a number of attacks 
on both states when they stopped payment in 2011 (Aziken, et’al 2012).  
The sect equally gives out cash gifts, no-interest loans, and support in-kind, to local merchants. 
This strategy is used to gain the trust of these individuals and use them for the sect’s whims and 
caprices. The strategy has also assisted them in recruiting, smuggle and steal for the sect (Gift and 
Graft, 2016). ‘As recently as April 2016, Boko Haram recruited fighters by giving young 
entrepreneurs loans, and then conscripting them into the group when they could not repay’ (Nigeria 
Armed Forces, 2016; CNN, 2016). Inhabitants of territories held and controlled by Boko Haram 
from 2013 to 2014, were taxed and failure to pay attracted a death penalty (Zenn, 2013). This 
corroborates the assertion made by officers of the JTF on the relationship that exist between the 
Boko Haram and some of the communities and of course, this kind of agreement which will be 
done in the hidden will not be relayed publicly by members of the communities for loyalty sake 
and fear of being attacked by the sect as there are moles among the local population. This further 
explains why there is so much apathy for the JTF by the people.    
Figure 7.1. details the conceptual model developed from the analysed coping strategies evolved 
by the communities spanning across the study area.   
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Figure 7. 1 Conceptual model for coping and survival of selected border communities against cross-border insurgency in the 
North-Eastern Nigeria  
CONTEXT(S) 
• No/ Limited Intervention 
• Consistent Attacks 
• Constant Disorder 
• Threat to life and properties 
PHENOMENON 
• Boko Haram 
Insurgency 
CONSEQUENCES 
• Unity 
• Coping 
• Survival 
STRATEGIES 
• Reconciliation and 
Unity 
• Vigilance and 
Prayerfulness 
• Formation of Vigilante 
Groups 
• Bargain 
CAUSAL CONDITIONS 
• Western Education 
• Poverty 
• Unemployment 
• Corruption 
INTERVENING CONDITIONS 
• Religion 
• Cultural Beliefs 
• Resources 
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7.1.5 Causal conditions of the phenomenon of cross-border insurgency and the 
context surrounding the evolvement of the coping strategies  
Basically, four causal conditions where deduced from the findings of the study which 
exclusively led to the evolution of the insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria. These 
conditions were; Western Education, poverty, unemployment and corruption. These 
conditions which have been discussed in chapter two and five, laid the foundation for the start 
of the Boko Haram. Poverty, unemployment and corruption were so endemic in the system 
till date that it led to a protest against western education. The idea was that if the western 
education which we inherited from the colonialist and still forms our model of education 
cannot change the lots of the people and give them a good life, why not jettison it and adopt 
a system to tackle these vices and improve the living conditions of the people. It was on this 
premise that Boko Haram started. Boko Haram literarily means “against western education”. 
The various responses of the government to this sect most especially the killing of its leader 
Muhammed Yusuf was what escalated the situation and made the group a full-fledged terror 
group terrorizing, killing, and maiming the people in the North-Eastern Nigeria especially the 
border communities situated on the peripheral of the Nigerian state.  It grew so strong that it 
was able to attack hard targets in the FCT such as the UN building, Police HQ and other 
security formations both in the FCT and in the North-Eastern Nigeria.  
Therefore, it was based on the preceding that coping strategies for survival were developed 
by the border communities as a response to the overwhelming threats, helpless feelings, and 
psychological stress they were subjected to by the Boko Haram. Such contextual markers 
included; no or limited Intervention on the part of the government, consistent attacks, 
constant disorder, and threat to life and properties in the communities. The first marker is 
closely related to the causal factors which has to do with poverty, unemployment and 
corruption. The fact that these factors existed before the emergence of Boko Haram were an 
indication to the local people that little or no response is likely going to come from the 
government. Coupled with the deeply rooted feeling of marginalization that long existed in 
the North-Eastern Nigeria, the people were forced to act fast and device means of protecting 
and themselves. This could also explain the much apathy or less cooperation shown to the 
JTF by the local people. This could not be unconnected to the kind of humiliation and 
261 
 
harassment many of them were subjected to during the various raids carried out by the JTF 
in those communities which led to the arrest and killing of many of their husbands, wives, 
fathers, mothers and children especially the male children aside from the deaths they had 
recorded when the Boko Haram started.  As report by Amnesty International (2011) supports 
the above claim. In an operation carried out by the JTF, twenty-five people were shot dead in their 
homes by officers, women and children were molested, homes were burnt, and many men and boys 
were reported missing in the Kaleri Ngomari Custain area in Maiduguri on 9th July 2011.  
7.1.6 The coping strategies: influencing factors and the consequences on coping 
and survival. 
Aside context, there were some conditions that directly or indirectly influenced the choice of 
strategies evolved by the communities. Such intervening conditions involve religion, cultural 
beliefs, resources and sex. Religion was so influential in the kind of coping strategies that 
were developed. Majorly Christians and Muslims lived together in peace and harmony before 
the insurgency started and caused rancour between the people. After members of both faith 
realized that the discord that existed between them was a strategy meant to foment more chaos 
in the communities by the Boko Haram, they both came together, settled their scores and took 
a decision to consistently engage prayers to God as they believe that God alone is the one that 
can deliver them from the clutches of the Boko Haram. And so, the Christians did sessions 
of prayers to God whenever they gather and in their various homes while the Muslims did 
the same in the mosques. Cultural beliefs and resources influenced pragmatic security 
measures taken by the people. The communities long had a security structure that oversee the 
security of the community. These are hunters that hunt for wild animals in the bushes and 
forests. They have weapons such as guns, machete etc. as well as traditional means such as 
charms to protect and arm themselves against attack from wild animals. They decided to 
come together to put these resources into use by confronting and combating the Boko Haram 
insurgents.  
In the light of the context and intervening conditions, the phenomenon of insurgency 
prompted the local population to develop strategies for coping and survival against the 
former. Such strategies include reunion, vigilance and prayerfulness, formation of vigilante 
Groups, and bargaining. These strategies as analysed in this chapter symbolizes the fact that 
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they were effective to a great extent in ensuring the continuing existence and survival of the 
local population within these communities. Reunion formed the bed rock on which other 
strategies were built because it settled all the rancour that existed between warring factions 
especially Christians and Muslims. It was based on this that other measures evolved worked 
most especially the vigilante groups that were formed in the communities. They were so 
effective that government institutions utilized them as escorts in their engagements across the 
North-Eastern Nigeria. Equally their activities attracted the attention of the Chief of Army 
Staff who recognised them as CJTF. As a result, they were officially co-opted in assisting the 
JTF in fighting the Boko Haram. Evidences through reports and the newspapers show that 
they have been resourceful in combating the Boko Haram.    
In the same vein, the strategies utilised by the selected communities surely had consequences 
on the people and on the communities at large. These strategies succeeded in ensuring that 
the purpose for which they were developed was achieved and that is survival against all odds 
in their communities. However, while these strategies were a success, it has not eliminated 
the menace caused by the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria especially in the border 
communities. In all, these strategies have restored and consolidated unity and the spirit of 
oneness which once eroded the communities due to misconception on the part of different 
parties. The strategies have also assisted the communities to cope and survive against the 
dastardly acts of the Boko Haram in their communities.   
7.2 Conclusion 
This chapter depicts that the cooperative engagement of social capital as discussed in chapter 
two came to play in the border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria as it formed a basis for 
which the coping strategies were evolved. These strategies include a reunion, vigilance and 
prayerfulness, formation of vigilante groups, and finally bargaining. These strategies were 
utilized in all the selected communities except for bargaining which is unique with the border 
communities in Yobe state. Every sane individual was involved in the process of 
implementing or carrying out these measures. At one point or the other men, women, male 
youths and female youths were involved. Their various efforts were targeted at making sure 
that no vacuum was left for the insurgents to utilize for striking in their communities. As 
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discussed above, these strategies have all proven to be effective in their own little ways in 
terms of limiting the Boko Haram’s access into the communities and as well carrying out 
attacks at will. The fact that they (the Boko Haram) once lived in many of the communities 
made it easy for the local people to recognize and identify them whenever they come into the 
communities as spies. So, as they became more alert and vigilant, it became almost 
impossible for the insurgent to penetrate these communities anymore. Another veritable 
strategy utilized was the vigilante groups that were formed across the communities. This was 
quite easy for them (the local people) to form because many of the men engage in hunting as 
a profession. They hunt after small and wild animals, so they are not scared to face the Boko 
Haram in a duel. The courage these hunters showed made other men and youths who are 
farmers, fishermen and so on to join in the fight by picking up arms against the insurgents.  
The vigilante groups performed excellently well by laying siege and foiling many attempted 
attacks by the Boko Haram thus attracting public attention and the name CJTF. It was on this 
premise that the Chief of Army Staff recognized these groups and co-opted them into the JTF 
which is mainly composed of the Nigerian military and some para-military outfits to combat 
the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria. It is important to note that of all the strategies 
discussed above, bargaining strategy remains unique in that findings revealed that it was only 
utilized secretly by some border communities in Yobe state.    
However, with these strategies evolved by the communities, the effect of the Boko Haram 
insurgency still abounds within the border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria 
symbolizing the fact that the impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency on the affected 
communities cannot be over-emphasized. As a matter of fact, the effects abound in the 
selected communities and the local population continue to live with these inhumane 
situations. Majority of the local population still live in fear as they are still being attacked by 
the sect.  
These attacks now manifest in varying forms. Many now manifest in the form of suicide 
attacks carried out especially by women in purdah. Basic amenities destroyed by the sect 
largely remain unrepaired while structures such as schools, and hospitals remain 
unreconstructed. Though, it was observed that some bridges in some of the communities are 
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being reconstructed, many of them remains unattended to by the government. Again, while 
it was observed that some of the local population have returned to their daily engagements 
majorly farming and fishing in the selected communities especially in Michika and Mubi 
communities of Adamawa state, hunger still continue to permeate some communities as they 
rely on supplies from NGOs such as the Red Cross, UNICEF, UNHCR, Salvation Wonders, 
Save the Children, Action against Hunger etc.  
In addition, the NGOs has been at the fore front of reuniting missing children with their 
parents in the North-Eastern Nigeria. This has gone a long way in relieving the local 
population off the psychological trauma they are going through most especially, the women. 
The Red Cross Rescue Team reunited some minors displaced by the Boko Haram with their 
mothers after nearly seven years. These minors were identified by the Red Cross in Cameroun 
and flown back to Nigeria where they were reunited with their mothers in Borno state 
(Channels Television, 2017). 
These are communities where people inhabit. As stressed by the local population through the 
interviews, FGDs and informal interactions, many are not ready to leave their communities 
as they are willing to defend and protect their heritage even if it will cost them their life. 
Many averred that they have nowhere to go or run to as their homes remain their homes. This 
shows the resilient spirit displayed by the local population to defend their heritage with 
everything that they have at their disposal. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
8.0 Introduction 
The primary objective of this study was to investigate the coping strategies adopted by 
selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria. This concluding chapter provides 
a summary and conclusion of the study drawing on both the literature reviewed, and the 
empirical data collected from respondents in the border communities selected for the study. 
The chapter also brings to fore the central thesis of the study and from there suggests 
pragmatic recommendations on how to address the plight of border communities as laid bare 
in the study. These recommendations are relevant to all stakeholders including government 
at all levels, the Joint Task Force, the local population and to researchers in the field of border 
studies. Finally, in the last part of this chapter, the study points out possible trajectories for 
future research on strategies for border security.  
8.1 Conclusion 
Chapter one introduced the study by providing a concrete background, setting out the research 
problem, the objectives of the study, and the research questions. The chapter also established 
the scope of the study, its significance, theoretical framework, preliminary literature, and a 
conceptualization of key concepts. Other aspects covered in the chapter included a succinct 
description of the methodology, and an outline of the structure of the thesis.  
The overarching objective of the study is targeted at exploring the coping strategies evolved 
by border communities vis-à-vis cross-border insurgency (Boko Haram) in the North-Eastern 
Nigeria. Understanding the strategies would provide further explanation and assist in 
appreciating why some of the local population continue to reside and survive in these 
communities. This is despite continued attacks from Boko Haram and relocation by some 
inhabitants to different locations both within Nigeria and across the borders into neighbouring 
countries such as Niger, Chad and Cameroun. The research problem generated questions that 
are germane and key to this academic adventure. These questions are posited to identify the 
different patterns in which cross-border insurgency manifest in the selected border 
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communities. It equally sought to examine the impact of cross-border insurgency on the 
selected border communities and the responses of the government to tackle such inimical 
activities and restoring the needed peace and safety in these enclaves. The study further 
explored the strategies that has made it possible for the inhabitants of these communities to 
survive against the dastardly acts of the Boko Haram in the region and finally, how the 
adopted coping strategies has impacted on the continued existence of the border communities.  
The chapter also provided the research methodology and methods including approaches; 
research design; study population; sample size; data collection methods; validity and 
reliability of the instrument; data analysis and ethical issues. This research engaged a 
qualitative research model using a phenomenological case study approach. The choice of 
these methods was informed by the nature of the research and the need to rely on the use of 
words rather than numbers which is often associated with a quantitative study.  
The target population of this study included all the inhabitants of border communities in the 
North-Eastern Nigeria. Typical case purposive sampling method was employed in the 
selection of participants as the study is strictly qualitative using a case study design. This 
implies that the population sample was selected based on the experience and knowledge they 
have which is useful for this study. The researcher chose three states of the North-Eastern 
Region of Nigeria namely Borno, Adamawa and Yobe because, they are the major states that 
experience cross-border insurgency, i.e. the most affected part of the nation that shares 
boundaries with neighbouring states such as Cameroun, Chad and Niger where Boko Haram 
carries out its nefarious activities.  
The sample size of this study consisted of 276 participants who were interviewed. These 
respondents were inhabitants of the selected border communities in Nigeria’s North-Eastern 
Region. A convenient representative sample of 46 participants were selected from each of the 
modestly populated border communities located in each state. In each of the six communities, 
six In-depth Interviews were carried out with key stakeholders who included the traditional 
ruler, the men leader, the women leader, the youth leader, and two Faith Based Organizations 
(FBOs) identified in each community. Four Focus Group Discussions were conducted with 
men, women, youths, and the vigilante group in each community. The selected communities 
included. Gamboru-Ngala and Baga communities in Borno State, Michika and Mubi 
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communities in Adamawa State as well as, Yunusari and Kanamma communities in Yobe 
State. In each state, the service of a local guide and interpreter was employed to facilitate 
access to these communities and their inhabitants who were respondents for the study. In-
depth interviews, focused group discussions and raw data from reports, constituted the 
sources of primary data for this study. The secondary sources were drawn from books 
journals, and verifiable newspaper sources retrieved from the library and the internet. The 
data gathered for the study were content analysed in a systematic and thematic way that 
addressed the research questions which the main crux of the study was. 
The strategy of dealing with subjectivity was employed to assist the researcher in achieving 
the goal of fairness and equity which is representing participants’ viewpoints by avoiding 
thwarted interpretations that represent the biases of the researcher or only a few participants. 
With regards to ethical considerations, the researcher strictly followed the principles of 
autonomy and anonymity which stresses respects that the right of self-determination of 
respondents must be respected. This study therefore adhered to the ethical considerations in 
accordance with the policies set out by the University of KwaZulu-Natal Ethics Committee 
(UKZNEC) (see Appendix III). The researcher equally secured verbal permission from the 
traditional rulers before starting the data collection process in each community. Also, the 
respondents were informed that their participation in the study was voluntary and if 
uncomfortable in the process they were free to withdraw from the study at any stage without 
restrictions or penalty. Above all, the respondents were reassured of their anonymity and that 
data collected would be treated with uttermost confidentiality. 
Equally, conceptualizing and contextualizing some key concepts and as well reviewed some 
literature relevant to the study. These concepts are germane to this study hence, why it is of 
essence to clarify them as used in the study. These concepts include border, insurgency and 
coping strategy. The concept of border is constantly changing. Border has been 
conceptualized by different scholars, international, regional and sub-regional organizations 
who have defied uniformity of parlance. Currently, the predominant definition has been 
geographical, independent of all that the concept of border encompasses; it would appear that 
in the last few years, there has been a broadening of the concept that surpasses the 
traditionally accepted identification of the border. For this study therefore, border is the point 
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of demarcation that separates Nigeria from neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Chad 
and Niger where border communities are situated. 
Insurgency as an ambiguous concept connotes an organized movement that has the aim of 
overthrowing a constituted government through subversive means and armed. This definition 
suggests that insurgent groups employ unlawful means towards achieving an end, which 
could be political, religious, social or even ideological. The goal of insurgency is to confront 
and overthrow an existing government for the control of power, resources or for power 
sharing (Siegel, 2007:328). Therefore, in this study, insurgency entails the Boko Haram Sect 
and its activities which cut across border communities in Nigeria and its neighboring 
countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad. 
Chapter one further conceptualized the term coping and border communities. ‘Coping’ which 
is mainly a term used in psychology and has also found expression in other disciplines such 
as sociology, biology to explain ways through which a society or an organism is defined. It 
is perceived as ongoing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific (external and/or 
internal) demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the individual as 
asserted by Lazarus and Folkman (1984). In essence therefore, the cogent function of coping 
strategies is basically to assist an individual, or communities adapt to whatever situation that 
confronts them and as such for this study, coping strategies refer to the responses of border 
communities to cross-border insurgency which ensures their survival in those communities.  
The term “border communities” most often suggests that the closeness to the border is a major 
point that a given space is known for. With its closeness to different countries, diverse 
cultures and practices rub off on these communities. As such, border communities are highly 
multicultural communities, where traveling and trading frequently take place. They can also 
be flashpoints for international conflicts, most importantly when the two connecting 
countries are involved in territorial disputes. This is because of the strategic positionality of 
the communities and their proximity to the borders. Essentially, border communities are 
communities that straddle the border. Some of these communities may fall on one side of the 
border making it exclusively a part of a country while many are being divided by virtue of 
the borderline that cut across them, making them a part of both sides of the border. In Nigeria, 
these communities exist across the different regions that share boundaries with neighboring 
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states of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in the North-Eastern and South-Southern Nigeria and 
Benin Republic in the South-Western Nigeria. Specifically, for this study, border 
communities are communities situated along the borders found in three states of the North-
Eastern Nigeria namely, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States.   
Chapter two started off with a review of the literature which centered on various themes and 
sub-themes that are related to the study. The themes examined included border threats from 
the global, regional and sub-regional point of view, and the construction of borderlines in 
Africa. Border threats which could otherwise be called transnational crimes include crimes 
that daily occur within a country, but their grievous consequences are significantly felt in 
another country, most often neighbouring countries and countries that serve as transit routes 
for such dastardly acts. Transnational crimes include but are not limited to trafficking both in 
persons, goods and commodities, sex slavery, cross-border banditry, and terrorism offences 
etc. and are carried out by organized criminal networks otherwise called crime organizations 
within a country and across its borders.  
 
The phenomenon of transnational crimes is not alien to West Africa in particular and to Africa 
as a whole. Literature has shown that most parts of the African continent are characterized 
by insecurity, underdevelopment and conflict. Some of the fundamental causes of these 
problems are cross-border criminalities which range from cattle rustling, automobile theft, 
smuggling of arms, ammunitions and commodities, human trafficking, to terrorism among 
others. This is because even in the face of globalization and technological advancement, 
borders in Africa aside from being largely porous, they are often managed by limited 
personnel that are ill-equipped, ill-trained and unmotivated to prevent cross-border crimes 
and to facilitate harmonious interactions between countries as a result of the mismanagement 
of these borders. This situation has therefore nearly perpetually opened the borders to 
transnational crimes. Because they are largely unchecked, these illicit activities carried out 
across the African borders daily thrive to the extent of becoming established on the continent 
and in the West African region respectively. Examples of the major transnational crimes 
prevalent in Africa are Smuggling of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), Human 
Trafficking, Trafficking of Narcotics, and other commodities.  
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Chapter two equally engaged the literature to trace the artificial construction of borders in 
Africa since the nineteenth century with the Europeans’ scramble for African land and 
territories. Countries such as Germany, Britain, France, Spain, Italy and Portugal came into 
the territory of Africa, divided and ruled over it until late 1960s when most African countries 
gained their Independence. Scholars of history have emphasized that border construction 
were either absent or weak in pre-colonial Africa and during slave trade. This explains why 
African border construction became evident from the moment that the Berlin Conference was 
concluded in 1885; a period that political and economic rivalries between the new industrial 
nations in Europe became obvious, as well as the subjugation of African nations and its 
traditional territorial structures. 
Literature further revealed that the colonial policy which established the indistinct boundaries 
in Africa also presented the western powers themselves with serious challenges throughout 
the year 1900. Accordingly, expanding territories and establishing borders led the Europeans 
to sign many treaties, such as the Ottoman-German 1914 treaty; the 1919 Treaty of Versailles 
(established the term of peace after World War I, and obliged Germany to surrender territories 
under its colony to its European counterparts); the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 delimited the 
boundaries of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Egypt and Sudan. Treaties from 1925 to 1945, and 
subsequently late 1950s were mostly signed between Britain, France and African nations, 
namely the 1934 British-Egyptian Agreement that delimited the border of present-day Libya, 
the 1935 Franco-Italian Agreement concerning Aouzou Strip. By late 1950s and early 1960s, 
African nations had started gaining their independence. 
Majority of the treaties identified above were signed fundamentally to ascertain sovereignty 
and control over territories, resources, and consequently to prevent conflict among European 
powers. In America and Europe, borders are nowhere simply the product of geography, but 
established by war, domination, and resistance. In Africa, it is almost the contrary because 
borders were arbitrarily created based on the outcome of Berlin Conference.  
Therefore, the erection of borders in Africa was targeted at enhancing trade, economic and 
political relations among the European countries. Nevertheless, the border construction today 
appears to frustrate its desired purpose. Borders are now more like barriers rather than 
bridges, and as such inhibit trades even among countries with the closest borders. It is vital 
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at this juncture to observe that no country in Africa is absolved of inefficient border 
procedures with complex trade facilitation. There is a cogent need to make policies that would 
make borders bridges and not barriers to reduce issues of insecurity smuggling. 
This chapter went on to review the coping strategies of border communities that have 
experienced cross-border communities from a global and regional lens. In the Americas, 
much as in some countries of Europe and Asia, the protracted border conflicts between the 
United States and Mexico offers a reading for understanding dispute across boundaries from 
a global perspective. Those living in the border area of the conflict developed strategies to 
cope with their situation until formal governmental and/or organizational intervention would 
become available or sufficient. Of all the conflicts that have occurred in the United 
States/Mexico border such as those induced by facilitation, development, the environment 
and water, the “aquifers conflict” which sprang up as a result of claim to water resource 
particularly serves as reference point for the current study because it is one which attracted 
personal, concerted efforts of the residents of the borderline areas in terms of coping 
strategies.  
The principal coping strategy employed by inhabitants of this border community was 
collaboration which the Pacific Council on International Policy (PCIP) has succinctly 
described as meaningful and mutually beneficial “cooperative solution”. Collaboration as 
used in this study differs from its conventional meaning in Peace and Conflict Studies 
parlance where it depicts a win/win strategy employed by parties to a conflict to ensure that 
both sides are satisfied. Open discussion of all issues of concern, exploring all alternative 
solutions, being honest and committed are required in this instance. By collaboration in this 
study, we mean the coming together of community stakeholders from the various border 
communities in both countries, i.e. the United States and Mexico to assuage the devastating 
effects of the conflict on themselves as much as to attempt a lasting solution to same – not as 
parties to the conflict, but as victims of the conflict. One feature of collaboration that stands 
it out as a strategy for coping with or managing conflict is that its bi-national nature makes 
diversity of perspectives possible, thereby leading to amicable decisions.   
Chapter two showed how collaboration in different climes made room for a wide range of 
contribution from affected parties to get actively involved in the process remediating a 
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worsening situation be it a resource-based or value-based conflict as in the US/ Mexico and 
Sudan or a full-fledged war as in Columbia/ Ecuador and Venezuela. In the case of the border 
riverway border conflict between the United States and Mexico, members of each community 
travel mostly in pairs to the other to assist in tracing illegal weapons confiscated by authorities 
of both countries. In Columbia and Venezuela, border communities engaged in civil society 
cross-border peacebuilding initiatives such as meetings and protests organized and executed 
by women of both countries, humanitarian action initiatives organized by religious bodies 
notably the social Action Agency of the Roman Catholic Church and the Jesuit Service for 
Refugees, a bilateral network for environment, Chambers of Commerce meetings, media 
forums, and conferences from the stables of bordering municipal local authorities while in 
Colombia-Ecuador border communities, there was an establishment of a Bilateral Dialogue 
Group (BDG), comprising ten renowned figures from either country, with the objective of 
facilitating efforts on mediation by setting up dialogues with the conflicting parties (various 
governments concerned with the conflict), so as to solidifying diplomatic bilateral ties. And 
in Colombia-Ecuador, border communities established a Bilateral Dialogue Group (BDG), 
comprising ten renowned figures from either country, with the objective of facilitating efforts 
on mediation by setting up dialogues with the conflicting parties (various governments 
concerned with the conflict), so as to solidifying diplomatic bilateral ties.  
In Sudan, the basic coping strategy employed by inhabitants of the conflict-ridden border 
communities of Northern Darfur in Sudan includes (re)grouping towards institutionalized 
support by professional associations, women groups, CBOs networks, rural committees and 
camp committees. Professionals such as blacksmiths, potters and tanners appeared to be 
faring well in spite of the conflict. This is largely due to their skills being in very high demand, 
thereby enabling them to be able to continue with their profession in the heat of the crisis. 
Another factor would be that in Sudan, blacksmiths are locally highly respected; as such they 
were able to garner external support to help with managing the conflict and establishing 
survival strategies for the benefit of the border communities. Additionally, their ability to 
help in coping with the crisis situation was further enhanced by their potential to influence 
policy, thanks to their legal identity.  
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The chapter concluded with a discussion on theories; this study was anchored on three 
theories: (i) the state fragility (ii) Functional Prerequisite (iii) Human needs. While the state 
fragility theory was adopted to explain the inability of the government to perform its major 
function of protecting lives and properties in the border communities, Functional prerequisite 
theory and human needs theory were adopted to illustrate the basic assumptions prompting 
the evolvement of coping strategies by border communities. Above all, a theoretical model 
that speaks to the coping strategies of inhabitants of border communities was developed from 
the findings of the study (see Figure 7.1).  
Chapter three provided an historical overview of the border arrangements in Nigeria and the 
chronological evolution of its state structure. Nigeria as a country located in West Africa 
came into existence in the 1914 and attained independence in 1960. The country’s region was 
one of the favorite territorial areas of the British colonialist in the 19th century, who coined 
Nigeria’s name out of the words “Niger Area”. Before the birth of Nigeria in 1914, through 
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates, Nigeria comprised different 
independent chieftains, states, kingdoms and empires. These, among others, included the 
Borno Empire, the Hausa States, and the Sokoto Caliphate, in the North and in the South the 
Igbo segmentary societies, Benin Kingdom and the Oyo Empire.  
In the early 20th century when Nigeria became fully placed under the British government 
control in 1914, when it was amalgamated by Sir Frederick Lord Lugard and eventually 
became independent in October 1, 1960. A self-governing state, with three regions, namely 
Western, Eastern and Northern region, Nigeria was administered from the center by Nnamdi 
Azikiwe who the Governor and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who was the Prime Minister. 
However, Nigeria became a Federal Republic in 1963. During that period, the Midwest 
Region was carved out of the Western Region, making Nigeria a federation of four Regions.  
The chapter shows the diversity that exist to this day, and how this has informed the current 
number of states and the geopolitical zones that Nigeria has been divided into. Today Nigeria 
is a country with a total number of 36 states, and six geopolitical zones, namely South-West, 
North-Central, North-East, North-West, South-East and South-South. Nigeria is also a 
country with about 374 diverse ethnic groups, the three major of which are the Hausa, Yoruba 
and Igbo. There are also over 400 languages spoken in Nigeria from the over 1000-2500 
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languages spoken in Africa depending on different estimates. Nigeria is again the most 
populous Black Country in the world with a population of over 190 million according to the 
National Population Commission (NPC). These existing diversities prompted the adoption of 
a federal system of government which is still operational in the country to date. 
Conclusively, the chapter touched on the long run effect of state as agitations for creation of 
more states by minority ethnics are yet to cease, and sometimes boundary dispute is a 
common hitch from state creation, especially if deposits of valuable resources are perceived 
to be available or discovered around or between the boundaries of the old and new states.  
Chapter four reviewed the nature of African and the West African borders. It equally 
examined the responses of the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) to border related issues through the border architecture of both 
organisations as a regional and sub regional organisation respectively. This was necessary to 
reveal the various efforts of both organisations in tackling the issue of border porosity within 
the region and why it has been quite easy for rebels, insurgents and terrorists to move across 
the African borders freely.  
Historically, African borders have remained porous partly because of the way they were 
created. African borders are an artificial creation of the colonial masters. These boundaries 
distinguishing different sovereign states of the continent were drawn by colonialist in the late 
19th century without the knowledge of the African people and in the predominant 
peculiarities. As noted in chapter two, this was what the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 was 
targeted at which was to satisfy the cravings of European superpowers’ quest for territories 
and to make an attempt to integrate Africa into the European concept of nation states with 
clearly defined and demarcated borders.  
 As explained by the African Union (AU) through its border program (AUBP), the 
geographical circumstances of the continent have placed the states on different location. 
While most of the countries on the continent are surrounded mostly by seas and oceans, there 
a few island states, which are separated from the rest of the continent by vast tracts of water 
in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Since the majority of the 55 countries are on the continental 
mainland, they share significant lengths of their land, air or maritime boundaries. These 
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circumstances explain why the continent is prone to different threats hence the illicit activities 
of criminals, terrorists, and traffickers to exploit the undefended water ways and porous 
borders to engage in illegal activities that threatens regional and continental peace, stability 
and security.  
The chapter identified the responses of the AU having identified this phenomenon as a 
challenge which needs urgent attention. Some of such efforts was the decision made in the 
1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of state and Government of the OAU, held in 
Cairo (Egypt) in July 1964, as well as Article 4(B) of the Consultative Act of the African 
Union (AU), which adopted the principle of respect of existing borders on achievement of 
national independence, the shared commitment to pursue the work of border delimitation and 
demarcation as factors for peace, security and economic and social progress, as affirmed 
notably in Resolution CM/Res. 1069(XLIV), as well as in the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), 
adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Durban (South Africa), 
in July 2002.  
This chapter equally reflected critically on the challenges that confront the AUBP. These 
revolved round lack of commitment and co-operation by member states towards the success 
of the program. Howbeit, many successes were recorded some of which are the adoption of 
the first declaration on the AUBP by African Ministers in charge of Border Issues on 7th June, 
2007, and the endorsement of the Declaration and its Implementation Modalities at the 11th 
Session of the AU Executive Council on 27th June 2007; Provision of technical and financial 
assistance covering among others, crucial equipment and training for various countries 
implementing the AUBP; Completion of the demarcation of the remaining 413km of the 
Burkina Faso-Mali border, and above all the African Union’s Protocol on free movement of 
persons, goods, services and the African Passport.  
At the sub-regional level, the chapter delved into the West African sub-region; Article 27 of 
the Treaty establishing ECOWAS affirms a long-term objective to establish a community 
citizenship that could be acquired automatically by all Member States’ nationals, in other 
words, a borderless West Africa. This formed the basis for the Commission enacting a treaty 
called The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Capital and the Rights of 
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Residence and Establishment in 1979. This Protocol thus afford community citizens the right 
to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States. The right of entry, residence 
and establishment were structured to be accomplished in three phases, namely: Phase I – 
Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa; Phase II – Right of Residence and Phase III – Right of 
Establishment.  
The Implementation of this laudable effort of ECOWAS started smoothly as the first phase 
was introduced and implemented by member states. The second phase (Right of Residence) 
which was delayed eventually came into force in July1986, when all member states ratified 
it, while the last phase which is the Right of Establishment has not yet been implemented. 
Different efforts were targeted at setting the third phase in motion. In March 2000, the heads 
of state and government met in Abuja to fashion out renewed efforts to create a borderless 
ECOWAS. Also, the ECOWAS 30th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State 
and Government held in Abuja in June 2006, mandated the Executive Secretariat to take the 
initiative in defining an ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration. However, despite these 
efforts, and just like the AU is experiencing, the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol 
on free movement has suffered a great set back due to several issues which ranges from the 
egotism of member states that see itself as a sovereign state, expulsion of aliens from some 
member states which negates the whole raison d’être of establishing ECOWAS (Ghana, 
Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire fall into this category), the inter-state borders remain mini “iron 
curtains” and “narrow gates” and barricades erected on the trans-boundary roads are done on 
the basis of security which obstruct free traffic or persons, goods and services.  
The chapter therefore concluded by identifying what needs to be done, if the vision of 
borderless region and sub-region of Africa and West Africa respectively is to be realizable. 
For instance, member states have to discard the notion of a rigid state Sovereignty and see 
the need to join forces towards managing the borders. Also, they should be more committed 
and determined not only in the speeches they make but in the action they take toward 
implementing the protocols. This can be measured in the zeal and commitment thrown into 
the implementation process. Until this is done, African borders will remain porous and 
instead of gradually turning them into bridges, they will perpetually remain barriers at the 
detriment of member states.  
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Chapter five critically reviewed the security situation in North-Eastern Nigeria in relation to 
cross-border insurgency which is the Boko Haram. Engaging the literature backed up by 
findings from the study, the chapter addressed research questions one and two by attempting a 
chronological descriptive analysis of insurgent activities in the region, and the challenges 
impeding a successful counter-activities against insurgency.  
This chapter began by attempting to trace the evolution of Boko Haram through a review of the 
situation that existed during that period. This all started when Zamfara Governor Ahmed 
Yerima, embarked on a restoration campaign of the Sharia Law in 1999. This initiative in no 
time became popular across states in the North as Muslims massively supported the move. The 
common people gave their support because they saw Sharia as a tool for liberation from the 
hand of the corrupt politicians by creating a safe, just, safe, and compassionate society devoid 
of corrupt practices. The political elite and the Saudana of Sokoto equally gave their support. 
While former Governor Yerima went ahead to implement this law, some other northern 
governors followed suit all in a bid to reinforcing the movement of restoration championed by 
Usman dan Fodio’s Sokoto Caliphate two centuries back. At some point, the federal 
government denounced the Sharia Law as it does not conform with federal laws governing 
Nigeria, but this was met a massive resistance by the northerners. As states went ahead to 
implement in full the Sharia Law, it met a serious resistance from Christians who believed the 
law goes against their fundamental human right. This led to serious upheavals in Kano and 
Kaduna in 2000 and as a result, more than 2,000 lives were lost.  
In 2002, Boko Haram was established by Mohammad Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State. The 
resistance of the government which turned the group into a violent group made them start to 
carry out attacks on government installations and facilities. Its first attack was carried out on 
the 24 December 2003 when its members attacked police stations and government buildings 
in the towns of Kanamma and Geiam in Yobe State. They occupied those structures for some 
days until the military and the Police dislodged them killing 18 members of the sect. This 
made them disperse into other parts of the north and later in 2004 calved out a base called 
‘Afghanistan’ in Kanamma village of Yobe State, a border town close to the Republic of 
Niger. It was at this point the Boko Haram grew more ferocious in their attacks as they began 
to attack with sophisticated weapons. This was made possible as they began to get support 
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from international terrorist networks like Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, AQIM, etc. This support 
was gotten in the form of funds and arms donation and training of its members. This support 
gotten, contributed enormously to the continuous existence of this sect and its nefarious 
activities carried out on communities found in the North-Eastern Nigeria to date.  
The impact of these attack on the region cannot be over emphasized. Such impacts include 
among others, high toll of mortality, displacement and humanitarian crisis, destruction of 
many lives and properties, excessive child abuse, excessive sexual and gender-based 
violence, destabilization of the health care and education system. The activities of the sect 
have brought upon the people all the afore-mentioned causing the local population a lot of 
pains and hardship on a daily basis. 
Chapter six addressed research question three by examining the role which the state and non-
state actors have played in quelling the Boko Haram menace. The Nigerian government took 
a step to quell the activities of the sect. This they attempted military wise and policy wise. 
Policy wise, in 2011 the government adopted a counter-terrorism strategy established in 2007 
called the National Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT). It is composed of several security 
agencies and government departments charged with the responsibility of implementing 
Nigeria’s national security agenda. Its activities were overseen by the Office of the National 
Security Adviser (ONSA), while the National Security Council, headed by the President, 
occasionally met to evaluate national security matters. However, on the 30th April 2014, a 
comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), was ratified for execution 
by President Goodluck Jonathan. This strategy encapsulates the counter-terrorism policy 
framework of the federal government of Nigeria. The second edition was approved under 
President Buhari’s government on August 23, 2016. This initiative put into consideration the 
nature of the terrorist threat that confronts Nigeria, the response procedures and mechanism, 
and the roles stakeholders have to play, and finally the institutions that are needed in the 
counter-terrorism mission.  
Military wise, in June 2011 the Federal Government under former President Jonathan set up 
a special Joint Task Force (JTF) in Maiduguri comprising of the military (army, air force and 
navy), the Department of State Security (DSS) and the Nigerian Police Force. The 
government equally took some steps to enable the security forces function optimally. Check 
279 
 
points were erected at various entry points and strategic locations around the federal capital 
territory of Abuja after it was attacked twice. Also, while a state of emergency was declared 
in specific location of Niger, Borno, Yobe, and Plateau states where the activities of the sect 
is being felt a curfew was enforced in Adamawa state. Asides response from the Nigerian 
government, many countries supported in this counter-terrorism move by donating weapons 
and offering trainings for both the JTF and civilians on the best modern practices of 
countering terrorism. However, with this support system the Nigerian government has, Boko 
Haram still carry out their attacks killing both the security personnel and civilians. 
Moreover, the chapter extensively analysed the humanitarian responses to the humanitarian 
crisis created by the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Many actors were involved 
such as the Nigerian government through its agencies NEMA and SEMA established for 
disaster management across the country, international state actors such different countries 
across the globe, local and international government and non-governmental organizations, 
cooperate establishments and concerned individuals. Many of these actors donated funds and 
relief materials such as food items and other relief materials while others were on ground to 
assist the affected people majorly in the IDP camps and much later in the affected 
communities. The responses of the local population and the observations made indicated that 
much needs to be done in terms of responding to the needs of the people and getting them 
back to living a normal life. There is a need for extensive rebuilding and reconstruction in the 
affected communities. This falls majorly on the desk of the Nigerian government who do not 
need to be pushed to action at this time as they were pushed by various actors in 2015 to stand 
up for its dying people in the North-Eastern Nigeria.    
Chapter seven in response to research questions four and five, critically analyzed and 
discussed the findings of the study in relation to the literature reviewed and the theoretical 
framework that underpinned the study. Findings revealed that most of the attacks carried out 
by the sect occur around the borders thus making the border communities susceptible to 
constant attacks. While all the respondents alluded to the fact that their communities have 
suffered a lot of attacks from the sect, they equally expressed their worries and fears of 
imminent attacks on their communities. Boko Haram attacks have manifested in the selected 
border communities in the form of massive deployment of members of the sect who shoot 
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sporadically on motorcycles and Hilux vehicles. This always led to chaos and pandemonium 
in the communities making the local population run helter-skelter within the communities in 
a bid to be safe.  
Again, findings showed that the Boko Haram utilized different tactics in carrying out attacks 
in the selected border communities. Members of the sect carry out attacks both in the day and 
in the night. While some of its members lay ambush in surrounding bushes, some proceed 
into the communities shooting sporadically in order to raise tension in the communities. Once 
the people hear the sound of the guns they began to run and the process they are being shot 
dead by those who laid siege in the bushes. At times, they break into the houses, bring the 
people out, shoot them, loot their houses and set the houses on fire. It is shocking to know 
that in some selected communities, the local population discovered that some members of the 
sect came into their communities as spies without the villagers knowing it. Some came in as 
visitors to live with them. They were accepted into the communities and well taken care of 
by the people until when they fully mastered the nooks and crannies of the communities. 
Once this is done, they signal their members and an attack is carried out on such communities 
carting away their valuables and leaving many people dead and properties destroyed.  
Prodding into the reactions and responses of the government vis-à-vis the Boko Haram 
attacks, it was discovered that, though literature have advanced that this phenomenon 
attracted the attention of the government with the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) 
comprising the military, the DSS and the Nigeria Police to quell the crisis and fight the Boko 
Haram sect to a stand-still within the region, findings showed that the border communities 
were neglected and left to their fate in the face of the looming perils that confronted them. 
This was the assertion of majority of the respondents and a section of the local population 
interacted with in the selected border communities. Many of the community leaders pointed 
out that the communities were neglected by the government for a very long time including 
the officers of the local government who were supposed to be more concerned in the plight 
and pains of the local population. Respondents in some of the selected communities made it 
clear that the presence of the security forces is of no benefit to them. If they were to be, Boko 
Haram would not be successful in the attacks they carry out which has left the communities 
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to almost dead zones. Basic infrastructures and structures in the communities have been 
destroyed thus, making life unbearable for the local people.  
The perception of majority of the respondents showed that the presence of the military has 
being a curse to them as they have not really assisted them in anyway. They believe that the 
JTF are not capable of confronting and combating members of the Boko Haram sect 
especially when they come to attack. They averred further that on different instances have 
they seen members of the JTF take to their heels when the Boko Haram come into the 
communities. However, few of the respondents appreciated the presence of the JTF as it has 
allayed their fears to some extent.  
Finally, based on the nature of man that stirs up his willingness to survive under whatever 
situation he finds himself and given the circumstances the selected border communities found 
themselves in it was discovered across the selected communities for this study, that the local 
population came up with five major pragmatic strategies to ensure their safety and survival 
within these communities. These strategies include a reunion, the formation of local vigilante 
groups, prayers to God, and bargain. The first step taken by the selected communities was to 
mend the fence created by the Boko Haram attacks between the Christians and the Muslims. 
At the initial stage of attacks, Christians were targeted and killed while churches were burnt 
down. This continued until the Christians had a perception that the attacks were against the 
Christians in the communities. This brewed a kind of cold war between members of both faith 
as friends and family members suddenly turned enemies to the point of attacking one another 
until the dimension of the attacks changed and Mosques and Muslims were being attacked as 
well. Suicide bombers simply entered the Mosques during morning and evening worship and 
suddenly detonates the bomb on him or herself or started to shoot sporadically killing the 
worshippers and eventually killing himself. The local population discovered that without the 
discord been resolved, peace cannot be restored back into the communities and when there is 
no peace the communities cannot forge ahead with regard to evolving workable strategies that 
will ensure their survival against the inhumane activities of the Boko Haram. Once this was 
resolved, they discovered that some members of the Boko Haram sect lived with them as spies 
thus the need to be vigilant and always alert. Members of the communities were encouraged 
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to be police of themselves by identifying strangers and strange movement to appropriate 
quarter once sighted.  
Building up on this, vigilante groups were created to police the communities and guard against 
the further incursion of the sect. The men and the youths in the communities constitutes these 
groups. In fact, in some communities, male children were found to be a part of these group. 
Furthermore, since these communities were religious communities constituting Christians and 
Muslims, whatever the circumstance might be they believed God is always there to save them 
as His children if they call on Him. This they continued to do during the time of worship. It 
was discovered that because of fear, the women stayed in-doors and rendering prayers to God 
for the safety of themselves, their husbands and children and the communities as a whole.   
Conclusively, it was discovered that some hinter communities had no choice than to bargain 
with the Boko haram for their safety to be assured. They entered this sort of contract because 
they saw it as the only way they can survive since they were abandoned by the government 
who is supposed to secure them as citizens. Boko Haram make monthly demands especially 
food items which they thrive to provide at the end of each month else they risked been fiercely 
attacked by the sect. Members of the JTF revealed that upon their entry into these 
communities, they met serious resistance by the people. This manifested in their relationship 
with them. They do not give them information as to the whereabouts of the Boko Haram for 
fear of being killed. This has made the military come under severe attacks in these 
communities which has led to the death of many soldiers. The villagers will rather keep mute 
that divulge information for fear of been killed afterwards. As regards feeding, some of them 
had access to their farms which they tilled for subsistence while many relied mostly on 
humanitarian organisations who brought food, clothing and shelter to them in the midst of 
fierce attacks. 
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8.2 Recommendation 
The following recommendations are made: 
To the Government 
1. While the government has been able to draw up a counter-terrorism strategy policy to 
combat the scourge of the Boko Haram insurgency and as well deployed the Joint 
Task Force to the North-Eastern Nigeria, there is the need to be more pragmatic in its 
approach toward combating this menace because obviously, the Boko Haram keeps 
waxing strong as they still carry out sporadic attacks on border communities. 
2. It is high time the government started to address the salient underlining issues that 
culminated into the Boko Haram menace. Issues such as poverty, unemployment, 
food shortage, marginalization and inequality and access to basic infrastructure 
should be tackled. It was observed that in some border communities, some rebuilding 
projects are on-going like the rebuilding of bridges etc. These projects that are long 
overdue continues to drag. The schools and health facilities largely remained 
untouched.  
3. It is also of necessity for the government to carryout institutional capacity and 
structural reforms, especially with institutions that are directly linked to the fight 
against the Boko Haram. Government’s main focus is to combat and denounce 
corruption in all its forms, so that the fight against this scourge can be objective and 
worthwhile. 
4. The JTF Unit should be handled seriously by the government just like the duty they 
are called up to do largely remains a serious one. Although there is no contention in 
the zeal and readiness of the soldiers to take the fight to the Boko Haram enclave and 
end the insurgency, however the morale to sustain their efforts is not there. The 
weapons supplied does not match with the enemy’s. Officers of the JTF are not been 
well taken care of on the field and their salaries which is meagre is being delayed. 
These should be addressed else the morale of the soldiers will keep dwindling. 
5. The building of public trust and legitimacy is very crucial especially those of people 
living in the North-Eastern Nigeria. This could be achieved by upholding 
transparency and accountability in the management of oil wealth. Periodic release of 
accurate data that highlight fuel consumption and subsidy payment as well as the 
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release of any other data necessary information should be prioritized by the 
government.  
To the Joint Task Force 
1. They should adhere strictly to the rules of engagement guiding their operations in the 
region irrespective of whatever situation that confronts them. 
2. They should desist from molesting and maltreating the local population in the region 
especially the youths. This is sheer transfer of aggression and should be stopped. If 
not stopped it will continue to decrease their acceptance in the region as they will as 
the second foe rather than being the savior.  
To the local population. 
1. They should continue to build on the peace that they have restored and built as there 
lies their strength as communities. It forms the solid foundation upon which their 
activities in the communities is built. 
2. Again, as communities, they should continue to engage in community policing 
irrespective of the presence of the JTF. They should not desist from being vigilant 
and carrying out surveillance. 
8.3 Contribution to knowledge 
The contribution of this study is unique. HNO (2014) in the process of reviewing the 
humanitarian needs of affected areas, gave a demographic profile of the North-Eastern 
Nigeria for 2014. As at the end of 2014, 24.5 million people were living in the six states of 
the North-Eastern Nigeria, 15.5 million people were living in the affected areas, out of which 
0.98 million people were displaced. This simply depicts that 14.52 million people remained 
in the affected areas. This work went further to provide an extensive survey on the challenges 
these displaced persons face in the various Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) and refugee 
camps and how they were able to cope in the face of those confronting challenges. Looking 
critically at the population figures above, it is evident that out of the 15.5 million people 
living in the affected areas, only 0.9 million of the population were displaced while, 14.52 
million remains in those communities in the face of the daily looming security threats. HNO 
(2015) equally executed an extensive need assessment of the affected population with regard 
to the IDPs and refugees in their host communities and camps with no attention accorded the 
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border communities. This conforms to the assertion of Wastl-Walter, et’al (2003). He averred 
that border areas are peripheral regions par excellence and in several respects. They also see 
them as areas that are at the margins of the nation-states. Because of their distance from the 
core areas, border areas are geographically isolated as well as being marginalized and as such 
people living there are often also marginalized politically, socially and economically. 
Extant literature have therefore revealed the laxities of the studies as they have simply 
focused on the humanitarian crisis cross-border insurgency has created and the humanitarian 
attention and intervention this situation has received from agencies of government and 
international humanitarian organizations with regards to IDPs and refugees while little or no 
attention has been given to border communities who are the first victims of cross-border 
insurgency and in the same vein how they have been able to manage, cope and survive 
through the security threats and challenges that daily confront them in their communities.  
This study has therefore made three key contributions. First, by investigating and examining 
the coping strategies that have been evolved by the border communities thus, making it 
possible for them to continue to live in their communities despite the looming danger that 
surrounds them, the study has filled a gap in literature on the coping strategies of border 
communities where clearly, there has been a dearth of academic research on how inhabitants 
of border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria have being able to cope against the Boko 
Haram insurgency.    
Second, this study has also raised an issue that is subject to a debate. This centers on how 
these strategies evolved has impacted on the continued existence of these communities. To 
this end, the study though advocated for more of government response in the region, went 
beyond merely advocating for that but by strongly appealing for a consolidation of some of 
the strategies evolved which I feel will go a long way in protecting the people and sustaining 
the communities against future internal crisis and violence on the long run. The peace that 
has been negotiated successfully should be jealously guarded so that issues that degenerate 
into ethno-religious crisis does not occur again at any point in time.  
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Lastly, aside the theories adopted, the study has developed a theoretical model that 
encapsulate the coping strategies of the selected border communities against cross-border 
insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria. 
8.4 Suggestions for further study 
The thesis offered an in-depth investigation and examination of the coping strategies evolved 
by some selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Among the many border 
communities situated in that region, the study was limited to two border communities in each 
of the three states that share boundaries with neighbouring countries including Niger, Chad 
and Cameroon. These states are Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Since there are many border 
communities affected by this phenomenon, future studies may want to concentrate on other 
border communities that are not considered in this study in order to afford a holistic appraisal 
on the coping strategies adopted by border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria.  
There is also the need for future studies to engage more on the theme insecurity as new 
ferocious threats continue to emerge within the Nigerian state. A case in point is the Fulani 
herdsmen who have started to unleash terror on rural communities not only in the northern 
region of Nigeria but equally in the southern region where it is least expected that such attacks 
can be carried out. The various attacks carried out by the Fulani herdsmen have led to the 
death of many, destruction of properties and on the extreme, extermination of a whole 
community. Equally, there are media reports to show that in the southern region, the Fulani 
herdsmen have engaged in kidnapping for the purpose of extorting money from their victims 
who are usually successful people in the society. This indicates that they continue to spread 
their tentacles despite the threat they pose to the Nigerian state. Delving into this phenomenon 
is important so as to unravel the issues surrounding the various attacks carried out by the 
Fulani herdsmen and why and how they continue to wax strong within the Nigerian state 
more so that they constitute a more serious threat than the Boko Haram witnessed so far in 
Nigeria.   
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I: CODING 
CODING FOR ADAMAWA STATE 
MICHIKA COMMUNITY 
AM-1: Community leader in Michika 
AM-2: Men leader in Michika 
AM-3: Women leader in Michika 
AM-4: CAN representative in Michika 
AM-5: Director of Jama’atul Nasril Islam of Michika 
AM-6: Mr Ibrahim Musa a lecturer with College of Education Hong, Adamawa and an        
indigene of Michika. (telephone interview). 
AM-7: Leader of the vigilante Group 
FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
FGD-AMM: FGD with men in Michika 
FGD-AMW: FGD with women in Michika 
FGD-AMY: FGD with youths in Michika 
FGD-AMV: FGD with vigilante group in Michika 
FGD-AM 
MUBI COMMUNITY 
AMB-1: Mubi District Scribe 
AMB-2: Men leader in Mubi 
AMB-3: Women leader in Mubi 
AMB-4: Chairman Muslim Council in Mubi    
AMB-5: Assistant Secretary of the CAN in Mubi 
AMB-6: Youth leader in Mubi 
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FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
FGD-AMBM: FGD with men in Mubi 
FGD-AMBW: FGD with women in Mubi 
FGD-AMBY: FGD with youths in Mubi 
FGD-AMBV: FDG with vigilantes in Mubi 
 
CODING FOR BORNO STATE 
GAMBORU-NGALA COMMUNITY 
BG-1: Village Head in Gamboru-Ngala 
BG-2: Men leader in Gamboru-Ngala 
BG-3: Women leader in Gamboru-Ngala 
BG-4: Youth leader in Gamboru-Ngala 
BG-5: A member of CAN in Gamboru-Ngala 
BG-6: A representative of the Muslim Council in Gamboru-Ngala 
FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
FGD-BGM: FGD with men in Gamboru-Ngala 
FGD-BGW: FGD with women in Gamboru-Ngala 
FGD-BGY: FGD with youths in Gamboru-Ngala 
FGD-BGC with CJTF in Gamboru-Ngala 
BAGA COMMUNITY 
BB-1: A representative of the District of Baga community 
BB-2: Men leader in Baga community 
BB-3: Women leader in Baga community 
BB-4: A member of CAN in Baga community  
BB-5: Youth leader in Baga community 
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BB-6: A representative of the Muslim Council in Baga Community 
FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION 
FGD-BBM: FGD with men in Baga community 
FGD-BBW: FGD with women in Baga community 
FGD-BBY: FGD with youths in Baga community 
FGD-BBC: FGD with CJTF in Baga community 
 
CODING FOR YOBE STATE 
YUNUSARI COMMUNITY 
YY-1: Community leader in Yunusari community 
YY-2: A representative of CAN 
YY-3: A representative of the Muslim Council 
YY-4: Men leader in Yunusari community 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
FGD-YYM: FGD with men in Yunusari community 
FGD-YYW: FGD with women in Yunusari community 
FGD-YYY: FGD with youths in Yunusari community 
FGD-YYV: FGD with vigilantes in Yunusari community 
YY-1, FGD-YYM, FGD-YYW, FGD-YYY, FGD-YYV 
KANAMMA COMMUNITY 
YK-1: A representative of the community leader in Kanamma community 
YK-2: Men leader in Kanamma community 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
FGD-YKM: FGD with the men in Kanamma community 
FGD-YKY: FGD with the youths in Kanamma community 
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FGD-YKW: FGD with the women in Kanamma community 
FGD-YKV: FGD with the vigilantes in Kanamma community 
YK-1, YK-2, FGD-YKM, FGD-YKY, FGD-YKW, FGD-YKV 
All the interviews were conducted in November 2017 except for AM-6 which was 
conducted in January 2018 via the phone. 
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APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
My name is OKUNADE, Samuel Kehinde, a PhD student with Student Number: 216076644 
in the Department of Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies in the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. The title of my study is “Cross-border 
insurgency and the coping strategies of border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria”.  
Your sincere responses will go a long way in assisting to respond to the research questions 
of this study adequately. This information shall be treated confidentially and used only for 
academic research. Therefore, you should be comfortable and honest in responding to the 
questions as you possibly can.  
Thank you for your anticipated cooperation. 
1. Has your community been attacked by the Boko Haram?  
2. In your own opinion, what are the different tactics Boko Haram employ in attacking 
your community? 
3. What are the various ways in which Boko Haram’s attack manifest in the community? 
4. In your own opinion, what are the effects of these attacks on the community? 
5. Does the community get an early warning prior to Boko Haram attacks? 
6. If yes, how do they get these warnings and what are their reactions to such?  
7. How has the community reacted to these attacks, during and after the attacks? 
8. How has the community been able to exist in spite of the constant attacks on the 
community? 
9. What are the various mechanisms devised by the community to combat insurgency in 
the community? 
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10. Has the community gotten external support from international humanitarian 
organizations, Faith Based Organizations etc to ensure their safety and survival? 
11. If yes, mention them and the kind of support rendered the community? 
12. How effective are their interventions in terms of survival and safety of the 
community? 
13. Is there any intervention from the government be it the federal, state and local 
government? 
14. If yes, at what point did they intervene and how has the government intervened to 
ameliorate the situation faced by the community? 
15. What are the impacts of government intervention in relation to safety and survival? 
16. How effective has the mechanisms devised by the community being towards their 
survival and existence in the community? 
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APPENDIX III: ETHICAL CLERANCE 
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APPENDIX IV: CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CONSENT FORM 
Dear Participant, 
 
My name is Okunade Samuel Kehinde (Student N0: 216076644). I am a PhD candidate 
studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. The title of my 
research is: Cross-border insurgency and the coping strategies of border 
communities in North-Eastern Nigeria. 
 
The aim of the study is to investigate and explore the coping strategies of border 
communities vis a vis cross border insurgency in the North-Eastern region. I am interested 
in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject 
matter. 
 
Please note that: 
 
• The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only. 
• Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to 
participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for 
taking such an action. 
• Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name 
nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study. 
• The interview will take about one hour 
• The transcript and any other items associated with the interview will be held in a 
password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a 
period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed of by 
shredding and burning. 
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• If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a 
separate sheet will be provided for signatures). I would be using a tape recorder 
for the interview. 
 
I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg. 
Email:2 1 6 0 7 6 6 4 4 @ s t u . u k z n . a c . z a /      
s a m u e l _ o k u n a d e @ y a h o o . c o m   
Cell: +27833455442 
 
 
 
My supervisor is Dr Olusola Ogunnubi who is located in the School of Social Sciences, 
Pietermaritzburg Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
Contact details:  
Email: ogunnubi@ukzn.ac.za  
Phone number: +27833455442 
 
The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as 
follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email:  
ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Phone number +27312603587. 
 
Thank you for your contribution to this research. 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I………………………………………………………………………… (full names of 
participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of 
the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
 
 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so 
desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate. 
 
I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable) 
 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT                                        DATE
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